sible for the future safety of that country, where his influence might be the most extensive and prejudicial. This brought his lordship to the point of the propriety of naming Elba as the place of residence for Buonaparté. The noble earl had asked, whether any other place could afford greater security? But the true mode of viewing this matter was, to take care to name no place for his residence which was not pre-eminently secure. The Allies might have given Buonaparté liberal revenues, ample territory, and generous provision for his family; but only on the condition that the situation where he was to reside was such as to extinguish and annihilate all chance of escape and future disturbance of the world. Was Elba such a situation, more especially with reference to France and Italy? The noble earl had vindicated this choice, by stating that it was rather to be expected that Buonaparté would have made his descent upon Italy; but surely it was a very curious mode of defending this determination, by showing that it was the most dangerous situation that could have been selected. The noble earl had maintained that it would have been impossible for our fleet to have interfered with the designs of Buonaparté without a special provision-if so, why was not this point made a matter of concert with the Allies? Why was it not made a part of the engagement, that if Buonaparté did attempt to escape he should be intercepted? It was rather a singular argument from the noble earl, that supposing the war with America had been concluded, no English ship could have interfered with the expedition of Buonaparté. The Earl of Liverpool explained. He had said, that by the general law of nations, no British commander could interfere with the voyage of Buonaparté to France, unless the officer had obtained information that he was on board a par ticular ship. The Marquis of Lansdowne apprehended, that it would have been the unquestionable right of a British ship to prevent the sailing of Buonaparté for France with arms and armed troops. Upon such a subject, however, precise instructions ought to have been given; and because ministers had failed in this duty, he thought sufficient grounds had been laid for the motion, which went to inquire into the force in the Mediterranean, and upon what service it was employed.The noble marquis then proceeded to notice other parts of the speech of the earl of Liverpool, and particularly that in which he had asserted that Buonaparté had never justified his return to France on the ground that the articles of the Treaty of Fontainbleau had not been fulfilled. In opposition to this assertion, he quoted a passage from a proclamation of Buonaparté, dated from Bourgogne, the 8th of March, in which he expressly complained of a violation of the Treaty with respect to himself and his wife and son. Supposing, however, that this positive proof did not exist, still it did not follow that Buonaparté did not feel that he had a right to complain, although he did not think it prudent to notice that subject in his proclamations. He was there addressing the people of France, not appealing to the Allies; and Buonaparté at least deserved this credit for wisdom, that instead of insisting upon his own personal claims, be had placed in the front, the assertion that the Bourbons had not performed their part of the compact with the people of France, and consequently that the latter were released from their allegiance. He established his foundation upon that affection of his adherents and of the army, which lord Castlereagh had assigned as his reason for assenting to the Treaty of Fontainbleau: if the motive for consenting were so strong, the stronger ought to be the motive for adhering to the Treaty. The ground on which the noble mover had rested his motion, and on which he should give it his support, was, that with regard to the main point of the security of Europe, as connected with the person of Buonaparté, no proper precautions had been employed by the ministers of this country, or by the allies-that while communications were constantly made, assemblies convened, and treaties signed, with regard to the territories of the various powers, the distribution of the people of Germany, and the settlement of the government of France and of other countries, nothing had been done, not a single step had been taken as to the security of the person of Buonaparté, by which all the regulations made by the Allies, all the determinations of the Congress, were to be permanent and effectual. Neither in the advance upon Paris, nor in any subsequent stage, did any contingency of the kind we had recently witnessed appear to have been contemplated. In the next place his lordship contended, that although the arrangement of Fontain bleau had been concluded on grounds avowedly unsatisfactory to the British minister, no provisional precautions on the subject of the residence of Buonaparté on Elba had been adopted; and that during the discussions of Congress, while the ministers of all the nations of Europe amused themselves with contemplating a variety of visionary dangers, for the purpose of effecting changes in the ancient habits of the people, such, for instance, as the case of Genoa ceded to the King of Sardinia; yet no measures had been contemplated, and much less taken, against the more certain, proximate, and