The reason for mentioning that one particular point is to pay a tribute to the men of the navy and especially to the men who were on those torpedo boat destroyers. Our navy convoyed eighty per cent of the troops that went over; and if there was any other portion of the men in the navy, or any men in any service, who went through a harder and more continually trying experience, I have never heard. of them. The life of the sailors and the men on board those torpedo boat destroyers was of the roughest kind and full of all kinds of hardship. So I think that, although they never fought battles and their names may never get into the newspapers or magazines, it is quite necessary to remember the work of the naval men. (Applause.)

I must make an explanation of my personal work in connection with the army in order to show why it is that I have no interesting personal experiences to relate. Immediately on arriving in France at the general headquarters of the army, I was detailed on work in the intelligence section, and I lived at Chaumont throughout the entire year, with occasional trips around various portions of France. The work of the intelligence section is concerned entirely in getting information about the enemy, and the result is that those who engage in that work never meet with any particular adventures; so for that reason my personal experiences would be of no interest to you here. tonight. But service at headquarters, especially in the intelligence section, has this value in that one can keep track of the trend of events. I think most men who were in particular sections of the army, and especially those in the more active service, while they had more interesting individual experiences and saw something of special battles, failed to see the events as a whole. On the contrary, it was possible for those who were in the intelligence section at headquarters to have a view, as it were, of all of the actions that were taking place throughout the battle line; and while we were denied any experiences of actual battle, such as the captain here will speak of later, those who served in the intelligence section at headquarters had a very interesting time in watching the course of events. I mention that because it is my intention to cover very briefly the course of the campaign of 1918 and to deduce a few conclusions.

A Word for the Y. M. C. A.

I must first make mention of the Y. M. C. A. I stopped at their hotels in various cities, seven or eight of them. I saw their work over a considerable portion of Northern France-not upon the battle line, because I was not there, but in the areas of the rear; and, admitting all that has been said in the way of criticism, it is my personal opinion

that the work of the Y. M. C. A. over there was an enormous contribution to the welfare and well-being of the soldiers of the army. (Applause.)

That statement makes it necessary to generalize or rather to emphasize a thing that it seems necessary to insist on. You will find coming back home with the army an enormous amount of criticism; and the American people are about as handy with that weapon as any other people, with the possible exception of the French. But in that connection there are two things that I want to call attention to and which you should always carry in mind: Does the individual expression of disapproval of any activity warrant you in losing sight of the major thing and the major work done? That question applies not only to the Y. M. C. A., but to any other similar organization. It applies to the work of the army. Therefore, when any kicker comes around—as kickers do, and they were over there in the army as well as everywhere else—when they come around and tell you individual experiences that count against any particular activity, ask yourself the question: Does this really measure the full value of the thing that was done, or is it only a partial view of it? For instance, in coming back I heard a number of very severe criticisms against General Pershing. I was at headquarters the entire time I was away, and saw the General at a distance very often; I never became personally acquainted with him. I want to say this, though, in connection with General Pershing: He is entirely a soldier. He went to France to do a certain piece of work. He did not take with him any press agencies, and did not take with him a brass band. I think he endeavored to do his work as well as any man who went over there, and I think he can leave the results to show for themselves. (Applause.) But if at any time you hear criticisms of the General, and there is no reply, remember that he is a soldier of the regular army and will make no reply. You may think it rather strange that I should enter into a subject of that kind at the present time, but I have heard criticisms of the General since coming home, and I think that there again you should take the major results of the work of the American army, of which he was commander in chief, and then discount the tales that might come up against him.

Atrocities by the Germans

I pass on now to another phase of the war, which is really one of the most disagreeable things connected with it, but which has a bearing on the present situation-the subject of the German atrocities in France and Belgium.

I have heard it stated by American officers and men on the other side that they thought this was greatly exaggerated, because they had never seen them; a great many of the Germans they had met were pretty decent fellows. That is probably true. The unfortunate phase of it is this, that the atrocities were committed in the early portion of the war, and if our army never saw any of them it is because the people who suffered the atrocities were under the ground. I believe that not one-thousandth part of the things which the Germans did in the early portion of the war will ever get into print. A collective idea of the atrocities of the Germans can be gained from the devastated regions of France.

I had the privilege of traveling across the devastated regions right after the armistice was signed, and covered the region from the city of Reims, over the hills of Verdun, through the Meuse-Argonne region, where the Americans fought their concluding battle, and thence to Metz. When one passes through that region and sees there the wreck and the ruin, there comes over one a burning anger against the authors of the wrong and injury perpetrated upon plain, poor, peasant people, who have had their houses broken down, their little churches ruined, and their fields destroyed by shell fire.

