On April 27, 1825, Mr. Clay, Secretary of State, in a dispatch to Mr. A. H. Everett, our minister at Madrid, instructing him to use his exertions to induce Spain to make peace with her revolted colonies, says:

The United States are satisfied with the present condition of those islands (Cuba and Puerto Rico) in the hands of Spain, and with their ports open to our commerce, as they are now open. This Government desires no political change of that condition. The population itself of the islands is incompetent at present, from its composition and its amount, to maintain self-government. The maritime force of the neighboring Republics of Mexico and Colombia is not now, nor is it likely shortly to be, adequate to the protection of those islands, if the conquest of them were effected. The United States would entertain constant apprehensions of their passing from their possession to that of some less friendly sovereignty; and of all the European powers, this country prefers that Cuba and Puerto Rico should remain dependent on Spain. If the war should continue between Spain and the new Republics, and those islands should become the object and the theater of it, their fortunes have such a connection with the prosperity of the United States that they could not be indifferent spectators; and the possible contingencies of such a protracted war might bring upon the Government of the United States duties and obligations the performance of which, however painful it should be, they might not be at liberty to decline.

Mr. Van Buren, writing to Mr. Van Ness, our minister to Spain, October 2, 1829, says:

The Government of the United States has always looked with the deepest interest upon the fate of those islands, but particularly of Cuba. Its geographical position, which places it almost in sight of our southern shores, and, as it were, gives it the command of the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas, its safe and capacious harbors, its rich productions, the exchange of which for our surplus agricultural products and manufactures constitutes one of the most extensive and valuable branches of our foreign trade, render it of the utmost importance to the United States that no change should take place in its condition which might injuriously affect our political and commercial standing in that quarter. Other considerations, connected with a certain class of our population, make it the interest of the southern section of the Union that no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population, the result of which could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States. On the other hand, the wisdom which induced the Spanish Government to relax in its colonial system, and to adopt with regard to those islands a more liberal policy which opened their ports to general commerce, has been so far satisfactory in the view of the United States as, in addition to other considerations, to induce this Government to desire that their possession should not be transferred from the Spanish Crown to any other power. In conformity with this desire, the ministers of the United States at Madrid have, from time to time, been instructed attentively to watch the course of events and the secret springs of European diplomacy, which, from information received from various quarters, this Government had reason to suspect had been put in motion to effect the transfer of the possession of Cuba to the powerful allies of Spain.

You are authorized to say that the long-established and well-known policy of the United States, which forbids their entangling themselves in the concerns of other nations, and which permits their physical force to be used only for the defense of their political rights and the protection of the persons and property of their citizens, equally forbids their public agents to enter into positive engagements, the performance of which would require the employment of means which the people have retained in their own hands; but that this Government has every reason to believe that the same influence which once averted the blow ready to fall upon the Spanish islands would again be found effectual on the recurrence of similar events; and that the high preponderance in American affairs of the United States as a great naval power, the influence which they must at all times command as a great commercial nation, in all questions involving the interests of the general commerce of this hemisphere, would render their consent an essential preliminary to the execution of any project calculated so vitally to affect the general concerns of all the nations in any degree engaged in the commerce of America. The knowledge you possess of the public sentiment of this country in regard to Cuba will enable you to speak with confidence and effect of the probable consequences that might be expected from the communication of that sentiment to Congress in the event of any contemplated change in the present political condition of that island.

And again, on the 13th of October, 1830:

This Government has also been given to understand that if Spain should persevere in the assertion of a hopeless claim to dominion over her former colonies they will feel it to be their duty, as well as their interest, to attack her colonial possessions in our vicinity, Cuba and Puerto Rico. Your general instructions are full upon the subject of the interest which the United States take in the fate of those islands and particularly of the former; they inform you that we are content that Cuba should remain as it now is, but could not consent to its transfer to any European power. Motives of reasonable state policy render it more desirable to us that it should remain subject to Spain rather than to either of the South American States. Those motives will readily present themselves to your mind; they are principally founded upon an apprehension that if possessed by the latter it would, in the present state of things, be in greater danger of becoming subject to some European power than in its present condition. Although such are our own wishes and true interests, the President does not see on what ground he would be justified in interfering with any attempts which the South American States might think it for their interest, in the prosecution of a defensive war, to make upon the islands in question. If, indeed, an attempt should be made to disturb them, by putting arms in the hands of one portion of their population to destroy another, and which in its influence would endanger the peace of a portion of the United States, the case might be different. Against such an attempt the United States (being informed that it was in contemplation) have already protested and warmly remonstrated in their communications last summer with the Government of Mexico; but the information lately communicated to us in this regard was accompanied by a solemn assurance that no such measures will, in any event, be resorted to; and that the contest, if forced upon them, will be carried on, on their part, with strict reference to the established rules of civilized warfare.

