Tripartite Treaties in 1909*

No. 247.]

Minister Dawson to the Secretary of State.

[Extract.]

AMERICAN LEGATION,

Bogota, March 29, 1909. SIR: Referring to the subject of my No. 244, of March 8, 1909,1 and of my telegrams of March 10, March 13, March 14, March 16, March 17, March 18, March 19, March 23, March 26, and March 27-the discussion of the ratification by Colombia of the treaties with the United States and with Panama, and the political disturbances incident thereto I have the honor to report that on March 6 and 7 many clandestine meetings were held by those opposed to the Reyes government and to ratification, and plans matured for popular demonstrations to be made as soon as the expected majority report of the committee should be presented.

On March 7 I sought a personal interview with the President. His words were confident, but his manner indicated irresolution. He was plainly nervous.

On March 8 the majority report was presented and published, copy of which is inclosed. It was written by Antonio José Restrepo. Of the 18 members of the committee 14 favored unconditional ratification, 3 ratification with amendments, and 1, Francisco de P. Matéus, ex-minister for foreign affairs and many times plenipotentiary for his country during the last quarter of a century, opposed the treaty en bloc. He read a minority report, a copy of which is inclosed. This minority report was not then published, but the purport of its inflammatory assertions that the treaties were deceitfully drawn so as to give the ports of Cartagena and Buenaventura to the United States, and that the boundary arbitration provision in regard to the Jurado region meant that the United States and Panama intended to grab all the territory through which a canal up the Atrato could reach the Pacific, spread like wildfire, and his bitter denunciation of the attitude of the United States when Panama declared her independence found a ready echo among the excitable and easily prejudiced people of this capital.

That evening, March 8, the students of the different university schools, with the knowledge and encouragement of many of their professors, including Dr. Luís Felipe Calderón, nephew of the President and brother of Climaco Calderón, who, as minister of foreign affairs in 1905 and 1906, began the negotiations looking toward these very treaties, made demonstrations throughout the city. On the morning of March 9 the streets were filled with excited crowds of people and bands of students and young men crying "Down with the treaties," "Death to the traitors of Panama," "Death to the United States," "Viva Matéus," "Death to Restrepo," etc. They made demonstrations of approval at the house of Matéus and Nicholas

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1910, pp. 384-392, 399, 402, 406-407. See pp. 365-376 for an exposition on the treaties by the Colombian Minister for Foreign Affairs. I Not printed,

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Eaguerra and of disapproval at the house of Antonio José Restrepo. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, while I was writing in the legation office, about 40 students came to the legation door and, upon its being opened by the servant, they all crowded in. Hearing the noise I went into the reception room and sent them word that I would see them there. They came politely enough and three leaders, representatives respectively of the faculties of law, medicine, and arts, made speeches, the substance of which was that since liberty of the press did not exist in Colombia under Reyes's administration they had no other means of letting me know that they as well as all other honest Colombians were opposed to the treaties because Colombia's recognition of Panaman independence would dishonor and disgrace her, and because the assembly, which had them under consideration, was an unconstitutional body whose members had been appointed by the President and whose servile cooperation was assured by the granting of offices and favors. I briefly called their attention to the fact that it would be improper for me, as a foreign representative, to discuss with private individuals the merits of the treaties; that I could assure them that the Government and people of the United States were animated only by friendly sentiments toward the Colombian people and earnestly desired for them the blessings of prosperity and peace. Happily, the spirit of personal politeness and decorum, so characteristic of Colombians, prevented their saying anything insulting about the United States in my presence, and they retired without anything disagreeable happening. I took no measures to communicate the incident to the authorities, but shortly afterwards heavy detachments of police were placed in front of the legation and at the four corners of the block in which it is situated. About half past 6 in the evening a great crowd assembled at one of these corners, probably with the intention of making a new demonstration, but their leaders were arrested. Throughout the afternoon disorders continued in various parts of the city, and there were

numerous arrests.

The excitement, disorders, and arrests continued on March 9, but to far as I could see then, or have since heard, no further attempts were made to demonstrate against this legation. The rioters, however, were with difficulty restrained from acts of violence against members of the assembly. In the afternoon there was an acrimonious debate in the assembly upon a motion to definitely postpone the consideration of the treaties. The minister for foreign affairs was kind enough to send me word that he thought it would be better for me not to be present since I might hear very disagreeable things about my country. Such things were, in fact, said, as I have been informed by members of the diplomatic corps who were present, who also assured me that nothing was said reflecting upon the official or personal conduct of Mr. Barrett or myself. For the most part the Government deputies sat silent except Antonio José Restrepo, who made the mistake of demanding that the galleries be cleared upon the first sign of disagreement with his remarks. This incident greatly excited public feeling against him.

