#19. Historical Notes Relative to the Universal Interoceanic Canal Company of France (1880-1894) Until the Organization of the New Company.*

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

The great excitement which followed the downfall of the old Panama Canal Company can be explained only by the universal character of the enterprise, the distinction of the man who directed it, and the importance of the interests involved.

That downfall, however, was so unfortunate as to be subservient to political passion. Hence, the attention of the public was turned aside from the work itself. Exaggeration, ignorance, and also bad faith finally destroyed confidence in the future of an enterprise which the excessive optimism and, we must add, the errors of Mr. de Lesseps had seriously jeopardized.

A little reflection and dispassionate reasoning will convince anyone that the construction of an interoceanic canal is, all proportions being observed, an industrial affair like any other. In order to be properly planned and regularly carried out, it had to be previously studied with care in all its details.

The solution to be adopted should not have been based upon preconceived ideas, however fattering they appeared, but upon serious and practical observation of the facts. Such a method was especially necessary for a work of such magnitude, difficulty, and perplexity.

Now, the real cause of the downfall of the old Panama Company was the lack of the serious studies which should have preceded its organization. In view of the results that would have been secured by such studies, in view of the enormous amount of work to be performed and the proportionate expense to be incurred, we may believe that the enterprise would have been, from the outset, based upon a plan and directed according to a programme different from those which were adopted by Mr. de Lesseps. It was only under the pressure of circumstances that Mr. de Lesseps decided to modify his original plan. It was, however, too late, and success had become, for him, impossible.

In order to give a correct idea of the events which succeeded each other, it is necessary briefly to review the history of the old company. It will be seen that the original errors were followed by a succession of mistakes, the inevitable consequence of which was the final disaster.

CHAPTER L

THE UNIVERSAL INTEROCEANIC CANAL COMPANY.

(1880-1889.)

L-BRIEF SKETCH OF THE DISCOVERIES, EXPLORATIONS, AND PLANS FOR MARITIME CANALS ON THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNTIL 1879.

When Vasco Nuñez de Balboa, in 1513, had seen the Pacific Ocean, he ardently sought for a natural passage between the two oceans. At the very outset his idea was to utilize the course of the wide rivers of the Isthmus of Darien.

After his death, in 1520, Don Angel Saavedra, interpreting his views, proposed to Charles V to construct a canal through that isthmus.

A few years later Hernan Cortéz, then master of Mexico, desired to dig a maritime canal through the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and in his letters to Charles V he laid great stress upon the necessity of accomplishing that project.

Finally, in 1550, the Portuguese navigator, Antonio Galvão, published a book designed to show that it was possible to construct a ship canal through the isthmuses of Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and southern Darien.

*Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission (1904), Appendix B, pp. 197–218.

(79)

Thus, at the close of the sixteenth century the four principal routes for an interoceanic cana were known.

Many explorations succeeded each other; but no serious effort was made, and none could be made, in a practical manner, at that time.

The interoceanic canal question was neglected and almost forgotten during the entire seven teenth century and the greater part of the eighteenth.

It was England that, toward the close of the eighteenth century, attached to this question its full political and commercial importance. The British Government, with characteristic fore sight, thought that the national interest rendered it imperative for it to secure possession of the part of the American isthmus which then seemed to offer the best route for the establishment of communication between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. This was the cause of Nelson's unfor tunate expedition against Nicaragua in 1778.

After that time, except during the Revolution and the first years of the Empire, explorations were multiplied. That of 1780 deserves special mention. It was organized by order of Charles III, King of Spain, and its object was the construction of a canal through the Isthmus of Panama Humboldt, who visited the American isthmus in 1804, declared his preference for a route via the Isthmus of Darien. From 1814 to 1842 numerous surveys were made on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec.

