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tent and of republicanism. This is a movement not like our last revolution-the result of the agitation of the wealthy and the educatedbut one which is the outcome of the popular sentiment of all classes. Much surprise has been expressed that with the immense army and resources at hand Spain has not been able to crush the insurrection or prevent its rapid growth. Aside from the climate, which is deadly to the raw, ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-treated, and badly paid Spanish troops, the greater part of whom are mere lads, the Spaniards have to divide their troops into an army of occupation and another of operation. These must necessarily move in considerable numbers, because if compelled to flee without a knowledge of the intricacies of the country they would be decimated.

A Cuban command on dispersion is readily reorganized, as each man is his own guide. This is one of the most valuable of Cuban movements to disperse as if routed, to rally at a previously agreed point, and then to fall upon and surprise the seemingly victorious enemy. The Cuban, used to the country and the climate, marches and rides much faster than the Spaniard. He can live and thrive, and does so in necessity, on food that is death to the Spanish soldier. Moreover in a friendly country the movements of the enemy are readily ascertained by the Cuban general, who can thus select his own position or evade the engagement, while the Spanish are never so well informed and are at the mercy of their guides.

It must be remembered that the Cuban fights for the noblest principle of man-independence. That he does so without compulsion or pay, but spontaneously and enthusiastically-nay, he fights the battle of despair, knowing it is better to be killed thus than to bear the tortures of a Spanish prison or to trust himself to the tender mercy of a Spanish commander. On the other hand, the Spanish troops fight by compulsion and for pay, which is even now months in arrears; they fight without faith, for their heart is not with their cause. They know that surrender means pardon and good treatment, while fighting may mean death. Hundreds of Spanish soldiers have singly or in groups gone over to the insurgent lines, being satisfied that they would live there under better conditions.

CHARACTER OF THE WAR.

There was also an attempt made by the Spanish to brand the Cubans with carrying on an uncivilized warfare because of their use of dynamite. General Roloff before using this explosive issued a proclamation warning all persons of the danger of traveling by rail. Dynamite has been used freely, but only as a substitute for gunpowder in the destruction of railroad bridges, trestles, and trains which could be used and were used for the transportation of Spanish troops. Of course it is a serious loss to Spain to have these railroads destroyed, but no one can seriously deny that it is a measure justified by the necessities of war. The use of this explosive as a substitute for gunpowder in the operation of mines is simply a proof that the Cubans are keeping pace with the advance of inventions in the art of war.

DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY.

The subject, however, which has caused probably the most discussion is the order of General Gomez to prevent the grinding of sugar cane and in case of the disobedience of said order the destruction of the crop.

General Gomez issued a preliminary warning dated July 1, of which the following is a copy:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF LIBERATION,
Najasa, Camaguey, July 1, 1895.

To the Planters and Owners of Cattle Ranches:

In accord with the great interests of the revolution for the independence of the country and for which we are in arms:

Whereas all exploitations of any product whatsoever are aids and resources to the Government that we are fighting, it is resolved by the general in chief to issue this general order throughout the island that the introduction of articles of commerce, as well as beef and cattle, into the towns occupied by the enemy, is absolutely prohibited. The sugar plantations will stop their labors, and whosoever shall attempt to grind the crop notwithstanding this order, will have their cane burned and their buildings demolished. The person who, disobeying this order, will try to profit from the present situation of affairs, will show by his conduct little respect for the rights of the revolution of redemption and therefore shall be considered as an enemy, treated as a traitor, and tried as such in case of his capture. MAXIMO GOMEZ,

The General in Chief.

Nevertheless throughout the country preparations were made for the grinding of the crop. A peremptory order, of which the following is a copy, was then issued on November 6:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF LIBERATION,

Territory of Sancti Spiritus, November 6, 1895. Animated by the spirit of unchangeable resolution in defense of the rights of the revolution of redemption of this country of colonists, humiliated and despised by Spain, and in harmony with what has been decreed concerning the subject in the circular dated the 1st of July, I have ordered the following:

ARTICLE I. That all plantations shall be totally destroyed, their cane and outbuildings burned, and railroad connections destroyed.

