properly in time. What he proposed was, to call on his Majesty's Government to produce such information as would enable the House and the country to decide, whether, in point of fact, they had exercised a sound discretion, and made use of all those precautionary measures which prudence and reason directed. on the part of his majesty's ministers, that occurrence might not have been prevented. The Message from the Throne informed the House, that in consequence of the events which had recently occurred in France, it was necessary that great disposable force should be placed in the hands of the executive Government, and that a closer concert should be entered into with his Majesty's Allies. Not one dissenting voice was raised against the Address; and, under these circumstances, he conceived he was entitled to call on the House to determine, whether his Majesty's Government should not be put on their defence, and compelled to show, whether they had not received information as to the intended departure of Buonaparté, and whether they had or had not taken steps to counteract the projects of which they had been apprised. If he asked the House to enter into the consideration of the terms of the Treaty of Fontainbleau-looking to the change of circumstances which had taken place since it was entered into-looking to the alteration of the brilliant prospects which last year opened to the country-he did not think he should be too late even for that discussion. Because, by so doing, he should be calling on those who had claimed the applause and gratitude of the country, as having assisted in the deliverance of Europe, to state why they had placed their fame and the repose of the world on so insecure a foundation. But, as it might be alleged, that he had passed by the proper period for such a discussion, he would not introduce it now. He should, therefore, merely look to the rights which the different parties to the Treaty of Fontainbleau derived under that Treaty, and, in particular, what rights accrued to us, under its provisions. Having ascertained the latter point, it would be for the House to consider whether his Majesty's ministers had exercised due and proper vigilance, in conformity with the rights given to this country by the Treaty. This being his object, it could not be said, that he came forward too late; because, if he had asked for the information he now sought for, at an earlier period, he would then have been told on official authority, that to answer such questions would be a direct breach of public duty, and would tend to defeat the very object which it was proposed to attain. He, therefore, came to the House, with the present motion, most strictly and It was impossible to discuss these subjects with advantage, without adverting to the circumstances under which the Treaty of Fontainbleau was concluded; without, however, entering into the propriety of the terms or conditions of that Treaty. On the subject of the terms, they had heard two statements, directly contradictory of each other. By some persons it was contended, that they proceeded from a mistaken magnanimity on the part of the Allies; while others, and amongst them the noble lord (Castlereagh) asserted, that the Treaty was dictated by hard necessity. He was not inclined to accede to either of these propositions. He thought it was a nearer approximation to truth to suppose that, when the Treaty of Fontainbleau was agreed to, though Buonaparté was not in such a situation as to be immediately compelled to accept any terms that might be offered to him, yet the Allies possessed such superior strength, that, if he had refused those terms which appeared to them calculated to insure the security of Europe, they would have been very speedily enabled to enforce their demand. They, in this situation of affairs, deemed it more wise to accede to the terms which he was willing to take, than to expose Europe to the evils of a protracted contest. At this time, however, Buonaparté had lost his capital, and they were told that he had lost the confidence of his troops, and, above all, that the authority of opinion was no longer in his favour. Disaffection, it appeared, had spread amongst his officers; and his army at Fontainbleau, even if it were joined by the remnant of the force under Mortier and Marmont, did not exceed 50,000 men, to oppose which the Allies had an army of 140,000. Soult was driven from the south of France by the duke of Wellington, and the army of Augereau was opposed by superior numbers. This was the picture drawn at the time by the accredited ministers of this country. They exultingly declared, that Buonaparté, who so recently commanded a mighty empire, then stood alone, and that the Allied Sovereigns were received with such delight in Paris, that they were number of persons in France were zea- Napoleon must have left France, well knowing that his friends had arms in their hands. He must also have been aware, that a large proportion of the people would view his departure with regret, particularly those who were proprietors of confiscated lands, and who, though they might not have been much attached to Buonaparte, must have viewed with apprehension the return of the Bourbons, as threatening the destruction of the tenure by which they held their property. There was another point most material for consideration. It was now admitted, that the Treaty was founded in necessitythat the strength of Buonaparté commanded