island offered a vast field to censure, nothing was done to improve its condition. It was thought by the central government that it was only necessary by force to save Cuba to Spain. It was common remark, however, that the Government ought to sustain two campaigns in Cubaone against insurrection and the other against corruption. Said Mr. Cushing: So merely mercenary and so regardless of duty and the public weal are many of the public officers who go out to the island as to cause the saying to become current that on embarking they leave all sense of shame behind them in Cadiz. And he observed that all testimony was unanimous as to the corruptions and the embezzlements of the administrations of Cuba. The testimony of Mr. Cushing is of the most convincing character, as he has never been accused of being unfriendly to Spain. That he did not draw a too highly colored picture of Spanish misrule is shown by the declaration of the minister of transmarine affairs at Madrid, in an official paper quoted by Mr. Fish in 1874: A deplorable and pertinacious tradition of despotism which, if it could ever be justified, is without a shadow of reason at the present time, intrusted the direction and management of our colonial establishment to the agents of the metropolis, destroying, by their dominant and exclusive authority, the vital energies of the country and the creative and productive activity of free individuals. And although the system may now have improved in some of its details, the domineering action of the authorities being less felt, it still appears full of the original error, which is upheld by the force of tradition, and the necessary influence of interests created under their protection. A change of system, political as well as administrative, is therefore imperatively demanded. It is needless to say no such change has been made. The Spanish Government to-day in Cuba is of the same character as it was when Richard Henry Dana visited the Island in 1854, "an armed monarchy encamped in the midst of a disarmed and disfranchised people; an unmixed despotism of one nation over another." Dana warned the public against the testimony of Americans and other foreigners engaged in business in Cuba as to the condition of affairs there: Of all classes of persons I know of none whose situation is more unfavorable to the growth and development of sentiments of patriotism and philanthropy and of interest in the future of a race than foreigners temporarily resident, for purposes of money making only, in a country with which they have nothing in common in the future or the past. This class is often called impartial. I do not agree to the use of that term. They are indeed free from the bias of feeling or sentiment, but they are subject to the attractions of interest. It is for their immediate advantage to preserve peace and the existing order of things. That the condition of Cuba had not improved prior to the present war is shown by a report of our consul-general at Havana to the State Department in 1885. This stated that the entire population, with the exception of the official class, was living under a tyranny unparalleled at this day on the globe: * * 料 There is a system of oppression and torture which enters into every phase of life, eats into the soul of every Cuban, mortifies, injures, and insults him every hour, impoverishes him and his family from day to day, threatens the rich man with bankruptcy and the poor man with beggary. The exactions of the Spanish Government and the illegal outrages of its officers are in fact intolerable. They have reduced the island to despondency and ruin. The Government at Madrid is directly answerable for the misery of Cuba and for the rapacity and venality of its subordi. nates. No well-informed Spaniard imagines that Cuba will long continue to submit to this tyranny, or at least that she will long be able to yield this harvest to her oppressors. Spain cares nothing whatever for the interests, the prosperity, or the sufferings of her colony. The Government does almost nothing to ameliorate any of the evils of the country. The police are every where insufficient and inefficient. The roads are no roads at all. Every interest which might enrich and improve * the island is looked upon by the officials as one more mine to exploit. Cuba is held solely for the benefit of Spain and Spanish interests, for the sake of Spanish adventurers. Against this all rebel in thought and feeling if not yet in fact and deed. They wish protection from the grasping rapacity of Spain and see no way to attain it except by our aid. * He concluded, that from the general misery, war must ensue, of such a savage character that the world would be shocked, and the United States would be compelled from sheer humanity to interfere and save a country which Spain would be unable either to control or to preserve. He had learned from many quarters that in any future attempt to change the condition of affairs all the inhabitants would go hand in hand; "it is generally understood that the permanent white population is of one mind." While some of the reforms stipulated for by the Cubans and engaged to be carried out by General Campos in 1879 were nominally granted, they were all substantially withheld. The central government did not feel itself bound after the cessation of hostilities was secured to perform the conditions by which that result was brought about. Our consul-general reported (1885) "that the island is worse governed than at any previous period of its history." * * Cuba it was determined must pay the entire cost of the war. At the time when the fostering care of the Government was most needed to heal the wounds inflicted by the war, when