FOREIGNERS TO SUCCEED. IF NOT AMERICANS, WHO?

This country and sovereignty will soon be left to the possession of foreigners, "to unlineal hands, no sons of theirs succeeding." To what foreign nation shall these islands belong if not to the great Republic? At the present those of foreign nativities hold all the important offices of Government and control legislation, the judiciary, etc. Well disposed as the Government now is toward the United States and its resident citizens here, in course of time it may be otherwise, as was the case during our civil war.

POINTS WHICH SHOULD INFLUENCE U. S. POLICY.

I now proceed to state some points of a mere general character which should influence the United States Government in their decision of the policy of acquiring possession of this archipelago.

NECESSITY AS NAVAL DEPOT.

Their geographical position occupying, as it does, an important central, strategical point in the North Pacific Ocean, valuable, perhaps necessary, to the United States for a naval depot and coaling station and to shelter and protect our commerce and navigation, which in this hemisphere is destined to increase enormously from our intercourse with the 500,000,000 population of China, Japan, and Australia. Humboldt predicted that the commerce on the Paciffe would, in time, rival that on the Atlantic. A future generation, no doubt, will see the prophecy fulfilled.

The immense injury inflicted on American navigation and commerce by Great Britain in the war of 1812-1814, through her possession of Bermuda and other West India Islands, as also that suffered by the English from French privateers from the Isle of France during the wars between those nations, are instances in proof of the necessity of anticipating and preventing, when we can, similar evils that may issue from these islands if held by other powers.

COMMERCIAL VALUE.

Their proximity to the Pacific States of the Union, fine climate and soil, and tropical productions of sugar, coffee, rice, fruits, hides, goatskins, salt, cotton, fine wool, etc., required by the West, in exchange for flour, grain, lumber, shooks, and manufactures of cotton, wool, iron, and other articles, are evidence of the commercial value of one to the other region.

EUROPEAN POWERS MAY SEIZE IN TIME OF WAR.

Is it probable that any European power who may hereafter be at war with the United States will refrain from taking possession of this weak Kingdom, in view of the great injury that could be done to our commerce through their acquisition of them?

PALMERSTON'S VIEW OF DESTINY OF HAWAII.

Prince Alexander and Lott Kamehameha (the former subsequently became the fourth Hawaiian King and the latter the fifth) and Dr. G. P. Judd, my informant, visited England in 1850 as Hawaiian commissioners.

Lord Palmerston, at their interview with him, said, in substance, "that the British Government desired the Hawaiian people to maintain proper government and preserve national independence. If they were unable to do so he recommended receiving a protectorate government under the United States or by becoming an integral part of that nation. Such," he thought, "was the destiny of the Hawaiian Islands, arising from their proximity to the States of California and Oregon and natural dependence on those markets for exports and imports, together with probable extinction of the Hawaiian aboriginal population and its substitution by immigration from the United States." That advice seems sound and prophetic.

HISTORICAL FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS.

The following historical events in relation to these islands are thought worthy of revival in recollection:

February 25, 1843.-Lord George Paulet, of Her Britannic Majesty's ship Carysfort, obtained, by forceful measures, cession of the Hawaiian Islands to the Government of Great Britain July 31, 1843. They were restored to their original sovereignty by the British Admiral Thomas.

November 28, 1843.-Joint convention of the English and French Governments, which acknowledged the independence of this archipelago and reciprocally promised

never to take possession of any part of same. The United States Government was invited to be a party to the above, but declined.

August, 1849.-Admiral Tromelin, with a French naval force, after making demands on the Hawaiian Government impossible to be complied with, took unresisted possession of the fort and Government buildings in Honolulu and blockaded the harbor. After a few weeks' occupation of the place the French departed, leaving political affairs as they were previous to their arrival.

January, 1851.-A French naval force again appeared at Honolulu and threatened bombardment and destruction of the town.

DEED OF CESSION TO UNITED STATES.

