lustration of the inutility of Latin and Greek in the performance of great actions in the world. Every one can draw a comparison between the atchievements and the present situation of Louis XVIII and Buonaparté; nor does it require the spirit of prophecy to foretell how they will stand upon the page of history. Yet, according to the notion of the "learned," Buonaparté is an ignorant fellow. I shall be told, perhaps, that the atchievements of Buonaparté are not to be cited in support of my opinion respecting the inutility of what are called the "learned languages;" but, why not? The conqueror of Europe has been reproached for not knowing how to spell, and the person of whose throne he has got possession is now held up to our admiration as a "profound sholar;" as speaking Latin with "classical elegance." This, then, is an instance for me to cite, and a striking instance too. Here is a man, so ignorant" (to use the epithet of the learned), that he did not, a little while ago, know how to spell; and he has not only placed himself at the head of a great nation; but, has subdued many other nations, and has made a new distribution of almost all the territory of Europe, not forgetting to cause to be issued laws, or decrees, relating to government in all its branches and departments. In short, the greatest conqueror and the greatest lawgiver that Europe ever saw. And yet he hardly knows how to spell; and is, according to the notion of my correspondent, ScoTO-BRITANCUS, but one remove from Savage. But, do I pretend, that, if Buonaparté had what is called a classical education, he would have been less likely to arrive at his present greatness? Yes, I dɔ; and, 'I think, it is very reasonable to suppose, that, if, from his infancy, he had had Latin and Greek sounds dinned into his head; if he had passed the flower of his youth in counting syllables upon his fingers, in writing nonsense verses, and in reading Latin and Greek books; if, in short, he had, almost necessarily, contracted the habit of regarding a knowledge of words as the greatest of human endowments, he never would have attained to so complete a mastery in that science, which, more than any other, perhaps, demands an extensive acquaintance with men and things. But, Buonaparté has men "under him who are learned." Here again, the devil shows his spite against the Doctors; for, it is notorious, that the chief of his generals and ambassadors have risen from the ranks of the army; and, if I mistake not, the very general who negociated and concluded the finous capitulation at the

a

Helder, with his Royal Highness the Duke of York (who, by-the-bye, is also a Doctor of Laus), was, but a few years before, a grenadier serjeant. Whether the learned Doctors of St. John's College, Oxford, admitted his Royal Highness as one of their Jearned body before, or after, the capitula. tion of the Helder, I am not certain; but, it is pretty evident, that the learning, which entitled him to the dignity, must have been acquired previous to that epoch; and, yet it did not appear, that he was, in any great degree, an over-match for the "ignorant" grenadier serjeant.There remains one topic, not sufficiently dwelt upon in my last, namely, the granting of sums out of the taxes for the support of Louis XVIH, which grant is strongly recommended by all the news-writers, as far as my observation has gone. So, as a correspondent observes, because the superior genius and valour of Buonaparte and the will of the French people elevate a new dynasty in France, we are to support the wants of the exiled family; we are to oppose the effect of genius, the consequences of imbecility, or the caprices of fortune, with resources drawn from the exertion of our industry, the labour of our nation, and the sweat of the poor. Where, again, I ask, is this to end? With numerous place-men and pensioners of our own, are we also to support every exiled stem of roy alty and aristocracy. Who can tell what exiled monarchs and princes and nobles are yet to come? The business of exiling does not appear to be half completed; and, if we are to give support in one case, why not in another? Thus, in a few years, we may have to maintain half the former monarchs of the world. I am quite at a loss to conceive, not only how such grants (out of the earnings of the people) could be attributed to generosity, but how they could be reconciled to justice, or to prudence. Should peace be wanted, and peace must be made in time, how are we to get rid of the person, who, under whatever title we may support him, has claims to the throne of France ? But, setting aside all consideration connected with peace, I object to the expense, which is already great, and which, if we be consistent, may, and probably will, become enormous. Let it be recollected, too, that the whole of the expenses, on this and similar accounts, will be ascribed to royalty. The consequence may easily be foreseen, and, if there be any wisdom left, it will be avoided. With what justice can the people of these kingdoms be called upon to support any exiled family? Is there any one from whom they have ever received any benefit?

