operations of the ostensible executive. He is neither fettered nor sheltered by constitutional advisers. He stands alone in his accountability, and is therefore liable to be more narrowly watched in all his movements, to be more readily detected, and more easily baffled, should his plans or measures be of a dangerous tendency. When added to all this, the comparatively short term of his appointment, and the mode of his election by persons immediately chosen by the people for the purpose, are taken into consideration, it would not appear to be within the compass of human address, for a magistrate so circumstanced, to succeed in the establishment of a tyranny; particularly, as it would be necessary before the object could be achieved, either to deceive or to corrupt not only the two houses of congress, but the state legislatures and the nation at large.

Impotent as may be the president of the United States for the purposes of personal aggrandizement at the expense of the public rights, he is nevertheless an officer of mighty influence in the state, and capable at all times either of injuring or benefiting the public weal in a very material degree. " A "political executive magistracy," says Mr. Burke, "though "merely such, is a great trust. It is a trust, indeed, that has "much depending upon its faithful and diligent performance, "both in the person presiding in it, and in all its subordinates." With this intrinsic importance there is connected in our case a great external weight derived from accidental circumstances, and from certain habits into which the people have fallen. The executive is now the source to which a large proportion of the country looks up, not only for information but for opinions, on matters of the highest national concern. The tenure of his office, that of popularity, or of the favour of the majority, -the nature of his functions, and the dignity of his station, enable him to fashion almost at will, the public sentiment. They place him, indeed, in such a relation with regard both to the people, and to the legislative department, that, if he be supported by a strong party in the latter and be himself gifted with a supremacy of intellect, he may become nearly absolute within the limits of the powers granted to the federal government, and for purposes other than those of tyranny or lawless personal ambition.

It may be easily inferred from these remarks, and from the scope and character of the executive authority such as we have described it, that, as regards the dearest interests of the country, the president of the United State should be a person of no ordinary capacity or vulgar virtue. To fill his station in the manner required by the public interests and his own personal glory, he should resemble in point of firmness, integrity and patriotism, the august individual who first occupied this post;by whose approbation the constitution was in the first instance so brilliantly auspicated, and by whose services it was afterwards and as we trust, inviolably hallowed. A president of the United States should possess a mind of the most enlarged and vigorous cast, enlightened and disciplined by experience in the management of public affairs, enriched and liberalized by long study and a profound knowledge of the history of mankind, and of the principles of moral and political science. He should be intimately acquainted with both our domestic interests and external relations, familiarly conversant with all the branches of public economy, and capable of directing the operations, and pursuing the details of every department of the executive administration. We scarcely need add of a magistrate to whom so many important interests are confided-who is solely and perilously responsible for the exact performance of so many heavy duties-that he should be indefatigably industrious, uniformly circumspect, jealous of every appearance of encroachment on his authority, tenacious of the power and influence of the general government, and warmly attached to the constitution.

It must also be obvious that his personal aims and demeanor should invariably correspond in dignity, to the elevation of his official rank; that he should be inaccessible to all party feelings, above all narrow prejudice, incapable of cherishing undue foreign partialities, or of acting under the guidance of vulgar passions. There should be nothing of low cunning in his nature; nothing of petty or oblique artifice in any one of the proceedings either of his public or private life. Watchfulness, and prudence are indispensable for his office; and if some share of subtlety or refinement may be admitted, it should be of a noble and generous kind-magna et laudabilis astutia, not allied in the remotest degree to the craft of a huckster, or the knavish ingenuity of a mountebank. Fortem, justum, severum, gravem, magnanimum, largum, liberalem, hæ sunt regiæ laudes, says Cicero. These which the orator denominates royal virtues, should shine with superior lustre in the character of the chief magistrate of a system of government, the prosperity of which is more intimately connected than that of any other form, with the personal qualities of those, to whose management it is intrusted. To suppose a president of the United States either the leader or the voluntary tool of a domestic faction, either the

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pensionary or the blind instrument of a foreign power, is to imagine a case of supreme ignominy and of superlative folly. The hypothesis would imply the lowest degeneracy into which human nature can fall; the vilest, most pernicious and criminal prostitution to which public authority can be exposed.