The King, Kamehameha III, with the Government, fearing it would be carried into effect, and in mortal dread of being brought under French rule similar to that placed by the latter over Tahiti, of the Society Islands, executed a deed of cession of all the Hawaiian Islands and their sovereignty forever in favor of the United States of America. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning

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Hawaiian Islands, p. 825.)

Annexation under discussion in Hawaii.

In a dispatch to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, February 17, 1873, U. S. Minister Henry A. Pierce, at Honolulu, writes as follows:

Annexation of these islands to the United States and a reciprocity treaty between the two countries are the two important topics of conversation and warm discussion among Government officials and foreign residents.

A large majority of the latter favor the first-named project, while the former advocate reciprocity. All are convinced, however, that some measure should be taken by the Hawaiian Government to effectually stay the decline in the prosperity of the country, evidenced in decreasing exports, revenue, population, whale fishery, and an increasing public debt.

OVERTHROW OF GOVERNMENT, ESTABLISHMENT OF REPUBLIC, AND ANNEXATION FORESHADOWED.

Annexation of the islands to the United States will never, in my opinion, be adopted or presented as a Government measure, however much the people as a whole may desire it. The glitter of the crown, love of power, and emoluments of office have too many attractions to prevent it. Should the great interests of the country, however, demand that "annexation" shall be attempted, the planters, merchants, and foreigners generally will induce the people to overthrow the Government, establish a republic, and then ask the United States for admittance into its Union. My opinion has recently been frequently asked in regard to probable success of the two measures proposed. I have said that if annexation or a reciprocity treaty is proposed on the part of Hawaii to the United States, that the subject will in either case be profoundly considered and decided upon.

KING WILLING TO SELL OUT.

Those favoring the former measure think it can be carried if the King's consent thereto is first obtained (and endeavors will be made to that end), provided the United States will, for and in consideration of said cession, pension off His Majesty and all the chiefs of royal blood with the aggregate sum per annum of $125,000, and pay off the Hawaiian national debt, now amounting to about $250,000, and bestow upon the cause and for the benefit of education, public schools, and the nation's hospitals (three of the latter in number) the proprietorship and revenues of the crown and public lands. The value of said lands is at present estimated at about $1,000,000. It includes, however, the public buildings, waterworks, wharf property, fish ponds, etc. The income of the crown lands, now inuring to the sovereign, amounts to about $25,000 per annum. The public, or Government, waterworks give about $15,000 per annum, wharf property about the same, notwithstanding the free use of them granted to steamship lines.

U. S. GOVERNMENT SHOULD DECLARE ITS POLICY.

Many persons are lukewarm on the subject of annexation to the United States solely for the reason that they fear repulse by the United States Government. I think the latter should declare its policy and object in regard to this important subject. This nation is

bewildered and suffering to some degree, not knowing how to shape its own policy in connection with its hopes and expectations in regard to the United States. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 961.)

The Kalakaua election riot.

In a dispatch to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, U. S. Minister Pierce describes the riot in Honolulu at the time of and consequent upon the election of Kalakaua as King, which was suppressed by United States troops.

American war vessels should always be maintained at Honolulu.

He concludes:

Hereafter a United States vessel of war should always be stationed at these islands under a system of reliefs. A time may arrive when the United States Government will find it necessary, for the interests of our nation and its resident citizens here, to take possession of this country by military occupation. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 970.)

Reciprocity urged to bind Hawaii to the United States.

Mr. Pierce, to Secretary Fish, urges the negotiation of a treaty of reciprocity between the two countries, and concludes:

In view of the best interests of the United States in their relations with these islands, I take the liberty to express the hope that a liberal commercial treaty may soon be inaugurated by the two countries, feeling confident that such act would result to the equal benefit of both nations in a pecuniary sense, and, moreover, be the means of binding this archipelago to the United States by the chains of self-interest, nerer to be severed. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 971.)

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Increase of annexation sentiment in Hawaii.

