object of the confederacy to establish. store the constitution of the German A difference of sentiment on some points states. The question was, whether the of the arrangements could be no impeach- arrangements which had been made were ment of the wisdom of the whole. Per- calculated to effect these great objectsfection belonged to no work of human whether the assembled powers had enbeings, even when many years were de- deavoured unduly to aggrandize themvoted to it; much less when its comple- selves, or faithfully to execute their trust. tion was accelerated by the necessity of The hon. gentleman had alluded to the circumstances. On this general princi- letter of the minister of France, protesting ple he applauded and was prepared to against throwing the whole population maintain the proceedings of the Congress of Europe into a general fund, and then at Vienna. On this general principle he drawing it out again in different portions, protested against the observations made for the advantage of particular sovereigns. by the hon. gentleman on the conduct of If that letter were written against the anthe allied sovereigns. If they had issued nexation of Saxony to Prussia, and if a declaration that all the governments of that annexation were not called for by all Europe, which had been swept away the circumstances of the case, and justified during the late convulsions, should be by every consideration of the law of revived, without considering the tendency nations and of a wise policy, the arguof that revival to recreate the dangers ment would be cogent. But while he from which Europe had so happily admitted the truth of the general princiescaped, and without providing any safe-ple, which it involved, he denied its apguards against their recurrence; if that plication in the present case. The object was the way in which their declaration was to give Prussia additional force, and was to be understood, he should be increased population was that force. ashamed that Great Britain belonged to a confederacy founded on a system of such imbecility. But parliament had to inquire (and the hon. gentleman was too much of a statesman, and his mind was too manly, to deny it), first, whether or not the principle on which Congress had proceeded was unsound, and if not so, then whether by departing from that principle in execution they had betrayed the trust which the confidence of Europe had reposed in them. On these grounds he was ready to refute the hon. gentleman. The excellence of the principles on which they had set out--the principles comprehended in the Treaty of Paris, the hon. gentleman had already acknowledged, and it would be found that from those principles no departure had been made. It was perfectly understood, during the whole of the negociations for the general peace, that the great object of the sovereigns of Europe was the re-establishment and the re-organization of those two great monarchies, which, to all practical purposes, had been destroyed during the war-Austria and Prussia. To do this it became necessary to establish a security for the flanks of those monarchies: a power between the north of Germany and France, and a power acting as a barrier between Italy and France, to prevent them from coming into contact. It was necessary also to maintain the independence of Switzerland, and to re(VOL. XXX.)

But he would first endeavour to call the attention of the House to the allegations made by the hon. gentleman, of the breach of faith on the part of this country with respect to Genoa. If such a breach of faith should be proved, he hoped the whole wrath of the country might fall upon himself. The good faith of England was the greatest power she possessed on the continent, and accusations against it ought not to be slightly hazarded. The hon. gentleman assumed that a solemn pledge had been given to Genoa that she should be preserved as an independent state, coupling this accusation with a reference to a prior proclamation to Italy, promising the establishment of an Italian kingdom. He wished first to disentangle the question of Genoa from that of Italy. From the misinformation of the hon. gentlemen on this subject, he gave a character to the real facts, by the drapery in which he clothed them, that rendered it difficult to know them. It was true that at a remote period, before he had the honour of holding the seals of the foreign office, an intimation had been made to the British Goof vernment of a disposition on the part the Italians to throw off the French yoke, and a disposition had been expressed by the British Government, in return, to aid the attempt by military means. But the circumstance never assumed the consistency alluded to by the hon. gentleman. Details as to the shape or sovereign of this (U)

projected Italian kingdom had never been entered into; and the expectations which had been held out had never been in the slightest degree realized. Down to the moment at which the French were driven out of Italy, never were a people so passive, and so inclined to submit to their oppressors, as the Italians had shewn themselves to be. At the moment that half the French troops were engaged in a disastrous He maintained, that on the subject of contest in Spain, and the infatuation of the Genoa the Congress had decided wisely man at the head of the French nation was and right-wisely with respect to Europe sacrificing the other half in Russia-when-right with respect to Genoa. The union of Genoa to Piedmont was a principle to which the confederated Powers looked before they left Paris. If there was any thing in the Treaty of Paris which the different Powers could not avow at the proper moment, he would be ready to consign those Powers to the execration to which the hon. gentleman, without information, was so ready to devote them. But certainly there were parts of that Treaty not then promulgated, proceeding, however, on a principle of serving, and not of imposing on the credulity of Europe. For instance, the hon. gentleman had asked if there was any thing in that treaty about Holland? There was. He should have thought he exhibited a criminal confidence, if he had not brought

