of this sort. The letter also goes beyond the pleasantries usual on such occasions to mention (although in standard terms) several political matters, US-Polish relations, the Conference on European Security, and Vietnam. Moreover the letter is very warm in tone." Kissinger joined the Department of State in recommending that the President respond. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files-Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972) On December 4 Nixon signed a letter to Gierek thanking him for his "cordial and thoughtful letter." "It is satisfying to know," he wrote, "that the talks which I had with you and your colleagues have been followed by some very concrete and useful steps in our bilateral relations.... We anticipate that Poland will play a helpful role in preparing for the current projects for promoting cooperation in Europe. As you will recall from our talks last spring, there is no cause to which I am more dedicated than ending the war in Vietnam. It now appears we are close to that goal. We look to your cooperation and assistance in the demanding task of keeping the peace in that area once the ceasefire has been established." (Ibid.) Romania 176. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 Washington, January 27, 1969. SUBJECT Romanians Fish for High-Level US Visit In the attached message (Bucharest 139),2 Ambassador Davis reports a conversation with Romanian party and state chief Ceausescu in which the latter urged that US-Romanian "political relations" be developed, referred to his meeting with President Nixon two years ago3 and expressed hope that the President might some time visit Romania. He also expressed the hope that President Johnson might visit Romania. I doubt whether Ceausescu would expect this invitation to be taken up, at least any time soon and I think Dick Davis is right in supposing that the Romanians are fishing for a high-level but less than Presidential visit. I believe this is well worth considering as is the possibility of more or less regular political consultations. This kind of activity, if carried on without excessive fanfare, would be in the category of deterrence diplomacy along the lines of what we have been doing with the Yugoslavs. There are of course pitfalls: if you overdo the deterrence you may bring on the thing you are trying to prevent; if we invest too much of our prestige in our relations we have more of it to lose if things go badly. But given skill and the built-in restraints, both here and in Bucharest, I think the State Department can be encouraged to pursue Ceausescu's overture. My candidate for a trip some time would be Governor Scranton. HS Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files-Europe, Romania, Vol. I -8/69. Confidential. Sonnenfeldt routed the memorandum through Eagleburger. 177. Memorandum of Conversation1 Washington, April 1, 1969, 5:30–6 p.m. SUBJECT Situation in Europe PARTICIPANTS Romania: Gheorghe Macovescu, First Deputy Foreign Minister The Secretary Geroge R. Kaplan, EUR/EE, Romanian Affairs Recalling that he had met both President Eisenhower and Secretary Rogers late in the Eisenhower administration when he was Minister here, Mr. Macovescu expressed his personal condolences as well as those of President Ceausescu.2 The Secretary replied that, as the youngest member of the Eisenhower Cabinet, he had had a special feeling toward the late President who had been something like a father to him. Mr. Macovescu said that his government desired above all a better atmosphere and peace in Europe and was pursuing the avenues it considered appropriate toward this end. He noted that he would be visiting Dutch Foreign Minister Luns in The Hague immediately following his Washington trip. The Secretary said that we, too, not only want peace but are willing to go half way and more to achieve it. He said that a new administration has a certain initial advantage and can therefore take a fresh look at the important problems of achieving it. He noted, however, that Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and Mr. Brezhnev's ideological justification had ominous overtones. Mr. Macovescu said that the Brezhnev doctrine was not a justification but rather an explanation. The Romanian Government, he said, simply does not accept this doctrine and has stated its views repeat 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL EUR E. Confidential. Drafted by Kaplan and approved in S on April 4. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is part 1 of 4; parts 2 through 4 are ibid. 2 Former President Eisenhower died on March 28. Macovescu attended the March 30 state funeral as the representative of his government. 3 See footnote 3, Document 72. edly. The Secretary said that, while the Brezhnev doctrine may indeed be an explanation for one situation, it could as easily be construed as justification for all situations. Mr. Macovescu said that the Romanian delegation had signed the Budapest declaration on March 174 in good faith, feeling that it provided an excellent starting point in the quest for an improved atmosphere in Europe. Romania wants to play a role in working toward the abolition of blocs and the prevention of Czechoslovakia-type situations. Equally important, of course, is to build something tangible for the future. In this connection, he emphasized that the military arrangements agreed to in Budapest were not directed against anyone. The Secretary asked how this could be the case. Mr. Macovescu replied that prior to these arrangements, the Warsaw Pact had no actual working regulations. The Soviets could do whatever they wished. Now, all members know their obligations. It would now be impossible, for example, for the Soviets to decide unilaterally that maneuvers would be held anywhere in the Warsaw Pact area. Mr. Macovescu stated categorically that the subject of maneuvers had not arisen in the Budapest meeting. The Secretary asked if there had been any discussion in Budapest concerning Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Macovescu replied that, although there had not, the Romanian Government takes every opportunity to inform the Soviets that they would be well-advised to remove their troops and renounce solutions to international problems by force. Mr. Macovescu said that he had been instructed by President Ceausescu to emphasize that Romania did not want any special help from the United States but would on its own renounce any pressure to subscribe to any policy dictated from outside Romania. He reiterated that Romania intends to decide its own destiny by itself. The Secretary noted that it would probably be just as well in these circumstances for the United States to stay quiet. Mr. Macovescu agreed. The Secretary said that we have already told the Soviets on a number of occasions that another Czechoslovakia would make any improvement in bilateral relations utterly impossible. Dobrynin knows this. The Secretary said that both he and the President respect the Romanian attitude and detect obvious concern over it on the part of the USSR. Mr. Macovescu said that President Ceausescu had been absolutely clear in his public statements and in his contacts with the Soviets that, while Soviet-Romanian friendship is desirable, Romania had * For extracts of the relevant portions of the communiqué issued by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact appealing for a Conference on European Security, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1035–1037. no intention of strewing flowers in the path of the Soviets should they decide to enter Romania. He added that his country's policy was more realistic than courageous. The Secretary asked if the Soviets had given any assurances to the Romanian leadership that they would not invade their country. Mr. Macovescu replied that the question had a certain academic quality inasmuch as the Soviets had given such assurances to the Czechoslovaks. 178. Editorial Note On May 20, 1969, Ambassador to Romania Richard Davis reported that in the course of a discussion with Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu, the latter had extended an invitation for President Richard Nixon to visit Romania. Davis characterized the invitation as "hardly surprising," and noted that the Romanians, "in pursuit their policy of develop[ing] good bilateral relations with all countries have increasingly used technique of visit exchanges." He endorsed such a visit as promoting improved bilateral U.S.-Romanian relations. (Telegram 983 from Bucharest, May 20; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files-Europe, Romania, Vol. I—8/69) The United States agreed to a visit in June and set the dates for August 1-3. The Romanian visit became the last stop on a Presidential trip to the Far East from July 23 to August 1. President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger discussed the background and the visit in White House Years, pages 151–158. |