Of the constitution of the judicial department in the federal system, we shall say but a very few words, it being our intention to allot a separate dissertation to this fruitful and important topic, in some future number of our work. The Convention have displayed no less wisdom and skill, in the structure of the judiciary, than in that of the other branches of the government, of which we have endeavoured to give a general but distinct outline in the preceding pages. The firm, incorrupt, and impartial administration of the laws of the United States, is secured by the best expedients which human ingenuity can devise for the purpose; by the same regulations which imprint so exalted a character of dignity and utility on the British courts of justice. The federal judges hold their stations by the tenure of good behaviour, and are liable to be removed, only through the process of impeachment before the senate, and on conviction by that body of high crimes and misdemeanors. They enjoy a compensation to be determined by congress at stated times, but which cannot be diminished during their continuance in office. As a tribunal of appellate jurisdiction, the supreme court of the United States possesses the highest degree of excellence, and is a far more suitable organ of the judicial power in the last resort, than the British house of lords, or than any legislative assembly can possibly be rendered. The most remarkable feature by which the constitution of the American is distinguished from that of the British judiciary, is the right with which the former are invested, of declaring null and void all legislative acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution of the United States. The necessity and utility of this important privilege, are clearly established in the seventy-eighth number of the Federalist. It secures to our government all the benefits which the tribunitial power so wisely established, but so fatally abused in Rome, was calculated to produce.

We have thus completed a general and hasty survey of the federal system of the United States. Imperfect as must neeessarily be an examination of this nature confined within narrow limits, and to which but little time could be devoted, it may yet be sufficient to infuse into others some portion of the admiration and attachment, which we ourselves cherish for the work of the Convention. Every view which can be taken of

the constitution, justifies the opinion, so often repeated by the enlightened authors of the Federalist, that, although endowed with ample powers, it can never become formidable to the public liberties, or capable of absorbing the residuary sovereignty of the states. The preponderance of the state governments in the Federal scale, was chiefly dreaded by the Convention, and regarded as the strongest ground of apprehension for the safety of the general government. The influence and consistency acquired by the latter since its establishment, and the sensible diminution of the authority of the former, have, however, greatly lessened the danger from that quarter. We consider the existence of these subordinate sovereignties, as of indispensable importance to the well-being of the country, and to the interests of the general government. This opinion is frequently expressed by the writers of the Federalist.

Let the federal government be in any manner well administered, and we see no sufficient cause why it should not continue to flourish for an indefinite period. - Almost any extent of country may be tranquilly and prosperously united under one rule, by the agency of the principle of representation. What we have to provide in this respect is, that the confines of the republic may be always at a distance from the centre, such as will allow the representatives of the people, to meet as often as may be necessary for the administration of public affairs, and that the deliberative assemblies of the Union do not become too numerous, or consist in too large a proportion of heterogeneous materials. For the preservation of that excellent scheme of liberty which we now enjoy, firmness and moderation are moreover necessary virtues both in the rulers and the governed. The laws of the former should be uniformly of such a tenor, as to persuade the people that their interest and happiness are inseparably connected with the stability of the constitution.

The people on their part should not forget, in exercising the right of suffrage, that their own permanent welfare requires something more in the representative, than mere good intention, or a readiness to indulge their weaknesses, and to flatter their passions. Without wisdom and intelligence, honesty is of but little avail in public men, and serves only to make more obstinate dupes. The most perfect model of government, that the imagination could frame, might be rendered mischievous, in incapable hands. Nothing can be more absurd, unjust and destructive, than to intrust the management of the state, to those whom neither nature nor education has qualified for the task. It is to a bad purpose that government exists at all, if it serve-not to enlighten and direct the governed, but to lead them astray.

The members of congress should banish all narrow, local considerations, and make the collective welfare of the Union, -the dignity and support of the federal government, the objects of their affections and labours. They, together with the other branches of the public administration, should strive unremittingly to cultivate throughout the country a national spirit and a quick sensibility to national honour; to elevate the views and to familiarize the conceptions of their constituents to an enlarged, liberal, prospective plan of policy, the objects of which might be the appropriation of a portion of the surplus wealth, now accumulated among us, to internal improvements, which always pay back with usury what is expended upon them, the creation of a suitable army and navy for the common defence, -the collection of an ample revenue from permanent sources, -the encouragement of learning and the arts by every form of liberal and munificent patronage,the allotment of such a provision to the public servants, and particularly to the national representatives abroad, as would, by disintangling the former from meaner cares, secure the exclusive devotion of their powers to the public weal; and enable the latter to maintain an appearance correspondent to the dignity of their official character. It is by these means alone, -by clothing the image of the government with "bright forms of excellence," -by multiplying on all sides manifest, sensible proofs of its utility, -by rendering it both lovely and and venerable, that the popular bias in favour of the state sovereignties may be advantageously diverted, that the constitution may be riveted in the public affections, and that a system of national manners may be formed, which combined with those affections, will shield it effectually from internal dangers. By imitating in the points we have enumerated, the magnanimous policy of the ancient republics, or even the selfish wisdom of the monarchies of modern times, we shall reap an ample share of that glory which crowned the career and irradiates the memory of the former, while we shall strip the latter of every shadow of real advantage, in the comparison so often instituted, between the respective operation of the two forms of polity.

The establishment of the federal system, must be viewed by every lover of the country, as a subject of congratulation, even should its dissolution be near at hand;-a catastrophe of all others to be most earnestly deprecated, and which, if we possessed the power, we would render it penal to suggest,