to be foreseen in all their variety and extent, it followed of necessity, that no bounds could be assigned to the powers which such a government would require. The Convention were guided, on this head, by doctrines of which the solidity can no more be questioned, than the sagacity can fail to be admired. As they may serve to the more complete development of the merits of the constitution, we shall quote them in some detail, commencing with the enumeration made by the Federalist of its leading objects.

"The principal purposes," says General Hamilton, "to be answered by the Union are these:-the common defence of the members:-the preservation of the public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations, and between the states; the superintendence of our intercourse political and commercial with foreign countries.*

"The authorities essential to the care of the common defence are theseto raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both, to direct their operations and to provide for their support. These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances which endanger the safety of nations, are infinite, and for this reason, no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed, on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive with all possible combinations of circumstances, and ought to be under the direction of the same councils, which are appointed to preside over the common defence. This is one of those truths which to an unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along with it. It rests upon axioms as simple as they are universal-the means should be proportioned to the end -the persons from whose agency the attainment of any end is expected, ought to possess the means by which it is to be attained. The moment it is decided in the affirmative that there ought to be a federal government, intrusted with the care of the common defence, it will follow, that such a government, ought to be clothed with all the powers requisite to the complete execution of its trust.

"Every view we take of the subject, as candid inquirers after truth, will serve to convince us, that it is both unwise and dangerous to deny the federal government, an unconfined authority, in respect to all those objects which are intrusted to its management. The very extent of the country is the strongest argument in favour of an energetic government, for any other can never certainly preserve the union of so large an empire.

"Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be observed, because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable. In pursuing an inquiry concerning the powers necessary for the govern

• The preamble to the constitution, declaratory of the purposes of the Union, is of the utmost possible latitude of comprehension. "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, provide for the common defence, insure domestic tranquillity, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish," &c.

ment, we must bear in mind, that we are not to confine our view to the present period, but to look forward to remote futurity. Constitutions of civil polity, are not to be framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies; but upon a combination of these with the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural and tried course of human affairs. Nothing therefore can be more fallacious than to infer the extent of any power proper to be lodged in the national government, from an estimate of its immediate necessities: There ought to be a capacity to provide for future contingencies, as they may happen, and as these are illimitable in their nature, so it is impossible safely to limit that capacity.

"A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution for want of proper powers, or from the usurpation of powers requisite for the public safety. Whether the usurpation when once begun, will stop at the salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, must depend on the contingencies of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of power, called for on pressing exigencies, by a defective constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional authority. There are certain emergencies of nations, in which expedients, which in the ordinary state of things ought to be forborne, become essential to the public weal; and the government from the possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have the power of making use of them."

It was thus that the Convention reasoned on the subject of the powers to be allotted to the constitution. They knew that nothing short of an abstract omnipotence, as to the means of accomplishing the objects we have mentioned, would answer the ends of its creation. Liberty, according to their sense of legislative duty, was not only to be boldly asserted, and correctly defined, but to be permanently imbodied, and firmly secured. This great, vivifying, and tutelary principle was not to be left, "in all the nakedness, solitude, and imbecility of "metaphysical abstraction," but to be brought into beneficial operation, and to be directed to its proper ends, by those artificial aids and arrangements, without the support of which it must remain inert and unproductive. It was to be invested with its natural relations:-to be combined with a fixed code of laws with a regular administration of justice-" with "public force-with the collection of an effective, and well "distributed revenue-with morality and religion-with so"lidity and property-with peace and order-with civil and "social manners."*

To establish such an association, and not merely to proclaim, classify, or expound natural rights, however accurately or luminously, is the true end and scope of government in its essence. This was preeminently the object of the federal system, which its framers wished, and intended to render capable of securing to the country, all the benefits that can accrue to man from the establishment of civil society.-To accom

Mr. Burke-Reflections on French Revolution. "Without these," adds this experienced statesman, "liberty is not a benefit while it lasts, nor is it "likely to continue long."

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plish their purpose, they laboured to render it, in its theory at least, the instrument of all the powers, and the organ of all the wisdom contained in the nation; framing it, however, so as to oblige it to control itself, and subjecting it for its continuance, to the will of the majority, deliberately formed, and solemnly expressed. With respect to this point, we may apply to the legislators of the Convention, the language which Mr. Burke uses, in speaking of the measures of those who regenerated the English constitution in 1666. "Ill," says this great writer, " would our ancestors at the revolution have "deserved their fame for wisdom, if they had found no "security for their freedom, but in rendering their government " feeble in its operations, and precarious in its tenure; if "they had been able to contrive no better remedy against " arbitrary power than civil confusion."