Mr. Buchanan, in his dispatch to Mr. R. M. Saunders, of June 17, 1848, said:

With these considerations in view, the President believes that the crisis has arrived when an effort should be made to purchase the Island of Cuba from Spain, and he has determined to intrust you with the performance of this most delicate and important duty. The attempt should be made, in the first instance, in a confidential conversation with the Spanish minister for foreign affairs; a written offer might produce an absolute refusal in writing, which would embarrass us hereafter in the acquisition of the island. Besides, from the incessant changes in the Spanish cabinet and policy our desire to make the purchase might thus be made known in an official form to foreign governments and arouse their jealousy and active opposition. Indeed, even if the present cabinet should think favorably of the proposition, they might be greatly embarrassed by having it placed on record, for in that event it would almost certainly, through some channel, reach the opposition and become the subject of discussion in the Cortes. Such delicate negotiations, at least in their incipient stages, ought always to be conducted in confidential conversation, and with the utmost secrecy and dispatch.

At your interview with the minister for foreign affairs you might introduce the subject by referring to the present distracted condition of Cuba and the danger which exists that the population will make an attempt to accomplish a revolution. This must be well known to the Spanish Government. In order to convince him of the good faith and friendship toward Spain with which this Government has acted, you might read to him the first part of my dispatch to General Campbell and the order issued by the Secretary of War to the commanding general in Mexico and to the officer having charge of the embarkation of our troops at Vera Cruz. You may then tonch delicately upon the danger that Spain may lose Cuba by a revolution in the island, or that it may be wrested from her by Great Britain, should a rupture take place between the two countries, arising out of the dismissal of Sir Henry Bulwer, and be retained to pay the Spanish debt due to the British bondholders. You might assure him that while this Government is entirely satisfied that Cuba shall remain under the dominion of Spain, we should in any event resist its acquisition by any other nation. And, finally, you might inform him that, under all these circumstances, the President had arrived at the conclusion that Spain might be willing to transfer the island to the United States for a fair and full consideration. You might cite as a precedent the cession of Louisiana to this country by Napoleon, under somewhat similar circumstances, when he was at the zenith of his power and glory. I have merely presented these topics in their natural order, and you can fill up the outline from the information communicated in this dispatch, as well as from your own knowledge of the subject. Should the minister for foreign affairs lend a favorable ear to your proposition, then the question of the consideration to be paid would arise, and you

have been furnished with information in this dispatch which will enable you to dis cuss that question.

The President would be willing to stipulate for the payment of $100,000,000. This, nowever, is the maximum price; and if Spain should be willing to sell, you will use your best efforts to purchase it at a rate as much below that sum as practicable. In case you should be able to conclude a treaty, you may adopt as your model, so far as the same may be applicable, the two conventions of April 30, 1803, between France and the United States, for the sale and purchase of Louisiana. The seventh and eighth articles of the first of these conventions ought, if possible, to be omitted; still, if this should be indispensable to the accomplishment of the object, articles similar to them may be retained.

Mr. Everett, in his celebrated letter of December 1, 1852, to the Compte de Sartiges, rejecting the joint proposition of the French and British Governments for a tripartite convention with the United States, disclaiming, severally and collectively, all intention to obtain possession of the Island of Cuba, and respectively binding themselves to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of any power or individuals whatever, said:

Spain, meantime, has retained of her extensive dominions in this hemisphere but the two islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. A respectful sympathy with the fortunes of an ancient ally and a gallant people, with whom the United States have ever maintained the most friendly relations, would, if no other reason existed, make it our duty to leave her in the undisturbed possession of this little remnant of her mighty transatlantic empire. The President desires to do so. No word or deed of his will ever question her title or shake her possession. But can it be expected to last very long? Can it resist this mighty current in the fortunes of the world? Is it desirable that it should do so? Can it be for the interest of Spain to cling to a possession that can only be maintained by a garrison of twenty-five or thirty thousand troops, a powerful naval force, and an annual expenditure for both arms of the service of at least $12,000,000? Cuba at this moment costs more to Spain than the entire naval and military establishment of the United States costs the Federal Government. So far from being really injured by the loss of this island, there is no doubt that, were it peacefully transferred to the United States, a prosperous commerce between Cuba and Spain, resulting from ancient associations and common language and tastes, would be far more productive than the best contrived system of colonial taxation. Such, notoriously, has been the result to Great Britain of the establishment of the independence of the United States. The decline of Spain from the position which she held in the time of Charles V is coeval with the foundation of her colonial system, while within twenty-five years, and since the loss of most of her colonies, she has entered upon a course of rapid improvement unknown since the abdication of that Emperor.

Mr. Marcy, in his dispatch of July 23, 1853, to Mr. Pierre Soulé says:

SIR: There are circumstances in the affairs of Spain, having a connection with this country, which give unusual importance at this time to the mission to that Government. The proximity of her remaining possessions in this hemisphere-the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico-to the United States, the present condition of the former, and the rumors of contemplated changes in its internal affairs, complicate our relations with Spain. The Island of Cuba, on account of its magnitude, situation, fine climate, and rich productions, far superior in all respects to any in the West India group, is a very desirable possession to Spain, and, for the same reasons, very difficult for her to retain in its present state of dependence. The opinion generally prevails among the European nations that the Spanish dominion over it is insecure. This was clearly evinced by the alacrity with which both England and France, on occasion of the late disturbances in Cuba, volunteered their aid to sustain the Spanish rule over it, and by their recent proposition to the United States for a tripartite convention to guarantee its possession to Spain. Without an essential change in her present policy, such a change as she will most likely be unwilling to make, she can not, it is confidently believed, long sustain, unaided, her present connection with that island.

What will be its destiny after it shall cease to be a dependency of Spain is a question with which some of the principal powers of Europe have seen fit to concern themselves, and in which the United States have a deep and direct interest.

I had occasion recently, in preparing instructions for our minister to London, to present the views of the President in relation to the interference of Great Britain, as well as of France, in Cuban affairs. To spare myself the labor of again

going over the same ground, I here with furnish you with an extract from those instructions.

The policy of the Government of the United States in regard to Cuba, in any contingency calling for our interposition, will depend in a great degree upon the peculiar circumstances of the case, and can not, therefore, now be presented with much precision beyond what is indicated in the instructions before referred to. Nothing will be done on our part to disturb its present connection with Spain, unless the character of that connection should be so changed as to affect our present or prospective security. While the United States would resist, at every hazard, the transference of Cuba to any European nation, they would exceedingly regret to see Spain resorting to any power for assistance to uphold her rule over it. Such a dependence on foreign aid would, in effect, invest the auxiliary with the character of a protector, and give it a pretext to interfere in our affairs, and also generally in those of the North American continent. In case of collision with the United States, such protecting power would be in a condition to make nearly the same use of that island to annoy us as it could do if it were the absolute possessor of it.

Our minister at Madrid, during the Administration of President Polk, was instructed to ascertain if Spain was disposed to transfer Cuba to the United States for a liberal pecuniary consideration. I do not understand, however, that it was at that time the policy of this Government to acquire that island unless its inhabitants were very generally disposed to concur in the transfer. Under certain conditions the United States might be willing to purchase it; but it is scarcely expected that you will find Spain, should you attempt to ascertain her views upon the subject, at all inclined to enter into such a negotiation. There is reason to believe that she is under obligations to Great Britain and France not to transfer this island to the United States. Were there nothing else to justify this belief but the promptness with which these two powers sent their naval forces to her aid in the late Cuban disturbances, the proposition for a tripartite convention to guarantee Cuba to Spain, and, what is more significant than either of the above facts, the sort of joint protest by England and France, to which I adverted in my instructions to Mr. Buchanan, against some of the views presented in Mr. Everett's letter of the 2d of December last to Mr. Sartiges, the French minister, would alone be satisfactory proof of such an arrangement. Independent of any embarassment of this nature, there are many other reasons for believing that Spain will pertinaciously hold on to Cuba, and that the separation, whenever it takes place, will be the work of violence.