In the afternoon the President offered the ministry of war to Fernández, the ruthless Conservative general who, when in charge in 1901 and 1902, executed so many Liberals. He declined, and Perdomo, another Conservative general, of much the same type and record, was named. Perdomo's appointment was received with a

storm of indignation and was withdrawn. Reyes issued a decree intrusting the maintenance of order in the city directly to the minister of war, and the first popular impression was that he was going resolutely to suppress the disorders and pass the treaties. However, it has since transpired that a threatening telegram had just been received from the military chiefs in Santander (a copy is inclosed). Many members of the assembly and the cabinet were becoming frightened, and others thought they saw an opportunity to push Reyes out of the presidential chair and themselves get into control Friends of Jorge Holguín almost openly advocated his elevation to the Presidency, and it is certain that he strongly advised the President to throw the treaties overboard.

The student demonstrations continued on March 11, and the lower classes also began to take part, and while arrests were numerous the prisoners were in all cases soon released and no really vigorous measures taken to restore order. On that day still another new cabinet was announced, Jorge Holguín being admitted to it and named Designado or successor to the Presidency. In the assembly the discussions of the treaties continued. The minister for foreign affairs, Dr. Urrutia, made a strong speech in their favor; a copy of which is inclosed, but the majority members of the assembly were evidently weakening. Just before the session closed a vote was forced on the first and second articles of the treaty with Panama, and they were approved by 43 to 3: Corral, Quijano Wallis, and Matéus.

On March 12 Gen. Vázquez Cobo was elected to the presidency of the assembly in place of Holguin, who assumed charge of the ministry of the treasury. Telegrams from officeholders all over the country continued to pour in asking that the treaties be ratified, but since it was well known that these telegrams were sent in response to Government solicitation they produced little effect. In the absence of freedom of the press or any other organ of public opinion, it was im possible to tell what the real opinion of the country was, and it was certain that the populace in the Provinces was even less informed than that in Bogota of the substance and real intent of the treaties. Rumors of disorders at various points were current, and by common consent the assembly dropped the consideration of the treaties and waited for Reyes to take decisive action.

On the morning of the 13th President Reyes made an attempt to reduce the students to a better frame of mind by inviting some of them to the palace, but instead of discussing the treaties the speakers for the students reproached the President for his financial policies, his establishment of monopolies, his suppression of the freedom of the press, and his refusal to give Columbia an elective congress. Living as he has done for the last four years, in an atmosphere of enforced adulation, not accustomed to hear criticisms or suggestions, the President took this in very bad part.

Shortly thereafter he hastily wrote his resignation and sent it to the assembly. The news astounded everyone, and it is impossible even yet to be sure what motives inspired him.

Holguin took oath as Acting President and named a new cabinet, in which Nicolás Esguerra, now the most prominent Liberal in the country, was included. Carlos Cuervo Márquez became minister of war. Holguin at once sent a message to the assembly advising it to refrain from further consideration of the treaties. Urrutia resigned as minister for foreign affairs. Esguerra and another recently ap

pointed Liberal refused to accept. Holguin and Cuervo Márquez ordered the police not to interfere with popular demonstrations, and anarchy broke loose. The long-smoldering hatred of Reyes had free rein; crowds paraded the streets crying "Abajo el tirano," "Mueran los vendidos"; street-corner orators reviled Reyes as a grafter; the. crowds stoned the offices of the Correo Nacional and Nuevo Tiempo, the Government subsidized newspapers, and even demonstrated against the apostolic delegate and the archbishop. A howling mob besieged the assembly hall all afternoon, and the members waited until dark and slipped out one by one. Restrepo was run off the streets and his house stoned. About 7 o'clock Dr. Urrutia called on me in a very excited condition to say that Holguin would in fact have the assembly take up the treaties again in a few days and that he himself had therefore continued to remain in office. About the same time Reyes telephoned me privately to come over to the palace at 8 o'clock for consultation. This fact is my principal reason for suspecting that his resignation had always a string to it. Half an hour afterwards came another message that my call would not be necessary. About 9 o'clock a mob wrecked Vázquez Cobo's house.

