object of the confederacy to establish. store the constitution of the German A difference of sentiment on some points states. The question was, whether the of the arrangements could be no impeach- arrangements which had been made were ment of the wisdom of the whole. Per- calculated to effect these great objectsfection belonged to no work of human whether the assembled powers had enbeings, even when many years were de- deavoured unduly to aggrandize themvoted to it; much less when its comple- selves, or faithfully to execute their trust. tion was accelerated by the necessity of The hon. gentleman had alluded to the circumstances. On this general princi- letter of the minister of France, protesting ple he applauded and was, prepared to against throwing the whole population. maintain the proceedings of the Congress of Europe into a general fund, and then at Vienna. On this general principle he drawing it out again in different portions, protested against the observations made for the advantage of particular sovereigns. by the hon. gentleman on the conduct of If that letter were written against the anthe allied sovereigns. If they had issued nexation of Saxony to Prussia, and if a declaration that all the governments of that annexation were not called for by all Europe, which had been swept away the circumstances of the case, and justified during the late convulsions, should be by every consideration of the law of revived, without considering the tendency nations and of a wise policy, the arguof that revival to recreate the dangers ment would be cogent. But while he from which Europe had so happily admitted the truth of the general princiescaped, and without providing any safe- ple, which it involved, he denied its apguards against their recurrence; if that plication in the present case. The object was the way in which their declaration was to give Prussia additional force, and was to be understood, he should be increased population was that force. ashamed that Great Britain belonged to a confederacy founded on a system of such imbecility. But parliament had to inquire (and the hon. gentleman was too much of a statesman, and his mind was too manly, to deny it), first, whether or not the principle on which Congress had proceeded was unsound, and if not so, then whether by departing from that principle in execution they had betrayed the trust which the confidence of Europe had reposed in them. On these grounds he was ready to refute the hon. gentleman. The excellence of the principles on which they had set out--the principles comprehended in the Treaty of Paris, the hon. gentleman had already acknowledged, and it would be found that from those principles no departure had been made. It was perfectly understood, during the whole of the negociations for the general peace, that the great object of the Sovereigns of Europe was the re-establishment and the re-organization of those two great monarchies, which, to all practical purposes, had been destroyed during the war-Austria and Prussia. To do this it became necessary to establish a security for the flanks of those monarchies: a power between the north of Germany and France, and a power acting as a barrier between Italy and France, to prevent them from coming into contact. It was necessary also to maintain the independence of Switzerland, and to re(VOL. XXX.)

But he would first endeavour to call the attention of the House to the allegations made by the hon. gentleman, of the breach of faith on the part of this country with respect to Genoa. If such a breach of faith should be proved, he hoped the whole wrath of the country might fall upon himself. The good faith of England was the greatest power she possessed on the continent, and accusations against it ought not to be slightly hazarded. The hon. gentleman assumed that a solemn plédge had been given to Genoa that she should be preserved as an independent state, coupling this accusation with a reference to a prior proclamation to Italy, promising the establishment of an Italian kingdom. He wished first to disentangle the question of Genoa from that of Italy. From the misinformation of the hon. gentlemen on this subject, he gave a character to the real facts, by the drapery in which he clothed them, that rendered it difficult to know them. It was true that at a remote period, before he had the honour of holding the seals of the foreign office, an intimation had been made to the British Government of a disposition on the part of the Italians to throw off the French yoke, and a disposition had been expressed by the British Government, in return, to aid the attempt by military means. But the circumstance never assumed the consistency alluded to by the hon. gentleman. Details as to the shape or sovereign of this (U)

without any such purpose as that ascribed to him, was evident, for on the receipt of his (lord C.'s) letter, he would otherwise of course have recalled it. No officer could indeed be authorized to do that which lord W. Bentinck was said to have done. Not only was he not authorized, but he had been prohibited from doing it by positive instruction.

He maintained, that on the subject of Genoa the Congress had decided wisely and right-wisely with respect to Europe

of Genoa to Piedmont was a principle to which the confederated Powers looked before they left Paris. If there was any thing in the Treaty of Paris which the different Powers could not avow at the proper moment, he would be ready to consign those Powers to the execration to which the hon. gentleman, without information, was so ready to devote them. But certainly there were parts of that Treaty not then promulgated, proceeding, however, on a principle of serving, and not of imposing on the credulity of Europe. For instance, the hon. gentleman had asked if there was any thing in that treaty about Holland? There was. should have thought he exhibited a criminal confidence, if he had not brought

He

projected Italian kingdom had never been entered into; and the expectations which had been held out had never been in the slightest degree realized. Down to the moment at which the French were driven out of Italy, never were a people so passive, and so inclined to submit to their oppressors, as the Italians had shewn themselves to be. At the moment that half the French troops were engaged in a disastrous contest in Spain, and the infatuation of the man at the head of the French nation was sacrificing the other half in Russia-when-right with respect to Genoa. The union no French troops were in Italy-not an Italian rose; and Buonaparté was in as complete possession of that country as we were in possession of Yorkshire, or any other loyal county. With the exception of a small rising among the mountains of Tuscany, the success of the allies in Italy was entirely owing to their own arms. But, was this the single circumstance that justified the conduct of the Congress with respect to Italy? Did the House recollect the auspicious moment, when every thing depended on awakening Austria to a determination to join the common cause of Europe? The House had on its table the Treaty by which the. great confederacy was bound together.-The basis of that Treaty was, that all the Powers should act in unison, for the purpose of giving inde-France to a sense of the essential interests pendence to Europe generally. But it was evident, that this was incompatible with the re-construction of that ancient government in Italy to which the hon. gentleman argued that the country was pledged; and that Austria could not be restored to the rank which, for the security of all, she ought to hold in Europe, unless at least the northern parts of Italy were under a sovereign not an Italian. As to the Proclamation of lord William Bentinck issued on the 12th of March, he had read it while in Paris with peculiar attention, on the representation of marshal Murat, who had also complained that lord W. Bentinck's corps had appeared with the colours of Italian independence. Having read this Proclamation, he had told the Neapolitan ambassador that he could not concur with him in thinking that the Proclamation declared in favour of Italian independence. He then wrote to lord W. Bentinck, apprising him of the misapprehension which existed with respect to his objects, and guarding him against any appearance of cherishing an interest separate from that of the other powers. That lord W. Bentinck issued his Proclamation