There appears to be no reason in the thing. If, indeed, it was resolved to support Louis XVIII. as king of France, and to make war with a view of placing him upon the throne of that country, the matter would be different. The grant, if made, would then be a national measure, for an avowed national purpose, and there was a time when such a measure might have been proper. But, now, there is neither justice nor common sense in it; and, one would suppose, that it would be rendered unnecessary by the choice of the prince himself, who, if not acknowledged king of France, would, if he be a wise man, prefer a perfect obscurity, in which a man may be very happy, to that splendid misery, in which a parliamentary grant would support him.

PORTUGAL.Nothing decisive seems, as yet, to have taken place, with respect to the fate of this country. It appears unaccountable that the French should have so long delayed to take actual possession of it; but, hearing nothing except through partial channels, we must leave the reason for this delay to future developenient.--In the meanwhile, we are told, that our traders there have packed up, and are ready to sail away, except, indeed, those who seem to think, that they shall make a shift to live and get money under Napoleon's government. The breaking up of this branch of trade will not do England any harm at all, in my opinion, though it may produce great individual less and distress; and, I think, I can safely defy any one to shew, how it can possibly diminish our resources for war, or our means of comfort in peace; while, on the contrary, I can easily shew, how those resources and those means have been diminished by this branch of trade, which produced us nothing but luxuries in exchange for the useful productions of our land and our labour.Another view to take of this coming revolution in Portugal, is, as it affects royal governments in general. We are now told, flatly and plainly, that there are designs formed, by the people of Lisbon, upon the life of the Prince Regent; and, that, by way of defence, troops have been called in from the country places. Troops! Good heavens! are there troops, then? It is not yet a month ago, since we were assured, that the Prince Regent was adored by the people, who were ready, to a man, to follow him to the Brazils. But, it seems, that it is the French who have fomented discontents amongst the people..." French emissaries!" This is always the case. But, how happens it that French emissaries became possessed of more

influence than the government? How came the people to be so much disposed to listen to French emissaries? The French no longer preach liberty and equality. They come, and they tell you they are coming, for the sole purpose of conquering, of overturning your government, and taking possession of the country. And yet, from the moment they get upon the frontiers, not a man of the country can be made to stir hand or foot against them; nay, the only hope, that seems to be entertained, is, that the people will not actually rise in arms against their own government. -There must be some cause for this, very different from the intrigues and instigations of French emissaries; and, it well behoves every government, which is, as yet, unassailed, to examine, by times, whether, if the hour of trial should come, it will have reason to apprehend the natural effects of such a cause.

I have received no second letter from Scoto Britannus; and I must defer, till my next, what I have further to say upon the subject of the poor laws. Botley, Nov. 12, 1807.

ON THE DEFENCE OF IRELAND.

(Being Mentor's Second Letter) SIR; -I address you for the second time, again grounding my claims to your at tention, on the proposition that if "Ireland is conquered by Buonaparte, England will also be conquered by him." A proposition which still appears to be incontrovertible, notwithstanding the pains which your correspondent M.H. has taken to prove the contrary. He argues from the successful resistance of the people of France, in opposing the enemies of their new system of government; I argue from the failure of all the princes of the continent, in endeavouring to rouse their subjects in defence of their old regimes; and, when I do so, I certainly have the best of the argument, and maintain my position as far as this mode of arguing bears upon the question. But, I shall not permit this most important proposition to remain explained on such shallow reasonings as that, which may be collected from the history of other nations. I shall examine what Ireland would be if she was a province of France, and what danger England would have to encounter if such an event ever came to pass. Three weeks possession of Ireland would enable Buonaparté to form an army of from one to two hundred thousand Irishmen; these he would provide with the arms taken from the yeomanry, and the militia, and out of the several depots. The private soldiers of the Irish militia, who would join his standard,

and those of his own troops would afford a sufficient number of drill serjeants; whilst the French subaltern officers, and serjeants, would be perfectly competent to supply the place of officers to this immense army. To any, one in the least degree conversant with the numbers of the Irish people; with the great proportion which the poor bear to the rich; with their inclination to join the French if successful in conquering the country; and with their natural love of fighting, this statement will appear to be a most faithful one.

