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1778. which increased to a violent tempest, and continued for near 48 hours, put by the engagement. Two of the French ships were dismasted, and others much damaged. The Languedoc of 90 guns, d'Estaing's own ship, loft her rudder and all her masts; and was met in that condition on the evening of the 13th, by the Renown of 50 guns. Capt. Dawson bore down without hoisting colours. The count ordered capt. Caleb Gardner, who was on board as a pilot, to hail him, that he might know what ship it was. Dawson made no answer, but ran with a full fail and fair wind till he was under the stern of the Languedoc, then hoisted English colours, fired in great and small shot, and musketry, and failed off. The Languedoc upon that fired two chace guns after him, when he never attempted to approach her more. The same evening the Preston of 50 guns, commodore Hotham, fell in with the Tonant of 80 guns, with only her main-mast standing, and attacked her with spirit, but night put an end to the engagement. The junction of fix fail of the French squadron, prevented

Aug.

all further attempts upon their two disabled ships, by the 16. Renown and Preston the next morning. On the 16th, the Isis of 50 guns, capt. Raynor, was chaced by the Cæfar, capt. Bougainville, a French 74 gun. Neither had fuffered in the tempest. A close and defperate engagement was maintained on both fides, with the greatest obstinacy, for an hour and a half, within pistol shot. The Cæfar at length put before the wind and failed off, the captain having lost his arm, the lieutenant his leg, a number of men being killed and wounded, and the ship confiderably damaged. The Isis had fuffered so in her

mafts and rigging, that she could not attempt a pur- 1778.

fuit.

The troops under gen. Sullivan now demand our attention. When they had landed, they possessed themfelves of the heights near the north end of the island. They fuffered no less than the ships by the tempeft. The wind blew most violently, attended with a flood of rain through the whole day of the 12th, and increased so at night, that not a marquee or tent could stand: several of the foldiers perished by the feverity of the storm, many horfes died, the greatest part of the ammunition delivered to the troops was damaged, and the condition of the army was deplorable. On the 14th, the storm was over, and the weather clear and fine. The garrifon having enjoyed better accommodations and greater security than the Americans, Sir Robert Pigot had a fair opportunity of attacking the latter while dispirited and worn down by the painful scenes from which they had just emerged. Gen. Greene and some British officers are of opinion, that a bold and vigorous onset under these circumstances would have been highly proper and fuccessful. But as nothing of this kind happened, the day was spent by the Americans in drying their clothes, &c. and getting in order for an advance. The next morning they marched at fix o'clock, and took poft about two miles from the British lines. By the 20th 20. they had opened two four gun batteries; but their approaches were flow. About two o'clock in the afternoon the French fleet was discovered standing for Newport. At seven gen. Greene and the marquis de la Fayette went on board the Languedoc, to confult upon meafures proper to be pursued for the success of the expe

1778, dition in which they were engaged. They urged d'Eftaing to return with his fleet into Newport harbour. He was apparently inclined to a compliance: but all the captains and principal officers on board were rather unfriendly to him. He being a land officer, they thought it an affront to their understandings, and a piece of injustice done to their merits and services to have him appointed to the command over their heads. They therefore crossed him in every measure, that looked like giving him any kind of reputation, in order if possible to bring him into disgrace. His instructions from the court of France were to go to Boston, if the fleet met with any misfortune, or if there appeared a fuperior British fleet upon the coast. The count had met with a misfortune, the Cæfar which had steered for Boston was missing, and a fuperior British fleet was expected. All the officers insisted upon his following the inftructions, and entered into a formal protest against profecuting the expedition any further. About twelve o'clock at night of the 21st,. Greene and the marquis returned, and made a report of what had passed. The next day letters went on board from gens. Sullivan and Hancock; as also a proteft dated-Camp before Newport, Aug. 22, 1778-and signed by John Sullivan, N. Greene, John Hancock, J. Glover, Ezek. Cornell, Wm. Whipple, John Tyler, Solomon Lovell, Jon. Fitconel. They protested in a folenn manner against the count's taking the fleet to Boston, as derogatory to the honor of France, contrary to the intention of his most Christian majesty and the intereft of his nation, and destructive in the highest degree to the welfare of the United States of America, and highly injurious to the alliance formed between the

two nations. One of the reasons affigned for the protest 1778. was, that the army and stores collected for the reduction of the island would be liable to be loft, by an opportunity's being given to the enemy to cut off the communication with the main, and totally to prevent the retreat of the army. The best apology that can be made for this protest is, that it was designed as a finesse to induce the captains of the French fleet to confent to its returning into the harbour of Newport. But it had not this effect, and met with a spirited answer from the count, who failed on the fame day for Boston. Sullivan was so chagrined at the departure of the fleet, that contrary to all found policy, he gave out in general orders on the 24th" The general cannot help lamenting the fudden and unexpected departure of the French fleet, as he finds it has a tendency to discourage some who placed great dependence upon the assistance of it, though he can by no means suppose the army or any part of it endangered by this movement. He yet hopes the event will prove America able to procure that by her own arms, which her allies refuse to assist in obtaining." Two days after, in new orders, he endeavoured to fmooth off the reflection contained in it, by declaring he meant not to infinuate that the departure of the French fleet was owing to a fixt determination not to assist in the enterprise, and would not wish to give the least colour to ungenerous and illiberal minds to make fuch unfair interpretations. Count d'Estaing, when arrived in Bofton port, wrote to congress on the 26th, and in his letter mentioned the embarraffsments of the king's squadron as well on account of water as provisions, how his hopes were deceived with regard to these two articles,

1778. which were growing more and more important that it was neceffary for him to confine all his attention to the preservation of the squadron, and restoring it to a condition to act that he was no longer at liberty to depend on deceitful expectations of watering and getting provisions. He justified his repairing to Boston from the situation of his ships, the advices of a squadron from Europe, the ignorance of what was become of lord Howe's fleet, and the advantage that his lordship would have had for attacking him had he returned into Newport. He also expressed his displeasure at the proteft.

It appears unreasonable to censure the count for repairing to Boston, when all his officers insisted so upon the measure; though had he returned into Newport, the garrifon would most probably have capitulated before Howe could have fuccoured them. Upon the fleet's failing for Boston, it was said "There never was a profpect so favorable, blasted by such a shameful defertion." A universal clamor prevailed against the French nation: and letters were fent to Boston containing the most bitter invectives, tending to prejudice the inhabitants against d'Estaing and all his officers, to counteract which the cooler and more judicious part of the community employed their good services. Between two and three thousand volunteers returned in the course of 24 hours, and others continued to go off, and even many of the militia, so that in three days Sullivan's army was greatly decreased: it was foon little more in number than that of the enemy. An attempt to carry their works by storm, would have been too hazardous, had all the volunteers and militia remained, for the bulk of the troops had never been in action: the neceffity of a re

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