Finally, in 1844, a Frenchman, Napoleon Garella by name, engineer in chief of mines, first made an accurate report concerning the Isthmus of Panama, which he had surveyed both with a view to the construction of a canal and of a railway. He had been sent by a French company which had received a concession for these two routes, and which, in pursuance of his report, decided in favor of the construction of a railway. But the events of 1848 came. The concession of the French company lapsed, and the railway was built, from 1850 to 1855, by an American company, which is still operating it. At this same time the grave diplomatic incidents occurred between England and the United States which had reference to the control and the neutrality of the future interoceanic route, and which were terminated in 1848 by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. From 1850 to 1870 new explorers, most of whom were Americans, made new surveys in various parts of the Isthmus. Public opinion in the United States was passionately in favor of some of these routes; then the American Government resolved (1870) to cause the Isthmus to be surveyed, at its own expense, from Tehuantepec to Darien. The explorations lasted three years, and were still incomplete.

The Congress of Geographical Science, which met at Antwerp in 1871 and at Paris in 1875, gave its attention to the subject of an interoceanic canal. At this latter meeting Mr. de Lesseps. declared that, in his opinion, the authors of all the plans entertained up to that time had committed a serious error by examining only routes for canals with locks. He declared that an interoceanic canal, in order to meet all the requirements of commercial navigation, must be constructed on a level, as the Suez Canal had been.

This formal and absolute opinion of Mr. Ferdinand de Lesseps was destined to prevail, four years afterwards, before the International Congress of Surveys. It was not fully adopted, how ever, by the congress of 1875, which confined itself to expressing the following wish:

The congress expresses the wish that the governments interested in the construction of an interoceanic cans! will have the surveys for such a canal made with as much activity as possible, and that they will adhere to the routes which offer to navigation the greatest facilities for access and traffic.

But, pending the intervention of the Powers, which might have caused a very long delay, the Society of Commercial Geography at Paris saw fit actively to pursue the solution of the problem. It had ascertained, from the debates of the recent congress, that the world was not in possession of full topographical information concerning the American Isthmus. It was convinced, moreover, that it was impossible, without supplementary surveys, to make, intelligently, a choice of a route that should be based upon proofs and reasons. Only, the society had neither the resources nor the credit necessary to enable it to undertake the costly explorations which had to be made. It thought proper to place its work in more powerful hands, and to that end it organized, March 24, 1876, a French committee to examine the subject of the construction of an interoceanic canal. Mr. de Lesseps was chosen president of the committee; Admiral de la Roncière le Noury and Admiral Meurand were chosen vice-presidents; Messrs. Daubrée, Levasseur, and Delesse (of the institute), Count Foucher de Careil, and Messrs. Malte-Brun, Cotard, Maunoir, Hertz (Charles) were members; Mr. Bionne was secretary; At the same time, General Turr and Lucien Napoleon Bonaparte Wyse organized a civil association, which undertook to defray the expense of the explorations, and before the close of the year 1876 an international expedition, under the direction of Mr. L. N. B. Wyse, was operating on the ground. It finished its surveys in 1878. In the month of May, 1878, Mr. L. N. B. Wyse, in the name of the Civil Association, secured from the Government of Colombia the concession of the ship canal to be constructed through the territory of that country.

The French committee was then able to convoke a special congress, to which it submitted the data which it had collected. We will briefly review the work of that congress, which shopted the name of "The International Congress of Surveys for an Interoceanic Canal."

IL-THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF SURVEYS FOR AN INTEROCEANIC CANAL.

(May 15-29, 1879.)

The International Congress of Surveys for an Interoceanic Canal held its sessions at Paris from the 15th to the 29th of May, 1879.

The 135 members who composed it were divided up into five large commissions, whose titles were the following: (1) Statistics; (2) Economical and commercial questions; (3) Navigation; (4) Technical questions; (5) Ways and means.

We will not discuss here anything but the conclusions which were formulated by the first

and fourth commissions.

