not simply aver such facts as a conclusion. Boone v. Gleason, 10 Ky. Opin. 254.

ILLEGAL BUSINESS.-A company is not bound to communicate a message which is to furnish the means of carrying on an illegal business-e. g., to furnish reports of the market prices of stocks and provisions to a "bucket shop"-even though it had contracted to furnish such reports. Smith v. W. U. Tel. Co., 84 Ky. 664, 8 R. 672.

ILLEGALLY OR ERRONEOUSLY COLLECTED.—A statute which authorizes the recovery of taxes "illegally or erroneously collected" is not limited in its operation to cases where the property is within the taxing power, or to where there has been irregularity in the levy, or assessment, or collection, but extends to any case where the citizen has paid taxes which the city had no right to exact. City of Covington v. Hoadly, 5 R. 430.

The words "illegally or erroneously collected," in the "act to amend the charter of the city of Covington," providing that all actions to recover taxes paid which were illegally or erroneously collected, covers every case where taxes are paid which the city had no right to exact. City of Covington v. Voskotter, 80 Ky. 219, 3 R. 749.

ILLICIT. The word "illicit," found in a petition for slander, held meaningless in the connection in which it was found, and did not in any way affect the meaning or change the effect of the other words of the sentence, which was perfect without it. Williams v. Noel, 8 Ky. Opin. 836.

ILLITERACY COMMISSION.-See Ky. Stats. (1915), Sec.

2171-a.

ILLNESS.-Under a certificate providing that the benefit should not be payable where the insured committed suicide, except in delirium resulting from "illness," this does not mean only such sickness as confines the deceased in bed. "Illness is defined as a disorder of health-sickness." Supreme Lodge K. of H. v. Lapp, 74 S. W. 656, 25 R. 74. See SICKNESS.

ILLS WE HAVE. "Such a thought 'makes us rather bear those ills we have, than fly to others that we know not of.'' Com. v. I. C. R. Co., 160 Ky. 745, 170 S. W. 171.

ILLUSORY APPOINTMENT DOCTRINE.

See statement

of this doctrine in Barret's Exor. v. Barret, 166 Ky. 413.

ILL-WILL-It is a uniform rule in criminal practice in homicide cases to permit the Commonwealth to give evidence of any pertinent facts or circumstances tending to show ill-will or bad feeling on the part of the accused toward the deceased, or a motive that may have contributed to influence the commission of the act. Childers v. Com., 161 Ky. 440, 171 S. W. 149.

IMMATERIAL ISSUE.-An issue is immaterial where a plea to the whole declaration does not answer the whole cause of action. Shields v. Henderson, 1 Litt. 239. Or where that which is materially alleged is not traversed, or an issue taken on such a point as will not determine the cause. Garrard v. Willet, 4 J. J. M. 629.

IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATELY-IMMEDIATE NOTICE."Immediately," held not to mean, as used in an answer, instantly; but within a reasonable time. Whitecotton v. Simpson, 4 J. J. Mar. 12.

While the contract of insurance required the bank upon discovery of any speculation on the part of its cashier to give immediate notice, notice by telegram fourteen days after the discovery was sufficient, in view of the fact that in the meantime the officials were trying to secure enough money and property from the cashier to make good the shortage, and did get all he had. Moreover, the question of whether the notice was reasonable was submitted to the jury under proper instructions. It was not error for the court to instruct the jury that the words "immediate notice" as used in the contract of insurance mean notice given as soon as practicable and within a reasonable time, nor was it error to state in an instruction that it is admitted in the pleadings that the cashier appropriated a certain sum of money, though the pleading states that the appropriation was with the consent of the officials of the bank. Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation v. Stanley Deposit Bank, 149 Ky. 735, 149 S. W. 1025.

A provision in a fidelity bond that the employer shall immediately give notice of a fraudulent act of the employe does not require the employer to report its suspicions to the insurer, even though they be strong enough to justify, in the opinion of the employer, the discharge of the employe. After suspicion is aroused it ought to pursue its inquiries with reasonable diligence, and when satisfied that defalcation exists, notice of the fact ought to be given promptly to the insurer. Co. v. Western Bank, 94 S. W. 3, 29 R. 639.

Fidelity & Guar.

The following instruction on "immediate notice" has been approved: "The court further instructs the jury that the words 'immediate notice' as used in the contract of insurance, sued on herein and in these instructions, mean notice given as soon as practicable after the event and within a reasonable time, the covenant of the plaintiff in said contract being to act promptly and with dispatch in giving notice to defendant." Employers' Liability A. Corporation v. Stanley Deposit Bank, 149 Ky. 735, 149 S. W. 1025.

