the meaning of this law and that it caused or permitted some of its employees to labor without the prescribed rest in violation of the terms of the statute. Its defense is based solely and squarely on the contention that the law is unconstitutional and invalid. Its broad claim is that in attempting to limit the right of a male adult to contract for his labor in the pursuits named, the legislature violated the provisions of the Constitution both of the State and the United States which in substantially similar language provide that no person shall be deprived "of life, liberty or property without due process of law," and also the provisions of said Constitutions which respectively provide that "No member of this State shall be . . . . deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers," and "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

We agree with the appellant that the statute cannot be sustained as one enforcing the religious observance of any day, but that it must be sustained, if at all, as a valid exercise of the police power of the state for the promotion and protection of the public health and welfare.

It is of course very familiar law that the legislature under its socalled police power may by enactments which really tend to accomplish such beneficial public purposes interfere in many and substantial ways with individual rights without being considered as in conflict with the constitutional safeguards which surround such individual. The doctrine that personal liberty must yield to what is supposed to be the public welfare has not waned any during recent years, and if the statute now before us comes within the principles which sanction and regulate such legislation it is not subject to the attack made upon its constitutionality. For the purpose of determining whether it is thus immune we shall first briefly consider its important features and purposes and the effects which it can be seen will naturally flow from its operation.

"The purpose of (such) a statute must be determined from the natural and legal effect of the language employed; and whether it is or is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States must be determined from the natural effect of such statutes when put into operation and not from their proclaimed purpose." (Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 64.)

We see at the outset that it is applicable only to certain classes of employees. But these are they who work in factories and mercantile establishments. We know as a matter of common observation that

such labor is generally indoors and imposes that greater burden on health which comes from confinement many times accompanied by crowded conditions and impure air. Thus special conditions are presented which become a reasonable basis for special consideration.

Can we say that the provision for a full day of rest in seven for such employees is so extravagant and unreasonable, so disconnected with the probable promotion of health and welfare that its enactment is beyond the jurisdiction of the legislature? Or does the very reverse seem to be its character? We have no power of decision of the question whether it is the wisest and best way to offset these conditions and give to employees the protection which they need even if we had any doubt on that subject. That question, as we have many times said in other similar cases, is for the legislature. Our only inquiry must be whether the provision on its face seems reasonable, fair and appropriate, and whether it can fairly be believed that its natural consequences will be in the direction of betterment of public health and welfare, and, therefore, that it is one which the state for its protection and advantage may enact and enforce. It seems to me very clear that we may answer that it is such an one.

The thought of one day of rest in seven has come down to us fortified by centuries of recognition. It is true that often it has been coupled with and perhaps subordinate to the desire for religious observance. But the idea of rest and relaxation from the pursuits of other days has also been present and whether we like it or not we are compelled to see that in more recent times the feature of rest and recreation has been developing at the expense of the one of religious observance.

I suppose that no one would contend that continued and uninterrupted indoor labor would be good even for an adult man. The laws which have been passed and sustained with general approval in almost every jurisdiction limiting the hours of labor for women and children and for those engaged in especially trying employments, such as mining and the operation of railroads, amply testify to the widespread belief that in certain fields the public health and welfare are subserved by generous opportunities for relaxation and recuperation. A constantly increasing study of industrial conditions I believe leads to the conviction that the health, happiness, intelligence and efficiency even of an adult man laboring in such employments as those mentioned in this statute will be increased by a reasonable opportunity for rest, for outdoor life and recreation, for attention to his own affairs, and, if he will, study and education.

Then we come to the question what is a reasonable opportunity, and within wide limits that problem is for the legislature. Anybody would probably say that one day in thirty or sixty would be too little and one day in each two days extravagant. Between these extremes none can safely assert that the mean adopted by the legislature of one day in seven is unreasonable. In fact, historical and worldwide customs seem to make it a natural one and we should not interfere with it. . . . The order appealed from should be affirmed.

Order affirmed.

