alive to these considerations, simple and forcible as they may seem. Something more is still wanting than the lessons of our own case, to awaken us to a proper sense of the unchangeable character of the individual, with whom we have to deal.

"The indulgence of a sort of undefined hope," says Mr. Burke, when speaking of the light, in which the first revolutionary usurpers of France were viewed both at home and abroad," an obscure confidence that some lurking remains of "virtue, some degree of shame, might exist in the breast of the " oppressors of France, has been among the causes which have "helped to bring on the common ruin of the king and people."* This observation may be well applied to the public feeling in the United States, and perhaps among some of the nations of Europe, in relation to Bonaparte. The prevalence of a delusion similar to that here described has conduced materially to the success of his schemes of conquest on the Continent of Europe, and should we not soon be undeceived, may lead to the triumphant accomplishment of his designs on this country. It betrays and disarms those who are exposed to his omnivorous ambition; renders them careless of timely precautions; feeble and irresolute in their opposition to his intrigues. The same profound writer whom we have quoted above, justly remarks, that there is no safety for honest men, but by believing all possible evil of bad men, and by acting with promptitude, decision and steadiness on that belief.f

If any thing can be effectual when our own bitter experience has proved insufficient, to dissipate all reliance on the moderation or justice of the French emperor, it must be the contemplation of his deportment, towards the nations immediately within the range of his power. Our limits and object will not permit us to develop this subject fully, nor indeed is it desirable that we should retrace here, a group of horrors which has been so minutely, and glowingly depicted, by other and abler hands. We shall therefore be satisfied, with merely recalling to the recollection of the public, some of the most flagrant of the instances of foreign usurpation, chargeable upon the imperial government of France. Many of the circumstances attendant on the oppression of Portugal, and the erasure of Holland from the list of nations, are, however, of so peculiar a character and so hideously illustrative of the complicated depravity of the usurper, that we shall not be well able to refrain from noticing them in detail, in order, if possible, that no part of the benefit of so instructive a warning may be lost to our readers. The case of Spain, of all the enormities recorded of human guilt, the most abominable in its nature, and the most pernicious in its effects, we shall not attempt to describe. The simple narrative of the facts already so familiar to the world, is in itself sufficient to awaken all the emotions which could be expected to result, from the agency of the most consummate powers of description or of reprobation, that were ever exerted in the cause of virtue or honour.

However useful to our purpose the history of the cozenage and the devastation of Spain, we must confess that for the reputation of human nature, and for the interests of the American name, we could almost wish that an impenetrable veil were for ever thrown over these terrible scenes. With respect to the conduct of the American administration, in relation to this subject, we have but one faint consolation. Should the free government of the United States continue to flourish a century hence, and the spirit of our revolutionary patriots animate the breasts of the people who will then be in the enjoyment of the fruits of their struggle, that people may reject as a sacrilegious perversion of their annals, -as spurious and malignant, the tradition which records, that we, the immediate descendants of those who threw off the British yoke,-disclaimed all sympathy-all political communion, with the victims of so monstrous a combination of cruelty and fraud;-nay, even sought the alliance and rejoiced in the triumphs of the usurper, at a moment too, when, after having laid waste and deluged with blood the theatre of his hellish enterprise, so far from manifesting either compunction, or irresolution, he was, with a ferocity heightened by disappointment, and a rancor embittered by opposition, collecting all his strength for new and mightier efforts, destined to consummate, not merely the ruin of the Peninsula, but that of the cause of freedom throughout the Continent of Europe. With our posterity, and with the high-minded and intelligent among our contemporaries, the circumstance that the Spaniards have not displayed in their own defence, all the wisdom which their safety demands, or all the energy which their injuries are fitted to inspire, will not serve as our vindication.

To the generous eye,
Distress is virtue; and, though self-betrayed,
A people struggling with their fate must rouse
The hero's throb.

THOMSON'S LIBERTY.*

* Or in the just language of another poet,

The state that strives for liberty, tho' foiled

And fore'd to abandon what she bravely sought,
Deserves at least applause for her attempt,
And pity for the loss.

How ardently do we not wish to see realized in the case of Spain what follows in the same passage of Cowper:

But that's a cause

Not often unsuccessful: pow'r usurped
Is weakness when opposed; conscious of wrong,
'Tis pusillanimous and prone to flight.