it. It was stated, that he possessed, at the time, a large force, and yet, in that situation, he preferred negociation to resistance. Now, it was impossible for any person, who knew these circumstances, and was aware of the state of France at time, to entertain a doubt, that Buonaparté felt it better to cherish the future contingent hope of returning back to France, instead of holding out to the last against the Allies, and thus putting all to hazard. At the time the Treaty of Fontainbleau was signed, these several facts were known. It was known that a great pleased, except to the coast of France. If this were the case, what security was there for his keeping the Treaty of Fontainbleau? If it were said, that his abdication of the throne of France afforded the necessary security, he must state, that this argument would not serve the noble lord or his colleagues, who had all along described Buonaparté as a person who never would abide by a treaty prejudicial to his interests, if he possessed the means and power of breaking it. But he did not think the construction given to the Treaty of Fontainbleau by the noble lord, was the true one. On the contrary, he conceived, that the right of watching and detaining Buonaparté, under certain circumstances, did arise out of the Treaty. The spirit of the Treaty was not confined merely to his abdication of the throne of France. What necessarily followed from that stipulation? Assuredly, that he should not be suffered, hereafter, to disturb the peace and security of that country. No one could suppose that, at Elba, Buonaparté could devise the means of invading France, as those sovereigns might do, who possessed more extensive means. His hopes rested alone on the people and the army of France; and these engines could not be rendered dangerous to the peace of that country, unless he was personally present. His personal movements ought, therefore, to have been watched with scrupulous jealousy, since it was by per sonal exertions alone that he could effect any ambitious project. The Treaty, he contended, gave us a right of remonstrance and representation, and even an authority to watch Buonaparté. But, even if no such right existed under the Treaty, and although it might be considered defective jesty's ministers had made themselves a party. He would say for himself, that the moment he (lord C.) was brought to look at that question, he was convinced that the arrangement could not be otherwise than carried into effect, without flying in the face of the Government of France; and that it was perfectly impossible for this country to have opposed even a feeble resistance to it at that period. When he found that a distinct assurance had been given by the Emperor Alexander to Buonaparté, respecting the tenour of that Treaty, he did not think it was any longer a subject to which this country ought to hesitate to lend its approbation. The arrangement, as he had stated formerly, was not one of his making; at the time when he first saw it, it had assumed a very grave and serious, if not a conclusive shape; and, if it had been rejected, it would have been the means of placing the Allies in the most odious light. He was convinced that if such counsels had been adopted, there was not one of the ministers of the Allied Powers who would have ventured to look such a calamity in the face. But what was the real footing on which this question now stood? If the hon. member complained of the conduct of foreign states, he (lord C.) must enter his protest against being bound to answer for that conduct, or that ministers should be obliged to make that justification for them which they could make for themselves were they here. It was not right that the ingenuity of gentlemen should be employed to blacken the conduct of those Powers with whom we were in alliance. He trusted that that new principle of logic lately introduced would not be generally adopted; namely, that any thing which might be asserted by a French general should be deemed conclusive, unless the French Government should think proper to contradict it. Conclusions were drawn from late transactions which could not be deduced on any foundation from the conduct of the Allied Powers. The good faith of this country had been in no degree violated. The British Government had not even gone to the extent of guaranteeing the stipulations in the Treaty of Fontainbleau, respecting the territorial arrangements; it was, therefore, perfectly unnecessary to enter upon any justification on their account. From the time Buonaparte withdrew from Elba, the Treaty of Fontainbleau had ceased to exist. The arrangements respecting Maria Louisa were arrangements of pure generosity, and could not be considered as a claim of right. From the moment when Buonaparté reclaimed the throne of France, from that moment the Treaty of Fontainbleau had ceased to have any obligation in any of its bearings or relations. Great Britain, was, however, answerable for nothing more than giving facilities to Buonaparté for occupying those territorial possessions which had been granted to him, and as to the rest those parties must be answerable who were accessory to the acts. He would not deny that there had been plans in agitation respecting some change in the territories allotted to Maria Louisa; but these were subjects connected with the occupation of those duchies, which made it a question whether it would not have been wise on her part to accept