Mrs. Vázquez was badly frightened, and her husband rushed to the palace and to their faces furiously denounced Reyes, Holguín, and Cuervo Márquez as cowards and traitors to their friends. He threatened to go himself to the barracks and put himself in command of the troops. Reyes asked him if he would accept the ministry of War, and upon his answering in the affirmative, he assumed the Presidency and dismissed Cuervo Márquez. In the meantime a large and excited public meeting of persons prominent socially and politically was being held at the jockey club where violent diatribes against Reyes were uttered. Olaya Herrera who had been very active durmg the week, and who is believed to have been in communication with revolutionary plotters in Panama, Tumaco, and elsewhere, proposed the formation of a supreme junta with Esguerra at its head, but these proceedings were suddenly interrupted about midnight by the arrival of troops who arrested nearly everyone present and carried them off to prison. Until a late hour the police scoured the streets dispersing and arresting the groups of students and workmen, and several people were killed and injured.

Next morning, March 14, Bogota woke to find Reyes in the Presi dency, a state of siege declared, machine guns placed commanding the central plaza, the police and troops armed with Mausers, and Vázquez Cobo, Fernández, and Perdomo, the three most dreaded generals in the country, in command. Olaya Herrera and his lieutenant, Escobar, were sentenced by court-martial to five years in the Cartagena dungeons; Climaco Calderón was arrested. The malcontents were terrorized, and the city became as quiet as a graveyard. Monday morning, March 15, I called on Vásquez Cobo. He told me the treaties would be pushed through at once if Panama would consent to define the Jurado region. In the afternoon he resigned as minister of war to reassume the presidency of the assembly, and I had bright hopes of early action. But when I went to see the minister for foreign affairs, to my great disappointment I found that Reyes himself was not disposed to take advantage of the opportunity and assume the responsibility. Speaking officially, the minister said he regretted to have to admit that an unexpectedly strong popular

opposition to the treaties had developed, complicated with much dissatisfaction at the fiscal policies of the Government, its centralising tendencies, its interference with the liberty of the press, and its failure to provide an elective congress. The opponents of the Government had succeeded in arousing the latent popular sentiment of indignation that had never ceased to exist against the Panaman leaders who took part in the declaration of independence and against the United States for its alleged complicity with their acts. Opposition members of the assembly had succeeded in further exacerbating public sentiment by insisting that certain articles of the treaties were susceptible of a construction that would be ruinous to Colombia. They were laying special emphasis on Article VI of the treaty with the United States and the boundary arbitration provision of thẻ treaty with Panama.

The department will get an idea of the general nature of these misrepresentations and charges from the following paragraphs of the minority report, written and signed by F. de P. Matéus, ex-minister for foreign affairs, and who has served as Colombia's plenipotentiary at many posts during the last 25 years:

By article 6 of the treaty Colombia concedes to the United States the use of all the ports of the Republic open to commerce as places of refuge for any vessels employed in the canal enterprise and for all vessels in distress passing or bound to pas through the canal and seeking shelter or anchorage in said ports, being exempt from all payments for anchorage or tonnage dues.

Calvo defines "refuge:" "The protection against an imminent peril, whether of man being pursued or a ship menaced by a tempest." Refuge being a natural right, an act of humanity, in respect to ships in peril recognized by all nations, there is no reason to refer to it in the treaties. The real intention was to create a servitude of use in our ports in favor of the United States, calling it refuge in order to secure its easy approval. Nevertheless, the article makes a clear distinction between the use conceded to any ships employed in the canal enterprise, including warships and ships in distress which are really in need of refuge.

Calvo says in his Dictionary of International Law that "Use is the right of using. personally, something whose property belongs to another and to participate in its products. This right includes things movable as well as immovable." The deductions from this doctrine is that as long as the use of our ports is conceded to the United States the latter nation may construct in them docks to shelter their ships and may establish coaling stations on their shores.

Whatever may be the reasons adduced to prove the innocence of this clause of the treaty, which I do not doubt was loyalty and honorably accepted by the Colombian minister, I entertain the profound conviction that the concession of the use of our ports to the United States signifies the loss of the independence of Colombia. It is not long since that the foreign press discussed the intention of the Government of the United States to establish a naval station at Cartagena and another at Buenaventura, in view of ulterior events, as strategical points for the defense of the canal. Recently an American squadron arrived at Colon, and it is not impossible, once the treaties are ratified, that that squadron will occupy Cartagena and a like measure be shortly adopted in respect to the port of Buenaventura on the Pacific.

The minister said that in the speeches in the assembly reference has also been made to the fact that in the Spanish text of article 6 a comma was placed after the word "refugio" instead of after the word "comercio."

The minister added that he and the rest of the Colombian executives understood perfectly well that the article did nothing more than clearly confirm an already existing practice and right under international law, except that it put Colombia under the obligation of not charging anchorage and tonnage dues. However, many members of the assembly and the public in general insisted upon soms additional guarantee on the subject. During the past week he had