VII HOURS OF LABOR A. MAXIMUM HOURS I. CHILDREN INLAND STEEL CO. v. YEDINAK Supreme Court of Indiana. 1909. 172 Ind. 423. [Yedinak, a thirteen-year-old child, was employed in the appellant's steel mill, working twelve hours a night for six nights a week. One week he was compelled to work fourteen hours a night, and early one morning, during a lull of work, he fell asleep near a railroad track usually not used at that time of the day, unconsciously placed a foot upon the track and was injured by a passing train. He sued for damages and recovered $2,000 in the trial court. The company appealed.] MONTGOMERY, J. . The first paragraph of this complaint is founded upon § 8021 Burns 1908, Acts 1899, p. 231, § 1, which prohibits the employment of a person under sixteen years of age in a manufacturing establishment for more than sixty hours in any one week, or for more than ten hours in any one day, except for the purpose of making a shorter day of the last day of the week. The second paragraph is based upon § 8022 Burns 1908, Acts 1899, p. 231, § 2, which forbids the employment of a child under fourteen years of age in any manufacturing establishment within this State. The violation of these statutes is made a misdemeanor, punishable by fine, or fine and imprisonment for repeated offenses. § 8045 Burns 1908, Acts 1899, p. 231, § 25. [Only that part of the opinion is given which deals with the constitutionality of the statutes.] It is argued that article 1, § 10, of the Constitution of the United States, and article 1, § 24, of the Constitution of this State, which prohibit the passage of a law impairing the obligation of contracts, are infringed. These constitutional restrictions were manifestly intended to prohibit the enactment of laws impairing such valid contracts only as shall be in existence and outstanding at the time of the adoption of the law. These statutes were in force long prior to the making of any contract involved in this action, and the constitutional provisions cited have no application to this controversy. It is stated that the 5th amendment to the federal Constitution, which declares that no person shall be deprived of liberty or property without due process of law, is also violated. This amendment operated exclusively in restriction of federal power, and has no application to the several states. Thorington v. Montgomery (1893), 147 U. S. 490; Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio (1902), 183 U. S. 238. It is contended that these statutes unlawfully abridge the privileges and immunities of appellant as a citizen of the United States, in violation of the 14th amendment of the federal Constitution. Appellant is a corporation, and not a citizen within the meaning of that term as used in this connection, and cannot invoke the benefit of this provision which was made for the protection of natural persons. Pembina, etc., Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania (1888), 125 U. S. 181; Schmidt v. City of Indianapolis (1907), 168 Ind. 631. The next insistence is that these statutes deny appellant the equal protection of the laws, and deprive it of property without due process of law, in violation of the 14th amendment, supra. Children under sixteen years of age are wards of the State, and are preeminently fit subjects for the protecting care of its police power. This power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, and may be exercised to conserve and promote the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public. The liberty and property of the individual citizens are held subject to such reasonable conditions as the State may deem necessary to impose in the exercise of this power. Such regulations and conditions will not fall within the inhibitions of the 14th amendment unless they are palpably arbitrary, extravagant and unreasonably hurtful, and unnecessarily and unjustly interfere with private rights. Barbier v. Connolly (1885), 113 U. S. 27; Mugler v. Kansas (1887), 123 U. S. 623; In re Kemmler (1890), 136 U. S. 436; Crowley v. Christensen (1890), 137 U. S. 86. . . . . The doctrine thus declared had reference to the rights of adults, and may be stated even more strongly when addressed to laws regulating the rights of minors to contract. The employment of children of tender years in mills and factories not only endangers their lives and limbs, but hinders and dwarfs their growth and development physically, mentally and morally. The State is vitally interested in its own preservation, and, looking to that end, must safeguard and protect the lives, persons, health and morals of its future citizens. Acting upon this wise and humane principle, nearly all, if not all, other states of the Union and most other enlightened governments of the world have enacted laws very similar to our own, prohibiting the employment of young children in mines, factories and other establishments imperiling their health, lives and limbs, and at the same time affording them an opportunity to attend school, and to grow and develop in safe and wholesome surroundings free from the cares which generally engross the attention of adults in this commercial age. The validity of such laws has seldom been challenged, and, so far as our research extends, never denied. The length to which the state may go in providing measures looking toward the physical, moral and intellectual well-being of its helpless and dependent wards is a question of expedience and propriety which it is in the province of the legislature to determine. . . . . It is finally claimed that article 1, § 23, of the Constitution of Indiana is violated, inasmuch as these statutes are a species of class legislation. The statutes, as we have seen, forbid the employment and overworking of certain children in any manufacturing or mercantile establishment, mine, quarry, laundry, renovating works, bakery or printing office. The classification is natural, just and reasonable, and no substantial objection to its validity on this ground has been advanced. . . . . Our conclusion is that the statutes in question are valid, and that no error was committed in overruling appellant's demurrer to either paragraph of the complaint. . . . . QUESTIONS 1. Is the opinion of this court as to the relative functions of the legislative and judicial departments in connection with the police power consistent with that expressed in Holden v. Hardy, page 20, supra? 