ART. II. All laborers who shall aid the sugar factories-these sources of supplies that we must deprive the enemy of-shall be considered as traitors to their country. ART. III. All who are caught in the act, or whose violation of Article II shall be proven, shall be shot. Let all chiefs of operations of the army of liberty comply with this order, determined to unfurl triumphantly, even over ruin and ashes, the flag of the Republic of Cuba.

In regard to the manner of waging the war, follow the private instructions that I have already given.

For the sake of the honor of our arms and your well-known courage and patriotism, it is expected that you will strictly comply with the above orders.

To the chiefs of operations: Circulate this.

M. GOMEZ, General in Chief.

On the 11th of November the following proclamation was issued: HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF LIBERATION, Sancti Spiritus, November 11, 1895.

To honest men, victims of the torch:

The painful measure made necessary by the revolution of redemption drenched in innocent blood from Hatuey to our own times by cruel and merciless Spain will plunge you in misery. As general in chief of the army of liberation it is my duty to lead it to victory, without permitting myself to be restrained or terrified, by any means necessary to place Cuba in the shortest time in possession of her dearest ideal. I therefore place the responsibility for so great a ruin on those who look on impassively and force us to those extreme measures which they then condemn like dolts and hypocrites that they are. After so many years of supplication, humiliations, contumely, banishment, and death, when this people, of its own will, has arisen in arms, there remains no other solution but to triumph, it matters not what means are employed to accomplish it.

This people can not hesitate between the wealth of Spain and the liberty of Cuba. Its greatest crime would be to stain the land with blood without effecting its purposes because of puerile scruples and fears which do not concur with the character of the men who are in the field, challenging the fury of an army which is one of the bravest in the world, but which in this war is without enthusiasm or faith, ill fed and unpaid. The war did not begin February 24; it is about to begin now.

The war had to be organized; it was necessary to calm and lead into the proper channels the revolutionary spirit always exaggerated in the beginning by wild enthusiasm. The struggle ought to begin in obedience to a plan and method more or less studied, as the result of the peculiarities of this war. This has already been done. Let Spain now send her soldiers to rivet the chains of her slaves; the children of this land are in the field, armed with the weapons of liberty. The struggle will be terrible, but success will crown the revolution and efforts of the oppressed. MAXIMO GOMEZ, General in Chief.

The reasons underlying this measure are the same which caused this country to destroy the cotton crop and the baled cotton in the South during the war of the secession.

The sugar crop is a source of large income to the Spanish Government, directly by tax and export duty, as well as indirectly. The action of the insurgents is perfectly justified, because it is simply a blockade, so to speak, on land-a prevention of the gathering, and hence the export, of the commodity with, naturally, a punishment for the violation thereof.

PROTESTS OF ALIENS.

Strenuous protests have, too, been made by and on behalf of aliens residing in or having property in Cuba.

It is admitted in civilized warfare that the property of alien residents, whether they are in sympathy with the enemy or not, when in the track of war, is subject to war's casualties, and that all property which might be of aid and comfort to the enemy may be taken or destroyed, the commander in the field being the judge of the exigency and necessities which dictate such action. This proposition has been laid down by the State Department and the Supreme Court of this country in the matter of the destruction of cotton in the late war.

The provision of the constitution of the Republic of Cuba that the citizens of a country which acknowledges the Cubans as belligerents, shall be exempt from the payment of taxes and contributions to the Republic, naturally implies that the property of such citizens after the granting of belligerency by their country, even though by all the laws of war it is contraband and may be seized or destroyed, will be absolutely respected, and, I have all reason to assert, will be under the special protection of the Cuban Government and its army.

