311

Mémoire sur la Conduite de la France et de l'Angleterre à l'égard des Neutres. A Faris 1810. pp. 243.

Memoir on the Conduct of France and England towards Neutrals. Paris, 1810. pp. 243. 8vo.

THE work which we here announce is one of no ordinary interest for the rulers of this country. It was published in Paris in the summer of 1810, and must of course, from the nature of the supervision exercised over the press in that capital, be understood as speaking the sense of the French government on the topics of which it treats. Independently of the general presumption to this effect, which is certain as to all works of a political cast, there are, in this case, particular reasons leading infallibly to the same conclusion. We find throughout, intrinsic evidence that the volume was either written or dictated, by a member of that government, and given to the world under its immediate auspices. The tone is evidently official, and the tenets are those, which it is one of the most favourite objects of the French despot, to establish in the belief of mankind, although the course of his habitual policy, and the operation of all his measures, tend directly to confirm their falsehood. The author of the work, whoever he may be, is a -person of some ability as a writer, and well skilled in all the common-place sophisms and invectives, with respect to the maritime pretensions of Great Britain, which have filled the columns of the Moniteur with little intermission or variety, since the commencement of the French revolution. He displays no despicable share of learning in maritime jurisprudence and diplomatic history, and indulges occasionally in that kind of sarcasm, and still more largely, in that kind of declamation, which distinguish the writings of Hauterive, to whom in fact the Memoir has been attributed.

The purport of this informal manifesto, as it may be called, is to prove, that France has, from the earliest periods, recognised the most liberal principles with respect to the rights of neutral commerce and the freedom of navigation; that she has neglected no opportunity of proclaiming them; and that in all her proceedings however violent in appearance, or illegal, according to the maxims of universal justice, she has had but one object, the liberty of the seas; while on the other hand, the conduct of England has been the very reverse; invariably animated by an insatiable lust of domination, and obstinately opposed to the principles of maritime legislation adopted by the continental powers.

The mode in which the Author of the Memoir attempts to substantiate this doctrine is, by tracing summarily the progress of maritime law from its origin to the present time, and investigating the true principles, upon which it rests according to the usage of nations, the opinions of enlightened jurists and the spirit of modern treaties. The historical deduction embraces four distinct periods; the first of which ends with the year 1763;-the second with the commencement of the French revolution in 1789; the third with the treaty of Amiens in 1802;-the fourth with the state of things at the time the work was published.

With this deduction is interwoven, of course, an highly coloured narrative of the unremitted efforts of the British, both by perfidy and violence, to monopolize all power on the ocean, and to explode the maxims of public law received by the other nations of Europe.

As it might be expected also, the moderation, disinterestedness, and liberality of France are made to contrast with the cupidity, pride and ambition of her rival, in such a manner, that there cannot, -to use the language of the Memoir itself, -"fail to result, a prejudice altogether in favour of France and her cause." Not much is said concerning the conduct of the two powers towards this country, during the third period. The fourth, however, or the division corresponding to it, which embraces nearly one half of the work, is taken up entirely with the history of their relations with the United States, who are represented, as having no ground of complaint against France, and every reason to execrate the lawless policy of her antagonist, "our natural enemy and our vindictive oppressor."

From the space allotted to American concerns, and the stress laid upon them, it is quite apparent that the work was intended to bear chiefly upon the questions arising out of the late proceedings of the belligerents, which now engage our public councils, and to give us and the world to understand,somewhat obliquely indeed, but yet with perfect clearness,what are the steady views and the fixed resolves of his imperial majesty, with respect to his decrees and to our relative deportment. We shall, therefore, extract merely such passages as appear to have a direct application to our affairs, and to be calculated to enlighten us on the topics of most interest to our public welfare. The merits of the argument to which the first divisions of the work are allotted, do not call for any particular attention from us. The author exhibits some ingenuity in this part, together with all the partiality and knavery of a profligate swindler pleading his own cause, and labouring to acquire a reputation for honesty and philanthropy, chiefly with a view of accomplishing the more easily, the entire ruin of his dupes. In dwelling upon the concurrence of the nations of the continent in certain doctrines of maritime legislation, and upon the resistance made to them by the British, he studiously keeps out of view the important facts-that the former in their occasional coalitions, (for nothing like unanimity on this head, ever prevailed) could have been prompted by some other impulse, than a mere sense of right and justice;-that the naval power of Great Britain, oftentimes a barrier to their schemes of aggrandizement, and seemingly injurious to their commercial interests, might have been viewed with an eye of jealousy and aversion;-that the desire of seeing it either destroyed or reduced, might have influenced them to unite, from time to time, in any code likely to conduce to that end; and particularly that France, in abetting as she uniformly did, such sinister coalitions, cannot, with any sagacious or impartial reader of history, obtain credit for any other motive, than that of prostrating a hated and dreaded rival.

