in writing; or thirdly, that the agent had no authority; or Evasive fourthly, that the principal was not competent to give authority, denials. being of unsound mind-the very thing that the rules were intended to prevent. As the unsoundness of mind was the substantial defence set up, I think we must read the statement of defence altogether as referring to that ground of defence, and must conclude that it does not raise the general issue that there was no agreement by an agent duly authorized.” Gamble. In Harris v. Gamble (7 Ch. D. 877; 47 L. J. Ch. 344; Harris v. 38 L. T. N. S. 253), to a statement of claim for specific performance the defendant delivered a statement of defence in the following words: "The defendant puts the plaintiffs to proof of the several allegations contained in their statement of claim." Fry, J., held that this was not a proper mode of denying the averments in the claim, and that, acting upon rules 17 and 20 of Order XIX., the allegations of fact contained in the statement of claim must be taken to be admitted, and he gave judgment accordingly. To the same effect is the decision in Rutter v. Tregent (12 Ch. D. 758; 48 L. J. Ch. 791; 41 L. T. 16; 27 W. R. 902), where in a foreclosure action the defendant merely pleaded that he did not admit the correctness of the allegations in the claim, and required proof of them. So in Dunne v. Clancy (6 L. R. Ir. 305), to a statement of claim setting out a contract, and alleging breaches of it, a general denial that the party pleading "does not admit," or "he denies the statements" in the statement of claim was held insufficient. Tildesley v. Harper (7 Ch. D. 403; 47 L. J. Ch. 263; Tildesley v. Harper. 26 W. R. 263; 38 L. T. N. S. 60), also decided by Fry, J., is a strong case, from the circumstance that a statement of claim which charged fraud was taken to be admitted on the ground of the imperfection of the form of the denial. It was an action to set aside a lease of certain trust property, improperly given, as was alleged, by the trustee Matthew Tildesley to the defendant. The claim averred inter alia: "The defendant, knowing as he did that the plaintiff M. T. was in straitened circumstances at the time, offered him the said M. T. a bonus, or in fact a bribe of £500 if he would grant him the said lease for twenty-one years at the rent of £200, and arranged to give him such sum of £500 if he Evasive denials. would grant such lease; and the plaintiff, M. T., being at the time very hard pressed for money, accepted such offer, and assented to such arrangement, and in fact granted the defendant the said lease in consideration of such bribe and in pursuance of such arrangement. And the defendant has, in pursuance of such arrangement, and in fact, paid to the plaintiff M. T. £200, part of the said £500." The seventh paragraph of the defendant's statement of defence was as follows: "The defendant denies that he knew that the plaintiff M. T. was in straitened circumstances at the time. The said defendant denies that he offered the said plaintiff personally a bonus, and in fact a bribe of £500 if he would grant him the said lease for twenty-one years at the rent of £200, and Tildesley arranged to give him such sum of £500 if he would grant such v. Harper. lease, and that the plaintiff, being at the time very hard pressed for money, or in fact accepted such offer, and assented to such arrangement, or in fact granted the said defendant the said lease in consideration of such bribe, or in pursuance of such arrangement. The said defendant denies that he has in pursuance of such arrangement, and in fact paid to the said plaintiff M. T. the sum of £200, part of the said sum of £500.” At the trial of the action plaintiff's counsel contended that defendant's denial of the fact of the bribe was evasive, and that therefore the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as upon an admission. Fry, J., in giving judgment, said: "It must be observed that the denial here is a denial of a whole string of circumstances, and that it would be justified by proof that any one of these circumstances was not true. Now, what is the form of pleading required by the new rules? This is sufficiently pointed out by Order XIX. r. 22: When a party in any pleading denies an allegation of fact in the previous pleading of the opposite party, he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance.' The question is, What is here the point of substance? Undoubtedly it is that a bribe was given by Anderson to Tildesley, and that point of substance is nowhere met. The rule proceeds: Thus, if it be alleged that he received a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much he received.' Now, that illustration applies Evasive to this case. This denial would be true if any part of the denials. £500 had been offered or accepted. Again, the rule proceeds: And so when a matter of fact is alleged with divers circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to deny it as alleged along with all those circumstances, but a fair and substantial answer must be given.' This, as I have already pointed out, is a Tildesley denial of a fact along with the circumstances, and no fair and V. Harper. substantial answer is given to the allegation that there was a bribe. In my opinion it is of the highest importance that this rule of pleading should be observed strictly, and being convinced that it is one of the highest benefit to suitors in the Court, I, for my part, intend to give the fullest effect to it." The Court of Appeal (10 Ch. D. 393; 48 L. J. Ch. 495; 39 L. T. 552; 27 W. R. 249) overruled Fry, J., to the extent only that it gave the defendant leave to amend. In Collette v. Goode (2 Ch. D. 842; 47 L. J. Ch. 370; 38 L. T., N. S. 504) the plaintiff claimed damages for an alleged infringement by the defendant of his copyright in a song. The claim alleged that the plaintiff was the author and composer of a song entitled "What an Afternoon," which