Sympathy for France and Britain

The only reason for mentioning those things tonight is this. If now at the Peace Conference you find the French and the English not entirely in accord with certain ideas of universal brotherhood, and if you find them with an inclination to so shackle the German people as much as possible in order that this thing shall not occur again, the reason is plain. Their country has been devastated, millions of their people killed, and their lands ruined. So bear that in mind, that the people of Europe and the Frenchmen especially are forced by circumstances to look upon the German as a wild beast. It is an unfortunate situation. It is an unfortunate thing that the German people should have been led by their military masters and the teachings of their state socialism to so surrender their soul into the keeping of that gang at Berlin that they would perpetrate the things which they did. But the thing is done; and if the French, who have to live as neighbors with them, insist upon the proper guaranty and a proper arrangement by which this horror cannot be repeated, have a little sympathy with them. (Applause.) The thought which I have just expressed is inspired by my personal experience in going over the battle-field.

In order to take up the work of the American army and to get it in its proper perspective in the few minutes that are left to me, I want to

review the campaign of 1918. As I said before, my work kept me right in touch with what was going on. The collapse of the Russians in 1917 allowed the Germans early in the year 1918 to concentrate an enormous force in Northern France, and we kept following day by day the additions to the German strength. There was considerable speculation as to where the blow would fall. It fell on the British on March 21st; and the blow was of sufficient strength to break the British line and practically destroy the British 5th army. It resulted in the formation of the Amiens salient, the capture of 90,000 prisoners and enormous quantities of stores and equipment. Before that offensive ceased, the second one began on April 9th, and again the British lines were broken in the north and east. In both cases it was necessary for the French to throw in their reserve divisions to save the day, especially in the battle of March 21st, into which nine of the best French divisions were thrown to reinforce the broken British line. The third of the German offensives took place on May 26th— the assault being along the Chemin des Dames from the city of Laon down to Reims, and again they were successful. They drove down tɔ the Marne inside of five or six days. Sixty thousand French and English prisoners were taken; and then their army turned westward toward Paris. It was then that the event happened which in the opinion of most of us over in that region was the turning point of the campaign of 1918. It was the fact that the second American division was entered into battle at Belleau Woods, west of Chateau Thierry. The French were falling back under the German pressure, but the American division, although receiving the impact of six German divisions, held firm and even advanced under fearful losses. Thus the resistance of the second American division west of Chateau Thierry in the first days of June eventually stopped the third German offensive. It put the heart into the French, so that the fourth German offensive, in the neighborhood of Montdidier, was stopped by the French in a few days. I will refer to that result again in just a few moments. For several weeks from the middle of June until the 15th of July, the Germans made no further efforts. Then came their fifth and last offensive on July 15th. On a front of fifty miles, east and west of Reims, they made their assault, and on the 18th of July occurred the combined AmericanFrench counter attack on their right flank. Extending south from Soissons a distance of twenty-five miles, our armies drove the Germans before them, capturing the heights of Soissons, and put the German lines of communication under fire. The Germans began their retreat, and from the 18th day of July until the end of the war, on the 11th of November, there never was a time in which they succeeded in forging

ahead in any way. It was a complete, crushing defeat in a battle that extended over three and one-half months.

A Matter of Morale

The part played by the Americans was one which gradually grew and grew until one of the major battles of the war was fought by them in the Meuse-Argonne region. It is my opinion that it was the stand of the second American division at Chateau Thierry that changed the conduct of the whole campaign. Before that even the morale of the French was low; the British had been beaten back; but when our division held in there and brought that offensive to a close, things changed. It heartened the French and English; it told General Foch what was the character of the Americans coming over, a quarter of a million per month; it freed his own reserves, and it was the start of taking the morale out of the German army. (Applause.)

Those were no minor battles that took place. If I remember correctly, in clearing out the Marne salient in the battle that started on the 18th of July, about 200,000 Americans were involved ultimately. On September 12th to 15th, the First Army under General Pershing took the St. Mihiel salient, the first battle under American direction. I do not know the numbers involved in it. It was well done, but the resistance was not severe. But when the battle of September 18th began on a line that extended westward twenty miles from the River Meuse to the Argonne forest, nine American divisions went over the top on the first day. Ultimately I think about six hundred thousand Americans were engaged in that battle. That broke the Hindenburg line in a few hours. The whole of that famous defense system of the Germans was crossed in two days. Then occurred a month of severe fighting, when the best of the German reserves were thrown against us. Finally the Germans gave way and our army advanced to Sedan, and there they cut the railroad which formed the line of communications of the German army from east to west. In addition they crossed the Meuse, drove the Germans off the hills and out into the plains. The German army was in rapid retreat when the surrender armistice was signed.

Fighting Qualities of the Armies

One is forced to render proper tribute to the fighting qualities of the Germans. Bad as was the cause they were fighting for, I believe that in most cases everyone will concede that the Germans fought well. I think it is hardly necessary to mention the fighting qualities of the French. There is no more glorious history in the military annals of the French nation than the fighting they have done in the last four or five years. (Applause.)