fearful danger of the escape of Buonaparté from Elba. On these grounds he should support the Address of his noble friend. Earl Bathurst said, that if this debate had taken place this day last year, and if the noble lords opposite had then so delivered themselves, and had told the House all the dangers of the arrangement in question, and had pointed it out as one which the circumstances of the case did not justify, founded as they state it to have been in acts of gross injustice, then might they have obtained some credit for foresight. As it was, he was at a loss to conceive how they justified their conduct, thinking the Treaty bottomed in some injustice, in remaining silent either at the time they were apprised of it, or when their attention was called to it by taking into consideration the Treaty of Paris, which necessarily referred to this Treaty of Fontainbleau. They then contemplated it with perfect silence, and gave their unanimous vote of assent to it. Although the noble marquis who made the present motion had been reproached with this before, yet he had not a single word to say against it in his reply. The fact was, that if any arrangement had been made as to what should be done with the person of Buonaparté, it would have been useless, for his person was not in our power. Though he might have had but 20,000 men at that time (but the noble earl was inclined to think the number much greater), were there not considerable armies in other parts of the country? Though the capture of Paris was a great advantage to the Allies, it was also a considerable embarrassment to them; for if they had made a false step, they had no fortresses to retreat to, and would have been put to the inconvenience of a long march through an open and an hostile country. The faith of Russia and Prussia those dangers which we hoped were at an end, and placed in that very situation in which the noble earl triumphantly asked, what would have been the feelings of England and of Europe, had they placed us in the situation we were in previous to the conclusion of peace? God forbid that they should omit the first duty which was imposed on them, the duty of providing every means to look the danger in the face-and like men who, though disappointed in their hopes, and exposed to a recurrence of all those evils from which they had every reason to believe they were freed, were yet determined not to be wanting to themselves, to Europe, and to posterity. But having strengthened the arms of Government, even in the hands by whom it was at present conducted-having done every thing which their situation required-having recommended the adoption of measures of vigour, and of union and concert with our Allies,-did not England and Europe now require of them, that they should cast their eyes on the event which had reduced them to that situation, that they should endeavour to trace the causes of the past calamity, for the sake of provid interior of France, where could information of that be obtained? In the island of Elba, where he possessed the whole power, or in France? No blame attached to his Majesty's Government on any of these grounds. The noble earl then alluded to a subject, on which, he said, he was almost ashamed to trouble the House-the information which a Mr. Playfair bad stated he was able to communicate to government of the plan of Buonaparté. When Mr. Playfair was asked whether the person from whom he received his information, was a friend to Buonaparté or the Bourbons-how he became acquainted with him-what bad induced him to make the commcnication-where he could be seen to all these questions no answer could be returned. He had assured Mr. Playfair, that if he was able to substantiate his statement by proof, he should be rewarded. Mr. Playfair knew where to find him if he had any such proofs; and if he did not bring them forward, no blame could attach to any other person. At his solicitation, the French ambassador gave him a passport, and a letter of introduc tion to M. de Blacas; but he never heard of Mr. Playfair after; and when Mr. Playfair was asked why he did not availing against its recurrence in future? Conhimself of the passport and the letter, the reason he gave was, that the letter was sealed. The noble earl concluded by declaring, that he saw no reason whatever for acceding to the motion. Lord Grenville said, that the noble earl opposite had asked, what would have been the feelings of England and of Europe, if, by a different line of conduct from that which was adopted towards Buonaparté, they had exposed Europe to a renewal of the same dangers, and to the necessity of a renewal of the same efforts? They were now exposed to the same dangers-they were now renew ing the same efforts, and it was of the noble earl that England and Europe had now to ask how it had happened, that after such a sacrifice of treasure as was weighing down this country-after so much valuable blood had been poured out like water-after all the favours of fortune heaped on a just cause-after all the success that the most sanguine supporters of the cause, in their most sanguine moments, could not have expected, which had blessed the arms of justice that all these sacrifices, all these efforts, and all that success were rendered vain, and that we were now exposed to a recurrence of all vinced he was, that all those sacrifices which