every interest was prostrate and every business suffering, new and enormous taxes were imposed. A war tax of the most exaggerated character was laid. Every business, trade, art, or profession is taxed in the proportion of from 25 to 33 per cent of its net income. All ordinary mercantile business and all the petty trades and employments of the country are separately suffering. All participate in the common distress. * He stated that the absolute legal tax imposed on the island was only a part of what the wretched and impoverished inhabitants were compelled to pay. * * * It is a matter of notoriety that illegal charges are constantly made and then taken off for a bribe. The hordes of officials who batten like hungry beasts on the vitals of Cuba make no pretense of honesty except on paper. The highest officers, when they chance to be better than their subordinates, admit the character of their inferiors; more often they share it. The present state of things can not continue. Some change amounting almost to revolution is inevitable. What with governmental oppression and illegal tyranny, emancipation, brigandage, low prices for sugar and high taxes on everything, the ruin of the island is already almost consummated. She is absolutely incapacitated for rendering the revenue demanded or supporting the army of officials who keep her prostrate in her agony. Shortly after Mr. Blaine became Secretary of State, in the administration of President Harrison, it was the subject of consideration whether Spain could be induced to acknowledge Cuba as independent should the United States agree to guarantee the sum to be paid by Cuba for the relinquishment of all Spanish rights in the island. This movement was made by the sugar planters and it was thought that the entire sugar interest would support it. Mr. Blaine announced himself warmly in favor of the project, but after long conferences it was ascertained that the consent of Spain could not be obtained. In truth, the pacification effected by Martinez Campos in 1878 was hardly efficient even as a truce. The reports of our consular agents, the testimony of travelers, the avowals made in the Spanish press, and the constant evidence almost daily recurring in the Cuban press, show that between 1878 and 1895 Cuba enjoyed little peace or repose. Brigandage, which was merely one form of public discontent, never ceased. Only the presence of a very large Spanish army prevented organized war. The danger and the scandal of the Cuban situation have been such as can be compared with nothing but the condition of Armenia. So serious did they become, and so imminent was the peril, that in 1894–95 the Spanish Government at last adopted measures looking to the partial satisfaction of Cuban demands. These measures we need not discuss. They were held by the old insurgent party to be illusory and deceptive. Another attempt at independence was decided upon, and in February, 1895, the present "sanguinary and fiercely conducted war" broke out, "in some respects more active than the last preceding revolt." In thus characterizing the situation in Cuba as a state of war, President Cleveland, like Secretary Fish, has cleared the subject of all preliminary doubts. A state of war exists in Cuba. With that, and with that alone, we have to deal. The precedents are clear, and if our action were to be decided by precedent alone, we should not be able to hesitate. The last great precedent was that of the civil war which broke out in the United States in the spring of 1861. In that instance, without waiting for the outbreak of actual hostilities, further than the bloodless attack on Fort Sumter and its surrender, April 13, 1861, the British Government issued its proclamation of neutrality on the 13th of May following, before it had received official information that war existed, except as a blockade of certain insurgent ports. The French Government acted in concert with Great Britain, but delayed the official announcement until June. The Spanish Government issued its proclamation of belligerency June 17; and the first battle of our war was not fought until July 21, or known at Madrid until August. In this great instance the outbreak of insurrection and the recognition of belligerency were simultaneous. The United States protested against the precipitancy of the act, and have never admitted its justice or legality. Neither in 1869 nor in 1895 did the President enforce the precedent against Spain in regard to the insurrection in Cuba. Not even in 1875, when the insurgents held possession of a great part of the island and seacoast, with no restraint but the blockade, did the United States recognize their belligerency. Yet belligerency is a question of fact, and if declared at all it should be declared whenever the true character of neutrality requires it or the exigencies of law need it. The nature of such action may be political or legal or both. As a political act, impartiality requires that belligerency should be recognized whenever, existing in fact, its denial is equivalent to taking part with one of the belligerents against the other. In such cases the unrecognized belligerent has just ground for complaint. The moral support of the neutral government is given wholly to its opponent. That the Cuban insurgents were belligerents in fact as early as 1869 was expressly stated by Mr. Fish when he explained the meaning he attached to his phrase regarding "the civil war now ravaging the island." The word war in such conditions necessarily implies the fact of belligerency. President Cleveland, in his annual message of last month, informs us that the present war is more active than the preceding one. Nevertheless, our Government has still