cerning which it was entitled to judge and act for itself in the exercise of its lawful power to pass remedial legislation. [The court proceeds to show that the second objection to the validity of the statute that it denies the equal protection of the law-cannot be upheld as there is no attempt at arbitrary or unreasonable discrimination, and that, therefore, the law is not a violation of the constitutional rights involved. The judgment of the supreme court of Arkansas is accordingly affirmed.] QUESTIONS 1. Explain the "reasonable relation" of this act to the protection of the public health, safety, or welfare. 2. Was the purpose of the legislature, in passing this act, to see that coal miners were better paid for their labor? Does the act necessarily affect the scale of wages in coal mines? 3. What analogy is there between this act and legislation regulating the size of loaves of bread? 4. Why is the statute not invalid under the equal protection clause, applying as it does only to mines employing ten or more men underground? 5. If the statute had required that where the wages paid to coal miners depend on the amount of coal mined by them, they shall be paid according to the weight of the coal produced and not according to the volume, would it have been constitutional? 6. A state law provides that all coal miners shall be paid according to the weight of coal produced by them. Is it in violation of Amendment XIV? 7. Would a provision that coal miners may at their own expense hire a check weighman to see that the coal is properly weighed, where weight is the basis of computation of wages, be valid? 8. A state law requires that the employer in every textile factory where employees work by the job shall post up specifications of the character of each kind of work and the rates of compensation to be paid therefor. Is this proper police legislation? 9. A state law requires corporations to give 30 days' notice of intended reductions of wages. Is it constitutional? 10. Is there in your state any statute of the character under consideration in this section? If so, what are its provisions and how has it fared in the courts? 4. MEDIUM OF PAYMENT KEOKEE CONSOLIDATED COKE CO. v. TAYLOR MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court: These are actions of assumpsit brought by the defendants in error upon orders signed by employees of the plaintiff in error and addressed to it, directing it to pay to bearer "in merchandise only from your store," to the value specified. These orders were upon scrip issued by the plaintiff in error as an advance of monthly wages in payment for labor performed, and the only controversy between the parties arises from the refusal of the plaintiff in error to pay the indicated amounts in money. The facts were agreed, the circuit court gave judgment for the plaintiffs, and a writ of error was refused by the supreme court of appeals. The ground of the judgment was an act of February 13, 1888, amending and re-enacting an act of 1887, chap. 391, section 3, forbidding any person, firm, or corporation engaged in mining coal or ore, or manufacturing iron or steel or any other kind of manufacturing, to issue for the payment of labor any order unless the same purported to be redeemable for its face value in lawful money of the United States. The plaintiff in error saved its rights under the 14th Amendment, and, when the court of appeals refused to hear the cases, brought them here. Of course we do not go behind the construction given to the state law by the state courts. The objections that are urged here are that the statute interferes with freedom of contract, and, more especially, that it is class legislation of a kind supposed to be inconsistent with the 14th Amendment; a West Virginia decision upon a similar statute being cited to that effect. State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179. The former of these objections, however, is disposed of by Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, and Dayton Coal & I. Co. v. Barton, 183 U. S. 23. It is more pressed that the act discriminates unconstitutionally against certain classes. But while there are differences of opinion as to the degree and kind of discrimination permitted by the 14th Amendment, it is established by repeated decisions that a statute aimed at what is deemed an evil, and hitting it presumably where experience shows it to be most felt, is not to be upset by thinking up and enumerating other instances to which it might have been applied equally well, so far as the court can see. That is for the legislature to judge unless the case is very clear. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61; Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138. The suggestion that others besides mining and manufacturing companies may keep shops and pay their workmen with orders on themselves for merchandise is not enough to overthrow a law that must be presumed to be deemed by the legislature co-extensive with the practical need. Judgments affirmed. QUESTIONS 1. What is the evil aimed at by the statute in this case? Why is it any more of an evil in the case of mining and manufacturing companies than in the case of other employers? 2. Explain how the law promotes the health, safety, or welfare of the people? 3. How do you meet the objection that it interferes with freedom of contract? 4. If it applied to all employers and employees except farmers and farm laborers, would it be constitutional? 5. Would the law be constitutional if it applied to all employers? 6. A state law requires employers who issue written evidences of indebtedness for the payment of wages to redeem them in lawful money, at their face value, on demand. Is it constitutional? 7. If the law prohibited the issuance of store orders altogether, would it be constitutional? 8. If a law forbids employers to pay wages in any other form than lawful money of the United States, is it constitutional? 