The practice of nations, it is not denied, proceeds upon the presumption of Prescription, whenever there is scope for the admission of that doctrine. The same reason of the thing which introduced this principle into the civil jurisprudence of every country, in order to quiet possession, give security to property, stop litigation, (x) and prevent a state of continued bad feeling and hostility between individuals, is equally powerful to introduce it, for the same purposes, into the jurisprudence which regulates the intercourse of one society with another, more especially when it is remembered that war represents between States litigation between Individuals.(y) It is very strange that the fact, that most nations possess in their own municipal codes a positive rule of law upon the subject, has been used as an argument that the general doctrine has no foundation in International Law.

It is admitted, indeed, that Immemorial Prescription constitutes a good title to national possession; but this is a *perfectly nuga[*275] tory admission, if, as it is sometimes explained, it means only that a State which has acquired originally by a bad title, may keep possession of its acquisition as against a State which has no better title. If it had been merely alleged that the exact number of years prescribed by the Roman Law, or by the municipal institute of any particular nation, as necessary to constitute ordinary prescriptions,(z) is not binding in the affairs of nations, the position would be true. It is, perhaps, the difficulty attending the application to nations of this technical part of the

publica, testatur quotidie suo quisque exemplo, dum, quod alius mare in dominium suum transcribit, alius eo vel invito ingrediatur et alterius possessionem, si quam prætendat, continua navigatione turbet."

And again he says: "Cæterum ne plura addam, Grotius et Vasquius in causâ sunt, namque hi maris usucapionem submoverunt eis rationibus quas meas facere non dubitem, si demas, quæ ipsi aiunt de naturâ maris præscriptioni adversâ, utpote re communi ex legibus Naturæ et Gentium, et quæ nec in bonis esse possit, nec possideri, nec quasi possideri, nec alienari, et cætera, de quibus non nihil dicam cap. ult."-De Dominio Maris Præscriptio, c. vi.

(x) "Vetustas quæ semper pro lege habetur minuendorum scilicet litium causa." -Dig. xxxix. 3. 2. De. Acq. Pluv.

(y) "Bono publico usucapio introducta est, ne scilicet quarundem rerum diu et ferè semper incerta dominia essent."-Dig. xli. t. 3. 1.

(2) Puffendorf, under the title "De Usucapione," in the 12th chapter of his 4th Book, discusses the application of the doctrine of Prescription to nations. His remarks are perspicuous and wise. "Inter hasce (he says in his 9th section) discrepantes sententias id quidem liquidum videtur: quemadmodum dominia rerum pacis causâ sunt introducta; ita et illud ex eodem fonte promanare, quod possessores bonæ fidei aliquando sint in tuto collocandi, neve ipsis in perpetuum super suâ possessione controversia queat moveri. Quantum autem sit illud spatium, intra quod possessio bonæ fidei in vim dominii evalescat, precisè neque naturali ratione, neque universali gentium consensu determinatum deprehenditur; sed arbitratu boni viri non citra aliquam latitudinem definiendum erit.” He then refers with some humour to the vague tests of prescriptive poetry proposed in Horace, lib. 2. ep. 1., and proceeds :-" In designando autem hoc tempore ratio habebitur et antiqui domini, et recentis possessoris. Illius quidem, ut ne maturè nimis à persequendâ et investigandâ suâ re excludatur." And he closes the section with saying:-"Adeoque cum dominia rerum introducerentur, id quoque pacis causâ placuisse, ut qui aliquid neque vi, neque clam, neque precario, suo nomine possideret, tantisper dominus præsumeretur, quoad ab altero contrarium probaretur; qui autem per longissimum temporis spatium, per quod nemo mediocriter diligens rem suam negligere creditur, quid bonâ fide possederit, serum petitorem planè posset repellere, quia non citius rem suam vindicatum iverit."-De Jure Naturæ et Gentium.

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doctrine, which has induced certain writers to deny it altogether; but incorrectly, for, whatever the necessary lapse of time may be, there unquestionably is a lapse of time after which one State is entitled to exclude every other from the property of which it is in actual possession. In other words, there is an International Prescription, whether it be called Immemorial Possession, or by any other name. The peace of the world, *the highest and best interests of humanity, the fulfilment of the ends for which States exist, require that this doctrine be firmly incorporated in the Code of International Law. It is with great force of reason and language that Grotius, repelling the contrary proposition, observes: "Atque id si admittimus, sequi videtur maximum incommodum, ut controversiæ de regnis regnorumque finibus nullo unquam tempore extinguantur: quod non tantum ad perturbandos multorum animos et bella serenda pertinet, sed et communi gentium sensui repugnat."(a)

CCLVIII. It is impossible to speak with greater accuracy upon this very delicate subject; as the application of the general rule must of necessity be greatly modified by the special circumstances of each particular case. Vattel's remarks upon this subject are clear and sensible:

"La Prescription ne pouvant être fondée que sur une présomption absolue, ou sur une présomption légitime, elle n'a point lieu si le propriétaire n'a pas véritablement négligé son droit. Cette condition importe trois choses: 1°. que le propriétaire n'ait point à alléguer une ignorance invincible, soit de sa part, soit de celle de ses auteurs; 2°. qu'il ne puisse justifier son silence par des raisons légitimes et solides; 3°. qu'on ait négligé son droit, ou gardé le silence pendant un nombre considérable d'années; car une négligence de peu d'années, incapable de produire la confusion et de mettre dans l'incertitude les droits respectifs des parties, ne suffit pas pour fonder ou autoriser une présomption d'abandonnement. Il est impossible de déterminer en droit *naturel [*277] le nombre d'années requis pour fonder la Prescription. Cela dépend de la nature de la chose dont la propriété, est disputée, et des circonstances.(b)

(a) L. ii. c. iv. s. 1.