It is material for us, to remark in this place, that the principles, which, according to the first part of this Memoir, were, until the middle of the eighteenth century, the established law of continental Europe, and which France at all times asserted, are no other than those announced in the preamble to the Berlin decree; to wit; that maritime war cannot be lawfully extended to any private property whatever, nor to persons who are not military;-that the right of blockade should be restrained to fortified places actually invested by a competent force; that free ships make free goods, &c. This last maxim particularly, is the burden of every page of the first and second divisions, and declared to be fundamental as to the rights of trading nations, and essential to the prosperity of neutral com

merce.

"The Americans," says the Memoir in page 101, "had suffered more than any other nation from the instructions issued from time to time by the British council. No people was more interested in the establishment of a maritime code founded upon neutral rights. Nevertheless, whether the fear of a rupture with England prevented their making opposition to her usurpations, or the voice of private, silenced that of the public interest, it must be acknowledged that the principles once received in America with so much enthusiasm, underwent a sensible change. It appears even from the correspondence of Mr. Jefferson with Mr. Genet and with Mr. Morris, that the doctrine of the Americans became quite conformable to the views of England; and that they considered the seizure of enemy's property on board of a neutral ship, as authorized by the law of nations. Without doubt this consideration embol. dened the British government to push its pretensions still further."

"We may be well astonished that, after suffering so much injury, and so many iniquitous aggressions, the government of the United States, should, instead of demanding reparation, have sent Mr. Jay to London to negotiate the treaty of 1794, in which not only is there no mention made of the rights so vehemently asserted, and solemnly recognised, by the continental powers fifteen years before, but the privilege of search, of impressment, and of the extension of blockades, is expressly reserved to Great Britain, and the principle that "the flag covers the merchandise" totally abandoned."

Again in page 131" It is evident that, in consequence of the conduct and maxims of the British at the commencement of the present war, and of the acquiescence of neutrals-France was then intitled to exercise the right of blockade against England, in all its possible extension, and seize English merchandise wherever she could find them. Moreover, as the war declared in 1802 was in fact a war of commerce, France, from the necessity under which she laboured of providing for her own safety, was intitled to deprive England of all means of prolonging the contest, by subjecting her commerce to every possible impediment. Neutrals not having taken the same attitude towards both belligerents, could no longer claim the advantages of neutrality; thus France was no longer bound towards them, and from the beginning of the rupture, could justifiably have taken every measure which was required by her interests injured as they were by the cupidity of the British, and the blind condescension of neutrals."

With respect to the orders in council, the conduct of our government in the affair of captain Whitby, and the issuing of the Berlin and Milan decrees, the Memoir holds the following language:

"On the murder of John Pearce by the captain of the Leander, president Jefferson issued a proclamation, according

to which it might have been supposed, that the outrage could admit of no explanations. Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney had been sent on a special mission, for the redress of grievances and injuries sustained by America; but the English government avoided all explanation. After three months of delay, war appeared to be the only resort: Such was the opinion of the American government; but finally the dread of this contest, or that of losing a brokerage (courtage) advantageous to individuals, caused it to forget the national honour and interest. The time was consumed in mere discussion. The ports of France and of her allies remained open to a hostile commerce. The American merchants remained satisfied with the character of mere brokers or factors, when they should have supported their rights as a commercial body. Then the neutrality of the Americans became burdensome to France. She had then no other resource left than to retaliate on England, and the Americans had no right to complain. Thus the decree of Berlin issued at that time, was but a measure of reprisals which the French government had postponed too long, and by which it testified its desire of remaining faithful to the principles which it had adopted, and of bringing its enemies to recognise the freedom or inviolability of flags, the illegality of the capture of merchantmen, and the unlimited freedom of commerce. This was its object, and has been so in the whole series of rigorous but necessary measures which it has taken." P. 155. et seq.

"It must be confessed that if the ministers of his Britannic majesty, conformably to the tenor of the note, which they addressed to Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, and to their declarations in parliament-did believe that the emperor of the French would suffer the decree of Berlin to fall into inactivity or grow obsolete, its operation for four years past upon the commerce of England, must have cruelly defeated their hopes. It was but natural on the other hand, for the emperor Napoleon to think, that the English ministry would themselves feel the danger of their doctrine, and that neutrals looking to the source of these disastrous measures, would, in order to avert them, claim the enjoyment of their rights. Therefore it was that the American vessels taken under the Berlin decree, were provisionally sequestered. The court of prizes did not condemn them until proof was had, that the government of the United States would no longer pursue the redress of its grievances against England, and sacrificed its interests to the fear of a rupture."

"The Milan decree is but a rigorous consequence of the VOL. II. 2S