The provision in the policy requiring the insured to "give immediate notice in writing" in case of loss was waived when, the morning of the fire, the local agent knew of it and telegraphed the fact to the company, and within a few days the general agent came to the scene of the fire, and to the insured's question if it was necessary to give written notice, answered "no" American Central Ins. Co. v. Heaverin, 16 R. 95.

Where a policy provides that "immediate" notice in writing of any accident or injury should be given to the company, the word "immediate" is not to be construed literally, but as meaning that notice must be furnished within a reasonable time and in such time as the beneficiary can reasonably obtain information upon which to base it. Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Bethel, 140 Ky. 609, 131 S. W. 523.

"Immediately" construed. See note on this subject in 38 L. R. A. 538.

In Mechanics' Lien Law. Under the mechanics' lien law as amended by the Act of 1910, requiring notice in writing to the owner of the property or his authorized agent "immediately after the last item of said material or labor is furnished," the

word "immediately" is used in the sense of "promptly," and a notice given eight days after the last item of material or labor is furnished, is not sufficient. Wolflin-Luhring Lumber Co. v.

Mosely, 152 Ky. 701, 154 S. W. 22.

"The word 'immediately' is used in the statute in question with reference to time. Ordinarily it is defined as 'instantaneously,' 'instanter,' 'instantly,' 'forthwith,' 'without the intervention of time,' 'without the lapse of any appreciable time.' However, it is not a word of very precise signification, and is rarely employed to designate an exact portion of time. Thus, it is often construed to mean 'within a reasonable time.' Solomon v. Continental Fire Insurance Company, 160 N. Y. 595, 46 L. R. A. 682; or 'within a reasonable time under all the facts and circumstances of the case.'"' Peoples Accident Association v. Smith, 126 Pa. St. 317, 12 Am. St. Rep. 870. It is also held to mean 'within such convenient time as is reasonably requisite.' Martin v. Pifer, 96 Ind. 245; or 'may be reasonably necessary under the circumstances to do the thing required.' Foster v. New York Fidelity, etc. Co., 99 Wis. 447, 40 L. R. A. 833; Woodmen Accident Association v. Pratt, 62 Neb. 673, 89 Am. St. Rep. 777, 55 L. R. A. 291. Again, it is held to mean 'without any delay except such as is necessary in the usual course of the particular business in hand.' Inman, etc., v. Barnum, 115 Ga. 117. The broader meaning of 'within a reasonable time under all the facts and circumstances of the case' is usually applied in the case of accident insurance policies requiring immediate notice of the accident to be given. In this character of cases the policy is construed most favorably to the insured. While it is true that the word 'immediately,' as used in the statute in question, is not used in the narrow sense of 'instantaneously,' it is eviIdence that it is not used in the enlarged sense of 'within a reasonable time.' of 'promptly' and without attempting to fix a precise time within which the notice should have been given, it is sufficient to say that the notice of December 21st, which was given eight days after the last item of the material was furnished, was not given 'immediately' within the meaning of the statute." WolflinLuhring Lumber Co. v. Mosely, 152 Ky. 701, 154 S. W. 22. Fol

Our conclusion is that it was used in the sense

lowed in Farris Milling Co. v. Caldwell, 153 Ky. 837, 156 S. W. 896.

IMMEDIATELY, CONTINUOUSLY AND WHOLLY DISABLED. Where an accident policy provided indemnity against loss of time "resulting from bodily injuries effected through external, violent or accidental means, which independently of all other causes immediately, continuously, and wholly disables the insured from prosecuting any kind of business," and further provided that if "death results solely from such injuries within ninety days," the company would pay a stipulated sum, it was not necessary that a petition to recover the indemnity provided for death should charge that the injury immediately, continuously, and wholly disabled the insured from prosecuting his business. The words "immediately, continuously, and wholly" relate to losses growing out of disability to labor, and not to death. Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Bethel, 140 Ky. 609, 131 S. W. 523.

The word "immediately" in the constitution and laws of an order providing for benefits if a member shall sustain accidental injury, which shall, independently of all other causes, immediately, wholly, and continuously disable him, refers to time, not cause. Pepper v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 113 Ky. 918, 69 S. W. 956, 24 R. 723.

"In Commercial Travelers v. Barnes, 72 Kan. 392, it was held, consistent with sound reason, that 'immediately' was not synonymous with 'instantly,' and that so to define it would deprive a beneficiary of all rights of indemnity unless the hurt, the prime cause of the injury, was followed by immediate disablement. The court illustrated its position by an accidental poisoning. It said that such interim of time after the taking of the poison as the processes of nature might consume in bringing the poisoned person to a state of disability must be excluded in determining the meaning of immediately. In Brendon v. Traders & Travelers Accident Co., 84 N. Y. App. Div. 530, it was held that a physician was 'immediately, continuously and wholly' disabled by an accident notwithstanding he paid a professional visit meantime. In Hohn v. Interstate Casualty Co,,