weight of evidence, unless supported by circumstances. Louisville Water Co. v. Williams, 140 Ky. 320, 131 S. W. 10.

Juries are the triers of fact. They decide the weight to be given the testimony of the witnesses. The fact that the numerical weight of the testimony is against their finding affords no ground for reversal, if there is substantial evidence to support it. Harbison & Walker Co. v. White, 114 S. W. 250. Where the testimony is sufficient to sustain a verdict, the Court of Appeals has no power to control the judgment of a jury and say that it should have believed the testimony of one side and rejected that of another. Rutherford v. Bath Co., 80 S. W. 815, 26 R. 126.

The Court of Appeals will not set aside a verdict because of mere numerical superiority of witnesses for appellant. Id.

NUNC PRO TUNC.-A proceeding taken, judgment declared, etc., now for then. Where a proceeding, etc., has been delayed by the action of the court, or any like ground, the court may allow it to be dated as if it had taken place or been delivered on the earlier date. Cochran's Law Lexicon.

The office of a nunc pro tunc order is to supply on the record something which has actually occurred in the court, but omitted to be noted of record. It can not supply omitted action by the court. Jett v. Farmers Bank of Ky., 76 S. W. 385, 25 R. 817. The general rule is that when an order or direction of the court has been omitted by inadvertence or mistake on the part of the judge or clerk, and there is record evidence showing that all the steps necessary to have the omitted order or direction entered were duly made and taken, and by a reference to this record the court without any other evidence can see what judgment or order was intended to be entered, it may from this record evidence enter, as of the date when it should have been entered, a nunc pro tunc order. Ralls v. Sharp's Admr., 140 Ky. 744, 131 S. W. 998.

The rule is well settled that the court can not alter, correct or amend its records at a subsequent term by the recollection of the judge or the representation of others to him. There must be at least a minute or a memorandum on the court record

evidencing the order or judgment then rendered to justify the court at a subsequent term entering a nunc pro tunc order. Kendrick v. Williams, 157 Ky. 767, 164 S. W. 72.

Under the maxim that "An act of the court shall prejudice no one" (Broom's Legal Maxims, p. 115), made to also read by its frequent application to this class of cases as "A delay of the court shall prejudice no one," the practice of entering judgments nunc pro tunc exists, and has from very early times. Doune v. Lewis, 11 Ves. 601. Nor is there a limitation upon the time when it may be done, unless such be found in the modern statutes of limitation; one instance being recorded where such an entry was made twenty-three years after the judgment was rendered. Danl. Ch. Pr. 1219. The entry of such judgments are always to protect some right that has arisen since. the judgment was delivered, as otherwise a judgment now would be as efficacious as if entered then. For that reason, and to that end, in pursuance of the maxims just quoted, the courts will enter a judgment which was in fact rendered, but which through the omission of the clerk, or other casualty, has not been recorded; but, before proceeding to order such judgment entered as of the date of its rendition, strict evidence is required that it was then so rendered. Therefore the rule is that such judg ment can be entered only upon evidence of the fact of its rendition contained in the record itself. One purpose of entering a judgment now for then is to supply a matter of evidence, and not to alter or create facts. If the court had failed to act, or had acted erroneously, the matter can not be corrected by a judgment at a later term; but if it had acted, and the record shows it, but there was not made sufficiently formal evidence of the fact, the evidence may be made to conform to the truth as shown by record. Montgomery v. Viers, 130 Ky. 700, 114 S. W. 251.

"From the earliest times courts of law and equity have possessed and exercised the power of making entries of judgments and decrees nunc pro tunc in cases where such entries are necessary to prevent injustice to suitors. Mohun's Case, 6 Mod. 59; Mayor of Norwich v. Berry, 4 Burr, 2277; Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 56. Such power does not depend upon any statute,

but it is inherent in the courts. Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U. S. 62. The power is exercised not for the purpose of enabling the court to correct judicial errors, but to supply matters of evidence. If the court has not rendered a judgment that it might or should have rendered, or if it has rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it has no power to remedy these errors of omissions by ordering the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment. Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 68; Gray v. Brignardello, 1 Wall. 627; Smith v. Hood, 25 Pa. St. 218, 64 Am. Dec. 692. One of the classes of cases in which judgments may be entered nunc pro tunc is where the former judgment has been pronounced by the court, but not entered of record by reason of some accident or mistake, or through the neglect or omission or misprision of the clerk. In such a case the court rendering the judgment has the power to order the judgment so rendered to be entered nunc pro tunc, provided there be satisactory evidence, not only of the rendition, but of the terms of the judgment. Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 61; Whorley v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 72 Ala. 20; Shephard v. Brenton, 20 Iowa, 41." Chester v. Graves, 159 Ky. 244, 166 S. W. 998.

