peace, as well to arrange their finances, and recruit the exhausted state of their country, as to spare the further effusion of blood, yet they will faithfully perform their engagements, and afford every assistance in their power to prosecute the war for the great purpose of the alliance.

"You shall constantly inculcate the certainty of ruining the British fisheries, on the banks of Newfoundland, and consequently, the British marine, by reducing Halifax and Quebec ; since by that means they would be exposed to alarm and plunder, and deprived of the necessary supplies formerly drawn from America. "The plan proposed by congress for compassing these objects is herewith transmitted for your more particular instruction.

"You are to lay before the court the deranged state of the finances, together with the causes thereof; and show the necessity of placing them on a more respectable footing, in order to prosecute the war with vigor on the part of America.

"You are, by every means in your power, to promote a perfect harmony, concord, and good understanding, not only between the allied powers, but also between and among their subjects, that the connection so favorably begun may be perpetuated.

"You shall, in all things, take care, not to make any engagements or stipulations, on the part of America, without the consent of America previously obtained.*

The project of reducing Canada was brought before congress, soon after the arrival of the French minister, and was warmly supported, if not suggested by him. A detailed plan for effecting this object, was arranged by congress in October, and accompanied the instructions of the American minister to France. Large bodies of troops were to be collected at several points near the frontiers of that province, and in the ensuing campaign, the different posts of Detroit, Niagara, Oswego, and Montreal, were to be attacked at the same time; and in the reduction of Quebec and Halifax, a French fleet and army were to co-operate. The advantages to be derived from the execution of this measure, both to France and the United States, were stated in the plan itself.

* Note 3.

"The importance to France," congress say, "is derived from the following considerations:

"1. The fishery of Newfoundland is justly considered as the basis of a good marine.

"2. The possession of these two places (Quebec and Halifax) necessarily secures to the party and their friends, the island and fisheries.

"3. It will strengthen her allies, and guarantee more strongly their freedom and independence.

"4. It will have an influence in extending the commerce of France, and restoring her to a share of the fur trade, now monopolized by Great Britain.

"The importance to America results from the following consid erations:

"1. The peace of their frontiers.

"2. The arrangement of their finances.

"3. The accession of two states to the union.

"4. The protection and security of their commerce.

"5. That it will enable them to bend their whole attention and resources to the erection of a marine, which will at once serve and assist their allies.

"6. That it will secure the fisheries to the United States and France their ally, to the total exclusion of Great Britain.*

The marquis de la Fayette was to go to France and urge the co-operation of the French court in the execution of this project. The plan itself was transmitted to general Washington for his observations. The general was of opinion, that it was too complicated and hazardous, as well as too extensive for the finances of the United States, and could not be undertaken with a reasonable, much less a certain prospect of success. His observations were communicated to congress on the 11th of November. The members of that body were not easily induced to relinquish a favorite measure; particularly if France should be disposed to carry it into effect. On a report of a committee, therefore, to whom the observations of the general were refer* Secret Journals of Congress, volume 2, pp. 114, 115-and Note 4.

red, they were still of opinion, that he "should be directed to write to the marquis de la Fayette upon the subject; and also to write to the minister of the states very fully, in order that eventual measures may be taken, in case an armament should be sent from France to Quebec, to co-operate therewith to the utmost degree which the finances of the states would admit." In reply to the second communication on this subject, the general said, "The earnest desire I have strictly to comply, in every instance with the views and instructions of congress, cannot but make me feel the greatest uneasiness, when I find myself in circumstances of hesitation or doubt, with respect to directions. But the perfect confidence I have in the justice and candor of that honorable body, emboldens me to communicate without reserve, the difficulties which occur in the execution of their present order; and the indulgence I have experienced on every former occasion, induces me to imagine that the liberty I now take will not meet with disapprobation.