an equivalent for them; and with regard to the residence of the Empress at Vienna instead of attending Buonaparte to Elba, that was a point which depended solely upon her own choice. There was nothing on the face of the Treaty which placed the Allies in a situation to watch Buonaparté. It only authorized them to grant him a free escort from France. His lordship denied that any such project had ever been indulged by Congress as sending Buonaparté to St. Helena or to St. Lucie; on the contrary, he had done every thing in his power to procure the exact fulfilment of the Treaty, that no ground of cavil might be afforded; and even so late as his passage through Paris, on his return to England, he had represented to the French Government the necessity of paying the sum stipulated in the Treaty to Buonaparte. Upon the question of what precautions this country had used to prevent the escape of Buonaparté, he had no objection to state, that although conjectures might be indulged as to the designs of Buonaparté, (with the exception of Mr. Playfair's statement), it never came to the knowledge of ministers that any deliberate design of escape was on foot; and, therefore, even had they been practicable, no additional precautions had been adopted. It seemed to him perfectly idle to talk of any other security than onethat security to which every rational man in this country looked for, the preservation of the family of Bourbon, and for the continued banishment of Buonaparté from France. That security was the general sentiment of the French people, and even of the army, expressed most unequivocally it not a strong argument for increased vigilance on their side? Now, if he had at all established the fact, that, under the Treaty of Fontainbleau, we had a right to watch Buonaparté; and if that individual bad succeeded to the utmost of his hopes and wishes, in again placing himself on the throne of France, he conceived that a sufficient case was made out, to induce the House to inquire whether every necessary precaution had been taken by his Majesty's ministers to prevent the occurrence of this event. The hon. and learned gentleman ridiculed the argument which had been made use of by the noble lord, "that the whole navy of England could not hermetically seal up the island of Elba." Was it just reasoning to say, "because we cannot hermetically seal up this island, we ought, therefore, to have no watch upon it?" English vessels might have gone every day into the Elbese ports; and, if that privilege were refused, our cruisers might have applied for information to the ships of those Powers that were admitted. It was said, that France should have watched Buonaparte. But, if the Government of that country did not choose to do so, we had sufficient interest at stake to impel us to look towards him with jealous vigilance. Besides, if the French Government had sent out vessels for that purpose, the loyalty of their crews would have been put to a very severe test; and it was very probable that Buonaparte would have escaped. It was necessary, therefore, that the House should know what instructions had been given to our naval commanders, in the neighbourhood of Elba-what information ministers had received with respect to the intended project of Buonapartéand the precautionary steps which they took in consequence thereof. And here he must observe, that he totally contemned the trash published by a person of the name of Playfair, which he conceived to be altogether unworthy of notice; but, he believed, that ministers had, on a variety of occasions, received information, which ought to have excited the utmost exertion of their vigilance. It was right that the House and the public should know whether they had performed their duty properly, aye or no; and for that purpose it was expedient that they should be furnished with the most extensive information. The hon. and learned gentleman concluded by moving, 1. "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, copies er extracts, or substance of any instructions which may have been given by his Majesty's Government to any of his Majesty's naval commanders, respecting Napoleon Buonaparté and the island of Elba. 2. "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, copies or extracts, or substance of any information which his Majesty's Government may have received respecting the design of Napoleon Buonaparté to escape from the island of Elba, together with the date of the reception of the said information." Lord Castlereagh said, that with respect to that part of the hon. member's speech, which related to the alleged violation of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, it was sufficient to observe, that Buonaparté, at the time he quitted the island of Elba, did not complain of any breach of that Treaty. That individual took a more dignified course a course, at least, more worthy of his character. He put his proceeding on this broad ground, that he withdrew from France for a temporary purpose, and that he had returned to claim his indubitable right to the throne of that country. Latterly, however, he had set up the plea of breach of treaty. The hints on that point, he had received in the course of the discussions, to which recent events had given rise; and certainly a very copious brief was afterwards sent into this country, the composition of Mons. Caulaincourt, in which the argument of breach of treaty was pushed to its utmost