From these and other extracts that might be presented it is manifest that the ultimate acquisition of Cuba has long been regarded as the fixed policy of the United States-necessary to the progressive development of our system. All agree that the end is not only desirable, but inevitable. The only difference of opinion is as to the time, mode, and conditions of obtaining it.

The law of our national existence is growth. We can not, if we would, disobey it. While we should do nothing to stimulate it unnaturally, we should be careful not to impose upon ourselves a regimen so strict as to prevent its healthful development. The tendency of the age is the expansion of the great powers of the world. England, France, and Russia all demonstrate the existence of this pervading principle. Their growth, it is true, only operates by the absorption, partial or total, of weaker parties-generally of inferior races. So long as this extension of territory is the result of geographical position, a higher civilization, and greater aptitude for government, and is not pursued in a direction to endanger our safety or impede our progress, we have neither the right nor the disposition to find fault with it. England pursue her march of conquest and annexation in India, France extend her dominions on the southern shores of the Mediterranean and advance her frontiers to the Rhine, or Russia subjugate her barbarous neighbors in Asia; we shall look upon their progress, if not with favor, at least with indifference. We claim on this hemisphere the same privilege that they exercise on the other

"Hanc veniam petimusque damusque vicissim."

Let

In this they are but obeying the laws of their organization. When they cease to grow, they will soon commence that period of decadence which is the fate of all nations as of individual man.

The question of the annexation of Cuba to the United States, we repeat, is a question but of time. The fruit that was not ripe when John Quincy Adams penned his dispatch to Mr. Forsyth (it has not yet been severed by violence from its native tree, as he anticipated) is now mature. Shall it be plucked by a friendly hand, prepared to compensate its proprietor with a princely guerdon, or shall it fall decaying to the ground?

As Spain can not long maintain her grasp on this distant colony, there are but three possible alternatives in the future of Cuba: First, possession by one of the great European powers. This we have declared to be incompatible with our safety, and have announced to the world that any attempt to consummate it will be resisted by all the means in our power. When first we made this declaration we were comparatively feeble. The struggle would have been fearful and unequal; but we were prepared to make it at whatever hazard. That declaration has often been repeated since. With a population nearly tripled, our financial resources and our means, offensive and defensive, increased in an infinitely larger proportion, we can not now shrink from an issue that all were then ready to meet.

The second alternative is the independence of the island. This independence could only be nominal; it could never be maintained in fact. It would eventually fall under some protectorate, open or disguised. If under ours, annexation would soon follow as certainly as the shadow follows the substance. An European protectorate could not be tolerated. The closet philanthropists of England and France would, as the price of their protection, insist upon introducing their schemes of emancipation. Civil and servile war would soon follow, and Cuba would present, as Haiti now does, no traces of its former prosperity, but the ruins of its once noble mansions. Its uncontrolled possession by either France or England would be less dangerous and offensive to our Southern States than a pretended independent black empire or republic.

The third and last alternative is annexation to the United States. How and when is this to be effected? By conquest or negotiation? Conquest, even without the hostile interference of another European power than Spain, would be expensive, but with such interference would probably involve the whole civilized world in war, entail upon us the interruption, if not the loss, of our foreign trade, and an expenditure far exceeding any sum which it has ever been contemplated to offer for the purchase of Cuba. It would, besides, in all probability, lead to servile insurrection, and to the great injury or even total destruction of the industry of the island. Purchase, then, by negotiation seems to be the only practicable course; and, in the opinion of the committee, that can not be attempted with any reasonable prospect of success, unless the President be furnished with the means which he has suggested in his annual message, and which the bill proposes to give him.

Much has been said of the danger of confiding such powers to the Executive, and from the fierceness with which the proposition has been denounced it might be supposed that it was without precedent. So far is this from being the case, that we have three different acts upon the statute book placing large sums of money at the disposition of the Presi dent for the purpose of aiding him in negotiations for the acquisition of territory. The first is the act of February 26, 1803. Although its object was well known, viz, to be used in negotiating for the purchase of Louisiana, the act does not indicate it. It placed $2,000,000 unreservedly at the disposition of the President for the purpose of defraying