"I have attentively taken up the report of the committee of the fifth (approved by congress) on the subject of my letter of the 11th ultimo, on the proposed expedition into Canada. I have considered it in several lights, and sincerely regret that I should feel myself under any embarrassment in carrying it into execution. I still remain of opinion, from a general review of things, and the state of our resources, that no extensive system of co-operation with the French, for the complete emancipation of Canada, can be positively decided on, for the ensuing year. To propose a plan of perfect co-operation with a foreign power, without a moral certainty in our supplies; and to have that plan actually ratified with the court of Versailles, might be attended, in case of failure in the condition on our part, with very fatal effects.

"If I should seem unwilling to transmit the plan as prepared by congress, with my observations, it is because I find myself under a necessity (in order to give our minister sufficient ground to form an application upon) to propose something more than a vague and indecisive plan; which, even in the event of a total evacuation of the states by the enemy, may be rendered imprac

ticable in the execution by a variety of insurmountable obstacles; or if I retain my present sentiments and act consistently, I must point out the difficulties, as they appear to me, which must embarrass his negociations, and may disappoint the views of congress.

"But proceeding on the idea of the enemy's leaving these states, before the active part of the ensuing campaign, I should fear to hazard a mistake, as to the precise aim and extent of the views of congress. The conduct I am to observe in writing to our minister at the court of France, does not appear sufficiently delineated. Were I to undertake it, I should be much afraid of erring through misconception. In this dilemma, I would esteem it a particular favor to be excused from writing at all on the subject, especially as it is the part of candor in me to acknowledge, that I do not see my way clear enough to point out such a plan for co-operation, as I conceive, to be consistent with the ideas of congress, and will be sufficiently explanatory, with respect to time and circumstances to give efficiency to the measure.

"But if congress still think it necessary for me to proceed in the business, I must request their more definite and explicit instructions, and that they will permit me, previous to transmitting the intended despatches, to submit them to their determination.

"I could wish to lay before congress more minutely the state of the army, the condition of our supplies, and the requisites necessary for carrying into execution an undertaking that may involve the most serious events. If congress think this can be done more satisfactorily in a personal conference, I hope to have the army in such a situation before I can receive their answer, as to afford me an opportunity of giving my attendance."*

A committee was appointed to confer with the commander in chief, agreeably to his suggestion, relative to the operations of the ensuing campaign, and particularly on the proposed plan for the emancipation of Canada, in co-operation with an armament from France. On the first of January, 1779, the committee in reporting the result of this important conference, say, "That im* Marshall's Life of Washington, vol. 3, pp. 577, 578, 579. 9

VOL. II.

pressed with a strong sense of the injury and disgrace which must attend an infraction of the proposed stipulation on the part of these states, your committee have taken a general review of our finances; of the circumstances of our army; of the maga zines of clothing, artillery, arms and ammunition; and of the provisions in store, and which can be collected in season. Your committee have, also, attentively considered the intelligence and observations communicated to them by the commander in chief, respecting the number of troops and strong holds of the enemy in Canada, their naval force, and entire command of the water communication with that country; the difficulties, while they possess such signal advantages, of penetrating it with an army by land; the obstacles which are to be surmounted in acquiring a naval superiority; the hostile temper of many of the surrounding Indian tribes towards these states; and above all, the uncertainty whether the enemy will not persevere in their system of harrassing and distressing our sea-coast and frontiers by a predatory war. That upon the most mature deliberation, your committee cannot find room for a well grounded presumption, that these states will be able to perform their part of the proposed stipulations. That, in a measure of such moment, and calculated to call forth, and divert to a single object, a considerable proportion of the force of an ally, which may otherwise be essentially employed, nothing less than the highest probability of its success would justify congress in making the proposition.

"Your committee are, therefore, of opinion, that the negociations in question however desirable and interesting, should be deferred till circumstances should render the co-operation of these states more certain, practicable and effectual."* Though the reasons of the commander in chief, publicly communicated to congress, were in themselves conclusive against the measure, yet other reasons of a delicate nature, had no little weight with him. He had serious apprehensions, that if Canada should be conquered by the aid of French troops, its inhabitants being mostly French, might wish to return to their former allegiance ; * Secret Journals of Congress, vol. 2, pp. 127, 128.