The mere recollection of the judge of a court of what took place at a former term is not sufficient to authorize an addition to, or an amendment of, the record in regard to any order or judgment. There must be something in the record by which to amend. Boyd County v. Ross, 95 Ky. 167, 15 R. 520.

The re-enactment of a city ordinance levying a tax, and the passage of a nunc pro tunc order directing the clerk to record the "yea and nay" vote which had been taken on the original passage of the ordinance, cured the defect in failing to originally record the yeas and nays as required by Sec. 3489, Ky Stats. City of Pineville v. Burchfield, 19 R. 984, 42 S. W. 340.

The last day of the term at which judgment was rendered, a bill was signed by the judge, and indorsed by the clerk "filed in court," with the date of filing, but the clerk failed to enter an order showing the filing. At the next term, on motion, after notice, a nunc pro tunc order curing the omission was proper. L. & N. R. Co. v. Reed, 10 R. 495.

A nunc pro tunc order filing a bill of exceptions entered in the lower court after the affirmance of a judgment on appeal can not be considered on a petition for rehearing. Louisville Bridge Co. v. Neafus, 62 S. W. 2, 63 S. W. 600, 23 R. 183.

An entry in the clerk's minutes giving the style of the case and the case number, followed by the abbreviation "Judgt.,' is a sufficient basis for the entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc. Monarch v. Brey, 51 S. W. 191, 21 R. 279.

Where, in an action in equity, the parties agreed that such of the testimony as had not previously been taken by depositions might be orally heard by the court on the trial, as in an ordinary action where the right of jury is waived, and such agreement was approved by the court and oral evidence heard as therein stipulated, but, by inadvertence or mistake, the agreement was not reduced to writing or entered of record, the court's knowledge and approval of the agreement authorizes a nunc pro tunc entry of the agreement and orders in accordance therewith. Conrad's Exr. v. Conrad, 156 Ky. 231, 160 S. W. 937.

Where in an adoption proceeding there is among the papers in the case a judgment containing the following notation: "Let the above order be entered and of effect from this date. The 12th day of December, 1908. (Signed) Matt O'Doherty, Judge," such paper is a sufficient quasi record to justify the court's action in entering judgment nunc pro tunc. Chester v. Graves, 159 Ky. 244, 166 S. W. 998.

NUNCUPATIVE WILL.-See WILLS.

NURSING, WASHING.-Though under the statute no person other than the keeper of a tavern or house of private entertainment can recover for the board of another, unless a promise to pay therefor be established, there may be an implied contract to pay for "nursing, washing, feeding stock," etc., to one who neither keeps a tavern nor house of private entertainment. Turner v. Moberly, 14 R. 623.

NYMPHOMANIA. "But, while the senses are apparently sound and true, the affections may be perverted, or the moral sentiments unhinged in such a degree as to subjugate the will

to some morbid appetite or ungovernable passion, and thus precipitates against the will insane but conscious wrong. This is contradistinctively called moral insanity. Such are the forms of monomania entitled kleptomania, pyromania, nymphomania, homicidal mania, etc., now well-defined and recognized as irresponsible insanity." St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Graves, 6 Bush, 276.

OATH. It is provided in Civil Code, Sec. 732, that in the construction of the Code the word "oath" includes affirmation, in any case in which it may be substituted for an oath, and in like cases the word "sworn" includes affirmed.

It is provided in Ky. Stats., Secs. 446, 451, that in the construction of statutes, "the word 'oath' shall be construed to include affirmation in all cases in which an affirmation may be substituted for an oath; and in like cases, the word 'sworn' shall be construed to include the word 'affirm.'"'

The oath for all officers, members of the General Assembly and members of the bar, is prescribed by Ky. Constitution (1891), Sec. 228.

"An oath required by this Code may be substituted by the affirmation of a person who is conscientiously opposed to taking an oath." Civil Code, Sec. 680.

A magistrate is not authorized to issue a warrant of arrest without oath or affirmation made before him of facts sufficient to constitute reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has been guilty of a public offense. The personal knowledge of the magistrate will not justify the issual of a warrant. He may himself reduce to written form the information thus received, or may take an affidavit, and in either event will not be liable under Sec. 1372, Ky. Stats.; but whether he reduces the information so obtained on oath or affirmation to written form or not, he is not liable in civil damages, where he has in fact so obtained it. Clark v. Hampton, 163 Ky. 698, 174 S. W. 490.

Under Ky. Stats., Sec. 2157, providing that upon an inquest of lunacy the personal presence of the person charged may be