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The British Government acquiesced in this rule of European law or practice. On May 9, 1851, Lord Palmerston, then foreign secretary, said in Parliament, in reply to a formal inquiry, that the occupation of Rome was "a measure undertaken by France in her own discretion and in the exercise of her own judgment. The British Government had been no party to this measure. France had exercised her own rights in regard to it, and it was not at all necessary that the previous concurrence of the British Government should have been obtained in this matter. The British Government had been no party to this aggression and could not therefore be said to have concurred in it. It was a matter on which they might have an opinion, but in which they had no particular right, by treaty or otherwise, to interfere."

6. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1878.

Since the year 1827 intervention in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire has been so constant as to create a body of jurisprudence, and a long series of treaties on which the existence of all political systems of southeastern Europe seems now to be more or less entirely based.

Not only Greece, Montenegro, Roumania, Bulgaria, Roumelia, Servia, and Egypt have been the creations of such intervention, or the objects of its restraints, but also Samos, Crete, and even the Lebanon owe their legal status to the same source.

An authority so great must assume some foundation in law, seeing that the entire world acquiesced not only in the practical exercise of the force but also in the principle on which it rested, whatever that principle was.

The treaty of Berlin in 1878 was a broad assertion of the right of the European powers to regulate the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, but the treaty contains no statement of the principle of jurisprudence on which the right rests.

The preamble merely declares that the powers, "being desirous to regulate, with a view to European order, the questions raised in the East by the events of late years and by the war terminated by the preliminary treaty of San Stefano, have been unanimously of opinion that the meeting of a congress would offer the best means of facilitating an understanding."

In effect, the treaty of Berlin reduced the Ottoman Porte to tutelage, extinguished its sovereignty over certain large portions of its dominions, and restrained its rights over other portions. It recognized the independence of Servia, Roumania, and Montenegro, and fixed their boundaries. It established Bulgaria as "an autonomous and tributary principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan." It created the province of Eastern Roumelia "under conditions of administrative autonomy." It stipulated an organic law for Crete. It interfered in all directions with the internal arrangements of the Ottoman Empire.

Perhaps the most typical instance of assumption of power by the combined governments was Article XXV of the treaty, which began: "The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary."

So liberal a use of the right of intervention has seldom been made, but the principle of jurisprudence on which it rested has never been officially declared. Nothing in the treaties expressly limits to the Ottoman Empire the right of intervention which was exercised in its case. The only principle jealously insisted upon, seemed to be that of joint, as against separate, intervention by the European powers. With this

implied restriction, the right of intervention "with a view to European order" appears to be the only foundation for the existing status of southeastern Europe, and equally applicable to the rest of the world.

These six precedents include, as far as is known, every instance where a claim to independence has been made by any people whatever in Europe since the close of the Napoleonic wars in 1815. Other successful revolutions, such as those of Tuscany and the States of the Church in 1859, were the immediate results of intervention, and that of Naples in 1860 was, from first to last, perhaps the most striking example of intervention in modern times, although Naples hardly thought necessary to pass through any intermediate stage of recognition as an independent authority.

The six precedents, therefore, constitute the entire European law on the subject of intervention in regard to European peoples claiming independence by right of revolution. There is no other authoritative source of the law; for the judicial courts of Europe were bound to follow the political decision; and the opinions of private persons, whether jurists or politicians, being without sanction, could not be accepted as law. From this body of precedent it is clear that Europe has invariably asserted and practiced the right to interfere, both collectively and separately, amicably and forcibly, in every instance, except that of Poland, where a European people has resorted to insurrection to obtain independ

ence.

The right itself has been based on various grounds: "Impediments to commerce, "Burdensome measures of protection and repression," "Requests "of one or both parties" to interpose," "Effusion of blood," and Evils of all kinds," "Humanity" and "The repose of Europe" (Greek treaty of 1827); "A warm desire to arrest, with the shortest pos sible delay, the disorder and the effusion of blood" (Protocol of November 4, 1830, in the case of Belgium); "His own safety or the political equilibrium on the frontiers of his Empire" (Russian circular of April 27, 1849, in the case of Hungary;) "To safeguard the interest and honor" and to "Maintain the political influence" of the intervening power (French declarations of 1849-50 in regard to the States of the Church). Finally, in the latest and most considerable, because absolutely unanimous act of all Europe, simply the "desire to regulate" (Preamble to the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, covering the recognition of Servia, Roumania, Montenegro, and Bulgaria).