U. S. Minister John L. Stevens, at Honolulu, on February 8, 1892, says in a dispatch to Secretary of State Blaine, after describing the situation in Honolulu :

There are increasing indications that the annexation sentiment is growing among the business men as well as with the less responsible of the foreign and native population of the island. The present political situation is feverish, and I see no prospect of its being permanently otherwise until these islands become a part of the American Union or a possession of Great Britain. The intelligent and responsible men here, unaided by outside support, are too few in numbers to control in political affairs and to secure good government. There are indications that even the Liberals," just beaten at the election, though composed of a majority of the popular vote, are about to declare for annexation, at least their leaders, their chief newspaper having already published editorials to this effect.

NEW DEPARTURE NECESSARY-PROTECTORATE IMPRACTICABLE-ANNEXATION ONLY

REMEDY.

At a future time, after the proposed treaty shall have been ratified, I shall deem it my official duty to give a more elaborate statement of facts and reasons why a "new departure" by the United States as to Hawaii is rapidly becoming a necessity, that a "protectorate" is impracticable, and that annexation must be the future remedy, or else Great Britain will be furnished with circumstances and opportunity to get a hold on these islands which will cause future serious embarrassment to the United States.

At this time there seems to be no immediate prospect of its being safe to have the harbor of Honolulu left without an American vessel of war. Last week a British gunboat arrived here, and it is said will remain here for an indefinite period. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com, on For, Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 989.)

Revolutionary movement for annexation.

On March 8, 1892, U. S. Minister Stevens, in a dispatch to Secretary Blaine, states that there are indications of a revolutionary attempt to overthrow the Queen and establish a republic, with a view of ultimate annexation to the United States, and asks for instructions. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 990.)

NOTE. (The revolution indicated was not by the persons who afterwards carried out the revolution of 1893, but was being gotten up by an almost exclusively native combination, under the leadership of a half-white, Wilcox. They were politically hostile to the persons organizing the successful revolution of 1893, and since 1893 have been rabid royalists.)

Superior interests in Hawaii the avowed policy of the United States.

Mr. Stevens sent a dispatch to Secretary of State Foster, November 20, 1892, in which he states:

An intelligent and impartial examination of the facts can hardly fail to lead to the conclusion that the relations and policy of the United States toward Hawaii will soon demand some change, if not the adoption of decisive measures, with the aim to secure American interests and future supremacy by encouraging Hawaiian development and aiding to promote responsible government in these islands. It is unnecessary for me to allude to the deep interest and the settled policy of the United States Government in respect to these islands, from the official days of John Quincy Adams and of Daniel Webster to the present time. In all that period we have avowed the superiority of our interests to those of all other nations, and have always refused to embarrass our freedom of action by any alliance or arrangement with other powers as to the ultimate possession and government of the islands. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 996.)

Analysis of conditions.

He then proceeds to give an analysis of the situation, referring to the commercial and naval importance of the islands, its government, existing business status, and recommends that—

EITHER ANNEXATION OR CUSTOMS UNION.

One of two courses seems to me absolutely necessary to be followed, either bold and vigorous measures for annexation, or a “customs union," an ocean cable from the California coast to Honolulu, Pearl Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied but not necessarily stipulated American protectorate over the islands.

REASONS WHY ANNEXATION PREFERABLE.

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I believe the former to be the better, that which will prore much the more advantageous to the islands, and the cheapest and least embarrassing in the end for the United States. If it was wise for the United States, through Secretary Marcy, thirty-eight years ago, to offer to expend $100,000 to secure a treaty of annexation, it certainly can not be chimercial or unwise to expend $100,000 to secure annexation in the near future. To-day the United States has five times the wealth she possessed in 1854, and the reasons now existing for annexation are much stronger than they were then. A perpetual customs union and the acquisition of Pearl Harbor, with an implied protectorate, must be regarded as the only allowable alternative. This would require the continual presence in the harbor of Honolulu of a United States vessel of war and the constant watchfulness of the United States minister while the present bungling, unsettled, and expensive political rule would go on, retarding the development of the islands, leaving at the end of twenty-five years more embarrassment to annexation than exists to-day, the property far less valuable, and the population less American than they would be if annexation were soon realized.

