#6. President Polk's Message to the Senate on the 1846 Treaty with New Granada (Colombia), February 10, 1847*

"I transmit to the Senate, for their advice with regard to its ratifi. cation, 'A general treaty of peace, amity, navigation and commerce between the United States of America and the Republic of New Granada,' concluded at Bogota on the 12th December, last, by Benjamin A. Bidlack, chargé d'affaires of the United States, on their part, and by Manuel Maria Mallarino, secretary of state and foreign relations, on the part of that Republic.

"It will be perceived, by the 35th article of this treaty, that New i Granada proposes to guarantee to the Government and citizens of the United States the right of passage across the Isthmus of Panama over the natural roads and over any canal or railroad which may be constructed to unite the two seas, on condition that the United States shall make a similar guarantee to New Granada of the neutrality of this portion of her territory and her sovereignty over the same.

"The reasons which caused the insertion of this important stipulation in the treaty will be fully made known to the Senate by the accompanying documents. From these it will appear that our chargé d'affaires acted, in this particular, upon his own responsibility and without instructions. Under such circumstances it became my duty to decide whether I would submit the treaty to the Senate; and after mature consideration, I have determined to adopt this course.

"The importance of this concession to the commercial and political interests of the United States cannot easily be overrated. The route by the Isthmus of Panama is the shortest between the two oceans, and from the information herewith communicated, it would seem to be the most practicable for a railroad or canal.

"The vast advantages to our commerce which would result from such a communication, not only with the west coast of America, but with Asia and the islands of the Pacific, are too obvious to require any detail. Such a passage would relieve us from a long and dangerous navigation of more than nine thousand miles around Cape Horn, and render our communication with our own possessions on the northwest coast of America comparatively easy and speedy.

"The communication across the Isthmus has attracted the attention of the Government of the United States ever since the independence of the South American Republics. On the 3d of March, 1835, a resolution passed the Senate in the following words: [Here follows the resolution, as given supra.]

Moore, A Digest of International Law (1906), v. 3, pp. 7–10. The Senate approved the treaty 29-7 on June 3, 1848 as recorded in Executive Journal, VII, p. 424.

"No person can be more deeply sensible than myself of the danger of entangling alliances with any foreign nation. That we should avoid such alliances, has become a maxim of our policy consecrated by the most venerated names which adorn our history and sanctioned by the unanimous voice of the American people. Our own experience has taught us the wisdom of this maxim in the only instance, that of the guarantee to France of her American possessions, in which we have ever entered into such an alliance. If, therefore, the very peculiar circumstances of the present case do not greatly impair if not altogether destroy the force of this objection, then we ought not to enter into the stipulation, whatever may be its advantages. The general considerations which have induced me to transmit the treaty to the Senate for their advice may be summed up in the following particulars:

"1. The treaty does not propose to guarantee a territory to a foreign nation in which the United States will have no common interest with that nation. On the contrary, we are more deeply and directly interested in the subject of this guarantee than New Granada herself or any other country.

"2. The guarantee does not extend to the territories of New Granada generally, but is confined to the single province of the Isthmus of Panama, where we shall acquire by the treaty a common and co-extensive right of passage with herself.

"3. It will constitute no alliance for any political object, but for a purely commercial purpose, in which all the navigating nations of the world have a common interest.

"4. In entering into the mutual guarantees proposed by the 35th article of the treaty, neither the Government of New Granada nor that of the United States has any narrow or exclusive views. The ultimate object, as presented by the Senate of the United States in their resolution [of March 3, 1835] to which I have already referred, is to secure to all nations the free and equal right of passage over the Isthmus. If the United States, as the chief of the American nations, should first become a party to this guarantee, it can not be doubted, indeed it is confidently expected by the Government of New Granada, that similar guarantees will be given to that Republic by Great Britain and France. Should the proposition thus tendered be rejected, we may deprive the United States of the just influence which its acceptance might secure to them, and confer the glory and benefits of being the first among the nations in concluding such an arrangement upon the Government either of Great Britain or France. That either of these Governments would embrace the offer can not be doubted; because there does not appear to be any other effectual means of securing to all nations the advantages of this important passage but the guarantee of great commercial powers that the Isthmus shall be neutral terri

tory. The interests of the world at stake are so important that the security of this passage between the two oceans can not be suffered to depend upon the wars and revolutions which may arise among different nations.

"Besides, such a guarantee is almost indispensable to the construction of a railroad or canal across the territory. Neither sovereign states nor individuals would expend their capital in the construction of these expensive works without some such security for their investments.