ASIA.

There remains the experience of Asia and America

In regard to Asia, probably all authorities agree that the entire fabric of European supremacy, whether in Asiatic Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, India, Siam, or China, rests on the right of intervention. The exercise of this right constitutes another large but separate branch of public law which, by common consent, is not regarded as applicable to nations of European blood.

Furthermore, although many governments in Asia have been extinguished by means of the right of intervention, none is known to have claimed independence founded on the right of insurrection. Certainly none has been recognized by Europe or America on that ground.

AMERICA, 1822-23.

America, both North and South, has always aimed to moderate European interventon and to restrict its exercise. On this point we have the evidence of George Canning in a celebrated speech on the foreign-enlistment act in 1823:

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We have spent much time [said Canning] in teaching other powers the nature of a strict neutrality, and generally speaking we found them most reluctant scholars. If I wished for a guide in a system of neutrality I should take that laid down by America in the days of the presidency of Washington and the secretaryship of Jefferson.

In fact, the British Government did take that guide. The American neutrality act of 1794, revised and reenacted in the act of April 20, 1818, served as the model for the British foreign-enlistment act in 1819. The cause of that act of 1819 was stated by Canning in the speech just cited:

When peace was concluded between this country and Spain in 1814, an article was introduced into the treaty by which this country bound itself not to furnish any succors to what were then denominated the revolted colonies of Spain. In process of time, as those colonies became more powerful, a question arose of a very difficult nature, to be decided on a due consideration of their de jure relation to Spain on the one side, and their de facto independence of her on the other. The law of nations was entirely silent with respect to a course which, under a circumstance so peculiar as the transition of colonies from their allegiance to the parent state, ought to be pursued. It was difficult to know how far either the statute law or the common law was applicable to colonies so situated. It became necessary, therefore, in the act of 1818, to treat the colonies as actually independent of Spain.

Apparently Canning did not consider that the revolt of the American colonies in 1776 offered a precedent for "a circumstance so peculiar as the transition of colonies from their allegiance." He regarded the situation as so peculiar that it needed to be met by measures in regard to which "the law of nations was entirely silent." He seemed to regard the foreign-enlistment act as a recognition of independence.

The Government of the United States was not so much perplexed in regard to the steps by which colonies achieved independence; but in the actual condition of Europe, where the Holy Alliance held entire control and intervened everywhere against claims based on the right of insurrection, the President had the strongest reasons for moving slowly, and, if possible, only in concert with England.

The disturbances in the Spanish colonies in America had begun as a consequence of the overthrow of the Bourbon dynasty by Napoleon and the establishment of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain in 1808; but the movements for independence took serious form at a much later time.

In Mexico, the first national congress met at Chilpancingo in 1813, and formally declared the independence of Mexico on the 6th of November of that year. It was practically suppressed by the execution of Morelos, December 22, 1815, and did not revive until Iturbide, in January, 1821, joined Guerrero in the so-called plan of Iguala. Iturbide made his triumphal entry into the City of Mexico September 27, 1821. Venezuela first declared independence on July 15, 1811, but the Spanish forces continued the war until General Bolivar drove them from the interior in 1821, and General Paez captured Puerto Cabello in 1823. Chile began her revolution in 1810, but did not declare independence until January 1, 1818, and then only by proclamation of the executive authority, "the actual circumstances of the war not permitting the convocation of a national congress."

Buenos Ayres also began her revolution in 1810, but did not declare independence and claim recognition until October 25, 1816.

The question of intervention began in 1817. The Spanish Government appealed to the European powers for aid. The Czar openly took sides with Spain, and when, in September, 1817, the Spanish Government asked permission to build several ships of war in the Russian dockyards, the Czar suggested that Spain should buy five ships of the line and three frigates belonging to the Russian navy. This was done, and the ships were sent to the seat of war. At the same time, in October, 1817, the Russian Government instructed its ambassador in London to press on the British Government the great importance of European intervention.

Great Britain declared energetically that she would have no part in trying to force back the subjects of Spain under the domination of an oppressive Government. In fact, Lord Castlereagh had already assured President Monroe that if Great Britain intervened at all it would be on a system of perfect liberality to the Spanish provinces, and the President decided, as early as April, 1818, to discourage Euro pean mediation and to take the ground that there could be no rational interference except on the basis of the independence of the South Americans. In August he made a formal proposal to the British and French Governments for a concerted and contemporary recognition of Buenos Ayres, whose de facto independence made that country the natural object of a first step toward the establishment of a general policy. In December he notified both Governments that he had patiently waited without interfering in the policy of the allies, but as they had not agreed upon anything, and as the fact of the independence of Buenos Ayres appeared established, he thought that recognition was necessary. In January, 1819, he announced to them that he was actually considering the measure.

