that the motives for so quitting may be various. There may be physical infirmity producing incapacity, the prospect of higher wages or more congenial surroundings in another place or line of employment, and so on. In such cases there is not necessarily involved any intent to inflict injury upon another person, save as an intent may be inferred to produce injury to the employer, by the inconvenience produced by the withdrawal of an employee or a number of employees. And in such cases there is ordinarily involved no question of the legality of the quitting. But a combination to quit employment very often involves a definite intent to inflict injury. Applying, however, what has already been said, we may say here that (apart from the existence of contractual liability) the existence of the relation of employee justifies, as a natural incident or outgrowth of such relation, the quitting of employment, whether singly or in a combination, and whether or not with the intent to injure the employer (or any other person). This statement of the doctrine covers what have been termed sympathetic strikes, the only differ 1 Thus, where the intent is to inflict injury upon the employer to induce him to grant concessions, or in turn to injure a fellow-employee by refusing to continue to deal with him, that is to discharge him. So where the intent was to enforce a rule as to the number of apprentices to be employed by the employer. Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Oreg. 527; s. C., 38 Pac. Rep. 547 (1894). See § 10. In Arthur v. Oakes, 24 U. S. App. 239, 255; s. c., 63 Fed. Rep. 310, 319 (7th Cir., 1894), it is said: "The fact that employees of railroads may quit under circumstances that would show bad faith upon their part, or a reckless disregard of their contract or of the convenience and interests of both employer and the public, does not 1 ence between these and ordinary strikes being that, in case of the former, the object is not necessarily to influence the action of the employer of the striking employees, but that of some other employer with some purpose of whose employees the striking employees are in sympathy; as, for instance, where strikes are inaugurated on a number of lines of railroad for the purpose of influencing the proprietors of only one of these lines to grant an increase of wages. and from inducing them to refuse to extend to such company facilities for exchange of traffic. This was simply the case of the refusal of employees to do their work. It does not appear that they were under contract. But the court sought to justify the injunction on the ground that the intent of the employees was to induce their respective companies to refuse to deal with such other company, with the ultimate purpose of inducing the latter to discharge certain employees (engineers not members of the Brotherhood). We have elsewhere fully considered the propriety of considering intent, in determining whether a right of action arises from an action producing injury. See § 2. In the case cited, the doctrine that it is to be considered was very broadly applied. The court say in reply to the claim that an employee has the right to quit his employment, apart from contractual liability (p. 737): Generally speaking, this is true, but not absolutely. If he uses the benefit which his labor is or will be to another by threatening to withhold it or agreeing to bestow it, or by actually withholding it or bestowing it, for the purpose of 66 inducing, procuring or compelling that other to commit an unlawful or criminal act, the withholding or bestowing of his labor for such a purpose is itself an unlawful and criminal act." The decision was based not solely on the ordinary rules applicable to boycotts, but on the additional ground that the refusal to handle freight (being interstate freight) was in direct violation of the Interstate Commerce Law; hence the reference to inducing another "to commit an unlawful or criminal act." We elsewhere consider the legality of the acts intended, as distinct from the mere act of refusing to work. See § 12. So in Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 803, 818 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1894; for facts see § 12), it was said of a boycott: "All the employees had the right to quit their employment, but they had no right to combine to quit in order thereby to compel their employer to withdraw from a mutually profitable relation with a third person for the purpose of injuring that third person, when the relation thus sought to be broken had no effect whatever on the character or reward of their service." § 9. Liability for inducing refusal to deal; boycotts.No authority is needed to sustain the proposition that there is nothing inherently or necessarily illegal, either in refusing to deal or continue to deal, or in inducing a person to refuse to deal or continue to deal, with another. Thus there can, especially in case of response to a request for advice, be nothing inherently or necessarily illegal in inducing a person not to patronize this or that doctor or grocer. Such inducement or advice is a part of the very web and woof of ordinary neighborly and social intercourse. In a sense, injury is done by such act of inducement, in causing a loss of patronage. It seems at least doubtful, on principle, whether such injury is not too remote and contingent for the law to take into consideration. But supposing such injury to be done, 1 See observations of Lords Herschell and James, in Allen v. Flood, L. R. App. Cas. (1898), 1, 126, 179. In Ulery v. Chicago Live-stock Exchange, 54 Ill. App. 233 (1894), the action of a live-stock exchange in requesting its members not "to employ the plaintiff in the livestock commission business, or to transact any business with him at the Union Stock Yards," was held not unlawful, the court saying: "A person, with or without reason, may refuse to trade with another; so may ten or fifty persons refuse. An individual may advise his neighbor or friend not to trade with another neighbor; he may even command, when the command amounts only to earnest advice." It would seem scarcely necessary to argue that there is nothing inherently unlawful in merely refusing to deal with a person; but see People v. Duke, 19 Misc. (N. Y.) 292, 298 (N. Y. Co. General Sessions, 1897). In Wood ward v. Boston, 32 Am. Law Rev. 624 (Super. Ct. Mass., 1898), the discontinuance by the mayor of a city of work under a public contract was held not justified on the ground of non-compliance with a provision in the contract that the contractors should give preference in employment to "members of the several trades unions." Such provision was held void, as an unlawful discrimination between workmen. But if the contractors had the right to refuse to deal with, i e., refuse to employ, non-union workmen, why could they not bind themselves to so refuse to deal? 2 See § 13; Hughes v. McDonough, 43 N. J. Law, 459 (1881). In McDonald v. Edwards, 20 Misc. 523; S. C., 46 N. Y. Suppl. 