less impediments in her system of government, in her monopolies, and her system of commerce. France has the great disability of difference in language to contend with; and the institution of the present French manufactures has never, at any time heretofore, been trained or adapted to American commerce. The only particular and pacific facility which France ever possessed for American intercourse, has for many years been transferred into the British scale by the cession of Canada to Great Britain. The future commerce, between France and America, will chiefly be regulated by such conveniences as France can draw to herself from America, without much aptitude on the part of France, to accommodate her manufactures and commerce to American demands. In short, an interchange of reciprocities between France and America, would run against the stream on both sides; and all established habits, manners, language, together with the principles of government and commerce, would militate against such a system.

Conformably to this reasoning, it appears, that France has not at any time entertained any systematical design of forming any union or consolidation of interests with America. She took up the American cause, as instrumental to her political views in Europe. America likewise accepted the alliance with France, for her separate views, viz. for the establishment of her independence. The alliance, therefore, is completed and terminated, without leaving behind it any political principle of future permanent connexion between them. Occasional circumstances produced a temporary

a temporary alliance. Similar circumstances may, on any future occasion, produce a similar event of a temporary compact. Dissimilar circumstances, arising from any future political views of the Court of France

in Europe, may without any inconsistency of principle, throw the power of that kingdom into a scale adverse to the future interests of the American States. In such case, therefore, where there cannot exist any permanent political connexion between France and America, and where the commercial attachments can be but feeble, it would be vain to expect in the French nation any such ally, as newly established States ought to look out for, to give maturity and firmness to their constitutions.

As to Spain, every argument which has been stated respecting diversity of language, manners, government, monopolies, and system of commerce, from those which prevail in the United States of America, obtains in a superior degree. And much more to add besides, for Spain is not only incompetent to interchange reciprocities with the American States, but likewise her own situation in America will at all times render her extremely jealous of her neighbors. The only activity which Spain has exerted in the war, has been to procure a barrier against the American States, by annexing West Florida to her former acquisition of New Orleans; thereby embracing the mouth of the Mississippi, and by means of that river, jointly with her landed possessions, establishing a strong and jealous boundary against any future progress of the American States in those parts. Spain, therefore, cannot be looked upon by the American States as a suitable object of their election, to become a permanent ally and friend to them. Portugal, likewise, labors under all the disabilities of language, manners, monopolies, government and system of commerce. Her national power and importance would be likewise insufficient to constitute a strong and permanent ally to the American States. All these nations will

undoubtedly be found to have many commodious qualities for participation in commerce; but the permanent faculties necessary to constitute a firm and permanent ally to the American States, will be found deficient in them.

As to the Italian States, or any other powers in the Mediterranean, they are certainly not adequate to any competition of political alliance with the rising States of America. They will also form very commodious links and connexions in the general circuit of commerce; but beyond these considerations, they have no share in the present question. The several States in the Germanic body are in the same predicament.

As to the Northern powers, viz. those in the Baltic, they are not favored either by vicinity, or climate, for a frequent or facile intercourse of commerce with America. And even respecting several material articles of commerce, jealousies and competitions might arise. As to political alliances, there are no such in prospect from them to the American States. Even if there were any superfluity of force in any of them beyond the necessities of their respective domestic situations, the extreme distance would be conclusive against any possible application of such power, as a political alliance favorable to the establishment and conformation of the American States.

The only maritime state on the continent of Europe remaining to be discussed, as a competent candidate for commerce, or connexion with America, is the Republic of the United Netherlands, commonly called Holland. In respect to American commerce, the Dutch have among themselves every facility combined, which the separate States of Europe possess distinctly in their own concerns, or nearly. Their industry, frugality, and habits of com

merce, may even carry them so far, as to make them rivals to the Americans themselves, in the transportation of European merchandise to America. These faculties of commerce would have been of infinite importance to the American States, if the war had continued between Great Britain and them. But upon the event of peace, it becomes a matter of the most perfect indifference to America, whether each European State navigates its own commerce into the ports of America, which will open to all, or whether the commercial faculties of Holland enable her to exceed in rivalship her European neighbors, and thereby to navigate European goods to America beyond the proportion of her national share. The faculties of a nation of carriers may be fortunate for the marine of that nation; but considered in themselves, and with respect to other nations, they are but secondaries in commerce. They give no ground of reciprocities, or participation. That one nation should say to another, you shall navigate all our rivers, harbors, lakes, ports, and places, if we may do the same in yours, is a proposition of reciprocity; but that Holland should say to America, we will bring European goods to you, or you may be your own carriers, is neither concession nor reciprocity. Holland is not a nation of rivers, harbors, lakes, ports, and places, for the distribution of goods and manufactures for internal consumption, and, therefore, her reciprocities must be very scanty. Holland is the market-place of Europe, and the Dutch seamen are the carriers appertaining to that market-place. The admission of American ships to that market-place, freely to import and to export, is, undoubtedly, an act of reciprocity on the part of Holland as far as it goes, but in no degree

adequate to the unlimited participation of American commerce throughout the rivers, harbors, lakes, ports, and places of that vast continent. The commercial reciprocities of Holland, therefore, being inferior, on her part, towards America, the next point of view in which Holland is to be considered, as relevant to this question, is, as a nation of power, capable of becoming an effectual and permanent ally and guarantee to the American States, for that is the great object, which America, as a wise nation, recently arisen into independence, ought to keep in view. Holland has certainly been a nation of great and celebrated naval force. She remains so still; but having for many years suspended her exertions of force, and having directed the faculties of her people into the commercial line, she seems not to have any superfluity of force beyond the necessity of providing for her own security; and, certainly, no such redundance of power, as to extend to the protection of distant nations, as allies or guarantees. It appears, therefore, upon the whole of this argument, that Holland, although a commercial nation, cannot even interchange commercial reciprocities with America upon an equal footing, and that her faculties of force are inadequate to those, which America ought to expect in the permanent allies and guarantees of her country.

The independence of the American States being established, their first consideration ought to be, to determine with what friendships and alliances they will enter into the new world of nations. They will look round them, and cast about for some natural, permanent, and powerful ally, with whom they may interchange all cementing reciprocities, both commercial and political. If such an ally be to be found anywhere for them, it is still in Great Britain; at