of this country on that subject before he
parted with the essential securities in his
hand for the attainment of those interests.
And here he must say, that on that ques-'
tion, on the Slave Trade, and on the
general principles of European policy,
France had conducted herself in such a
manner as, he trusted, would produce in
the mind of the hon. gentleman a practical
feeling of the value of preserving that
government which had given peace to the
world, and by its conduct seemed capable
of maintaining it. He claimed praise for
having obtained from France a distinct
understanding, that although the precise
frontiers of Holland should be left open
for discussion, she should be assured of
such a mass of territory as should enable
her to maintain her independence. In
the former national assembly of France
there had been a person styling himself
the ambassador of the human race.
hon. gentleman appeared to emulate that
individual, and to set himself in active
opposition to all the sovereigns of conti-
nental Europe, to whom he did not even
observe the decorum that he was bound
to maintain, and did maintain, with respect

The

the treaty of Paris. That very state of
Genoa had in a great degree contributed
to the former weakness and overthrow of
Europe; for it had first contributed to the
overthrow of Sardinia, and thus been the
means of enabling the French to achieve
their conquests. An insurrection in Genoa
had led to a difference between the
Genoese and the people of Piedmont; and
this gave the French a pretence to inter-
fere, in their usual way, in the affairs of
these two states. The allies were bound
to act in the manner they conceived best
for the general interests, and to see if they
could not find some mode of re-uniting
Piedmont and Genoa, which would secure
the common interest and strengthen that
part of Italy against attack. Genoa, it
was proper to remark, was the most im-
portant military position in the north of
Italy; and the general security essentially
depended upon having the possession of
that port. The question was, whether the
measure adopted, or that of allowing it to
be held by a commercial republic, was
the most likely to provide for the general
security? Whether the allied princes de-
cided right or wrong on this point, this
much he would say, that there never was
a decision which could be less open to the
imputation of having been given from
improper motives than the one in ques-
tion. As far as the separate interests of
this country were concerned, had our view
been to seek a national benefit without
any reference to the general objects for
which the different powers were confe-

departed from their declarations, and
having been actuated by the same love of
conquest and aggrandisement which they
themselves had so loudly condemned. The
odious sense of conquest, on the principle
of which the Allies were said to have
acted in this and other cases, they posi-
tively disclaimed. In no part of their
conduct had they departed from the prin-
ciples professed by them; but they would
have been most unfit, indeed, for the situa-
tions which they assumed, by entering
into the general obligation to restore the
peace of Europe, had they so stultified
themselves in the eyes of the world and
of Europe as to disqualify themselves from
changing the face of Europe, the ancient
governments of which had been broken
down and destroyed, in such a manner as
might thereafter be found best calculated
for the preservation of its future peace and
tranquillity. The light in which their
conduct on this occasion had been viewed
by the hon. gentleman, carried such absur-
dity on the face of it, that it could never
have been taken up by any man possessed
of any thing like the information of that
hon. gentleman, without his having a taste
for running down the different sovereigns
of Europe, which in the times that we
lived in, to say the least of it, was indecent
as well as dangerous. The Allies had
made war, not for the sake of subjugating
any power, but for the sake of preserving
the whole of Europe from subjugation;
they had succeeded in their object; and
they had endeavoured to give to the dif-
ferent powers of the European common-derated, there could be little doubt but
wealth a protection from that danger by
which they had already been destroyed.
When he stated the principle upon which
the allies had acted, he had no hesitation
in saying at the same time, that he was
sorry that even the prejudices of the
Genoese people could not on this occasion
be attended to; for the prejudices of a
people were entitled to attention" when
greater objects did not stand in the way;
and by doing violence to their feelings,
even when the general safety rendered
such violence necessary, he was aware
that they might give rise to these attacks
of the hon. gentleman against the sove-
reigns of Europe. There were grave and
solid reasons why they could not grant to
Genoa what was demanded of them in be-
half of that people, arising out of the very
situation of Genoa, consistently with the
security of Europe, and the objects to
which they were pledged, arising out of

that these interests would have been best promoted by the establishment of an insulated republic there. The Genoese were willing to enter into any terms of alliance with us, and to give us every facility for availing ourselves of that important position in our different operations: but then, had we followed this policy, it would have been said on the continent, that we had broken loose from the general object, with the view of prosecuting our own separate interests. There never was a question in which it was less possible to impute bad motives to the continental powers than in this. The king of Sardinia had not the power, if they had not been so inclined, to impose on them, as the value of his services to them, any conditions derogatory either to their honour or their interests. He had been expelled from his states.on the continent, and was incapable of giving any assistance; and if the allies had not