With such an army once established, liable as England will be to be herself momentarily invaded, any attempt to reconquer Ireland must be wholly out of the question; and Buonaparté therefore, will have full opportunity to arrange his military preparations in Ireland for an invision of England. From Ireland an attempt of invasion must be more formidable than from any other quarter of Europe; because, the British navy canhot keep at sea in the Irish channel. From Milford Haven to Liverpool, there is no harbour in which any thing larger than a frigate can enter; to the northward of Liverpool there is no harbour even for a frigate. If a gale of wind comes on in the Channel, the custom is for every vessel to make the nearest port in order to avoid shipwreck; and, therefore, if Buonaparté was in possession of Ireland, and wished to send his troops to any part of the Welch or English coast, it would be necessary for him only to wait for the termination of a gale of wind, to be sure of having the channel to himself. Let us then suppose the whole population of Ireland at his command, and formed by his officers into large armies; let us suppose his French troops, and those of his allies, ready to embark from all the ports of Denmark, Holland, France, Spain and Italy, can any man be vain enough to flatter himself, that the people of England would be able to save their country from conquest? Can we look with confidence to such a result in the talents of the commander-inchief? Or in those of the numerous generals whom he has selected to lead our gallant forces Or in the counsels of our ministers, or in the zeal and patriotism of our people? The people of England once certainly lived under a constitution of government, which they would have defended against all foreign invaders; but, can it be supposed that the present race would be fired with the same zeal, which stimulated their forefathers in their virtuous exertions to defend it; now, that it exists, more as a shadow of what it once was, than as a possession of transcen

dant value and importance? On the whole, Sir, may I not then safely conclude, that if Ireland is conquered by Buonaparté, England must also be conquered by him? It seems as if he was waiting to put his threat of invasion into execution, until he shall have completely invested England by a successful invasion of Ireland. He already covers the North East coast with Denmark, Holland, and the northern parts of France; and he covers the southern coast with Normandy and Brittany, and had be but possession of Ireland the investment would be complete. Seeing then of what advantage Ireland would be to him, to enable him to carry into effect his favourite project of invading England, can any man doubt of his whole mind being devoted to the arrangement of measures for securing the conquest of Ireland? And having such a certainty before us of what his interests are, and of what the most constant occupation of his mind must be, is it not downright madness to withhold from the people of Ireland any boon which may secure their attachment to the connection with this country? If, Sir, I was to write for ever, or, if the House of Commons were to debate night after night on the state of Ireland, the truth is, that every thing that can be said about Ireland may be resolved into this short statement: Buonaparté must have Ireland in order to make sure of success, whenever he invades England; whilst England must secure the possession of Ireland in order to be safe from conquest. The way Buonaparté has to obtain Ireland is by the aid of fleets and armies; the way that England has to secure it, is by acting with honesty and justice towards the people of Ireland. The question then for the people of England to decide upon is this, whether or not they will secure their own safety by permitting their conduct towards Ireland to be governed by principles of honesty and justice. If they are honourable and just towards Ireland, they may depend upon it, that they will have nothing to fear from Buonaparté; but, if they are not, they had better begin to count the months and days for which they will be able to boast of their freedom and independence. For, rely upon it, that the period is not very distant, when a trial will be given to the security of England's possession of Ireland; and when it will be proved whether the act of Union, the Irish army, and the hearts of the people of Ireland, are all or any of them such bulwarks as they are commonly considered to be. I must make the continuation of this discussionn, the subject of another letter.- -MENTOR.

ON THE DEFENCE OF IRELAND.