M. Levasseur, member of the institute, was, at the same time, president and reporter of the commission of statistics, which made the following predictions concerning the traffic of the canal: In ten years (in 1889), before which time the canal will, in all probability, not be opened to traffic, 5,250,000 at least will probably represent the commercial movement of the two oceans, and about 2,000,000 tons will ent that fraction of the commercial movement between the East and Europe which, as it seems, may be dested from the route now followed, in order to take that of the American Isthmus; 7,250,000 tons in the aggregate. M. Levasseur took care to forestall any voluntary optimistic or erroneous interpretation of his conclusions. He called attention to the fact that they did not mean that 7,250,000 tons would Becessarily take the route of the canal within a year from its opening, or even in the years following. What he desired to ascertain and establish was the capacity of the double reservoir by which the canal was to be supplied, offering to navigation incontestable advantages over the val routes through the continent or to the south of the American continent.

M. de Lesseps was, afterwards, much more positive. He did not hesitate to consider the estimate made by M. Levasseur as representing the certain traffic of the canal as soon as it should be put into operation.

The fourth commission, which was specially charged with the technical examination of the various routes, had M. Daubrée, member of the institute, for its president, and Voisin Bey, formerly director-general of the work on the Suez Canal, for its reporter. It carefully examined the plans that were submitted to it. Unfortunately, those plans were based upon incomplete data. For none of them could the amount of work to be done be accurately determined. As to res and terms of construction, no standard of comparison and no precedent were available in

order to fix them.

When one reads the reports of the sessions of that commission, one constantly recognizes the inspiration of M. de Lesseps, one perceives the action of his will, so persistent in forming a eral opinion in favor of a plan for a canal on a level. The discussions of the commission were M. de Lesseps ng, and sometimes very heated. It clearly appears, however, that opposition to the views of was manifested mainly by abstaining from voting. Thus, at the time of formuating their opinion concerning the conclusions reached in the report of Voisin Bey, 40 members ented themselves, 10 abstained from voting, and only 19 voted, 16 of whom voted in the mative. And still, those conclusions were not yet wholly absolute. They were as follows: Limon to the Bay of Panama; and it particularly recommends the construction of a ship canal on a level in that The Technical Commission is of opinion that the route of the interoceanic canal should be from the Gulf of

érection.

twelve years, and that the cost of the work would be 1 milliard (billion) and 70 millions. The prediction was made that the time necessary for the construction of the canal would be Supposing that the interest payable in the meantime would amount to 130,000,000, the total

expenditure was to be 1,200,000,000.

The conclusions adopted by the congress in full session secured the complete triumph of de Lesseps. They were as follows:

the interest of commerce and navigation, is possible, and that such ship canal, in order to meet the indispensable The congress thinks that the construction of an interoceanic canal on a constant level, which is so desirable in ties of access and utilization which should be offered, especially, by a communication of this kind, should be ted from the Gulf of Limon to the Bay of Panama.

Totes were divided must be examined.

However, in order to appreciate the bearing of these conclusions, the manner in which the w taken and only 98 voted. The votes, for almost all of which reasons were given, were as Of the 135 members who composed the congress, 37 were absent at the time when the vote follows: Not voting, 12; noes, 8; ayes, 78.

96-6730-77-7

By considering the names of those who abstained from voting, of those who were absent, and of those who voted no, it is seen that M. de Lesseps had against him a majority of the engineers and of the contractors who were members of the congress. One of them, Mr. Kleitz, inspector-general of bridges and roads, presented in support of his negative vote the following remarkable observations:

I do not adhere to the conclusions submitted to the vote of the congress, because they seem to me to be too positive and too absolute.

The only conclusions which thus far seem to me to be justified by the discussion of the various plans are the following:

1. The interoceanic canal should extend from the Gulf of Limon to the bay of Panama.

2. The surveys submitted to the congress are not sufficiently thorough to render it possible, without fuller infor mation, to declare the possibility of the construction and operation of a canal on a level, and to make a choice, based upon reasons and proofs, between that system and that of a canal with locks.

3. The solution which should, if possible, be accomplished, is that of a canal on a level, because such a solution is better adapted to a large increase of traffic, and to securing the safety and rapidity of the passage.

4. In case the construction of a canal on a level should give rise to uncertainty, to too serious difficulties, or to excessive expense, a canal with locks would probably meet the requirements of maritime navigation.