OBJECTIONS TO CUSTOMS UNION.

To give Hawaii a highly favorable treaty while she remains outside the American Union would necessarily give the same advantages to hostile foreigners, those who would continue to antagonize our commercial and political interests here as well as

those of American blood and sympathies. Besides, so long as the islanās retain their own independent government there remains the possibility that England or the Canadian Dominion might secure one of the Hawaiian harbors for a coaling station. Annexation excludes all dangers of this kind.

DECISION SHOULD BE MADE AS TO WHICH POLICY TO FOLLOW.

Which of the two lines of policy and action shall be adopted our statesmen and our Government must decide. Certain it is that the interests of the United States and the welfare of these islands will not permit the continuance of the existing state and tendency of things. Having for so many years extended a helping hand to the islands and encouraging the American residents and their friends at home to the extent we have, we cannot refrain now from aiding them with vigorous measures, without injury to ourselves and those of our "kith and kin," and without neglecting American opportunities that never seemed so obvious and pressing as they do now. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, pp. 1002-3.)

OPINIONS OF U. S. MILITARY AND NAVAL OFFICERS CONCERNING THE CONTROL OR ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.

GEN. J. M. SCHOFIELD AND GEN. B. S. ALEXANDER.

Report on defensive capabilities of Hawaii in case of war.

On June 24, 1872, Secretary of War Wm. W. Belknap issued confidential instructions to Generals Schofield and Alexander to go to Honolulu and investigate its defensive capabilities in the event of war between the United States and some other maritime nation. Their report is lengthy and contains the following:

We ascertained from the officers of the U. S. Navy, from maps, and from seafaring men that Honolulu is the only good commercial harbor in the whole group of the Sandwich Islands.

An enemy could take up his position outside of the entrance to the harbor and command the entire anchorage, as well as the town of Honolulu itself. This harbor would, therefore, be of no use to us as a harbor of refuge in a war with a powerful maritime nation.

PEARL RIVER ONLY HARBOR THAT CAN BE PROTECTED IN TIME OF WAR.

With one exception, there is no harbor on the islands that can be made to satisfy all the conditions necessary for a harbor of refuge in time of war. This is the harbor of Ewa, or Pearl River, situated on the island of Oahu, about 7 miles west of Honolulu.

Pearl River is a fine sheet of deep water extending inland about six miles from its mouth, where it could be completely defended by shore batteries. The depth of water after passing the bar is ample for any vessel.

Pearl River is not a true river; it partakes more of the character of an estuary. It is divided into three portions called "locks"-the east lock, the middle lock, and the west lock, the three together affording some 30 miles of water front, with deep water in the channels.

EASILY DEFENDED-WATER-LAND-PROVISIONS.

If the coral barrier were removed, Pearl River Harbor would seem to have all, or nearly all, the necessary properties to enable it to be converted into a good harbor of refuge. It could be completely defended by inexpensive batteries on either or both shores, firing across a narrow channel of entrance. Its waters are deep enough for the largest vessels of war, and its locks, particularly around Rabbitt Island, are spacious enough for a large number of vessels to ride at anchor in perfect security against all storms. Its shores are suitable for building proper establishments for sheltering the necessary supplies for a naval establishment, such as magazines of ammunition, provisions, coal, spars, rigging, etc., while the island of Oahu, upon which it is situated, could furnish fresh provisions, meats, fruits, and vegetables in large quantities.

IF MADE A NAVAL STATION JURISDICTION SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED ΤΟ THE UNITED STATES.

In case it should become the policy of the Government of the United States to obtain the possession of this harbor for naval purposes, jurisdiction over all the waters of