IOWA: Agreement among the grocerymen in a certain town, not to engage in the butter business, so as to enable one firm to have a monopoly of that business. Chapin v. Brown, 83 Iowa, 156; s. C., 48 N. W. Rep. 1074 (1891).

KANSAS: Combination held illegal under the Kansas act (L. 1891, ch. 158) directed against restric tions upon the sale of live-stock. Greer v. Payne, 4 Kan. App. 153; S. C., 46 Pac. Rep. 190 (1896).

KENTUCKY: Agreement between proprietors of steamboats, rivals in the freight and passenger trade on the Kentucky river, for a division of net profits, in order to prevent the rivalry between them, though there was no agreement as to charges. It would seem, though not distinctly stated, that this arrangement resulted in a complete monopoly. Anderson v. Jett, 89 Ky. 375; s. C., 12 S. W. Rep. 670 (1889). In Huston v. Reutlinger, 91 Ky. 333; s. C., 15 S. W. Rep. 867 (1891), an injunction was granted against the enforcement by an association of underwriters, of bylaws imposing restrictions upon its members as to the number of solicitors they might employ, the time of employment, compensation to be paid, and forbidding them to contract with a solicitor, so as to make his pay depend on the number of risks he procured, and forbidding an employment of a solicitor who had severed his connection with another member. It seems a sufficient ground for the

decision that the by-laws were unauthorized by the fundamental law of the association, but the court unnecessarily, as it seems to us, adduce the further ground that they created unlawful restrictions upon competition. It does not appear to what extent the association controlled the business in question.

LOUISIANA: Agreement among eight firms in New Orleans, holding seven thousand four hundred and ten bales of India cotton bagging, not during three months to sell any of it without the consent of the majority. Nothing appears, however, to show how large a portion of the supply these bales constituted. India Bagging Assoc. v. Kock, 14 La. Ann. 168 (1859). Agreement among competing railroad corporations to divide their earnings from competition. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 41 La. Ann. 970, 980; s. C., 6 So. Rep. 888 (1889).

MASSACHUSETTS: In Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen, 370 (1866), an agreement not to manufacture and sell shoe cutters in Massachusetts was held non-enforceable at the suit of a person who was one of four in the State to whom the business was confined.

NEBRASKA: "Trust" agreement (the "Distillers' & Cattle Feeders' Trust") not only to limit the production of alcohol, but to dismantle as many distilleries as the trust might see fit. State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700; s. a., 46 N. W. Rep. 155 (1890).

J. Eq. ——; s. C., 39 Atl. Rep. 923, 945 (1898). In Elkins v. Camden & Atlantic R. R. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 5,14 (1882), the purchase by a railroad corporation of the stock and bonds of a rival road, was held to be "clearly ultra vires as a purchase with a view to extinguishing competition." In Meredith v. N. J. Zinc & Iron Co., 55 N. J. Eq. 211; S. C., 37 Atl. Rep. 539 (1897), the legality of the consolidation of the business of rival corporations, owners of property containing zinc ores, was sustained, it appearing that the amount produced by the consolidated corporation constituted but a small fraction of the world's supply. NEW YORK: Agreement among owners of several lines of competing canal boats, to fix the rates of freight and divide their net earnings. Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio, 349 (1847; under statute, now Penal Code, § 168, subd. 6, forbidding conspiracy "to commit any act injurious to trade or commerce"). Followed in Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 434 (1848), a case very similar as to facts. These two