For aliens to ask this protection as a right while their Government denies the existence of the belligerency of the Cubans might well be considered by the latter as allowing aid and comfort to go to their enemy, simply on the expectation that some time in the future the Government of those aliens may, out of gratitude to the Cubans, acknowl edge, what is after all but a state of fact, belligerency. In the meantime the aid and comfort thus allowed by the Cubans to flow to the Spaniards must strengthen the latter and thus draw out the struggle or weaken the former. General Gomez explains the importance of this measure in the following letter:

TO TOMAS ESTRADA PALMA.

DISTRICT OF REMEDIOS, Province of Santa Clara, December 8, 1895.

MY DEAR AND ESTEEMED FRIEND: It is not long since I wrote you, but an opportunity offers by which I may send you a few words of encouragement and good cheer. Rest assured I write you whenever I can, which is not often, owing to the great amount of work which at present falls upon my shoulders. I know the pen is mightier than the sword, but my mission at present is with the latter; others must wield the pen.

Eight days ago Gen. Antonio Maceo and myself met and fought the enemy with our forces in conjunction. The Spanish column, including infantry, cavalry, and

artillery were our superiors in number, but the arms of the Cuban Republic were again victorious. I have not time at present to go into details of the battle, they will follow later. Suffice it to say, Spanish reports to the contrary notwithstanding, we won the day.

Our advance may be slow, but it will be sure and firm. If you hear of our retreat remember that it will be temporary and for a purpose. Our faces are turned toward the west and nothing will stop us. The result of my observations as we proceed is that the Spaniards are in need of almost everything-money, sympathy, soldiers, and even leaders who have faith and courage in the righteousness of their cause.

If Cuban valor and resolution do not fail us, and if the hearts of Cuba's children do not weaken, I have every reason to believe that the close of the six months' campaign now initiated will find everything satisfactorily settled and Cuba free.

I know that unfavorable comment has been made on some of the methods we have been forced to employ in this revolution, but it will not do to listen to the complaints of the superficial and irresponsible. No sugar crop must be made this winter under any circumstances or for any amount of money. It is the source from which the enemy still hopes and dreams of obtaining its revenue. To prevent that end, for the good of our country, has been and shall be our programme.

We are Cubans and have one great aim in view, one glorious object to obtain-the freedom of our country and liberty. It is of more importance to us than glory, public applause, or anything else. Everything else will follow in time. I have never believed in or advised a sanguinary revolution, but it must be a radical one. First of all we must triumph; toward that end the most effective means, although they may appear harsh, must be employed.

There is nothing so bad, so dishonorable, so inexcusable, in the eyes of the world as failure. Victory is within our reach. To hesitate, to delay it, to endanger it now, would be stupid, would be cowardly, would be criminal. We will succeed first; the applause of the world will follow. To do otherwise would be not to love one's country. I have never felt more confident than at the present moment. You can rest assured that Cuba will soon achieve her absolute independence.

Ever your true friend,

MAXIMO GOMEZ.

As I have through various sources been approached on this subject in behalf of property of American citizens on the island, and as I know the cordial friendship which the Cubans bear to the Government and people of the United States of America, feeling assured that this country, from its very history, must likewise feel a deep sympathy with a people who are treading in their footsteps, I have written to the Government of the Republic of Cuba the following letter:

SALVADOR CISNEROS BETANCOURT,

President of the Cuban Republic.

NEW YORK, December 23, 1895.

MY DISTINGUISHED FELLOW-COUNTRYMAN: There have been many complaints made to me from various sources that the property of citizens of the United States of North America has been destroyed by our army of liberation in Cuba under the order of our distinguished general in chief, Maximo Gomez. I know very well how you and all my countrymen feel toward this Republic, and that you desire to do everything in your power to demonstrate your friendship, and I deem it my duty to communicate the above facts to you so that you may consider the matter carefully and thoroughly; at the same time I know that many Spaniards intend to transfer their property, as some have done already, to American citizens or companies especially organized for their purposes, in case that you should, before or after receiving the rights of belligerents, take active measures for the protection of North American interests.