9. Is the constitutionality of such statutes affected by a provision that any contract by which the right to receive lawful money is waived is illegal and void? 10. Is there in your state any statute regulating the medium of payment of employees? If so, what are its provisions and how have the courts interpreted it? 5. DEDUCTIONS The problem of deductions from wages involves (1) deductions in respect to fines, (2) deductions as payment for damages, (3) deductions for use of material and tools, (4) deductions for benefits. Fines are imposed, presumably, for disciplinary reasons, and vary in application and amount in different establishments and with the caprice of the individual employer. They may not always be a real deterrent, but may on the other hand lead to carelessness, suggesting to the worker that he has paid for what he has done. They may be unfairly imposed, creating a sense of injustice and irritating the workers, and they may even prove to be a source of petty profits to the unscrupulous employer. At all events, they decrease the income of the wage earner. Deductions as payment for damages may be for bad or negligent 2 Reprinted from The Principles of Labor Legislation by Commons and Andrews by permission of the publishers, Harper & Bros., 1920 Ed., pp. 56-57. work, injury to materials and to other property of the employer. Abuses are very general, for the employer determines the amount of damage done and puts the price on materials spoiled. It is humanly impossible to do perfect work, and no matter how good a worker may be at his trade, faults will occur at times. Such faults are part of the manufacturers' risk and should be dealt with as such. The employer is himself often to blame for setting an inexperienced hand to do work for which he is not competent. The case of charges for materials and tools used by employees involves the same principle as in the previous case. This system is intended to secure economy in the use of material by making the worker responsible. However, from the point of view of the worker the system is objectionable because of the possibility of overcharge which no regulation, however strict, can altogether prevent. Deductions for benefits received, such as medical attention, hospital care, and sickness insurance, are allowed by all states and countries, but some provide (as, for instance, New South Wales and Western Australia) that the deduction must not exceed the value of the thing supplied, and, when not stated, this is generally implied by all countries. Usually, also, these deductions from wages are in pursuance of a previous contract. B TERRITORY v. McVEAGH Supreme Court of Hawaii. 1916. 23 Haw. 176. Opinion of the court by QUARLES, J. The defendant was charged in the district court of Honolulu as follows: "That said Thos. McVeagh, at Honolulu, City and County of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, on or about the 22nd day of May, 1915, did deduct and retain all of the wages due and payable for the week ending May 22nd, 1915, as and for the services of a certain employee, to wit, one Herbert Alexander, he, the said Herbert Alexander having been employed by him, the said Thos. McVeagh, during said week; and that said Thos. McVeagh thereby collected of and from said Herbert Alexander, a purported offset or counterclaim without the consent of him, the said Herbert Alexander, either oral or in writing, or by action in court as provided by law, and without first having obtained a judgment therefor as provided by law, and contrary to sections 3446 3448 inclusive, of the Revised Laws of 1915; and that said Thos. McVeagh has wilfully and persistently and maliciously refused to pay to said Herbert Alexander the said wages, though often requested so to do, and has alleged as the excuse therefor his purpose to deduct, retain and collect the alleged offset or counter-claim." To the said charge the defendant demurred. His demurrer was overruled, and on trial he was convicted and fined $50. From said judgment of conviction the defendant appealed to the circuit court of the first judicial circuit and there again demurred to the charge upon the following grounds: Section 3446, 3447, and 3448 of the Revised Laws, under which this charge is made, are contrary to the Constitution of the United States of America, and the Organic Act of the Territory of Hawaii, in that said sections: "First: Impair the obligations of contracts, "Second: Deprive persons of property without due process of law, "Third: Provide for imprisonment for debt, and "Fourth: Deny the equal protection of the laws." The circuit court being in doubt as to the constitutionality of sections 3446, 3447 and 3448, R. L., under which the defendant is prosecuted, has reserved to this court the question "Whether said demurrer ought to be sustained by said circuit court, for any or either of the reasons or grounds of demurrer therein set forth." ... The statutes in question are sections of the Revised Laws as follows: "Sec. 3446. Wages, deductions from. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, partnership or corporation, within this Territory, to deduct and retain any part or portion of any wages due and payable to any laborer or employee, or to collect any store account, offset or counter claim without the written consent of such laborer or employee or by action in court as provided by law. "Sec. 3447. Fines, etc., deduction for. No fines, offsets or counterclaims shall be collected, deducted, or retained out of any wages due and payable to any laborer or employee by any person, firm, partnership or corporation, in this Territory, unless by action in court and judgment therefor first obtained as provided by law. "Sec. 3448. Penalty. Any person, partnership, firm or corporation who shall violate any provision of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than fifty dollars and not more than one hundred dollars." No provision in these statutes impairs the obligation of any con |