decisions are sought to be distinguished in Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pinney (Wis.), 123, 152 (1851), as based on conditions peculiar to canal transportation in the State of New York. This distinction avails little, in view of the extensive application that has been given to the doctrine of those cases. Agreement not to extend construction of railroad, the object being to prevent competition with another road. Hartford & New Haven R. R. Co. v. N. Y. & New Haven R. R. Co., 3 Robt. 411 (1865), which was distinguished in Ives v. Smith, 3 N. Y. Suppl. 645, 654; affirmed in 8 Id. 46 (Supm. Ct., Gen. T., 1889), where an agreement having reference to the future construction of railroads was sustained. Scheme to control the shipment and supply of coal for the Elmira market. Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558 (1877). As to means by which this was to be effected, see § 30. "Trust" agreement among seventeen corporations in different parts of the United States, engaged in the manufacture, refining and sale of sugar, leaving not more than six other companies or firms not engaged in the business. People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 54 Hun, 354; s. c., 7 N. Y. Suppl. 406 (1889; under Penal Code, § 168, subd. 6; see Hooker v. Vandewater, above); affirmed on another ground in 121 N. Y. 582; s. c., 24 N. E. Rep. 834 (1890). See as to trust agreements generally, § 26. Agreement

among brokers and dealers in sheep and lambs consigned to market in New York City and vicinity, to take effect at the same time with an agreement among butchers transacting business in the same locality; the brokers to sell only to the butchers, and the butchers to buy only from the brokers. Judd v. Harrington, 139 N. Y. 105; s. c., 34 N. E. Rep. 790 (1893). Combination comprising all the retail coal dealers in the city of Lockport, except one. People v. Sheldon, 139 N. Y. 251; S. C., 34 N. E. Rep. 785 (1893; sustaining conviction for conspiracy under Penal Code, § 168, subd. 6; see Hooker v. Vandewater, above). For an elaborate criticism of People v. Sheldon, see Stickney's "State Control of Trade and Commerce." Combination among dealers controlling ninety to ninety-five per cent. of the manufactured stock of bluestone sold in the State, and for the purpose of controlling the trade in New York City. Cummings v. Union Blue Stone Co., 15 N. Y. App. Div. 602; s. c., 44 N. Y. Suppl. 787 (1897). See, as to illegality of combination for control of business of manufacturing and selling carbons for electric lighting, Pittsburg Carbon Co. v. McMillin, 119 N. Y. 46; s. c., 23 N. E. Rep. 530 (1890). See Strait v. National Harrow Co., under Federal decisions.

OHIO: Agreement among all the salt manufacturers (with one or two exceptions) in a large salt-producing territory, and whose aggregate annual product was about

140,000 barrels, for the purpose of regulating the price and grade. Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880). Association of manufacturers of ninety-five per cent of all the star candles in that part of the United States east of the western boundary of Utah. Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., 47 Ohio St. 320; s. c., 24 N. E. Rep. 660 (1890). Agreement to establish a virtual monopoly of the business of producing petroleum and of manufacturing, refining and dealing in it and all its products, throughout the entire country. Here, where the facts were similar to those in People v. North River Sugar Refining Co. (see above), the court might, as in that case, have refrained from passing on the question of monopoly, and based its decision on the ground that the agreement subjected the corporation to an outside control inconsistent with its character as a corporation. State ex rel. v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137; s. c., 30 N. E. Rep. 279 (1892). Association of all or nearly all the brick manufacturers and dealers in and about a certain place, formed to control the price. Jackson v. Akron Brick Assoc., 53 Ohio St. 303; s. c., 41 N. E. Rep. 257 (1895). In Crawford v. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190 (1868), in an opinion strikingly picturesque as to language, was condemned an agreement by an employer to exercise his influence over his employees to induce them to deal solely with a third person, one of the grounds assigned being that it tended to

"unwarrantable monopoly." Compare Dionne v. New Iberia Refining, etc. Assoc., 50 La. Ann. -; S. C., 23 So. Rep. 624 (1898).