The Convention, guided by the comprehensive, and enlightened views we have mentioned, endowed the federal government with powers of the most ample nature, equal to the attainment of all the useful purposes of public authority. It now possesses-with the exception of the right of imposing duties on exports, -an unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary modes; and an unlimited discretion with regard to the disposal of the revenue;-an absolute command over the physical strength of the states, with the faculty of organizing that strength in any form, and of employing it in any way which may be deemed necessary for the purposes, either of executing the laws of the Union, of repressing insurrections, of repelling invasions, of defending the several states against mutual or domestic violence, and of securing to them the enjoyment of a republican form of government. It is invested also with a judicial power, to be exercised through the agency of a supreme court, established by the constitution, and of inferior tribunals to be created at the pleasure of congress; which judicial power extends to all cases, in law, and equity, arising under the federal constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which may be made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, to controversies to which the United States are a party; to controversies between two or more states, between citizens of different states, between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under grants of different states, and between the citizens of a state, and foreign states, citizens and subjects. The powers which we have here enumerated, together with the exclusive right of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and between the states, &c. give to the federal government, not only an adequate share of constitutional strength, but, as was intended by the Convention, much of that adventitious authority, to which we alluded in our seventeenth page. The sources from which springs the mere influence, as contradistinguished from the power of a government, and the utility of that influence, were well understood by the Convention, and are ably explained in the Federalist.

"I will," says General Hamilton, "hazard an observation, not the less just, because to some it may appear new; which is that the more the operations of the national authority, are mingled in the ordinary exercise of government; the more the citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their political life; the more it is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings; the further it enters into those objects which touch the most sensible chords, and put in motion the most active springs of the human heart; the greater will be the probability that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of the community. Man is very much a creature of habit. A thing which rarely strikes his senses, will have but a transient influence over his mind. A government continually at a distance and out of sight, can hardly be expected to interest the sensations of the people. The inference is that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the citizens towards it, will be strengthened rather than weakened, by its extension to what are called matters of internal concern; and that it will have less occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity, and comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through those channels and currents, in which the passions of mankind naturally flow, the less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous devices of compulsion."

strength

The Convention availed themselves of every practicable expedient, which had a tendency to strengthen the foundations of the federal system. For this purpose they have provided in their plan, that all the senators and representatives in congress, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers both of the United States, and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the constitution.-For the purpose also, according to the language of the Federalist, -" of guarding against "all caviling refinements in those who might hereafter feel a "disposition to curtail, and evade the legitimate authorities of "the Union," they have introduced two clauses, declaratory of a character, and vesting an authority, in the constitution, which, as the same writer justly observes, would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication, from the very act of endowing it with certain specified powers. These clauses are as follows. "That the federal legislature be authorized, to " make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper for car"rying into execution, the powers vested by the constitution "in the government of the United States, or in any department

"or office thereof: and that the constitution and the laws of the "United States, made in pursuance of the constitution, and the "treaties made by their authority, shall be the supreme law of "the land." Nothing we think can be more obvious, than that the constitutional operation of the federal government, would be precisely the same, if the foregoing provisions had been entirely omitted. It follows necessarily and immediately, from the establishment of a constitution, and from the very meaning of the term, that it must be the supreme law of the land: otherwise it would be a mere dead letter. It is equally clear that wherever certain powers are given, the means of carrying them into effect are of course included, and that the federal legislature is therefore authorized, by virtue of an indisputable axiom, to make all laws which may be necessary and proper, for the execution of the trusts reposed in the constitution. But the Convention chose, to perform thus what might, in strictness, be deemed a work of supererogation, and to delegate this authority in express terms, "rather than afford a pretext, which might be seized on critical occasions, for "drawing into question, the essential powers of the Union."* They were desirous with respect to the fundamental prerogatives of the constitution, if possible, to leave nothing for construction, and this not so much with a view of prescribing limits to its authority, as of obviating the attempts, which might otherwise be made to explain, and fritter away its vital powers. "They foresaw," says General Hamilton in the Federalist, "what it has been the principal aim of these pa"pers to inculcate, that the danger which most threatens, our "political welfare is, that the state governments, will finally sap the foundations of the Union." If they entertained any serious apprehension, relative to the sufficiency of their work, it was on the ground of its being defective in internal strength. Were it to be now interpreted, according to the spirit and views of the framers, all possible extent would be granted to the compass of its leading powers, and the utmost latitude of choice, as to the means of carrying them into effect; particularly when those means are obviously conducive to

* Mr. Madison.

• "Had the Convention," says the same writer, "attempted a positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying the general powers into effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which the constitution relates, accommodated too, not only to the existing state of things, but to all possible changes which futurity may produce; for in every new application of a general power, the particular powers which are the means of attaining the object of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that object, and be often properly varied, while the object remains the same." Number 44.

VOL. II.

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