we might be still called on to make, might have been prevented by the exercise of common foresight and precaution. Those to whom the public interests were entrusted, had not bestowed the smallest particle of caution with respect to the very circumstance which most of all others required it. After the reverses of Buonaparté in Russia, when the contest was brought finally home to the country which had for 20 years deluged all Europe with blood, the success of the Allies was every where confidently anticipated. There were two modes of proceeding open to the Allies, in looking to the security of Europe. One of these modes was, in taking that security from the then existing Government of France, by obtaining from it favourable terms of peace. The other mode of security was, to re-establish the regal Government in France, and to grant France more favourable conditions. of peace than would have been conceded under other circumstances. He had no doubt in his own mind which of these two modes was the best; but it was unneces sary now to enlarge on that subject: both modes were tried; the first failed, and in consequence of that failure the second was resorted to. It was a little unreasonable in his noble friend who spoke last, to object that those persons with whom he acted had complained that the proposed Treaty of Chatillon was not concluded, because to those friends, and to himself in parti. cular, the terms of the Treaty of Chatillon, were altogether unknown. That Treaty had always been hitherto withheld,-for what reason he did not know, but such was the fact; and how far therefore it would have been proper or improper to have made peace on the terms of the Treaty of Chatillon, was not known to them. But if what he had heard rumoured was correct, so far from making any complaint that peace was not made on those terms if such a peace had been made as that which had reached him on rumour, he for one should have given his most decided opposition to it on those conditions. He did not say this now for the first time, for that determination was known to many persons at that time. So much for the Treaty of Chatillon. But on those terms the peace was not concluded; and the allied Sovereigns determined and declared that security could be no longer obtained in that course, but only by such a change in the government of France as should enable them to treat with France for peace with any hope of safety; and that they would therefore make peace on grounds more advantageous to France than they could grant under other circumstances. Of the propriety of this declaration he entertained no doubt; but of the propriety or impropriety of it he needed not at present to say any thing. They determined to look to such a security as the success of their arms entitled them to expect. In plain terms they declared, that the removal of the Individual who then held the government of France, was an object which they had to accomplish before any hope of peace could be entertained. From that time, on what, he would ask, hinged the negociation on what hinged the war-what was the object to be gained by negociation? It was the security resulting from the exclusion of Buonaparte from the throne of France; and unless they obtained that security, they failed in the whole object of their exertions. To prove to their lordships that that security could not have been obtained by the course which was adopted, would at this day not be a waste of words only. Eleven months had not elapsed before the same apprehensions were entertained from the same individual in the same situation, who had assumed the same power, and God grant that he might not exert the same means, which so long had been the scourge and terror of Europe! Nothing but extreme necessity could have induced the Allies to come to the determination of declaring his exclusion from the throne of France indispensable to the security of Europe. When it was argued by the noble lords, as if it was a matter of comparative advantage, and that, perhaps, something more might have been obtained by the adoption of measures which. would necessarily have been accompanied by a certain degree of hazard, he would say that this was a most unfair view of the case. The fact was, that they had obtained nothing of that which they had made the whole hinge of their conduct. The noble earl seemed willing to persuade their lordships, that Buonaparté at Fontainbleau had power to inspire them with the same degree of terror as when he was at the head of his triumphant armies: he had almost told them that he was enabled to dictate peace to the Allies, and not they to dictate peace to him, and that they had, therefore, by the Treaty of Fontainbleau consented to relinquish that which they themselves professed to be the hinge of security-his expulsion from the throne of France. With what grace did it come from an Englishman, that Soult and Suchet were formidable in the South, when they were in presence of a Chief who had so often fought and conquered them, and who, in fact, after that transaction did defeat that very army now described as so formidable? These were very different sentiments from those which ought to have inspired an Englishman at that time; when firmness of mind and character were so much required. With respect to the French army of Italy, was it not kept in check by the army which was