XXIII. 3. The third instance, viz. the case of the Governor of an independent State assuming a new title, and claiming the Recognition of it, remains to be considered.

It is unquestionably competent to every sovereign ruler to assume any title of dignity or authority, which it may please him to adopt, or the nation to confer upon him. Formerly, indeed, the German Emperors claimed to be considered, in their alleged capacity of successors of the Roman Emperors, as universal sovereigns and chiefs of the Christian world, and to enjoy exclusively the title of "Majesty."(m)

*Even towards the end of the fifteenth century, after this [ *28] extravagant pretension had ceased, they still, for some time, claimed to be considered as the first among the crowned heads, then admitted to be their equals. But Napoleon attempted in vain to clothe the title of Emperor with the character of a higher class of sovereignty than that of simple monarchy. All the European kingdoms have long ago determined that the Crown is Imperial in every country where the ruler is a king.

The Emperors of Germany were not without a rival to their pretensions when these were at the highest; for till the beginning of the sixteenth century the Popes arrogated to themselves the right of conferring all distinctions of title and rank upon the rulers of all the kingdoms of the earth.(n)

XXIV. But although rulers may assume what titles they please, there lies no obligation upon other States to recognize any changes in the accustomed forms and appellations, which usage and convenience have hitherto sanctioned. (o) Nevertheless comity and the reason of the thing would induce other rulers to grant such Recognition,(p) except in the following instances:

1. Where the new title assumed is in opposition to or derogation from existing rights or pretensions of the rulers of other States. (2)

2. Where it introduces new obligations by way of concession, or otherwise, with respect to other States.

3. Where it tends to lower the dignity and degrade the character of the title already borne by the rulers of other States. (r)

*These objections, and especially the last, apply only to the novel assumption of a title for if its assumption has been sanc

[*29]

(m) Duck, de Usu et Auctoritate Juris Civilis, who wrote in the time of Charles I., combats this pretension.

Vattel, 1. ii. c. iii. s. 34.

Schmalz, c. 36, s. 18.

Saalfeld, p. 182.

Heffters, p. 53, c. vi. s. 29.

Mably, t. i. p. 213.

Klüber, ss. 107-112.

(n) Saalfeld, p. 37, s. 18.

Vattel, 1. ii. c. iii. s. 45.

Heffters, 1 B. 29, n. 4. (0) Martens, s. 128.

Saalfeld, 37.

(p) Schmalz, p. 183.

(r) Vattel, 1. ii. c. iii. s. 44. Heffters, 1 B. 29.

(9) Mably, i. 213, ii. 157.

tioned by time and usage, however inapt and ridiculous, it cannot be lawfully refused by other nations.

XXV. As the object for which a ruler or a nation assumes a new title would be practically defeated, unless it obtained the sanction of other Powers, it has been the usual practice to obtain the promise of their Recognition beforehand, either by private Recognition or public Treaty.

Frederic I., King of Prussia, obtained the consent of the Emperor of Germany before he assumed the royal title in 1700-a title afterwards formally recognised by every European State,(t) though not by the Pope till 1786.(u)

The Czar, Peter the Great, obtained the Recognition of his title as Emperor, first by private negotiation and then by solemn provisions of treaty; as, for instance, by treaty with the Porte in 1739, with Great Britain in 1742;(x) the latter Power, however, expressly stipulating that by such Recognition, it intended to convey no pre-eminence [*30] whatsoever over herself.

But Great Britain had already recognised the title de facto, and Prussia never made any difficulty about doing so; Sweden recognised it in 1723, Venice in 1726, Denmark in 1732, Charles VII., Emperor of Germany, in 1744; Francis I., in 1748, and also the Russian Empire. Poland did not recognise it till 1764, and then under conditions that the Empress Catherine II. should lay no claim to Red Russia.

In 1745 this matter assumed a shape which afterwards led to a curious diplomatic negotiation, for France and Spain in that year refused to recognise the title, without obtaining a pledge, in the shape of litteræ reversales (réversales) that the Recognition should not carry with it any change in the accustomed ceremonials of the Courts. Spain obtained the réversale; but France had not succeeded in obtaining it as late as 1762, when she in consequence refused Peter III. the title of Emperor: it was at last obtained by her, but again questioned, at the succession of Catherine II. a few months afterwards; but the matter was finally adjusted.(y)

(s) Vattel, 1. ii. c. iii. s. 44.

(t) Martens, 1. iv. c. 2, s. 128. De la Reconnaissance des Titres et Dignités, n. b. (u) Klüber, 107, n. c.

(x) Martens, ib. Ompteda, t. ii. p. 508.