We must confess, however, that we still tremble for the fate of the Peninsula, notwithstanding the glorious efforts and the brilliant achievements of the British. Passionately eager as we are for the final triumph of their arms, we yet can scarcely venture to cherish the expectation of such a result. We cannot comprehend how they are to resist for any length of time, the force which will be brought to act against them, without a cooperation on the part of those whom they defend, of another kind from that which is now lent. It is not enough that the Spaniards and Portuguese should hate their invaders. To insure their final liberation, there should be wisdom and providence in their councils, energy and unity in their military operations, skill in their commanders, a strong attachment and implicit deference to their protectors Judging from the accounts of the English travellers who have recently traversed Spain, and from the state of her military force, we are compelled to conclude that the very reverse is the case. Should Bonaparte accomplish her subjugation, she will in all probability be annexed to the French empire. His intentions on this subject are distinctly announced in the notes given by the Moniteur of the 26th of February last, on the Prince regent's speech at the opening of parliament. Some part of these notes is exceedingly curious, and deserves to be laid before our readers. There is, we think, much truth in what is said, with respect to the improbability of the final success of the British arms in Portugal.

"While you are exhausting yourselves on all sides," says the official paper addressing the British, -" the French army, conformably to our fundamental law on this head, lives upon the country in which it carries on the war, and costs France nothing more than the pay of the troops, which she would be obliged to defray wherever they might be."

"If Massena having received his reinforcements and his beseiging artil

:

This sentiment of the poet must be that of every truly noble and virtuous heart. There can be no real love of liberty, where there is not a determined, implacable hatred for oppression;no security for the continuance of free institutions, or of na

lery, marches upon you, after having silenced your batteries, or if you march against him, what will be the consequence? If you are victorious, you will finally gain nothing; for you will have scarcely advanced two steps, before you will encounter new armies. If you are vanquished, you are lost."

"We do not know what are precisely the views of the cabinet of the Thuilleries, but we heartily wish that the prince of Esling would continue to manœuvre, instead of attacking you, and keep you thus at bay for some years. The result would be for you, a hundred millions more added to your national debt, and for us the certainty of a more complete subjugation of the Peninsula. Where so large an extent of continent is concerned, what is the matter of a few years. All nations that have been subdued, defended themselves for several years. You alone set the example, before unknown to history, of a nation overcome in a single battle, and so completely subjected to the Normans your conquerors, that your laws, your usages, and your all was wrested from you by a single victory."

"Is it probable that England can contend against France in Spain? This is the whole question. She could not do it, when considerable Spanish armies occupied Saragossa, St. Andero, Bilboa and Burgos. The fine army of Moore was compelled to fly with the loss of every thing.-England could not do it at the period of the third coalition. Wellington advanced as far as Talavera: he obtained there some advantages; but he was almost immediately after obliged to abandon his hospitals and his sick, and to take refuge in Portugal. The presence of Moore could not prevent the defeat of the Spanish armies under Blake and Castanos, and the capture of Saragossa and Madrid. Wellington victorious at Talavera could not prevent the passage of the Sierra Morena, the occupation of Seville, Grenada, &c. And if it be admitted, as no man of sense can doubt, as the English generals themselves declared after the expedition of Moore, that it is impossible for them to defend the Peninsula, why do they expose themselves without any hope of success? The effect of the conduct of England will be in this instance, as it has been in all others, to consolidate the power of France."

"England, although convinced by experience that she could not defend Spain, has, without doubt, given employment to 300,000 Frenchmen; but Spain conquered foot by foot will be entirely subdued, and England may charge herself with having compromitted the independence and the integrity of Spain. The conquest of Spain will lead to consequences very different from those of a mere change of dynasty, which would have imparted to her the benefit of the reforms and liberal ideas introduced by a young, firm and vigorous government. Posterity, for whom years are but as an instant, will ascribe to the improvulent policy of England alone, the important results which will redound so eminently to the advantage of France." "The English government cannot sustain its credit with a losing commerce. It is directly affected by every individual failure. The French go. vernment on the contrary, has a credit independent of bankers and mercantile houses-Nine hundred millions of revenue received in hard money, the revenue of the empire itself, represents the wealth of her soil, and is more than sufficient for all her expenses (tous ses services)"

So much for the observations of the Moniteur. Our readers will do well to compare the boast made relative to the sufficiency of the internal revenue for all the public expenses, with the following passage which we extract from the report of the French minister of finance concerning the budget of 1808, opened the last year to the legislative assembly.

"It is probable," says the minister addressing Bonaparte, "that some ad

tional independence, if those who enjoy and cherish them at home, are not indignantly alive to the abominations of tyranny abroad, and at all times eager to protect, or disposed at least to countenance, the cause of liberty and justice wherever endangered. Admitting that the Spaniards are unfaithful to themselves, ungrateful to their magnanimous protectors protectors, prone to ignorance and to slavery, the guilt of the invader is not the less monstrous, nor the general tendency of his usurpation the less formidable; the reputation and the interests of a moral and republican people like that of the United States, do not the less imperiously and evidently require, that they should proclaim without reserve their abhorrence of his crimes, and exert indefatigably their utmost vigor to frustrate the accomplishment of his views. It would not seem to be within