to an armistice, and the statu quo; and stated his objections to the French minister.

He was indeed instructed to agree to no truce, unless it should be for so long a period, as to evince that it was on the part of Great Britain a virtual relinquishment of the war, and only an expedient to avoid an express acknowledgment of the independence of the United States. A question arose, in what character Mr. Adams was to appear at the proposed congress at Vienna, whether as the representative of an independent state, or otherwise.

The court of France was informed, that the king of Great Britain in accepting the mediation, declared, he was ready to make peace, "as soon as the league between France and his revolted colonies should be dissolved."

Without a variation of the haughty terms proposed by the court of London, it was evident nothing could be done at Vienna, so far as the United States were concerned.

Mr. Adams utterly refused to appear at the congress but as the representative of an independent nation. In a letter to Vergennes on this subject, among other things, he said :—

"It is impossible that there should be a treaty between Great Britain and the United States, at Vienna, unless both powers appear there, by representatives, who must be authorized by commissions or full powers, which must be mutually exchanged, and consequently admitted to be, what upon the face of them they purport to be. The commission from the United States, for making peace, which has been in Europe almost two years, is that of a minister plenipotentiary; and it authorizes him to treat only with ministers vested with equal powers. If he were to appear at Vienna, he would certainly assume the title and character of minister plenipotentiary; and he could enter into no treaty or conference with any minister from Great Britain, until they had mutually exchanged authentic copies of their full powers.

"This, it is true, wculd be an acknowledgment of his character and title, and of those of the United States too; but such an acknowledgment is indispensable, because, without it, there can be

no treaty at all. In consequence, he would expect to enjoy all the prerogatives of that character, and the moment they should be denied him, he must quit the congress, let the consequences be what they might. And, I rely upon it, this is the intention of the two imperial courts, because otherwise they would have proposed the congress, upon the two preliminaries, a rupture of the treaty (with France) and the return of the Americans to their submission to Great Britain, insisted upon by her; and because I cannot suppose it possible that the imperial courts could believe the Americans capable of such infinite baseness, as to appear in such a posture; nor can I suppose that they mean to fix a mark of disgrace upon the Americans, or to pronounce judgment against them; and because, otherwise, all their propositions would be to no effect, for no congress at Vienna can make either one or the other of the two proposed peaces, without the United States.

Upon looking over again the words of the first article, there seems to be room for dispute, which a British minister, in the present state of his country, would be capable of taking advantage of. The terms which are used are exceptionable. There are no American colonies at war with Great Britain. The power at war is the United States of America. No American colonies have any representative in Europe, unless Nova Scotia or Quebec may have an agent in London. The word colony implies a metropolis, a mother country, a superior political governor, ideas which the United States of America have long since renounced, forever.

“I am, therefore, clear, in my own opinion, that a more explicit declaration ought to be insisted on, and that no American representative ought to appear, without an express assurance, that while the congress lasts, and in going to it, and from it, he shall be considered as a minister plenipotentiary from the United States of America, and entitled to all the preprogatives of a minister plenipotentiary of a sovereign power. The congress might be to him and his country but a snare, unless the substance of this is intended, and if it is intended, there can be no sufficient reason for declining to express it in words. If there is a power VOL, II.

15

upon earth which imagines that America will ever appear at a congress, before a minister of Great Britain or any other power, in the character of repenting subjects, supplicating an amnesty or a warranty of an amnesty, that power is infinitely deceived. There are very few Americans who would hold their lives upon such terms. And all such ideas ought forever to be laid aside by the British ministry before they propose mediations. The very mention of such a thing to the United States by Great Britain would be considered only as another repetition of injury and insult. It would be little less to France."

The answer of his most christian majesty to the mediators, on this question, was in accordance with the views of Mr. Adams. "The two imperial courts cannot flatter themselves, that they can conduct the mediation to an happy conclusion, if they do not provide against the subterfuges, the subtleties, and the false interpretations, which any of the belligerent powers may employ, for understanding according to its views, the preliminary propositions. There is the difficulty which would infallibly occur, if we do not determine, beforehand, the sense of the expressions which relate to the Americans. The court of London, who will elude as much and as long as she can, any direct and indirect avowal of the independence of the United States, will take advantage of the general terms we employ in speaking of them, to maintain that she is not obliged to treat with her ancient colonies, as with a free and independent nation: That she is not, consequently, in a situation to admit a plenipotentiary on their part: That she is the mistress to see nothing in their representative but the deputy of a portion of her subjects, who appear to sue for pardon: From which it would result, when the mediation should be in activity, and the question should be to open and commence the negociations, that they would begin to contest concerning the character which the American plenipotentiary may display: That the king of England will not regard him, but as his subject, while the congress shall demand that he be admitted as the representative of a free people; by which means the mediation will find itself arrested in its first step.

"To prevent this inconvenience, it seems, that before all things, the character of the American agent ought to be determined in a manner the most precise and positive, and that the congress ought to be invited to confide its interests to the mediation. This invitation is so much the more indispensable, as the negociations relative to America, must march with an equal step with that which the court of Versailles and Madrid will pursue; and by consequence, these two negociations, although separate, must be commenced at the same time."

The answer of the French court being communicated by one of the mediating powers, to the cabinet of London, his Britannic majesty, on the 15th of June, 1781, declared in reply, that he could not in any manner or form whatever, admit the interference of any foreign power, between him and his rebel subjects; and therefore would not agree to the admission of any person as their minister at the proposed congress, as this would be totally incompatible with their situation as subjects. He would not, he said, consent to any measure, which might limit or suspend the exercise of the right every sovereign had, to employ the means in his power, to put an end to a rebellion in his own dominions; and that the mediation of the two imperial courts must be limited to a peace between the European belligerents, and not to a peace with his revolted subjects.* He declared at the same time, "that in all points to be agitated in a future congress, England will behave with great equity and condesension; but the dependence of her rebel subjects in America must be pre-established, and that this matter must be left entirely to the care of Great Britain."t

The views of the imperial courts on this point were in accordance with those of the British cabinet. They were unwilling indirectly to acknowledge the independence of the United States, without the consent of Great Britain. These views were made known to Mr. Dana, by a letter from the marquis de Verac, the French minister at St. Petersburgh, in September, 1781. Referring to the first preliminary article, he said, " the mediating powers Histoire &c. de la Diplomatie Francaise, vol. 7.

↑ Secret Journals of Congress, vol. 3, pp. 28, 29.

understand by this, that your deputies shall treat simply with the English ministers, as they have already treated in America, with the commissioners of Great Britain, in 1778. That the conclusion of their negociations shall teach the other powers upon what footing they are to be regarded, and that their public character shall be acknowledged without difficulty, from the moment when the English themselves shall no longer oppose it."* The reply of the court of London, put an end to all farther proceedings under the mediation of the imperial courts.

* Mr. Adams' Correspendence, p. 136.