Thus, all parties had agreed, as early as 1817 and 1818, upon the propriety of intervention between Spain and her colonies. Both the United States and Europe asserted that the time had come; they disagreed only as to the mode. When Lord Castlereagh, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, in October, 1818, proposed to the four other powers "to intervene in the war between Spain and her American colonies by addressing offers of mediation to the two belligerents," Russia energetically opposed and rejected the scheme, not because it was intervention, but apparently because it was mediation, and to that extent recog nized rights in the insurgents. When President Monroe interposed his fiat that no interference could be countenanced by him except on the basis of independence, he dictated in advance the only mode of intervention which he meant to permit. If he waited before carrying it out it was only because in the actual balance of European and American power he felt that isolated action might injure the cause he had determined to help.

He waited in vain. Neither England nor any other power moved again. No information came from Europe. No further attempt to subject the revolted colonies was probable, and even the declaration of the Congress of Troppau in November, 1820, which announced a general and active intervention against all "illegitimate" authorities, caused little alarm as long as England and France were not parties to it. Delay was not dangerous. The system which Monroe aimed to estab lish could not be firm or broad as long as it rested on the recognition of a single country like Buenos Ayres or on the isolated action of the United States. That system included all American communities which

rejected foreign authority; it was to be taken as a whole, and referred to every part of the contest, from the recognition of the flag at the outset to the recognition of independence at the close. Therefore, Monroe waited until the effect of his action should settle the whole question and cover all the ground. After a delay of four years from the time when he began his policy, the Greek revolt in Europe and the military successes of Bolivar and Iturbide in America gave the desired opportunity, and Monroe sent to Congress his celebrated message of March 8, 1822, recommending the recognition of all the revolted colonies of Spain-Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and Buenos Ayres.

These countries asked no more. They based their claim on their independence de facto, and Monroe admitted its force. "The provinces," he said, "which have declared their independence and are in the enjoyment of it, ought to be recognized." He added that "the measure is proposed under a thorough conviction that it is in strict accord with the law of nations." In reality, it created the law, so far as its action went, and its legality was recognized by no European power. All waited in open or tacit disapproval of Monroe's course. England herself, even after Canning succeeded Castlereagh, refused to approve. Spain protested vigorously; and, as far as concerned objec tions, the Spanish minister in Washington offered them in great numbers and with sufficient energy. He instantly protested, not only on grounds of morality and fact, but also of policy. "Buenos Ayres," he said, was "sunk in the most complete anarchy;" in Peru, "near the gates of its capital," a rebel and a Spanish army divided the inhabitants; in Chili, 66 an individual suppresses the sentiments of its inhabitants;" "on the coast of Terra Firma, also, the Spanish banners wave;"" Mexico, too, there is no government;" and he concluded, with force: "Where then are those governments which ought to be recognized?" The question was not without difficulties, as Monroe knew; and on this point all Europe supported the Spanish contention. Although Congress unanimously approved and adopted the President's views, and immediately appropriated $100,000 for diplomatic expenses; and although Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and Buenos Ayres were in consequence admitted into the family of nations by the sole authority of the President of the United States, with the approval of Congress, two years passed before the British Government consented even to discuss the subject in Parliament as a serious measure of policy.

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Then, on June 15, 1824, a motion was made by Sir James Mackintosh, and Canning replied. His speech made no allusion to the action of the United States; it denied the de facto right of recognition so far as to say that "we ought not to acknowledge the separate and independent existence of any government which is so doubtfully established that the mere effect of that acknowledgment shall be to mix parties again in internal squabbles if not in open hostilities." Canning still thought "that, before we can act, information as to matters of fact is necessary."

Nevertheless, Monroe's act, which extinguished the last hopes of the Holy Alliance in America, produced the deepest sensation among European conservatives, and gave to the United States extraordinary consideration. England used it as a weapon at the Congress of Verona to threaten the other powers when they decided on intervention in Spain. Slowly Canning came wholly over to the side of Monroe as France and Austria forced his hands in Spain. As early as October, 1823, he sent consuls to all the chief cities in rebellion throughout Mexico and Central and South America. Immediately after his speech in Parliament

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