extent. The hon. and learned gentleman, and those with whom he acted, were always either too early or too late, in the moment which they selected for the discussion of public questions. Nothing appeared so abhorrent to their nature, as to discuss a measure, at the period when it ought to be entertained. The wisdom of the Treaty of Fontainbleau they were fully prepared to argue against at the time; and they were equally prepared now to arraign the conduct and acts of the Congress, although that transaction was not at present in a state in which it could be argued. But the honourable member wished to know whether this Treaty was a measure to which his Ma jesty's ministers had made themselves a party. He would say for himself, that the moment he (lord C.) was brought to look at that question, he was convinced that the arrangement could not be otherwise than carried into effect, without flying in the face of the Government of France; and that it was perfectly impossible for this country to have opposed even a feeble resistance to it at that period. When he found that a distinct assurance had been given by the Emperor Alexander to Buonaparté, respecting the tenour of that Treaty, he did not think it was any longer a subject to which this country ought to hesitate to lend its approbation. The arrangement, as he had stated formerly, was not one of his making; at the time when he first saw it, it had assumed a very grave and serious, if not a conclusive shape; and, if it had been rejected, it would have been the means of placing the Allies in the most odious light. He was convinced that if such counsels had been adopted, there was not one of the ministers of the Allied Powers who would have ventured to look such a calamity in the face. But what was the real footing on which this question now stood? If the hon. member complained of the conduct of foreign states, he (lord C.) must enter his protest against being bound to answer for that conduct, or that ministers should be obliged to make that justification for them which they could make for themselves were they here. It was not right that the ingenuity of gentlemen should be employed to blacken the conduct of those Powers with whom we were in alliance. He trusted that that new principle of logic lately introduced would not be generally adopted; namely, that any thing which might be asserted by a French general should be deemed conclusive, unless the French Government should think proper to contradict it. Conclusions were drawn from late transactions which could not be deduced on any foundation from the conduct of the Allied Powers. The good faith of this country had been in no degree violated. The British Government had not even gone to the extent of guaranteeing the stipulations in the Treaty of Fontainbleau, respecting the territorial arrangements; it was, therefore, perfectly unnecessary to enter upon any justification on their account. From the time Buonaparté withdrew from Elba, the Treaty of Fontainbleau had ceased to exist. The arrangements respecting Maria Louisa were arrangements of pure generosity, and could not be considered as a claim of right. From the moment when Buonaparté reclaimed the throne of France, from that moment the Treaty of Fontainbleau had ceased to have any obligation in any of its bearings or relations. Great Britain, was, however, answerable for nothing more than giving facilities to Buonaparté for occupying those territorial possessions which had been granted to him, and as to the rest those parties must be answerable who were accessory to the acts. He would not deny that there had been plans in agitation respecting some change in the territories allotted to Maria Louisa; but these were subjects connected with the occupation of those duchies, which made it a question whether it would not have been wise on her part to accept an equivalent for them; and with regard to the residence of the Empress at Vienna instead of attending Buonaparte to Elba, that was a point which depended solely upon her own choice. There was nothing on the face of the Treaty which placed the Allies in a situation to watch Buonaparté. It only authorized them to grant him a free escort from France. His lordship denied that any such project had ever been indulged by Congress as sending Buonaparté to St. Helena or to St. Lucie; on the contrary, he had done every thing in his power to procure the exact fulfilment of the Treaty, that no ground of cavil might be afforded; and even so late as his passage through Paris, on his return to England, he had represented to the French Government the necessity of paying the sum stipulated in the Treaty to Buonaparté. Upon the question of what precautions this country had used to prevent the escape of Buonaparté, he had no objection to state, that although conjectures might be indulged as to the designs of Buonaparte, (with the exception of Mr. Playfair's statement), it never came to the knowledge of ministers that any deliberate design of escape was on foot; and, therefore, even had they been practicable, no additional precautions had been adopted. It seemed to him perfectly idle to talk of any other security than onethat security to which every rational man in this country looked for, the preservation of the family of Bourbon, and for the continued banishment of Buonaparté from France. That security was the general sentiment of the French people, and even of the army, expressed most unequivocally |