I say this because I am sure that, at least after the granting of belligerency, you will do your utmost to guard the interests of the citizens of a country which warmly sympathizes with us in our present struggle.

Hoping that you will give this subject your most thoughtful consideration, I remain your devoted friend, for country and liberty,

T. ESTRADA Palma.

In view of the history of this revolution as herein stated, in view of the causes which led to it, its rapid growth, its successes in arms, the establishment, operation, and resources of the Government of the Cuban Republic, the organization, number, and discipline of its army, the contrast in the treatment of prisoners to that of the enemy, the territory in its control and subject to the carrying out of its decrees, of

the futility of the attempts of the Spanish Govern to crush the revolution, in spite of the immense increase of its army in Cuba and of its blockade and the many millions spent for that purpose, the cruelties which on the part of the Spanish have especially characterized this sanguinary and fiercely conducted war, and the damage to the interests of the citizens of this country under the present conditions, I, as the duly accredited representative, in the name of the Cuban people in arms who have fought singly and alone against the monarchy of Spain for nearly a year, in the heart of a continent devoted to republican institutions, in the name of justice, in the name of humanity, in the name of liberty, petition you, and through you the Government of the United States of America, to accord the rights of belligerency to a people fighting for their absolute independence.

Very respectfully, yours,

The Hon. RICHARD OLNEY,

T. ESTRADA PALMA.

Secretary of State of the United States of America.

A

CUBA v. SPAIN.

War is a dire necessity. But when a people has exhausted all human means of persuasion to obtain from an unjust oppressor a remedy for its ills, if it apeals as a last resource to force in order to repel the persistent aggression which constitutes tyranny, this people is justified before its own conscience and before the tribunal of nations.

Such is the case of Cuba in its wars against Spain. No metropolis has ever been harsher or more obstinately harassing; none has ever exploited a colony with more greediness and less foresight than Spain. No colony has ever been more prudent, more long-suffering, more cautious, more persevering than Cuba in its purpose of asking for its rights by appealing to the lessons of experience and political wisdom. Only driven by desperation has the people of Cuba taken up arms, and having done so, it displays as much heroism in the hour of danger as it had shown good judgment in the hour of deliberation.

The history of Cuba during the present century is a long series of rebellions; but every one of these was preceded by a peaceful struggle for its rights-a fruitless struggle because of the obstinate blindness of Spain.

There were patriots in Cuba from the beginning of this century, such as Presbyter Caballero and Don Francisco Arango, who called the metropolitan Government's attention to the evils of the colony, and pointed to the remedy by pleading for the commercial franchises required by its economical organization, and for the intervention of the natives in its government, not only as a right, but also for political expediency, in view of the long distance between the colony and the home government, and the grave difficulties with which it had to contend. The requirements of the war with the continental colonies, which were tired of Spanish tyranny, compelled the metropolitan Government to grant a certain measure of commercial liberty to the Island of Cuba; a temporary concession which spread prosperity throughout its territory, but which was not sufficient to open the eyes of the Spanish statesmen. On the contrary, prompted by suspicion and mistrust of the Americans, they began by curtailing, and shortly after abrogated the limited administrative powers then possessed by some of the corporations in Cuba, such as the "Junta de Fomento"(a board for the encouragement of internal improvements).

As if this were not enough, the Cubans were deprived of the little show of political intervention they had in public affairs. By a simple royal decree in 1837 the small representation of Cuba in the Spanish Cortes was suppressed, and all the powers of the Government were concentrated in the hands of the captain-general, on whom authority was conferred to act as the governor of a city in a state of siege. This implied that the captain-general, residing in Habana, was master of the life and property of every inhabitant of the island of Cuba. This meant that Spain declared a permanent state of war against a peaceful and defenseless people.

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