(Being Mentor's Third Letter.) SIR;In my last letter, I iu part proved the proposition, by explaining the effects. of a successful invasion of Ireland, that "if Ireland is conquered by Buonaparté,

England will also be conquered by him." I reserved for this letter the explanation of the dangers to which England would be exposed in consequence of the capture of Ireland. But, before I proceed upon it, I feel that it is necessary to state a few more facts respecting Ireland, in order that the capability of that country to promote the views of Buonaparté may be clearly understood. It is a common error among the people of this country to think, that Ireland is not larger than Yorkshire; and that the people of it are not more numerous than the inhabitants of Manchester or Birmingham; and under this false conception of the extent and population of Ireland, a notion is too generally indulged in, that let what will happen in Ireland, an English army is all that can ever be necessary to put down rebellion, or successfully to resist invasion. Now, Sir, if you will take the trouble of looking into the ap dendix to Mr. Young's Tour in Ireland, the English edition, you will find that England and Wales contain 42 millions of acres, statute measure, and that Ireland contains 25 millions of acres of the same measure, and with this information will be able to form a tolerably accurate idea of the extent of Ireland, if you take a map of England, and draw a line through Holyhead and London; for the portion of England and Wales lying to the southward of such a line, will be nearly equal in extent to that of Ireland. You will also be assisted in acquiring a correet notion of the length and breadth of Ireland if you will measure the distance from the Land's-end to York, which will give you

the distance from the Giants' Causeway to Cape Clear; and if you will measure the distance from Yarmouth to Liverpool, which will give you the breadth of Ireland, between the Hill of Howth and Slince Head, in the county of Galway. As to the population of Ireland, it is computed, by Mr. Chalmers, to have been greater than 4 millions in 1788, and by Mr. Newenham to be greater than 5 millions in 1803. Many very intelligent persons consider it to be, at the present time, beyond 6 millions, grounding their opinions upon the cheapness and salubrity of potatoe diet, and the great facility with which every man in Ireland obtains a lease of a few acres of land. Now, Sir, the population of England and Wales. being little more than 9 millions, it will ap

pear then that Ireland is not only larger than one half of England and Wales, but has a population exceeding, in number, one half of the population of England and Wales. Conceive, then, a country of so large an extent, and so populous, and the people of it so much attached to France, and distant only a few miles from our shores, once under the rule of Buonaparté; and contemplate the consequences!!! This is the true way of considering what Ireland now is; what Ireland would be if justly treated by England; and what Ireland will be if once possessed by France: A country in exteet, population, trade and revenue, far beyond several independant kingdoms and principalities of Europe; not incapable of being herself an independent nation from a want of any attribute that an independent nation ought to possess; but, preferring a state of dependance on England, with a view to secure her protection, and to obtain the benefits of her constitution: A country ready to go all lengths in supporting the struggles in which England is involved; but feeling that England has no claim upon the exertions of her sons, in consequence of the policy with which for centuries, but, more particularly, during the last 6 months, she has acted towards them: A country anxions only to have an opportunity of feeling sentiments of gratitude for favours, which ought to be conferred, and to afford all the advantages of her population in warding off the imminent dangers which now threaten England; but alive to injury and insult, and not averse to a connection with France, it her connection with England should prove merely a nominal and barren boon. this country was but a few weeks under the government of Buonaparte's marshalls, depend upon it, Sir, the fate of England would be decided. England would have at once to be prepared against invasions from the coast of Denmark, Holland, France, Portugal, Spain, and freland. The numbers of troops that might be collected in either country would be so great, that it would be impraeticable for the fleets and armies of England to prevent them from making good a landing; and even a landing of a small portion of troops would go a great way in securing conquest, notwithstanding the numbers and valour of the volunteers, and the inestimable blessings of the modern British constitütion in church and state; for, what would become of the trade of England without a circulating medium, and of the revenue of England without trade? And what would England be if her revenue failed, but a bankrupt ruined and conquered. But if