2. "It is a reasonable principle, which in practice is observed, that the excercise of control must decrease as the age advances." (Freund, Police Power, 239). Is the graduation of this control entirely in the hands of the legislature? 3. As this is not a prosecution for violation of the statutes in question, why is the validity of the statutes relevant? 4. Contrary to statute, a boy thirteen years old is employed to drive a milk wagon and is injured by a fall from the wagon when a street car runs into it. Can he recover damages from his employer? 5. Is an employer in the position of the appellant altogether deprived of the defenses of assumed risk and contributory negligence? 6. If the appellant had been induced to employ the boy by representations that the latter was over sixteen years old, made by (a) the boy's parents, (b) the boy himself, would the decision be different? 7. A state statute prohibits the employment of children under the age of sixteen in factories before 6 a. m. and after 8 p. m. Is it valid under the Federal Constitution? 8. A state statute prohibits the employment of any child under sixteen in any gainful occupation during school hours, unless such child can read and write English or is attending night school. Is it valid? 9. Is there in your state any statute regulating the hours of labor of children? If so, has it been tested in the courts? 2. WOMEN MULLER v. OREGON United States Supreme Court. 1908. 208 U. S. 412. MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court: On February 19, 1903, the legislature of the state of Oregon passed an act (Session Laws 1903, p. 148) the first section of which is in these words: "Section 1. That no female (shall) be employed in any mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry in this state more than ten hours during any one day. The hours of work may be so arranged as to permit the employment of females at any time so that they shall not work more than ten hours during the twenty-four hours of any one day." Sec. 3 made a violation of the provisions of the prior sections a misdemeanor subject to a fine of not less than $10 nor more than $25. On September 18, 1905, an information was filed in the circuit court of the state for the county of Multnomah, charging that the defendant "on the 4th day of September, A.D., 1905, in the county of Multnomah and state of Oregon, then and there being the owner of a laundry, known as the Grand Laundry, in the city of Portland, and the employer of females therein, did then and there unlawfully permit and suffer one Joe Haselbock, he, the said Joe Haselbock, then and there being an overseer, superintendent, and agent of said Curt Muller, in the said Grand Laundry, to require a female, to wit, one Mrs. E. Gotcher, to work more than ten hours in said laundry on said 4th day of September, A.D. 1905, contrary to the statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Oregon." A trial resulted in a verdict against the defendant, who was sentenced to pay a fine of $10. The supreme court of the state affirmed the conviction (48 Ore. 252), whereupon the case was brought here on writ of error. The single question is the constitutionality of the statute under which the defendant was convicted, so far as it affects the work of a female in a laundry. That it does not conflict with any provisions of the state Constitution is settled by the decision of the supreme court of the state. The contentions of the defendant, now plaintiff in error, are thus stated in his brief: "(1) Because the statute attempts to prevent persons sui juris from making their own contracts, and thus violates the provisions of the 14th Amendment, as follows: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' "(2) Because the statute does not apply equally to all persons similarly situated, and is class legislation. "(3) The statute is not a valid exercise of the police power. The kinds of work prescribed are not unlawful, nor are they declared to be immoral or dangerous to the public health; nor can such a law be sustained on the ground that it is designed to protect women on account of their sex. There is no necessary or reasonable connection between the limitation prescribed by the act and the public health, safety, or welfare." It is the law of Oregon that women, whether married or single, have equal contractual and personal rights with men. It thus appears that, putting to one side the elective franchise, in the matter of personal and contractual rights they stand on the same plane as the other sex. Their rights in these respects can no more be infringed than the equal rights of their brothers. We held in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, that a law providing that no laborer shall be required or permitted to work in bakeries more than sixty hours in a week or ten hours in a day was not, as to men, a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, but an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right and liberty |