The Inter

These sensible observations of Mr. Kleitz were, unfortunately, not listened to. national Congress of Surveys for an Interoceanic Canal closed its sessions May 29, 1879. M. de Lesseps announced that he would agree to place himself at the head of the new enterprise, and, confiding in his lucky star, he uttered these words:

If a general who has won his first battle is asked whether he desires to win another, he can not refuse.

It is interesting to remember, after what has just been quoted of the observations of Mr. Kleitz, and especially in view of the present plans, that the idea of a canal through the Isthmus of Panama, comprising an inner lake formed by a dam across the Chagres Valley, had already been mentioned and submitted for discussion to the Congress of 1879.

On the Panama line the route leaves the Chagres Valley at Matchin; the height of the water course is 14.60 meters at that point; taking about that level for the bottom of the basin, we may fix the water plane at level 24; that is to say, a little below the height of the highest waters, and we get rid of the Chagres, whose presence near the trenches constitutes an increase of expense and a considerable augmentation of the time required for the work.

It is useless to raise the summit level any higher, it is doubtful whether that represents any saving, owing to the cost of the feeders, which will always be very far from securing the full flow of the river for the requirements of navigation, as is done by the arrangement aforesaid.

This point being established, we might doubtless take the ordinary canal system and go down the valley, cutting its spurs.

It is, further

Here, however, the abundance of water offers resources that are unknown in the temperate zones. more, very dangerous to the health of the men employed in the works to dig up the earth; this is certainly the greatest difficulty presented by this work.

The establishment of an artificial lake at the height of the summit level does away with all these inconveniences, while it replaces, for a great length, a canal with a narrow waterway by a route of more than 1,000 meters of minimum width, in which vessels may sail at any rate of speed desired and may pass each other without the turning out places.

We should thus, at this low altitude, have a real Bosphorus (Bosporus), extending from one ocean to the other, which would be approached through short stretches of water and flights of locks that could be easily and rapidly passed.

This system of retention of water was proposed at La Tuyra by Mr. Celler, engineer in chief of bridges and roads; it has been proposed by M. Blanchet, in Nicaragua, and by others, since 1860, for the passages of Tehuantepec and Darien; but it is here much better indicated by the nature of the locality and the facilities offered by the Chagres Valley and River.

It is, we repeat, the natural method, because it does away with labor and with the unhealthiness of the soil, and because it is most advantageous to navigation.

Taking the plan of Messrs. Wyse and Reclus for greater practicability, we reach the conclusion, according to the above data, that the time required for passage through such a canal would be twelve hours, while in a canal with a narrow waterway and on a level it would be ten hours and a half-that is to say, vessels would lose an hour and a half in the passage, with much less chance of suffering damage. Following up this calculation, the conclusion is reached that the loss of time represents, for the navigation of the globe, a capital of 1,500,000 francs, and as a regards the cost of construction a saving of money of nearly 600,000,000 francs, together with a saving of six years at least

in the construction.

It is evident that the dams in the valley raising the water plane to level 24 should be as near as possible to the two oceans; the desirable points are the mouth of the Gatun River, kilometer 8 and kilometer 64, where they seem possible. In all cases, kilometers 22 and 62, which are the termini of the first and sixth sections of the plan, are perfectly practicable.

The maximum depth of the trench would be 72 meters, that is, 12 meters more than the drain of the City of Mexico, which is placed in volcanic tufa the nature of which is by no means good; its average depth is 39.50 meters; here, on the contrary, the hardness of the rocks furnishes complete security. Its cube is 8,553,000 meters, about 253,000 meters being of surface earth.

The dams fixed at level 26 have their foundations on a level with the oceans and 1.50 meters below the bed of the river. They have a height of retention of 22.50 meters, which is much less than that of the dams of the Sig and of the Habra in Algeria. Several valley dams in France, and particularly in Spain, are much higher, especially those of Saint-Etienne and Madrid.

At this height it is possible to construct with earth, which work is both economical and durable. The Tlélat dam, in Algeria, is of the same height, but it is well to make provision for concrete dams, mainly for the avoidance of unhealthiness of construction.

