the relation having once terminated, it is not so clear that the previously existing relation will justify such acts done. with an intent to injure. Thus, in case of a "blacklist," which has been defined as "a list of persons marked out for special avoidance, antagonism or enmity, on the part of those who prepare the list or those among whom it is intended to circulate," and is said to be "most usually resorted to by combined employers, who exchange lists of their employees who go on strikes, with the agreement that none of them will employ the workmen whose names are on the lists." The general question of the legality of blacklisting seems thus far an unsettled one. If acts of blacklisting are to be sustained on any ground, it would seem to be that they are incidents or outgrowths of "solidarity of interest" among employers, justifying acts analogous to those employed by combinations of tradesmen, to protect themselves against non-paying customers. § 7. Legality of combinations to raise wages; trades unions. On principle, it is not apparent why the legality 1 Cogley on Strikes and Lockouts, p. 293. This definition was applied in Mattison v. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co., 3 Ohio Dec. 526 (Lucas Co. Com. Pl., 1895), sustaining an action for blacklisting. But in Jenkinson v. Nield, 8 Times L. R. 540 (1892), blacklisting an employee was held not actionable, it not appearing that "the defendants were actuated by any other motive than selfinterest." This on the ground that such action was within the limits of fair competition. also, as to liability for blacklisting, Bradley v. Pierson, 148 Pa. St. 502; S. C., 24 Atl. Rep. 65 (1892). Compare as to duty imposed on railroad company by custom to give discharged employee a "clearance card," to enable him to obtain employment elsewhere, Cleveland, C., See C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Jenkins, 70 Ill. App. 415 (1897). In Blumenthal v. Shaw, 39 U. S. App. 490; S. C., 77 Fed. Rep. 954 (3d Cir., 1897), was sustained an action against a former employer for preventing the plaintiff from obtaining employment elsewhere, and causing his dismissal from places where he had procured work. This was done by merely requesting that he be not employed, such requests being complied with in pursuance of an understanding among a number of such employers not to employ an apprentice belonging to another. 2 See note 1, above. But in several States it is made unlawful by statute. See Appendix. See as to injunction against blacklisting, § 16. 3 See § 9. of combinations among employees as such, should be subjected to any different test from that applied to combinations among employers as such, or among tradesmen as such. Combinations among those having a common interest are numerous and cover an infinite variety of purposes; witness, churches, clubs, lodges and other organizations for religious, social and business purposes. As a rule, the legality of such combinations, when unincorporated, is conceded on commonlaw principles, and at present much encouragement is furnished by statutes for their formation as corporations. But as to combinations among wageworkers, particularly for the purpose of obtaining an increase of wages, there has been sometimes announced the anomalous doctrine that such combinations are illegal as criminal conspiracies. The origin of this supposed doctrine appears on a consideration of the social conditions that had prevailed in England for centuries, producing a series of statutes dating as far back as the fourteenth century, operating most oppressively upon the laboring classes.1 1 The doctrine has been thought to find support in such decisions as King v. Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge, 8 Modern, 10 (1721); King v. Mawbey, 6 T. R. 619, 636 (1796). The sentiment among the ruling classes who until recently controlled the courts as well as Parliament, is strikingly reflected in that remarkable and much misunderstood decision, Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 El. & Bl. 47 (1855), where a combination among a number of mill owners, designed to secure unity of management, was held illegal, though the element of tendency to suppress competition did not enter into the case. It seems difficult to sustain the decision on any accepted principle of law, as the objections urged against the combination equally applicable to an ordinary seem corporation or partnership. The real motive for the decision was the fear that, by an application of the homely maxim that "what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander," a decision sustaining the legality of the agreement would have been by analogy used to sustain the legality of combinations among workmen. Thus, it was said by Alderson, J., on appeal (p. 76): “If a bond of this sort between masters is capable of being enforced at law, an agreement to the same effect amongst workmen must be equally legal and enforceable; and so we shall be giving a legal effect to combinations of workmen for the purpose of raising wages, and make their strikes capable of being enforced at law." And so the agreement was held unlawful, even on the supposition that the object, But this doctrine never gained foothold in this country, where it has been generally repudiated, and it may be regarded as established here, as a common-law principle, that a combination among wageworkers for the purpose of obtaining an increase of wages or for any other lawful purpose is entirely lawful,' the only question of legality being as to viz., to protect against combinations of workmen, was lawful. As a logical result, this decision was followed in Hornby v. Close, 2 L. R. Q. B. 153 (1867), holding such combinations of workmen to be illegal. But the advance in public opinion is shown by the decision of the same court two years later, its constitution having been changed in the meantime, the court being now equally divided on the question of the legality of such combinations. Farrer v. Close, 4 L. R. Q. B. 602 (1869) But as a result of recent elaborate investigation, it must be considered as settled that the doctrine that a combination among workmen for the purpose of obtaining an increase of wages, never existed in England, independently of statute. See Wright on Criminal Conspiracies and Agreements, p. 44; Stephen's History of the Criminal Law of England, vol. 3, pp. 202-227; Master Stevedores' Assoc. v. Walsh, 2 Daly, 1 (1867), Moreover, in England the question is at rest since the enactment in 1875 of the "Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act," providing that "an agreement or combination by two or more persons to do or procure to be done any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between employers and workmen, shall not be indict able as a conspiracy if such act committed by one person would not be punishable as a crime." See English statutes and decisions reviewed in an article by Clifford Brigham in 21 Am. Law Rev. 41 (1887). 1 Following King v. Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge, 8 Modern, 10 (1721); King v. Mawbey, 6 T. R. 619, 636 (1796), such a combination was held illegal in People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 1 (1835), which was, however, decided under the New York statute making it a misdemeanor to conspire to "commit any act injurious to trade or commerce." But People v. Fisher is not law in New York since the enactment of Penal Code, § 170. Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 60 How.Pr. (N. Y.) 168 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1880). See observations upon People v. Fisher in Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 111, 135 (1842); Master Stevedores' Assoc. v. Walsh, 2 Daly, 1, 4 (1867). But the American authorities generally are to the effect as stated in the text. Thus, Master Stevedores' Assoc. v. Walsh, above, where the authorities are very critically examined, in a decision sustaining a by-law of an association of master stevedores providing for fixing prices for which members should work. Here the question was simply between the the means employed. To such a combination may be applied the general term trade union, which has been defined as a combination of workmen of the same trade or of several allied trades for the purpose of securing, by united action, the most favorable conditions as regards wages, hours of labor, etc., for its members." As in the case of an indi association and its members, in an action to enforce a penalty for violating the by-law. In view of the recent agitation against contracts in restraint upon competition, it seems almost strange that the court did not consider the case from the standpoint from which a court would nowadays certainly consider it, namely, whether the by-law was not void as tending to destroy competition. Other authorities holding or declaring that combinations to raise wages are not illegal are Moores v. Bricklayers' Union, 7 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 108 (Super. Ct. Cinn., 1889); Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 272; S. C., 24 S. W. Rep. 397 (1893); Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Oreg. 527; s. C., 38 Pac. Rep. 547 (1894; sustaining a by-law limiting the number of apprentices to be employed in a news paper office); Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 803, 817 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1894); United States v. Cassidy, 67 Id. 698, 711 (D. Ct. Cal., 1895); Clemmitt v. Watson, 14 Ind. App. 38; S. C., 42 N. E. Rep. 367 (1895); Snow v. Wheeler, 113 Mass. 179 (1873; sustaining association of workmen formed to protect themselves from "encroachments" from their employers, and agreeing not to teach others their trade without the permission of the association). See also Commonwealth v. Carlisle, 1 Brightly (Pa.), 36 (1821). In some States the validity of such combinations has, as in England (see above), been expressly declared by statute. See Appendix. See as to effect of Pennsylvania statutes, Commonwealth v. Sheriff, 15 Phila. 393 (1881). See also Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. St. 420; s, c., 28 Atl. Rep. 190 (1894; see as to whether such statutes are unconstitutional as class legislation). See, as to New York Penal Code, § 170, Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 60 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 168 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1880; refusing injunction against a combination to entice from employment); People ex rel. Gill v. Smith, 5 N. Y. Crim. R. 509 (N. Y. Co. Oyer & Terminer, 1887; held not to legalize combination to compel discharge of employee, no question as to the rate of wages being involved); People v. Barondess, 133 N. Y. 649; s. c., 31 N. E. Rep. 240 (1892; dissenting opinion of Gray, J., in 45 N. Y. State Rep. 248), reversing 61 Hun, 571, 581; s. C., 16 N. Y. Suppl. 436 (1891); Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33; s. c., 46 N. E. Rep. 297 (1897); People v. Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Crim. R. 403 (N. Y. Co. Oyer & Terminer, 1886); People v. Kostka, Id. 429 (N. Y. Co. Oyer & Terminer, 1886); Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. Suppl. 264 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1891). 1 Century Dictionary. The incorporation of trades unions is some vidual employee, to such a combination of employees is doubtless applicable the general doctrine already stated. As applied, it is that the existence of the relation of employee justifies acts by a combination of employees that are the natural incident or outgrowth of such relation, whether or not done with direct intent to injure. It seems clear that the same general limitations apply to this relation as to the relation of trade competitor, excluding acts of fraud and violence as means of attaining the purposes of the union. But the application of this doctrine to special classes of cases, such as strikes and boycotts, will be hereafter considered. Thus, as to methods adopted for the purpose of increasing or retaining membership or enforcing regulations of the union. We exclude here from consideration, as only times provided for by statute. As to Maryland statute see Lucke v. Clothing Cutters', etc. Assembly, 77 Md. 396; s. c., 26 Atl. Rep. 505 (1893); as to act of congress (24 U. S. Stat. at Large) authorizing incorporation of national trades unions, Arthur v. Oakes, 24 U. S. App. 239, 262; s. c., 63 Fed. Rep. 310, 324 (7th Cir., 1894). 1 Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33; S. C., 46 N. E. Rep. 297 (1897). Here the court say: "The social principle which justifies such organizations is departed from when they are so extended in their operation as either to intend or to accomplish injury to others. Public policy and the interests of society favor the utmost freedom in the citizen to pursue his lawful trade or calling, and if the purpose of an organization or combination of workingmen be to hamper or to restrict that freedom, and, through contracts or arrangements with employers, to coerce other work ingmen to become members of the organization, and to come under its rules and conditions, under the penalty of the loss of their position and of deprivation of employment, then that purpose seems clearly unlawful and militates against the spirit of our government and the nature of our institutions." The court approve of the following language used in Queen v. Rowlands, 17 Q. B. 671, 686 (1851), with reference to combinations of workingmen: “A combination for the purpose of injuring another is a combination of a different nature, directed personally against the party to be injured; and the law allowing them to combine for the purpose of obtaining a lawful benefit to themselves, gives no sanction to combinations which have for their immediate purpose the hurt of another." In accordance with the view we have already advanced, we consider this statement open to criticism as making the "purpose or intent |