was a book within the meaning of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45; that he was the sole proprietor of the copyright therein; and that the song had been duly registered at Stationers' Hall, in accordance with the provisions of that Act. The defendant, in his defence, pleaded: "The defendant denies that the said. song has been duly registered at Stationers' Hall. The time of the first publication thereof is not truly stated in the registry." At the trial it appeared that at the time of registering the song the publisher's name was not correctly stated, and the defendant's counsel sought to rely on this as sustaining the defence that the song was not duly registered. It was not disputed that this was a fatal objection to the plaintiff's right to recover, if upon the pleadings he could rely upon it; but it was urged that the defendant could only rely on the defence specially pleaded, viz., that the time of the first publication was not truly stated. Mr. Justice Fry took this view, remarking, "The first question is, whether the defence that the name of the publisher Collette v. Goode. Evasive denials. Collette v. is not truly stated, is open to the defendant on the pleadings as they stand? . . There is a paragraph which says, "The defendant denies that the said song has been duly registered at Stationers' Hall. The time of the first publication thereof is not truly entered in the registry.' The paragraph contains, first, a general proposition denying that there has been a due registration; and, second, a particular allegation that the date of first publication has been untruly stated. Section 13 of the Copyright Act requires some six or eight matters, among them the date of the first publication and the name of the publisher. to be truly stated in the register, in order to make due registration; and if any one of them is false, it will invalidate the registration. The defendant alleges that one of these matters is falsely stated, and if that be so, he is justified in his denial of due registration. He might have been equally well justified by alleging a false statement of any other of the six matters which are required to be stated; but he has, in fact, alleged a false statement of only one of them. I hold that the point pleaded is the untrue statement of the date of first publication, and from that the defendant has stated a conclusion of law that the registration was undue. This will not let in evidence of any other false statement which would render the registration invalid. I am of opinion that this case is governed by Byrd v. Nunn, and that on the pleading the defendant cannot go into the question whether the name of the publisher is truly stated or not." So in Hayes v. Corcoran, 8 L. R. Ir. 75, when to an action in ejectment by an assignee of the reversion against the assignor, the defence denied that the defendants assigned or made over the premises to the plaintiff, it was held that the only issue was the execution of the assignment, and that it was not open to the defendants to contend that the assignment, though in fact executed, was illegal and void, as contrary to a covenant against alienation in the lease. See also Hildige v. O'Farrall, 8 L. R. Ir. 158; Barnes v. Barnes, ibid. 165; Rowley v. Laffan, 10 L. R. Ir. 9, for other instances of evasive denials. The cases we have quoted above show that a rigid interpretation was given to rules 20 and 21 of the Rules of 1875, directed against evasive denials, and there is no reason to believe the corresponding rules of the Rules of 1883 will receive a more liberal construction. 66 the suffi ciency in law of a contract. Where a defendant wishes to deny, as a fact, that he has Denial of committed a particular act, or entered into a particular contract, he must have regard to the provisions of rules 17 and 19, already set out. Where, however, instead of wishing merely to rely upon a denial of the facts, he intends setting up the defence that the particular contract on which he is sued was not made with all the formalities required by law, he must do more than merely deny that it was made. By rule 20 of Order XIX. the bare denial of a contract is only a denial that it was made in fact, and is not a denial of the legality or sufficiency in law of such contract, promise, or agreement, whether with reference to the Statute of Frauds or otherwise." The defendant in this case must specially allege in his defence the particular objection he means to take to the sufficiency, in law, of the alleged contract. "The defendant or plaintiff (as the case may be) must raise by his pleading all matters which show the action or counter-claim not to be maintainable, or that the transaction is either void or voidable in point of law, and all such grounds of defence or reply, as the case may be, as if not raised would be likely to take the opposite party by surprise, or would raise issues of fact not arising out of the preceding pleadings, as for instance, fraud, Statute of Limitations, release, payment, performance, facts showing illegality either by statute or common law, or Statute of Frauds." (Order XIX. r. 15.) The corresponding rule, in the Rules of 1875, was rule 18. It was not so full as the new rule in its specific enumeration of the grounds of defence which must be specially pleaded. But the words used were wide enough to require the defendant to plead every fact which, under rule 15 of Order XIX., he is now required to plead. Clarke v. Callow (5 Ch. D. 660; 46 L. J. Ch. 53) is an authority, though upon the clear words of the rule it would seem that authority is hardly necessary, that the Statute of Frauds must be specially pleaded. This was an action brought to recover the price of barley sold by the plaintiff to the defendant. The statement of claim alleged a contract for the sale of the barley by the plaintiff to the defendant, and also (paragraph 3) that the defendant had "accepted and actually received the |