"Weilen Ihro Britannische Majest. Ihro Kayserlichen Maj. von allen Reussen einen distinguirten Beweiss Ihrer Freundschaft und Hochachtung zu geben wünschen, so wollen dieselben hiermit, durch den gegenwärtigen separirten Artikel, Sr. Kayserl. Majest. von allen Reussen mehrmahls geäussertem Verlangen gemäss, Ihro und Ihrer Nachfolger auf dem Kayserlichen Russischen Thron Kayserwürde erkennen, und denenselben den Titel davon zugestehen; jedoch mit dieser ausdrücklichen Bedingung, dass Ihro Kayserl. Majest. aller Reussen und Dero Nachfolger niemahlen, wegen dieser Würde und dieses Titels, einigen Vorzug oder Vorrang, auf welche Art es seyn mag, fordern sollen, und dass diese Anerkennung weder jetzt noch künftig die geringste Veränderung in dem Ceremoniel, das bisher in Ansehung des Rangs unter den Ministris besagter Ihrer Kayserl. und Britannischen Majest. oder sonst auf irgend eine Art, sowohl an Ihren eigenen Höfen, als an andern, wo Sie, respective, Ministros haben, beobachtet worden ist, nach sich ziehen soll."-Foedus inter Russiam et Magnam Britanniam, a. 1742 (Separirter Artikel;) Wenck. Cod. Jur. Gent. tom. i. pp. 670-1.

(y) Martens, Causes Célèb. t. ii. p. 89-Cause Deuxième.

XXVI. The title of Emperor of the French, adopted by Napoleon in 1804, was recognised by every State in Europe except Great Britain.

At the dissolution of the German Empire, in 1806, the title of Emperor of Austria was universally recognised. One of the consequences of the Confederation of the Rhine was the assumption of new titles by old Potentates. The ancient Electors of Bavaria, Saxony, and Wirtemberg, became Kings; the ancient Elector of Baden, and the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, became Grand Dukes; and the Prince of Nassau a Duke; all which titles were recognised by the Treaties of Paris (1814) and of Vienna (1815.) Among the Recognitions of new titles at the Congress of Vienna were, the ancient Elector was recognised as King of Hanover, (*) and *the Dukes of Mecklenburgh, Weimar, and [*31] Oldenburgh(a) as Grand Dukes; the Emperor of Russia as King of Poland.(b)

On the other hand, the five great Powers, assembled at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, unanimously resolved to refuse the Recognition of a new title of King, which the Elector of Hesse at that time had indicated his intention to adopt; grounding such refusal, among other reasons, upon the consideration, that the title adopted by a ruler was not a question of mere etiquette, but was a fact connected with important political relations.(c)

*In making this refusal, they were justified by the express [ *32 ]

authority of Vattel, (d) who observes, "Comme il serait ridicule

à un petit prince de prendre le nom de roi et de se faire donner de la majesté, les nations étrangères, en se refusant à cette fantaisie, ne feront rien que de conforme à la raison et à leurs devoirs."

a) Art. xxvii. xxxiv.—xxxvi.

2) Art. xxvi. (6) Art. i. (c) "Protocole séparé. Séance du 11 Octobre, 1818, entre les cinq puissances. "La conférence aiant été informée de l'intention de Son Alt. Roïale, Electeur de Hesse, de prendre le titre de Roi, et aiant pris connaissance des lettres adressées par ce prince aux souverains pour obtenir leur consentement à cette démarche:

"Les Ministres des cinq Cabinets réunis à Aix 1. Ch., prenant en considération que le but de leur réunion est celui de consolider l'ordre actuel des choses, et non pas de créer de nouvelles combinaisons, considérant de plus que le titre porté par un souverain n'est pas un objet de simple étiquette mais un fait tenant à des rapports essentiels et à d'importantes questions politiques, sont d'avis, qu'en leur qualité collective ils ne sauraient prononcer sur cette demande; pris séparément les Cabinets déclarent, qu'attendu que la demande de S. A. R. Electeur de Hesse n'est justifieé par aucun motif satisfaisant, il n'y a rien qui puisse les engager à y accéder.

"Les Cabinets prennent en même tems l'engagement de ne reconnaître à l'avenir aucun changement ni dans les titres des souverains ni dans ceux de princes de leurs maisons sans en être préalablement convenus entre eux.

"Ils maintiennent ce qui a été statué à cet égard jusqu'ici par des actes formels. Les cinq Cabinets appliquent explicitement cette dernière reserve au titre d'Altesse Roïale, qu'ils n'admettront désormais que pour les chefs des maisons Granducales, l'Electeur de Hesse y compris, et pour leurs héritiers présomtifs.

"Sign. METTERNICH, RICHELIEU, CASTLEREAGH, WELLINGTON, HARDENBERG, BERNSTORFF, NESSELRODE, CAPO D'ISTRIA."

Traité de Diplomatie, t. i. p. 357. Comte de Garden; Meisel, Cours de Stile Diplomat.: Dresd. 1824, t. ii. p. 593; referred to by Heffters, 1 B. s. 29, p. 54. (d) L. ii. c. iii. s. 44.

OCTOBER, 1855.-4

[*33]

*CHAPTER V.

RIGHT TO EXTERNAL MARKS OF HONOUR AND RESPECT.

XXVII. THERE is a natural Equality among States as among Individuals; and it is as repugnant to the nature of a State as of a Person to be in a condition of servitude to the will of another.(a)

This natural Equality of States is the necessary companion of their Independence that primitive cardinal right, upon which the science of International Law is mainly built.