PENNSYLVANIA: Agreement among corporations controlling coal fields that constituted the great source of supply of bituminous coal to the State of New York and large territories westward, the purpose and effect being thus described: "These corporations represented almost the entire body of bituminous coal in the northern part of the State. By combination between themselves they had the power to control the entire market in that district. And they did control it by a contract not to ship and sell coal otherwise than as therein provided. And, in order to destroy competition, they provided for an arrangement with dealers and shippers of anthracite coal. They were thereby prohibited from selling under prices to be fixed by a committee representing each company. And they were obliged to suspend shipments upon notice from an agent that their allotted share of the market had been forwarded or sold." The court say: "The combination is wide in scope, general in its influence." Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay, 68 Pa. St. 173, 183, 184 (1871; under New York statute, now Penal Code, § 168, subd. 6; see Hooker v. Vandewater, above). Combination among fortyfive brewers of Philadelphia, individuals, firms and corporations, to regulate and control the sale and price of beer within the city of

Philadelphia and the county of Camden, New Jersey. Nester v. Continental Brewing Co., 161 Pa. St. 473; s. c., 29 Atl. Rep. 102 (1894). TEXAS: Agreement among independent dealers in and purchasers of cotton seed, engaged separately in the business of manufacturing therefrom "oil, oil cake, and other products of cotton and cotton seed," in various cities in the State, such agreement not only fixing prices, but prohibiting one of the parties in particular from purchasing, handling or shipping, directly or indirectly, any cotton seed at many of the most important markets in the State, and binding it to deliver the entire product, "make or yield" from cotton seed of its mills, to the other party to the contract, in consideration of certain profits guarantied to it. Texas Standard Oil Co. v. Adoue, 83 Tex. 650; s. c., 19 S. W. Rep. 274 (1892). Agreement among dealers representing all the bulk or keg beer consumed in El Paso, to jointly control the supply of beer, to cease competition among themselves in respect to it, and to regulate the price thereof in El Paso. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assoc. v. Houck, 27 S. W. Rep. 692 (Tex. Civ. App., 1894); affirmed as Houck v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assoc., in 88 Tex. 184; s. C., 30 S. W. Rep. 869 (1895; under Texas anti-trust act of 1889). In Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, Tex. Civ. App. —-; s. c., 44 S. W. Rep. 936 (1898), so far as appears, the transactions held unlawful were merely agreements for exclusive

dealing and selling at a fixed price, which certainly are not, considered by themselves, unlawful. The decisions in Texas, however, are generally based, not on the doctrine against restrictions upon competition, but on the statute forbidding contracts in restraint of trade. See § 21.

WISCONSIN: By-laws of association composed of about sixty of the seventy or seventy-five mason contractors in Milwaukee, the object being to suppress fair and free competition for building contracts in Milwaukee, it being provided that each member should submit any bid for a contract to the association, and that the lowest bidder should add six per cent. to the amount of his bid, before submitting it to the owner or architect. So the right to bid on changes or additions was limited to the original contractor, unless the amount was larger than the contract price. Milwaukee Masons & Builders' Assoc. v. Niezerowski, 95 Wis. 129; S. C., 70 N. W. Rep. 166 (1897).

1 That this is the proper test was elaborately contended for in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., 19 U. S. App. 36; s. c., 58 Fed. Rep. 58 (8th Cir., 1893), where was involved the legality of an agreement entered into between fifteen independent and competingrailroad companies, extensively engaged in interstate commerce in that part of the United States west of the Mississippi and Missouri rivers. The professed object of the

agreement was "mutual protection, by establishing and maintaining reasonable rates, rules and regulations on all freight traffic, both through and local." Provision was made for the establishment of such rates, rules and regulations. It was found by the court that the rates maintained under the contract had not been unreasonable, and that many reductions had been made under its operation. (19 U. S. App. 67.) The whole discussion is confused by the introduction of the erroneous and needless assumption that the doctrine against restrictions upon competition is based on that against contracts in restraint of trade. It is said (p. 59): "It is not the existence of the restriction of competition, but the reasonableness of that restriction, that is the test of the validity of contracts that are claimed to be in restraint of trade." An attempt is made, though in our view unsuccessfully, to show that the authorities generally that condemn restrictions upon competition, are in harmony with this test; it being said (p. 57): "These decisions rest on the ground that the main purpose of the obnoxious contracts was to suppress competition, and that they thus tended to effect an unreasonable and unlawful restraint of trade." So also (p. 55): "The main purpose of contracts of these classes that are thus held illegal is to suppress, not simply to regulate, competition, and, if suppression is not effected, it is be