See, too, Wolff.

And so Vattel: "Le droit de succession n'est pas toujours primitivement établi par la nation; il peut avoir été introduit par la concession d'un autre souverain, par l'usurpation même. Mais lorsqu'il est appuyé d'une longue possession, le peuple est censé y consentir, et ce consentement tacite le légitime, quoique sa source soit vicieuse. Il pose alors sur le méme fondement seul légitime et inébranlable, auquel il faut toujours revenir."-Vattel, t. i. 1. i. c. v. s. 59.

(b) "De ce qui est requis pour fonder la Prescription ordinaire." Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, t. i. 1. ii. c. xi. s. 142. And again: "Mais si la nation protégée ou soumis à certaines conditions ne résiste point aux entreprises de celle dont elle a recherché l'appui, si elle n'y fait aucune opposition, si elle garde un profond silence quand elle devrait et pourrait parler, sa patience, après un temps considérable, forme un consentement tacite qui légitime le droit de l'usurpateur. Il n'y aurait rien de stable parmi les hommes, et surtout entre les nations, si une longue possession, accompagnée du silence des intéressés, ne produisait un certain droit. Mais il faut bien observer que le silence, pour marquer un consentement tacite, doit être volontaire. Si la nation inférieure prouve que la violence et la crainte ont étouffé les

But that Prescription is the main pillar upon which the security of national property and peace depends, is as incontrovertible a proposition as that the property and peace of individuals rests upon the same doctrine.(c)

To these remarks should be added the observation of a living jurist:-(d)

“The general consent of mankind has established the principle, that long and uninterrupted possession by one nation excludes the claim of every other. Whether this general consent be considered as an implied contract or as positive law, all nations are equally bound by it, since all are parties to it; since none can safely disregard it without impugning its own title to its possessions; and since it is founded upon mutual utility, and tends to promote the general welfare of mankind."

*In one of those treatises(e) which show how deeply the mind [*278] of the writer was imbued with the principles of general jurisprudence, Mr. Burke uses the following admirable expressions :

"If it were permitted to argue with power, might one not ask one of these gentlemen, whether it would not be more natural, instead of wantonly mooting these questions concerning their property, as if it were an exercise in law, to found it on the solid rock of prescription; the soundest, the most general, the most recognised title between man and man that is known in municipal or in public jurisprudence; a title in which not arbitrary institutions but the eternal order of things gives judgment; a title which is not the creature, but the master of positive law; a title which, though not fixed in its term, is rooted in its principles in the Law of Nature itself, and is indeed the original ground of all known property; for all property in soil will always be traced back to that source, and will rest there"-"these gentlemen, for they have lawyers amongst them, know as well as I, that in England we have had always a prescription or limitation, as all nations have against each other""all titles terminate in Prescription; in which (differently from Time, in the fabulous instances) the son devours the father, and the last Prescription eats up all the former.”(ƒ)

témoignages de son opposition, on ne peut rien conclure de son silence, et il ne donne aucun droit à l'usurpateur."-Vattel, t. i. c. xvi. s. 199.

See list of authorities on the doctrine of International Prescription given by Ompteda, 512. s. 213, Lit. des Völkerrechts. (c) Vattel, 1. ii. c. xi. s. 142.

(d) Wheaton, vol. i. c. iv. s. 5. p. 207. "Es liessen sich viele Beispiele, unter andern in Deutschland nachweisen, wo das Recht der Staatgewalt nur auf langen Besitzstand gegründet ist ohne erweislichen Rechtstitel."-Heffters, s. 69. 1.

449. Letter to R. Burke, Esq.

(e) Vol. ix. p. 449.

See, too, vol. ix. p. 97. Reform of Representation in the House of Commons. "Prescription is the most solid of all titles, not only to property, but which is to secure that property, to Government." And vol. v. p. 274: "With the National Assembly of France possession is nothing, law and usage are nothing. I see the National Assembly openly reprobate the doctrine of Prescription, which one of the greatest of their own lawyers (Domat) tells us, with great truth, is part of the Law of Nature. He tells us that the positive ascertainment of its limits and its security from invasion were among the causes for which civil society itself was instituted."-Reflections on the Revolution in France.

(ƒ) The Abbé de Mably, speaking of the Treaty of the Pyrenees which followed

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*CCLIX. In the foregoing observations, the foundation of International Prescription has not been necessarily laid upon the abandonment or dereliction of the State, to whom the possession formerly belonged. It has been placed upon the length of time during which the possession has been held by the State which prescribes for it. It is important to establish clearly that dereliction does not, in the case of nations, necessarily precede prescriptive acquisition. Much of the uncertainty and confusion in the writings of International Jurists upon this subject may be ascribed to the want of firm discrimination and clear statement upon this point.