672 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1897), where the alleged injury consisted in making statements to a guaranty company by reason of which it refused to give a bond for the plaintiff's good con and intentionally done, we may (ignoring the existence of the intent) still apply the test already stated, namely, whether the act was the natural incident or outgrowth of some existing lawful relation. We might perhaps content ourselves with asserting the general relation as a member of society, justifying such act as a natural incident or outgrowth of ordinary neighborly or social intercourse.1 But this general relation is commonly reinforced by a more special relation, like that of trade competitor or employer or duct to a party with whom the plaintiff was negotiating for employment, whereupon such party refused to employ the plaintiff, no action was held to lie, the act complained of not being the proximate cause of the injury. The court say: "Between the wrong of the defendant and the damage to the plaintiff, the voluntary act of a third party intervened; and that act was the proximate cause of plaintiff's loss of employment." Moreover, the defendant did not volunteer his opinion of the plaintiff to the company, which had been referred to the defendant by the plaintiff to furnish information as to his habits and character. 1 This view seems fully sustained by Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578; S. C., 33 Pac. Rep. 492 (1893), (see § 13), which, although a case of inducement to break a contract, seems a fortiori applicable to the case of inducement not to deal. It must be admitted, however, that the authorities generally have not as yet gone to that extent. Thus, it was broadly stated by Lopes, J., in Temperton v. Russell, 1 L. R. Q. B. (1893), 715, 731: "The result of the authorities appears to me to be that a combination by two or more per sons to induce others not to deal with a particular individual, or enter into contracts with him, if done with the intention of injuring him, is an actionable wrong, if damage results to him therefrom." In harmony with this view is Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400; s. c., 16 S. W. Rep. 111 (1891), holding it actionable for a combination of cattle dealers to induce others not to sell to a butcher, it appearing that their interference with his business was not to serve any legitimate purpose of their own, but was wanton and malicious, causing pecuniary loss to him, as they intended. Here the relation of the defendants does not appear; but compare subsequent decision. (See note 2, below.) 2 Thus, the interest common to a body of tradesmen to protect themselves against dishonest debtors. On this ground have been sustained agreements among the members of such a body not to deal with a person indebted to any one of their number. Delz v. Winfree, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 11; s. c., 25 S. W. Rep. 50 (1894; see former decision, note 1, above); Brewster v. Miller, - Ky. employee. The question of legality has more commonly arisen in case of the acts of combinations of individuals than of mere individuals. But as, according to authorities already considered,2 the act is not made illegal by the intent to injure, so according to others' it is not made illegal by varian Brewing Co., 96 Ky. 224; s. C., 28 S. W. Rep. 504 (1894). In the case last cited, however, it was intimated that, if the plaintiff had not been indebted, the action of the combination would have been unlawful. But in Park v. National Wholesale Druggists' Assoc., 50 N. Y. Suppl. 1064 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1896), an injunction was allowed against a combination of wholesale druggists and manufacturers of proprietary medicines, to prevent a customer of one from obtaining goods from the rest, because of violation by such customer of an agreement as to prices of goods to be sold by the latter. Compare further decision in 30 N. Y. App. Div. 508; S. C., 52 N. Y. Suppl. 475 (1898); also Park v. Hubbard, 30 N. Y. App. Div. 517; s. c., 52 N. Y. Suppl. 481 (1898). Somewhat analogous is the case of the interest common to a body of employers in a contest with employees. Thus, in Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. St. 420, 430; s. c., 28 Atl. Rep. 190 (1894), an action by a dealer in building materials was held not to lie against an association of persons engaged in the business of contracting and building, for inducing dealers in building materials not to sell to the plaintiff. The ground of this action of the association was that the plaintiff had conceded the demands of workmen engaged in a general strike in the building trades. The court, considering it necessary to show the legality of the relation, after drawing a distinction between the rate of wages as fixed by the law of supply and demand in the absence of combination, and the rate as fixed by a combination of workmen, justified the defendants' acts on the ground thus stated: "The combination of the employers was not to interfere with the price of labor as determined by the common-law theory, but to defend themselves against a demand made altogether regardless of the price as regulated by the supply." To similar effect is Buchanan v. Kerr, 159 Pa. St. 433; s. c., 28 Atl. Rep. 195 (1894). 1 Though, as is well said by E. P. Cheyney, in 4 Pol. Sci. Quart. 274 (1889), "a boycott might be initiated as well by a single person as by a combination." 2 See § 2. In Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 49 U. S. App. 709, 722; s. c., 83 Fed. Rep. 912, 921 (8th Cir., 1897. See § 15), a case of a threatened boycott by employees, the court called attention to the fact that one object was "to deprive the public at large of the benefits to be derived from a labor-saving machine, which seems to have been one of great utility." 3 See § 4. |