QUESTIONS

1. Does the New York law conform to the test stated in Lawton v. Steele: "It must appear. . . . that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference"?

2. In passing upon Sunday statutes, are the courts justified in taking into account spiritual welfare as well as physical welfare?

3. If the statute had required that the one day's rest in seven should be on Sunday, would the decision have been the same?

4. Would the statute in the last question violate a provision in the State Constitution which guarantees religious liberty and prohibits any preference to be given to any religious establishment or mode of worship?

5. Would the decision have been the same if the statute had prohibited (a) all common labor on the Sabbath, (b) any worldly employment or business whatever on the Lord's Day, works of necessity and charity alone excepted?

6. Is the decision consistent with Lochner v. New York?

7. Suppose the act had exempted from its operation employees engaged in a manufacturing process necessarily continuous in which no employee is permitted to work more than eight hours a day. Would it still be constitutional?

8. Would it be constitutional to exempt employees in dairies, creameries, milk condensaries, milk-powder factories, milk-sugar factories, milk-shipping stations, butter and cheese factories, ice-cream plants, and milk-bottling plants where not more than seven persons are employed?

9. If the statute exempted persons who conscientiously observe the seventh day of the week as the Sabbath, would it violate the equal protection clause?

10. Would it be constitutional to exempt "employees, if the Commissioner of Labor in his discretion approves, engaged in the work of any industrial or manufacturing process necessarily continuous, in which no employee is permitted to work more than eight hours in any calendar day"?

11. A state law requires the closing on Sunday of shops, stores, groceries, bowling alleys, and billiard rooms, but excepts theaters, drug stores, undertaking establishments, garages, meat markets, and bakeries. Is the classification permissible?

12. A state law forbids the employment of women in any factory before 6 a. m. or after 10 p.m. Is it constitutional?

13. Consider the constitutionality of a law providing that in all factories women must be given an hour's rest at noon, after not more than six hours' work, and a rest period of one-half hour in the middle of the afternoon if the working day exceeds nine hours.

14. Could a state compel by a law the observance of a half-holiday on Saturday, during some or all of the year, in mercantile and industrial establishments?

15. Could it compel annual vacations on pay for employees who had served certain periods of time?

16. A state statute forbids the running of freight trains on any railroad in the state on Sunday. Is it in violation of the Federal Constitution?

17. Could Congress constitutionally provide that seamen of merchant vessels of the United States shall not be required, while the vessel is in a safe harbor, to do any unnecessary work on Sundays, New Year's Day, Fourth of July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day?

18. Consider the constitutionality of a law providing for a half-holiday for employees on election day to allow them to vote, and imposing a penalty upon employers who refuse to grant this time off.

19. Is there in your state any legislation of the character considered in this section? If so, how has it fared in the courts?

VIII

WAGES

A. REGULATION OF WAGE PAYMENT

I. TIME OF PAYMENT

STATE v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri. 1912. 242 Mo. 339.

BROWN, J.-The defendant was tried in the circuit court of Vernon county on October 14, 1911, and convicted of violating section 1 of an act of the 46th General Assembly entitled, "An Act requiring all corporations doing business in this State to pay their employees as often as semi-monthly, and fixing penalties for violation thereof." (Laws 1911, p. 150.)

By the judgment of the court, defendant was fined ten dollars, from which it appeals.

The defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment, for the alleged reason that the Act of 1911 upon which the information is based, violates numerous provisions of our State and Federal Constitutions.

The only real issues in this case are whether or not the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Missouri will permit the Legislature to regulate the private contracts of artificial and natural persons; and if so, whether the law in question is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.

The validity of the law in judgment can only be sustained on the theory that it comes within the purview of the police power.

The exercise of such police power as is essential to promote the health, morals and welfare of the people seems to be vested in every sovereign State. . . .

The police power of the State is somewhat difficult of precise definition. In its very nature it must be somewhat elastic to meet the changing and shifting conditions which from time to time arise through the increase of population and complex commercial and social relations of