III. The Battle Over the Colombia (Panama) and Nicaragua Routes, 1901-1903; The Era of the Spooner Act and the Hay-Herran Treaty with Colombia

#29. Conclusions of the Isthmian Canal Commission, 1899-1901, November 16, 1901*

CHAPTER XII.

CONCLUSIONS.

The investigations of this Commission have shown that the selection of "the most feasible and practicable route" for an isthmian canal must be made between the Nicaragua and Panama locations. Furthermore, the complete problem involves both the sea-level plan of canal and that with locks. The Panama route alone is feasible for a sealevel canal, although both are entirely practicable and feasible for a canal with locks. The time required to complete a sea-level canal on the Panama route, probably more than twice that needed to build a canal with locks, excludes it from favorable consideration aside from other serious features of its construction. It is the conclusion of this Commission, therefore, that a plan of canal with locks should be adopted.

A comparison of the principal physical features, both natural and artificial, of the two routes, reveals some points of similarity. Both routes cross the continental divide less than ten miles from the Pacific Ocean, the Panama summit being about double the height of that in Nicaragua. For more than half its length the location of each route on the Atlantic side is governed by the course of a river, the flow from whose drainage basin is the only source of water supply for the proposed canal; and the summit levels, differing but about 20 feet in elevation, Panama being the lower, are formed by lakes, natural in the one case and artificial in the other, requiring costly dams and westeways for their regulation and for the impounding of surplus waters to reduce the effect of floods and to meet operating demands during low-water seasons.

The investigations made in connection with the regulation of Lake Nicaragua have demonstrated that that lake affords an inexhaustible water supply for the canal by that route. The initial proposition, on the other hand, for the Panama route is to form lake Bohio so as to yield a water supply for a traffic of 10,000,000 tons, which can be supplemented when needed by an amount sufficient for more than four times that traffic, by means of the Alhajuela reservoir. For all prac

tical

purposes this may be considered an unlimited supply for the Panama route. So far as the practical operation of a ship canal is concerned, therefore, the water-supply features on both lines are satisfactory.

Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission, 1899-1901. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1901. 57th Congress, 1st session, Senate Document No. 54, pp. 257-263. TC773.U5 1901.

The difficulties disclosed and likely to be encountered in the con struction of the dams are less at Conchuda on the Nicaragua line thar at Bohio on the Panama route. Both dams, however, are practicable.

but the cost of that at Bohio is one-half more than that at Conchuda. A less expensive dam at Bohio has been proposed, but through a por tion of its length it would be underlaid by a deposit of sand and gravel pervious to water. The seepage might not prove dangerous, but the security of the canal is directly dependent upon this dam, and the pol icy of the Commission has been to select the more perfect structure, even at a somewhat greater cost. The wasteways at both locations present no serious difficulties. The advantages in the design and construction of the dams are in favor of the Nicaragua route.

The system of regulation at Lake Bohio consists only of the discharge of water over the crest of a weir, as the lake level rises under the influence of floods in the Chagres River. The plan of regulating the level of Lake Nicaragua is less simple, though perfectly prac ticable. It involves the operation of movable gates at such times and to such extent as the rainfall on the lake basin may require. The experience and judgment of the operator are essential elements in the effective regulation of this lake. The regulation of Lake Bohio is automatic.

The only means of transportation now found on the Nicaragua route are the narrow-gauge Silico Lake Railroad, about 6 miles in length, and the limited navigation of the San Juan River and the lake, but the Nicaraguan Government is now building a railroad along the beach from Greytown to Monkey Point, about 45 miles to the northward, where it proposes to establish a commercial port. By means of a pier, in the area protected by the point, goods and material for canal purposes can readily be landed and transported by rail to Greytown. Such piers are in constant use on our Pacific coast. This railroad and port would be of great value during the period of preparation and harbor construction, and should materially shorten that period. A well-equipped railroad is in operation along the entire length of the Panama route, and existing conditions there afford immediate accommodation for a large force of laborers.

The Nicaragua route has no natural harbor at either end. At both the Atlantic and Pacific termini, however, satisfactory harbors may be created by the removal of material at low unit prices, and by the construction of protective works of well-established design. An excellent roadstead, protected by islands, already exists at Panama, and no work need be done there for either harbor construction or maintenance. At Colon, the Atlantic terminus of the Panama route, a serviceable harbor already exists. It has afforded harbor accommodations for many years, but it is open to northers, which a few times in each year are liable to damage ships or force them to put to sea. Considerable

work must be done there to create a suitable harbor at the entrance of the canal, which can be easily entered, and will give complete protection to shipping lying within it. The completion of the harbors as planned for both routes would yield but little advantage to either, but the balance of advantages, including those of maintenance and operation, is probably in favor of the Panama route.

The existence of a harbor at each terminus of the Panama route, and a line of railroad across the isthmus, will make it practicable to commence work there, after the concessions are acquired, as soon as the necessary plant can be collected and put in place, and the working force organized. This period of preparation is estimated at one year. In Nicaragua this period is estimated at two years, so as to include also the construction of working harbors and terminal and railroad facilities.

The work of excavation on the Nicaragua route is distributed; it is heaviest near Conchuda, at Tamborcito, and in the divide west of the lake. On the Panama route it is largely concentrated in the Culebra and Emperador cuts, which are practically one. As a rule distributed work affords a greater number of available points of attack, contributing to a quicker completion; but in either of these cases such difficulties as may exist can be successfully met with suitable organization and efficient appliances.

The time required for constructing the Nicaragua Canal will depend largely on the promptness with which the requisite force of laborers can be brought to Nicaragua, housed and organized at the locations of heaviest work along the route. The cut through the divide west of the lake probably will require the longest time of any single feature of construction. It contains about 18,000,000 cubic yards of earth and rock excavation, or a little less than 10 per cent of the total material of all classes to be removed. With adequate force and plant this Commission estimates that it can be completed in four years. This indicates, under reasonable allowance for ordinary delays, that if force and plant enough were available to secure a practically concurrent execution of all portions of work on the route, the completion of the entire work might be expected within six years after its beginning, exclusive of the two years estimated for the period of preparation. The securing and organizing of the great force of laborers needed, largely foreigners, so as to adjust the execution of the various portions of the work to such a definite programme of close-fitting parts in a practically unpopulated tropical country, involves unusual difficulties and would prolong the time required for completion.

The greatest single feature of work on the Panama route is the excavation in the Culebra section, amounting to about. 43,000,000 cubic yards of hard clay, much of which is classed as soft rock, or nearly 45 per cent of all classes of material to be removed. It is estimated that