States, considered absolutely and apart from their condition as a member of the great society of nations, are entitled to the full enjoyment of a free moral individual personality-when considered practically and with relation to that society, they are entitled, in their intercourse with other States, to all the rights incident to a natural Equality.(b)

No other State is entitled to encroach upon this Equality *by [*34] arrogating to itself peculiar privileges or prerogatives, as to the

manner of their mutual intercourse.

The relation of natural Equality is, in its character, essential, and incapable of being affected by any accidental attributes of another State, such as its greater extent of territory, the larger number of its inhabitants the superiority of its resources, the form of its constitution, the title of its executive, or the remoter antiquity of its origin. All privileges claimed upon these or similar pretexts, are, for so much, derogations from the natural Equality of other States.

It is impossible to foresee how soon any departure from this rule may injuriously affect the liberty and independence of the State which submits to it. Hence the real value of those external marks of honour and respect so carefully embodied in the ceremonies and etiquette of nations, but which have been, it must be confessed, often carried to an extent in which a sober regard for the true end was lost in an idle unreflecting attachment to the means, or under pretence of which the unlawful object of fostering ambition has been substituted for the lawful object of securing independence.

Nevertheless, it has been said with equal truth and beauty,-"The

(a) Martens, t. i. s. 125. c. 2.

Vattel, 1. ii. c. iii., De la Dignité et de l'Egalité des Nations, de leurs Titres et autres Marques d'Honneur.

Ib. 1. i. c. xxv. s. 191., De la Gloire d'une Nation.

Wheaton's Elem. i. c. 3.

Klüber, Recht der Gleichheit, Erster Theil, Drittes Capitel.

Günther, i. 266.

Heffters, ss. 34, 103, 31.

Mackintosh, Miscellaneous Works, vol. iii. p. 468.

(b) Martens expresses the principle upon which this right is founded clearly and forcibly :-"Une nation, quelque puissante qu'elle puisse être, n'est pas en droit d'exiger de l'autre des démonstrations positives d'honneur, moins encore des préférences, quoique toutes soient autorisées à considérer comme lésion des démonstrations positives de mépris et des actes contraires à leur honneur."-Dr. des Gens, s. 125.

king's honour is that of his people. Their real honour and interest are the same. A clear, unblemished character, comprehends not only the integrity that will not offer, but the spirit that will not submit to, an injury; and whether it belongs to an individual, or to a community, it is the foundation of peace, of independence, and of safety. Private credit is wealth; public honour is security. The feather that adorns the royal bird, supports his flight; strip him of his plumage, and you fix him to the earth."(c) "A wrong done" (said the high authority of Sir James Mackintosh)" to the humblest British subject, an insult offered to the British flag flying on the slightest skiff, is, if unrepaired, a dishonour to the British nation."(d) And *in the sober language of Vattel: [ *35] "Puisque la gloire d'une nation est un bien très-réel, elle est en droit de la défendre, tout comme ses autres avantages. Celui qui attaque sa gloire lui fait injure; elle est fondée à exiger de lui-même, par la force des armes, une juste réparation. On ne peut donc condamner les mesures que prennent quelquefois les souverains, pour maintenir ou pour venger la dignité de leurs couronnes. Elles sont également justes et nécessaires. Lorsqu'elles ne procèdent point de prétentions trop hautes, les attribuer à un vain orgueil, c'est ignorer grossièrement l'art de régner, et mépriser l'un des plus fermes appuis de la grandeur et de la sûreté d'un état."(e)

This end, therefore, is always to be kept in view-namely, that the honour of a nation is an outwork of the citadel of its independence. Independently, however, of this consideration, every State, like every individual, has a substantive right to maintain and preserve its reputation. XXVIII. Perhaps this right will obtain its best general exposition from a consideration of the acts which have been treated as an invasion of it-of wrongs done with respect to it. They seem to admit of the following classification:-1. Insults offered to the Head or Executive Power of a State, through the official organs of another State. 2. Through the acts of a subject of another State.

XXIX. Among the first class are to be reckoned injurious and insulting proclamations put forth by the Government of a country, or by its representative abroad. Among the second, libels published by private subjects upon the Executive Power of another State. Insults offered by individual subjects of another State, not recognised by, or, if need be from any peculiarity in the circumstances, disavowed by the State of which he is a member, can, generally speaking, be scarcely held to justify an International complaint; but in our own country, and at no very distant period, as has been already stated, the Crown has prosecuted subjects guilty of libelling *Sovereigns with whom it was in amity ;(ƒ) and it is [*36] the bounden duty of every State to make reparation for injuries inflicted upon the ambassador of any Foreign Power residing at its Court. International Law forbids a libel upon a State, for the same reason that Municipal Law forbids a libel upon an Individual. The Individual

(c) Letters of Junius, xlii.

(d) Speech on the Recognition of the Spanish American States, vol. iii. p. 468. (e) Vattel, t. i. 1. i. ch. xv. s. 191.

(ƒ) Vide ante, vol. i. p. 417.—Prosecutions for libelling the Emperors of Russia

and France.