refrained from what Mr. Fish called "any public recognition of belligerent rights to the insurgents." No legal necessity arose to require it, and the political exigency was not absolute. Yet, after the victory of Bayamo in the month of July last, when the insurgents defeated and nearly captured the captain general, Martinez Campos, and gained military possession of the whole eastern balf of the island, the fact of their belligerency was established, and if further evidence was needed it was fully given by the subsequent victory at Coliseo on the 24th of December, when the insurgents drove the captain general back to Havana and gained military control of the western provinces. If the Government of the United States still refrained from recognizing the belligerency of the insurgents after this conclusive proof of the fact, the reason doubtless was that in the absence of any legal compli cations the question became wholly political, and that its true solution. must lie not in a recognition of belligerency, but in a recognition of independence. In 1875, when the situation was very far from being as serious as it is now, President Grant, after long consideration of the difficulties involved in public action, decided against the recognition of belligerency as an act which might be delusive to the insurgents and would certainly be regarded as unfriendly by Spain. He decided upon a middle course. The documents above quoted show that he proposed to the Spanish Government a sort of intervention which should establish the independence of Cuba by a friendly agreement. In doing so he not only necessarily recognized both parties to the conflict as on an equal plane, but he also warned Spain that, if such mediation should not be accepted, direct intervention would probably be deemed a necessity on the part of the United States. Spain preferred to promise to the insurgents terms so favorable as to cause for a time the cessation of hostilities. Since then twenty years have passed. The insurrection, far from having ceased, has taken the proportions of a war almost as destructive to our own citizens as to the contending parties. The independence of Cuba was then regarded by the President of the United States as the object of his intervention, and has now become far more inevitable than it was then. Evidently the Government of the United States can do no less than to take up the subject precisely where President Grant left it, and to resume the friendly mediation which he actually began, with all the consequences which necessarily would follow its rejection. Confident that no other action than this accords with our friendly relations with Spain, our just sympathy with the people of Cuba, and with our own dignity and consistency, I recommend the following resolution to the consideration of the Senate: Resolved, That the President is hereby requested to interpose his friendly offices with the Spanish Government for the recognition of the independence of Cuba. FIFTY-FOURTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION. April 29, 1896. [Senate Report No. 821.] Mr. Sherman, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following report: The Committee on Foreign Relations have considered the proposed amendment to the bill (H. R. 8293) "making appropriations to supply deficiencies in the appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1896, and for prior years, and for other purposes," appropriating $5,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to remove from the State of Montana, and to deliver to the Canadian authorities at the international boundary line, the refugee Canadian Cree Indians, and recommend the passage of the same. The recommendation of the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers, is herewith submitted. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 29th instant. House Ex. Doc. No. 341, Fiftieth Congress, first session, shows the circumstances under which the Canadian Cree Indians first crossed the boundary line of the State of Montana and something of their history since that time. Your remaining inquiries will, I believe, be fully answered by certain correspondence, copies of which are hereto annexed. It will be observed that the Canadian authorities have now for the second time agreed to accept and take charge of these refugee Indians upon their being delivered to them at the frontier. A third offer of the same kind can hardly be expected, and in my judgment it would be a great mistake if the present favorable disposition of the Canadian authorities were not at once availed of. The number of Indians to be deported is said to now amount to something like 500. Undoubtedly they can be removed by the President, with such aid from the Army as may be necessary, more expeditiously and cheaply than any other way. But he is at present without any authority to take any steps in the matter and without any funds to meet the necessary expenditures. I recommend, therefore, that you obtain appropriate legislation, if practicable, either by independent bill or resolution, or by some amendment to an appropriation bill. The legislation should expressly authorize the President to remove and deliver the Indians, with the aid of the Army, if necessary, and should appropriate a sum not exceeding $5,000 to defray the necessary charges. I am, very truly, yours, Hon. THOMAS H. CARTER, RICHARD OLNEY. United States Senate. THE STATE OF MONTANA, EXECUTIVE OFFICE, SIR: This office has had previous correspondence with the Department of State in relation to the presence of a number of Cree Indians in our State. These Indians, as you may know, are wards of the British Government, and generally referred to as |