opposed to it? Could that army by any possibility have marched to the assistance of Buonaparté at Fontainbleau ? And with respect to the garrisons in Dantzic, on the Rhine, or the Elbe, were their lordships to be told that that which was a source of weakness, they having garrisons at such a distance that they could not be available in the centre of the country, was a circumstance in his favour? The argument reduced itself to this, that with his army in the south of France, where we had a veteran army which had so often been found invincible; with the force in Italy, which was completely of returning again to France, and reoccupied; with an army, he would not assuming that government whenever he contend whether of 20,000 or 30,000 pleased. He conceived that he was not men, but which had been repeatedly only excluded from the throne, but fetbroken and defeated, and what was still tered and deprived of his liberty. That more than all these defeats, harassed by the words of the Treaty would bear that repeated marches for the sake of defend- interpretation, or any other interpretation ing Paris; that Buonaparté at the head of which any man might choose to put upon twenty or thirty thousand men would be them, he was ready to admit. He had able to face the Allies at the head of given the framers of this Treaty far more 160,000 men, and with all Europe to sup- than they were entitled to-he had placed port that cause for which they were fight all the ambiguity, absurdity, and inac ing. The noble lord would have them curacy with which it abounded, to a wish believe that it was just, wise, and neces- entertained on their part to manage the sary, rather than encounter the hazard of feelings of the individual, and of those meeting Buonaparté on such terms, to who were connected with him: and he leave him completely at liberty at any had supposed that there were some secret moment he might think fit to re-assume engagements for the purpose of making it that government, the exclusion from which effectual, which were purposely not was declared to be the only hope of secu- brought before the public. But the whole rity to Europe. The noble lord had bulwark and security of Europe was asked in a triumphant manner, why objec- utterly unprovided for in this Treaty. After tions were not made on this side of the the noble earl had contended that the House to the Treaty of Fontainbleau, and Treaty of Fontainbleau was wise and nein particular to the cession of the sove-cessary, he told them that our pleniporeignty of Elba. Why were those objections not made? In what country, in what House, to what persons were these questions addressed? And was there a man who heard him, be he who he would, who could lay his hand on his heart, and say he approved of the Treaty, or the terms which were granted to Buonaparté in that Treaty? Was it possible that the noble lord and his colleagues were so surrounded by flatterers, so insensible to the voice of the country, so destitute of friends to speak to them in the language of sincerity, that they did not know that that Treaty was acquiesced in, merely because the terms of it were not known, but it was too late for them to be changed; and that it met with the disapprobation of every individual of the countries of the nego ciators? The noble lord, in order to cover their negligence and want of subséquent precaution, had described the Treaty as far more favourable to Buonaparté than was ever before understood in this country, or in any other country of Europe, or by the individual himself who was principally concerned. Because, as to the whole of the blazoned independence and freedom of sovereignty, that individual told them that the breach of the Treaty of Fontainbleau had restored him to his throne and to liberty-to liberty, because he did not conceive that by banishing him to the island of Elba, it was the intention of the Allies to leave to him the choice tentiary hastened, on hearing of it, to Paris, to protest against it. After all the vain boasting which they had heard, of the success of Europe being principally due to the councils and efforts of Great Britain, it now came out, that when the decisive step was taken which was to purchase the security of Europe, there was either no British minister to take a part with Russia or Prussia, or if present, that the influence of Great Britain was so small as to be unable to prevent the precipitate adoption of an arrangement so injurious to this country, that the Secretary of State repaired to Paris and endeavoured to prevent it from being carried into execution. Highly as he respected the persons of the Sovereigns and the Governments of the Allies, desirous as he was of acting in union and concert with them, and convinced as he was that by such union and concert alone Europe could yet be saved, he would not allow that England ought to have held a subordinate station on such an occasion, and that a step of such magnitude should have been taken, not only without the approbation, but without even the knowledge of her agents. The noble earl, who was not consistent in any of his arguments, had told them that we had no right to interfere with Buonaparté in Elba, as he was a sovereign prince; but at the same time he had told them that there was an understanding with one of our officers to intercept his return. How could he re |