If

these events were not immediately to follow an invasion, what hopes can be entertained that the contest would terminate in favour of England? The points of the coast which would be exposed to attack would be so numerous, and the opportunities of attacking so frequent, that the army and spirit of England must in the end be worn out and overcome. Peace with France would be the only resource, and dat upon Bacraparte's own terms. It would be made, and when time would have afforded an opportu.ity for reflection, it would then be depleted, that the value of Ireland had not been better understood, and the dictates of justice and sound policy listened to in time.- is really lamentable to reflect upon that bind policy which leaves Ireland exposed to conquest, when the operation by which she could be secured, and England placed in a state to defy France, is so simple and obvious. What do we want but the hearts of the people of Ireland to be with us, or on what can Buonaparté build his hopes of conquest, but upon our own folly in alienating them? But, Sir, the peculiar danger to which this country would be exposed in consequence of Ireland being conquered, does not consist in the additions which Buonaparte would be able to make to his armies, but in the opportunity which he would acquire of sending his armies through Ireland into England and Wales. That he would be able to send his troops to Ireland in defiance of the fleets of England, is proved by the numerous instances which have occurred of late years, of his ships having been able to go to the West Indies, to Egypt, and to Ireland without molestation. That he would be able to transport his troops with safety from Ireland to England is evident, from the short distance between the respective coasts, and from the known fact, that no ships can keep at sea in St. George's Channel in tempestuous weather; much less men of war and frigates, for which there is no port between Milford Haven and Scotland. The passage from Dublin to Holyhead has been frequently made in row boats. The fishing beats on the eastern coast of Ireland are alone sufficient in number to convey a very large body troops; but if these were not sufficient for his purpose, the fishing boats and small craft on the west, and some shore boats might easily be collected in the several harbours between Cork and Waterford, and would afford the means of transporting an immense army. Yet, notwithstanding all this, are we doing every thing that lies in our power to promote Buonaparte's views in obtaining possession of Ireland. Eigoted and infatu

ated nation, to see more dangers in the crucifix of an old man, called the Pope, than in the sword of Buonaparté: To be occupied in dreaming about your church being attacked by visionary armies of monks, and friars; whilst your very existence as a nation is tottering before the threatened assault of your kuown and inveterate enemy! "Quem deus vult perdere prius dementat.” But, God grant that the darkness which has obscured your intellects may yet fleet away, before more is done towards the completion of the decline and fall of the British empire! I am, &c.-MENTOR.-Oct. 30.

SPENCE ON COMMERCE.

SIR;The extract from Mr. Spence's pamphlet on Commerce, inserted in the last number of your Register, and there carnestly recommended to the attention of your readers, I have reflected upon with all that consideration which I am always disposed to bestow upon every work that has obtained the applause of one possessing so sound a judgment as yourself. It is impossible for me, however, to acquiesce in the proposition which it is the object of that extract to substantiate; that * all the wealth of a nation is created by agriculture, none by manufac tures;" and, I shall, therefore, take the liberty of offering a few observations upon the subject. In order to be as brief as possible, I proceed at once to the example which Mr. Spence has adduced in the way of demonstration. "If a coachmaker were to em

ploy so many men for half a year in the building of a coach, as that for their sub"sistence during that time he had advanced

50 quarters of corn; and if we suppose "he sold this coach fo a land proprietor for "60 quarters of corn, it is evident, that the

coachmaker would be ten quarters of 66 corn richer, than if he had sold it for 50 quarters, its original cost. But it is equally clear, that the land proprietor would be ten quarters of corn poorer than if he had bought his coach at its prime cost.” That a land proprietor who purchases for 60 quarters of corn a coach, the prime cost of which was 50 quarters only, would after such purchase be ten quarters of corn poorer, than if he had bought it at the prime cost; and that the coachmaker would be ten quarters of corn richer, than if he had sold the coach at such original cost, are propositions too grossly plain and self-evident, to be in any danger of being controverted! But, it is not quite so apparent, that they afford the slightest countenance to the doctrine, that "manufactures are no source at all of national wealth." The deduction however,