Dereliction or voluntary abandonment by the original possessor may be often incapable of proof between nations after the lapse of centuries of adverse possession; whereas the proofs of prescriptive possession are simple and few. They are, principally, publicity, continued occupation, absence of interruption (usurpatio), aided no doubt generally, both morally and legally speaking, by the employment of labour and capital upon the possession by the new possessor during the period of the silence, or the passiveness (inertia), or the absence of any attempt to exercise proprietary rights, by the former possessor. The period of time, as has been repeatedly *said, cannot be fixed by International [*280] Law between nations as it may be by Private Law between individuals: it must depend upon variable and varying circumstances; but in all cases these proofs would be required.

Now it has been well observed by a recent writer,(g) that in cases where the dereliction is capable of proof, the new possessor may found his claim upon original Occupation alone, without calling in the aid of Prescription. The loss of the former, and the gain of the later possessor, are distinct and separate facts. Whereas, in cases of Prescriptive Acquisition, the facts are necessarily connected; the former possessor loses, because the new one gains.

CCLX. There was a dispute of long standing between France and England respecting Santa Lucia, one of the Antilles Islands. After the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), the matter was referred to the decision. of certain Commissioners, and it was the subject of various State Papers(h) in 1751 and 1754. The French negotiators maintained, that though

the Treaty of Westphalia (1659), observes :-"Le Roi de France proteste contre toute prescription et laps de temps, au sujet du Royaume de Navarre, et se réserve la faculté d'en faire la poursuite par voie amiable, de même que tous les autres droits qu'il prétend lui appartenir, et auxquels lui ou ses prédécesseurs n'ont pas renoncé. (Traité de Vervin, rappellé par le Traité des Pyrénées, art. 23. Traité des Pyrénées, art. 89.) Tous les auteurs qui ont écrit sur le Droit des Gens, conviennent que la prescription rend légitimes les droits les plus équivoques dans leur origine; et ce qui prouve la sagesse de ce principe, c'est qu'il est de l'intérêt de chaque nation en particulier de l'adopter. La difficulté consiste à savoir, comment la prescription s'acquiert; pour moi je croirois qu'elle ne peut être établie que par le silence de la partie lésée, quand elle traite avec le Prince qui possède son bien, ou que celuici le vend, le cède et l'aliène en quelque autre manière. Le silence dans ces occasions équivaut à un consentement.”—Droit Public, t. i. p. 31.

(g) Monsieur Eugène Ortolan. See his chapter on Prescription Acquisitive, in his work Du Domaine International (Paris, 1851).

(h) Ib. p. 111.

the English had established themselves in 1639, they had been driven out or massacred by the Caribbees in 1640, and they had, animo et facto and sine spe redeundi, abandoned the island; that Santa Lucia being vacant, the French had seized it again in 1650, when it became immediately, and without the necessity of any prescriptive aid, their property. The English negotiators contended that their dereliction had been the result of violence, that they had not abandoned the island sine spe redeundi, and that it was not competent to France to profit by this act of violence, and surreptitiously obtain the territory of another State; and that by such a proceeding no dominium could accrue to them. The principal discussion turned, not upon the nature of the conditions of Prescriptive Acquisition, but *upon the nature of the conditions [*281] of Voluntary Dereliction, by which the rights of property were

lost, and the possession returned to the class of vacant and unowned (àdéonora) territories.(¿)

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*CHAPTER XIV.

DERIVATIVE ACQUISITION.

CCLXI. We now enter upon the second kind of Acquisition, viz., that which in the system of Private Law is called Derivative.

Derivative Acquisition(a) is said to be that which takes place by the act of another, or by the act of the law (acquisitio derivativa, vel facto hominis, vel facto legis). In this system, not only Individuals, but Corporations or legal persons, are enabled to acquire and to alienate rights of property, through the medium of a representative, as minors and lunatics are in all systems of jurisprudence enabled to act through their guardian or tutor.

Who the representative of the corporation may be, depends upon the constitution of this legal person. But, as a general rule, the will of a corporation is expressed not only by the unanimous assent, but by the assent of the major part of its members. The rule that the will of the corporation may be collected from the agreement of a part of its members seems to be founded in Natural Law, as otherwise the body might be prevented from acting at all.(b) *The constructive whole, [*283] therefore, is held, for certain purposes, to reside in a part only. Turning from the system of Private to the system of International Law, we find that it is competent to one State possessed of property to

(i) Vide post, Extinction of Acquisition.

(a) Eugène Ortolan, p. 23.

Heffters, s. 71.

(b)"

quod à majore parte ordinis salubriter fuit constitutum."-Cod. x. t. xxii. 46. De Decur.

"Quod major pars curia effecit, pro eo habetur, ac si omnes egerint.”—Eig. 1. 1. 19. Savigny, R. R. s. 97.

But see Burke, vol. vi. p. 212; Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs.