Paris, and our army in the south of France, we were armed with means amply sufficient to ensure our ultimate triumph, and completely to secure the object in view-that in fact we were in possession of advantages extremely difficult, perhaps never likely, to be regained. Such, then, was our condition; and yet we consented to treat with Buonaparte as an independent sovereign, and really granted him such terms as one independent sovereign might be supposed to obtain from another with whom he was nearly on equal terms; the act of abdication being, in fact, a part of the terms or conditions of the Treaty. bility of Buonaparté to continue the contest, still looking to the result and the importance of the object in view, he could not accede to this Treaty-for in pursuit of such an object, no consideration of present risk or immediate disadvantage should have induced him to overlook contingent difficulties or probable dangers. This, indeed, was the principle which had governed that House throughout the prosecution of the war; for their lordships had never allowed any view of present risks or immediate disadvantages to withdraw them from the pursuit of that which was necessary to the ultimate security and permanent tranquillity of this country and the world. But he was prepared to contend, that the relative situation of the Allies and Buonaparte was not such as to render it in any degree necessary to comply with the inconsistent demands of that person: the Allies were, at the time this objectionable Treaty was concluded, in possession of 140,000 troops in the vicinity of Paris, and 30,000 cavalry were close upon Buonaparte's position; while that person commanded only 20,000 men, as it was said, but at the utmost calculation not more than 30,000. We had also a large army in the south of France, under the command of an officer whose military merit was the least distinguished part of his distinguished character; for his probity and magnanimity universally conciliated the esteem and admiration, not only of his army, but of the people whom he had subjected. Never, probably, in the history of the world had any general been so much adored by the people whom he had conquered; nay, perhaps, he might say, never had any prince been so much esteemed by the people whom he governed, as that general notoriously was by the people in the South of France. Was this a situation, then, in which we could be rationally supposed under the necessity of concluding any terms inconsistent with our safety? Was this a state of things in which we had any risks to look to, that should withdraw us from the pursuit of any object essential to that safety? Yes, he would repeat these questions, when even to-morrow we might hear of a declaration of war. Notwithstanding the contemptuous sneer of the noble earl (Liverpool) he contended, that no degree of risk existed, or could be contemplated, that should induce our accession to the terms of the treaty on the table; that, on the contrary, with the Allies in possession of The noble marquis repeated his positions, first, that this Treaty was contrary to policy; secondly, that it was unnecessary to conclude it; and thirdly, that no due measures of precaution were taken to enforce its performance. But the whole proceeding was, according to his judg ment, radically wrong; and as to generosity, which had been very loftily spoken of in this transaction, it was quite a mockery to pretend that any consideration of generosity influenced the Treaty. There was, in fact, no generosity, justice, or policy, belonging to its character. He would have granted a handsome, nay a noble provision to Buonaparté; but he would have taken care to make due provision against his return to power. There was not, however, one word in the Treaty on this point. No; this most material object was totally overlooked. But he would have taken an effectual step on this subject. He would not however say, that in order to guard against the return of Buonaparté to power, he should be disposed to commit the Allies in any engagement or pledge, to wage war with a view to secure the Bourbons on the throne of France, although in making such a proposition he could not apprehend any serious difficulty on the other side of the House. But instead of making any arrangement whatever to provide against the resurrection of Buonaparté, the affair was left entirely open; and therefore, when that person did return to France, a consultation with Congress was resorted to, in order to guard against the consequences of an evil, to avert which measures should have been taken in this Treaty. He would not, he repeated, with a view to exclude Buonaparté from power, pledge the Allies to war for the preservation of the French throne to the Bourbons. No: much as he felt for the sufferings-much as he re spected the character and venerated the virtues of that meritorious family, he would deprecate such a proceeding. But he would have made arrangements to guard against the revival of Buonaparte's power, notwithstanding the Allies, in any pledge with respect to the Bourbons. He would not have concluded a treaty for the exclusion of Buonaparté from power, without, as in the transaction under consideration, making any arrangements whatever to guard against its non-execution. As to the particulars of this Treaty, it would appear from the official translation laid before the House, that skill in translation was not deemed necessary to diplomatists. For according to the original Treaty it was agreed that the crown diamonds should belong to France, that is to the French sovereign whoever that sovereign might be therefore it was prescribed that "tous les diamants de la Couronne resteront à la France;" but their lordships would be surprised to find how this article was translated, namely, "that all the crown diamonds shall remain in France." Now, as he apprehended that the greater part of these diamonds were out of France, it would follow from the English version of the article alluded to, that England being a party to this Treaty, if it were to be fulfilled, these diamonds should be made good to France, and therefore we might happen to find in the next budget the proposition of a grant to buy a new crown and sceptre for Buonaparté [a laugh.] But other provisions equally objectionable were to be met with in this Treaty. The most improvident parts of the Treaty, however, were those which referred to the provision for Buonaparté himself, and his wife and family, together with those respecting a gratification to his followers and the payment of household debts. These parts, too, were guaranteed by the Allies, and surely the House must see the monstrous improvidence of such an arrangement. The main object ought to be to provide against the resurrection of Buonaparté's power. Yet by this Treaty that person himself was to be allowed a splendid establishment-all his family to be placed in a state of opulence-his followers to be granted à gratification, and his debts paid by France. This arrangement, then, appeared to the noble marquis to place the Allies in a most improvident dilemma. If the Treaty were fulfilled, Buonaparté and all his family would be possessed of a large establishment, which, of course, must furnish him with the means of promoting his return to power, while he was to have an additional bond of attachment upon his followers and creditors in France. It had been urged by the noble earl, that Buonaparté had no right to complain of the non-fulfilment of this Treaty towards himself, although no payment was made him, because the allowance being promised to him annually, a year had not yet expired since the Treaty had been concluded. The argument of the noble earl, he thought extremely weak at the time it was urged. For no indication whatever of a disposition to pay Buonaparté the sum mentioned in the Treaty having shewed itself, it could not be pretended that that provision of the Treaty was fulfilled; and he fancied that the learned lord on the woolsack would not, in equity, be satisfied with a similar argument, respecting the non-fulfilment of any similar engagement. But the fact was, that the noble earl was under an egregious misconception as to the provision upon which he undertook to animadvert. For that provision did not refer to a revenue to be paid annually, as the noble earl had stated, but as the article in the Treaty expressed it "de rentes sur le grand livre de France, produisant un revenu annuel, net, et déduction faite de toutes charges, de deux millions," that is, two millions in the stocks. Therefore, Buonaparté was to be at liberty, like any other public creditor, to dispose of the property which the Treaty proposed to secure to him. He did not mean to say that the non-fulfilment of this provision furnished a justification to Buonaparté for discarding the Treaty altogether; but he must contend that the case was not such as the noble ear! had stated. Now, on the other hand, if the Treaty were not fulfilled, how were the French soldiers attached to Buonaparté likely to feel? The House might judge from the statement of our minister at Paris, as to the tenacity of the French officers to make provision for Buonaparté, in satisfaction of their personal honour. So much then as to the egregious improvidence of this transaction. He had heard it reported that the person in question had afforded some grounds for the non-fulfilment of the Treaty; but if he had afforded grounds which would have justified the non-payment of the stipulated allowance to him, à departure from the Treaty in other respects would also have been justifiable. Without pressing that point further, he should take it for granted that the noble earl had meant to state that grounds had been afforded for with-holding the payment, though, accord. ing to his notions of the Treaty, it had not been violated. The next point to which he should advert was the disposal of the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla; and he should boldly affirm that there was never an engagement concluded by any government more disgraceful in principle, or more hostile to justice, than the grant of those States to the wife and son of Napoleon. The legitimate heir to those duchies was living, and had as good a claim to his States as the sovereign of any other State in Europe. He was not an adherent of those who held that at the termination of a conflict, avowedly instituted for the support of the existing powers of Europe, those States only were to be respected who were powerful [hear, hear!], and that the others were to be thrown into the consolidated fund of spoliation [hear, hear!], to be paid by he knew not what cashier to the orders of the greater Sove reigns. He could not conceive that a note to pay to the order of the Emperor of Russia two millions of souls, or to pay to the order of some other monarch so many thousand souls, was a valid transfer of independent States. Such proceedings and such principles were repugnant, not to the vested rights of sovereigns alone, but to the paramount rights of the people; for though he was not one of those who said all governments were of and from the people, yet he could not submit to say that all governments were not for the people, and that the vested rights of the people were the strongest. But these unfortunate duchies were taken out of this fund of spoliation to be spoliated in a still more extraordinary manner, and they were excepted from the general arrangements of the Congress; their sovereign was deprived of his rights, the people of the sovereign to whom they had probably been accustomed to look up; an insult had been offered to the Crown of Spain, to whom the sovereign of these States was allied, and to the illustrious House of Bourbon, from which he was descended, for the sake of gratifying the feelings of Austria, by an article, of which that power, however, had made no exertion to obtain the fulfilment. The article would have been improper, monstrous and unjust, if fulfilled; but as it was not ful The next point to which he should draw their lordships attention, was the qualified accession which we had given to the Treaty in question, by which the hopes which had risen from the termination of the struggle had been frustrated. It would appear on the examination of the Treaty, that the consent of our Government had been given to the very articles to which our assent should not have been given. As a treaty had been concluded with Buonaparte by which he had been stationed in the island of Elba, the great object which this country should have had, was to throw in the way of his return to the country which had been the seat of his power, all the obstacles which our means afforded us. What were the obstacles that we had thrown in the way of his escape? We had agreed to that article of the Treaty by which he was recognized as independent Sovereign of Elba, by which it became impossible to watch his motions with that strictness which we might otherwise have employed, either by land or by what had been called in another place, naval police. The other article to which we had given our assent was the transfer of the Duchies of Parma and Placentia, to which the highest objections bad been made, and which, if it was to be fulfilled, was most contrary to good faith and to the principles of that great man, now no more, who had so long conducted the affairs of this nation, and who had always made it his object to protect the legitimate rights of ancient sovereigns, and to foster that spirit of attachment in people towards their own dynasties which this article insulted or disregarded. On the other hand the non-fulfilment of the article was pregnant with evil from the personal hold which it gave Napoleon on the French army, which was pledged to maintain the Treaty. It was a fatal and lamentable fact, to which he supposed the noble earl had alluded, when he had spoken of some convulsion which might arise before the affairs of Europe permanently settled into tranquillity, that even if Buonaparté had not returned to France, a spirit existed in that country which would have given rise to a civil war. There were in France two great parties those who had been the ancient Jacobins, and who had termed | in their hands, of watching the movements themselves Liberales, after the Spanish use of the term-and the Constitutionalists, a party which professed to be well disposed to good order and to the Bourbons, but under more severe restrictions than they had been subjected to in the times of the old monarchy. Besides these a third party consisted of the purchasers of forfeited property, or national domains: and a fourth, and most important party, was the army. The French army was not to be regarded in the same light as any other army in the world, or any that had ever existed. Its numbers gave it a vast superiority in influence, and it was besides intimately connected with almost every family in France, for every family had afforded it officers or soldiers. The very severity with which the conscription had been put in force produced that effect, and habit had made it so familiar to the minds of the inhabitants, and so fixed it, as it were, in their nature, that many families considered the conscription as the means of providing for their children; and in many cases when the young conscripts had been returned to their homes, they had felt that dismission as an evil. With the knowledge of these facts before them, their lordships might conceive how greatly the danger to be apprehended from Buonaparte was enhanced by the non-execution of any part of the Treaty, which might give him a claim on the cooperation of a soldiery which constituted so large a part of the kingdom. There was great reason for supposing, that before any attempt had been made on the part of Buonaparté, something in the nature of an insurrection had been organized in France. In fact, instead of considering Buonaparté the prime mover of the insurrection, it was more probable that that insurrection had been planned by others, who had pitched on him as the chief under whom the attempt would have a greater chance of success, and who would be more likely to effect their purposes. While affairs were in this state, what we had done was to give him a good cause among the people of France, in addition to the other causes which induced those persons to call on him. The noble marquis then said, that even when we had placed ourselves in this unfortunate situation, that we had to apprehend the return of Napoleon to the seat of that power which he had formerly wielded, it was essentially the duty of our Government, that the small power which was left of that person, should be made use of to the utmost; and this duty was enhanced in proportion to the mischievousness of the articles. It had been said by the noble earl, that the whole fleet of England could not have effectually blockaded the island of Elba; but when the danger threatened by the escape of Napoleon, and the diffi. culty of preventing it were considered, they should rather have been incentives to diligence in attempting to prevent it. The noble earl seemed to consider all matters of state as matters of facility; he, (the marquis W.) on the other hand, had always been taught to consider them, as well as all other transactions of human life, as the choice of difficulties. Because all the fleet of England could not protect us against the possibility of an escape, the noble earl had come to the rapid conclusion, that no protection whatever was to be afforded against that event-that because protection was difficult and impor tant, that he would not protect us. It had not been said that instruction had been given to any one commander, but it had been said, that there was some understanding with the captain of a frigate. He had never heard, however, that that understanding was understood-[a laugh]. But even supposing that this frigate had been destined to watch any movements in Elba, it was needless to say how inadequate a single frigate was to such a task. How, then, could his Majesty's Government justify themselves (and if they had any suspicion that an attempt would have been made by Buonaparté, that justification would be still more impracticable), if so small an effort had been made to prevent that return of the person in question to France which had involved the country in so many difficulties? Indeed, there could not be a greater contrast than between the alarm which the escape of that person had created, and the efforts which had been made to avert the consequences of it, and the minute efforts which had been made to prevent the return of that plague of Europe. Another singular fact respecting the Treaty was, that as England recognised the sovereignty of Elba without necessity, so France did not accede to the provision for the payment of the allowance, which was to be paid out of the funds of that kingdom. The sum was granted by the Allies, and the payment guaranteed by them, and they had engaged that it should marquis had made on the Treaty of Fontainbleau, as being utterly destitute of wisdom-as not being justified on any principle of policy. Certain contingencies, the noble marquis observed, ought to have been foreseen and provided against, at the time this Treaty was agreed to. The attack was made, as if this were a new transaction, that had never been heard of before. Whereas, every man who walked this town-every man in every town of Europe, was apprised of the fact long since. Twelve months ago, the Treaty was published in every newspaper in this city. Not merely the prin ciple of the Treaty, but all its details. When the Treaty of Paris was last session laid before the House, they never heard any objection to the principle of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, which was so nearly connected with it. He would go farther, and say, that although the Treaty of Fontainbleau, article by article, must have been well known to the noble marquis, the attention of the public having been strongly called to it, yet the noble marquis had made no observation, either on the impropriety of its principle, or the impolicy of its details. Now, if it were a measure so fraught with danger, that the noble marquis conceived no man who deserved the name of a statesman could look to it without apprehension, why did he not exercise a sound discretion, why did he not perform that which was manifestly his duty, and call the attention of the House to a transaction, which was a complete matter of notoriety? Their lordships would probably be inclined to believe, that the fears of the noble marquis (who, whether he last year thought the Treaty wise or not, certainly did not appear to apprehend any danger from it) were only excited since the occurrence of those events that had recently taken place. be guaranteed by France; but he apprehended no such guarantee had been given either by the provisional or the established government of France. The Allies were bound to procure the payment to be made, but they so little cared to fulfil their engagements, that the royal French Government was said to have refused to make any such payment; at any rate it was clear that no measures had ever been taken to pay any part of the sum stipulated for. Now, whether it was to be expected that under these circumstances some attempt was to be made on the part of Buonaparte, and should have been provided against, he should leave their lordships to judge; but it was also reported, that some communication had been made to his Majesty's Government, in which some information respecting it had been given. He was not aware of the nature of that communication, but he wished to know what the information was, and what steps had been taken upon it, supposing such information had been given. Viewing, as he did, the improvidence of the Treaty, which afforded no security to Europe, the danger from the independence of Buonaparté in Elba, and the folly of engagements, which could not be fulfilled with safety, nor violated without danger and dishonour, or the semblance of dishonour; and the insufficient efforts which had been made under these disadvantages, with the means we still possessed; he should move, as a preliminary to a more serious inquiry, an humble Address to his royal highness the Prince Regent, for, "1. Copies or extracts, or substance of any instructions which may have been given by his Majesty's Government, to any of his Majesty's naval commanders, respecting Napoleon Buonaparté, and the island of Elba. 2. Copies or extracts, or substance of any information which his Majesty's Government may have received, respecting the design of Napoleon Buonaparté to escape from the island of Elba, together with the date of the reception of the said information." The Earl of Liverpool said, he could assure the noble marquis, that any intimation of surprise, which might have escaped from him in the course of his speech, did not arise from want of civility towards him, but was occasioned by a strong sensation, produced at the moment, by what he conceived to be the extraordinary propositions which the noble marquis had advanced. He alluded particularly to the attack which the noble Having said thus much on the course pursued by the noble marquis, he now came to the consideration of the Treaty itself. The noble marquis had made an attack, not only on the Government of this country, but on the whole of the Allied Powers, with respect to the line of conduct they had adopted. Now, the first question was, what was the situation of the Allied Powers at the time the Treaty was concluded? Were they to treat with Buonaparté as a prisoner, or as a person perfectly at liberty? That was the point on which the whole question |