"The guarantee of the sovereignty of New Granada over the Isthmus is a natural consequence of the guarantee of its neutrality, and there does not seem to be any other practicable mode of securing the neutrality of this territory. New Granada would not consent to yield up this province in order that it might become a neutral state, and if she should, it is not sufficiently populous or wealthy to establish and maintain an independent sovereignty. But a civil government must exist there in order to protect the works which shall be constructed. New Granada is a power which will not excite the jealousy of any nation. If Great Britain, France, or the United States held the sovereignty over the Isthmus other nations might apprehend that in case of war the Government would close up the passage against the enemy; but no such fears can ever be entertained in regard to New Granada.

"This treaty removes the heavy discriminating duties against us in the ports of New Granada which have nearly destroyed our commerce and navigation with that Republic, and which we have been in vain endeavoring to abolish for the last twenty years.

"It may be proper also to call the attention of the Senate to the 25th article of the treaty, which prohibits privateering in case of war between the two Republics; and also to the additional article which nationalizes all vessels of the parties which 'shall be provided by the respective Governments with a patent issued according to its laws,' and in this particular goes further than any of our former treaties.”

#7. United States Negotiations with Nicaragua for Treaty Righ 1849*

Soon after the [1846] convention with New Granada had been rat fied and proclaimed, efforts were made to negotiate a treaty wit Nicaragua, so as to obtain favorable transit rights through that cou try for the Government and citizens of the United States.

The advantages which this country offered for an interoceanic can had been known for centuries, and the desire to secure them led to th negotiation of a treaty with Nicaragua by Mr. Elijah Hise, charg d'affaires of the United States, in June, 1849. By its terms the Republ undertook to confer upon the United States, or a company of its cit zens, the exclusive right to construct through its territory canals, tur pikes, railways, or any other kind of roads, so as to open a passage an communication by land or water, or both, for the transit and passag of ships or vehicles, or both, between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacifi Ocean. The terms of the treaty were most liberal, and in return th United States was to aid and protect Nicaragua in all defensive war the Army and Navy and all available means and resources of bot countries to be used, if necessary, to defend the territories of the latte or to recover such as might have been seized or occupied by force Nicaragua consented to these terms because it was desired to secur the aid of the United States, in resisting the policy which Grea Britain was then pursuing in Central America, with the apparent in tention of securing the permanent control of the lower waters of the San Juan, under a claim already mentioned, that the boundaries of the Mosquito district extended to and included the mouth of that river where at this time the Mosquito flag was maintained under Britis protection.

Mr. Hise had exceeded his authority in making this treaty, and it was not approved by the Administration at Washington. He was after wards recalled and was succeeded by Mr. E. G. Squier, who negotiated another treaty upon the subject and a contract for facilitating the transit from the Atlantic to the Pacific, by means of a ship canal or railroad, in thé interest of the American, Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Company, composed of Cornelius Vanderbilt, Joseph L. White. Nathaniel H. Wolfe, and their associates.

These two treaties were never ratified, but they were subjects of conference and discussion during the negotiations which led to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of July 5, 1850. By this it was agreed, among other things, that the two contracting parties would support and encourage such persons or company as might first commence a ship canal through Nicaragua with the necessary capital and with the consent of the local authorities and on principles in accord with the spirit and intention of the convention; and if any such person or company had already entered into a contract for the construction of such a canal with the State through which the same was to pass, it was agreed that such person or company should have a priority of claim, if the parties to the treaty had no just cause of objection to such contract.

Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission, 1899-1901. Washington, Govt. Print. Off, 1904. 58th Congress, 2d session, Senate Document No. 222, pp. 34-35. TC 773.U5

1904.

This provision was understood to be in the interest of the company for which Mr. Squier had obtained a contract in August, 1849. By its terms the State had granted to it, for a period of eighty-five years, to be counted from the completion and opening of the work to public se, the exclusive right and privilege of excavating a ship canal for ressels of all sizes, from Greytown, or any other feasible point on the Atlantic, to the port of Realejo, Gulf of Amapala or Fonseca, Tamorinda. San Juan del Sur, or any other point on the Pacific by means of the San Juan River, Lake Nicaragua, the Tipitapa River, and Lake Managua, or any other waters within its jurisdiction. The contract also gave to the company the exclusive right to construct rail or carriage roads and bridges and to establish steamboats and other vessels on the rivers and lakes as accessories to and in furtherance of the execution of the canal project. And if the construction of the canal or any part of it should be found to be impracticable, then the company was authorized to establish a railroad or some other communication between the two oceans within the time limited and subject to the same terms and conditions.

Subsequently in March, 1850, the company was incorporated by the Republic of Nicaragua to prevent any embarrassments in the development and prosecution of its enterprise.