The Chagres drains 20 meters in five months. Its deflection for the purpose of allowing dredging and the ests shment of foundations in its bed presents no difficulties.

A series of five laks would be attached to the dam. By this means the maneuvering would be very rapid. A set of quschines would be established there, and it is probable that, with the aid of a reduction of the number of ates, the porsage would be made in an hour and a quarter. If this were so, less trouble and loss of time would be met with than with a canal on a level and with a narrow waterway.

The ebb locks would form the six locks of the series, which would reduce the time lost in the canal and the mount of the work on the short lengths with a narrow waterway.

Two weirs of the total length of 500 meters would be established near the dams, probably by means of small breaches in the neighboring valleys; their absolute security can always be guaranteed by the riprap and piles at their

foot.

In extraordinary freshets, giving 1,300 meters per second, the layer of outflowing water would be less than 1 meter thick, the current in the trench would be regulated by the length of the dam toward the Pacific.

If things are established in this manner the water plane is kept at its maximum, its variations being prevented. This is obeying natural laws while profiting by them and regulating them.

III. THE FIRST ISSUE.

In order to construct a canal on a level through the Isthmus of Panama, the route for which had been fixed upon in a general way by the International Congress of Surveys, an association was immediately organized under the name of "The Universal Interoceanic Canal Company;" its capital was to be 400,000,000 francs, represented by 800,000 shares of 500 francs each.

The public subscription was opened in Europe and America on the 6th and 7th of August, 1879. It was not a success. Only 30,000,000 were subscribed for.

Bitter attacks had been made upon the enterprise. The amount of cost estimated was criticised as being too small, and the amount of the receipts estimated was criticised on the ground that it was too large. From a political point of view it was sought to arouse fears of hostility on the part of the United States of America.

While under prosecution Mr. Charles de Lesseps explained the causes of this violent opposition, and showed how his father had succeeded in putting a stop to it. He was obliged to consent to put the financial management of the enterprise in the hands of a group of persons connected with journalism and finance, who undertook to render public opinion favorable to the enterprise. It is not for us to dwell upon this point.

On the other hand, however, in order to meet the repeated criticisms of the insufficiency and inaccuracy of the first estimates Mr. de Lesseps decided that new surveys should be made. In a letter bearing date of August 14, 1879, in which he admitted that the issue of the 6th and 7th of that month had not been successful, he announced that those supplementary surveys would be made with the approval of Mr. Couvreux and his associates, and that it would not be until his return from the isthmus that he would definitely organize the Interoceanic Canal Company.

IV. THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY COMMISSION.

M. de Lesseps embarked December 8, 1879, at St. Nazaire for Colon, where he landed on the 30th of that month.

An international technical commission accompanied him. The organization of this commission had been provided for and the work to be done by it had been defined by the concession law. According to article 1, section 3, of that law, it was to make the final surveys on the ground and to fix upon the route of the line of the canal. It was, moreover, charged with replying, by the results of its surveys, to the criticisms of the opponents of the new enterprise, or simply to the observations of those who did not look without fear into a dark future.

On the 14th of February, 1880, the International Survey Commission decided upon the conclusions of its report determining the final conclusions concerning the construction of the Panama Canal.

Notwithstanding our desire to state nothing but facts, we can not help here referring to the haste with which the supplemental surveys of the colossal work that was about to be undertaken were made.

The estimates for the work proper, prepared by the international commission, amounted to $43,000,000 francs. The commission at the same time expressed the opinion that with a good and judicious organization the work could be finished in eight years. It was, as compared with the conclusions of the congress, a reduction of 200,000,000 francs in the total cost and a saving of four years in the time to be employed in the construction.

M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, however, thought that he could still further reduce the estimates of the international commission, although they were already notably lower than those of the technical commission of the congress of 1879. He stated the reasons of the reductions made by him, in a note written on the 22d of February, 1880, on the steamer which took him from Colon to New York. It was necessary, according to him, to provide for an expenditure of only $55,000,000 francs; and, in his opinion, the amount that would be saved in the excavation