no French troops were in Italy-not an Italian rose; and Buonaparté was in as complete possession of that country as we were in possession of Yorkshire, or any other loyal county. With the exception of a small rising among the mountains of Tuscany, the success of the allies in Italy was entirely owing to their own arms. But, was this the single circumstance that justified the conduct of the Congress with respect to Italy? Did the House recollect the auspicious moment, when every thing depended on awakening Austria to a determination to join the common cause of Europe? The House had on its table the Treaty by which the. great confederacy was bound together.-The basis of that Treaty was, that all the Powers should act in unison, for the purpose of giving inde-France to a sense of the essential interests pendence to Europe generally. But it of this country on that subject before he was evident, that this was incompatible parted with the essential securities in his with the re-construction of that ancient hand for the attainment of those interests. government in Italy to which the hon. And here he must say, that on that quesgentleman argued that the country was tion, on the Slave Trade, and on the pledged; and that Austria could not be general principles of European policy, restored to the rank which, for the security France had conducted herself in such a of all, she ought to hold in Europe, unless manner as, he trusted, would produce in at least the northern parts of Italy were the mind of the hon. gentleman a practical under a sovereign not an Italian. As to feeling of the value of preserving that the Proclamation of lord William Bentinck government which had given peace to the issued on the 12th of March, he had read world, and by its conduct seemed capable it while in Paris with peculiar attention, of maintaining it. He claimed praise for on the representation of marshal Murat, having obtained from France a distinct who had also complained that lord W. understanding, that although the precise Bentinck's corps had appeared with the frontiers of Holland should be left open colours of Italian independence. Having for discussion, she should be assured of read this Proclamation, he had told the such a mass of territory as should enable Neapolitan ambassador that he could not her to maintain her independence. In concur with him in thinking that the Pro- the former national assembly of France clamation declared in favour of Italian in- there had been a person styling himself dependence. He then wrote to lord W. the ambassador of the human race. The Bentinck, apprising him of the misappre- hon. gentleman appeared to emulate that hension which existed with respect to his individual, and to set himself in active objects, and guarding him against any opposition to all the sovereigns of contiappearance of cherishing an interest sepa- nental Europe, to whom he did not even rate from that of the other powers. That observe the decorum that he was bound lord W. Bentinck issued his Proclamation to maintain, and did maintain, with respect

without any such purpose as that ascribed to him, was evident, for on the receipt of his (lord C.'s) letter, he would otherwise of course have recalled it. No officer could indeed be authorized to do that which lord W. Bentinck was said to have done. Not only was he not authorized, but he had been prohibited from doing it by positive instruction.

the treaty of Paris. That very state of Genoa had in a great degree contributed to the former weakness and overthrow of Europe; for it had first contributed to the overthrow of Sardinia, and thus been the means of enabling the French to achieve their conquests. An insurrection in Genoa had led to a difference between the Genoese and the people of Piedmont; and this gave the French a pretence to interfere, in their usual way, in the affairs of these two states. The allies were bound to act in the manner they conceived best for the general interests, and to see if they could not find some mode of re-uniting Piedmont and Genoa, which would secure the common interest and strengthen that part of Italy against attack. Genoa, it was proper to remark, was the most important military position in the north of Italy; and the general security essentially depended upon having the possession of that port. The question was, whether the measure adopted, or that of allowing it to be held by a commercial republic, was the most likely to provide for the general security? Whether the allied princes decided right or wrong on this point, this much he would say, that there never was a decision which could be less open to the imputation of having been given from improper motives than the one in question. As far as the separate interests of this country were concerned, had our view been to seek a national benefit without any reference to the general objects for which the different powers were confe

departed from their declarations, and having been actuated by the same love of conquest and aggrandisement which they themselves had so loudly condemned. The odious sense of conquest, on the principle of which the Allies were said to have acted in this and other cases, they positively disclaimed. In no part of their conduct had they departed from the principles professed by them; but they would have been most unfit, indeed, for the situations which they assumed, by entering into the general obligation to restore the peace of Europe, had they so stultified themselves in the eyes of the world and of Europe as to disqualify themselves from -changing the face of Europe, the ancient governments of which had been broken down and destroyed, in such a manner as might thereafter be found best calculated for the preservation of its future peace and tranquillity. The light in which their conduct on this occasion had been viewed by the hon. gentleman, carried such absurdity on the face of it, that it could never have been taken up by any man possessed of any thing like the information of that hon. gentleman, without his having a taste for running down the different sovereigns of Europe, which in the times that we lived in, to say the least of it, was indecent as well as dangerous. The Allies had made war, not for the sake of subjugating any power, but for the sake of preserving the whole of Europe from subjugation; they had succeeded in their object; and they had endeavoured to give to the different powers of the European common-derated, there could be little doubt but wealth a protection from that danger by that these interests would have been best which they had already been destroyed. promoted by the establishment of an insuWhen he stated the principle upon which lated republic there. The Genoese were the allies had acted, he had no hesitation willing to enter into any terms of alliance in saying at the same time, that he was with us, and to give us every facility for sorry that even the prejudices of the availing ourselves of that important posiGenoese people could not on this occasion tion in our different operations: but then, be attended to; for the prejudices of a had we followed this policy, it would have people were entitled to attention when been said on the continent, that we had greater objects did not stand in the way; broken loose from the general object, with and by doing violence to their feelings, the view of prosecuting our own separate even when the general safety rendered interests. There never was a question in such violence necessary, he was aware which it was less possible to impute bad that they might give rise to these attacks motives to the continental powers than in of the hon. gentleman against the sove- this. The king of Sardinia had not the reigns of Europe. There were grave and power, if they had not been so inclined, to solid reasons why they could not grant to impose on them, as the value of his serGenoa what was demanded of them in be- vices to them, any conditions derogatory half of that people, arising out of the very either to their honour or their interests. situation of Genoa, consistently with the He had been expelled from his states on security of Europe, and the objects to the continent, and was incapable of giving which they were pledged, arising out of any assistance; and if the allies had not