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enable us, after the example of England, to raise within the year, those supplies which the expenditure of the coming year will call for, but that its produce would fall far short of those taxes which it will be my duty to propose as provision for the Loan. They will be, I lament to say, of unexampled amount; but I shall not shrink from my duty in proposing, and I trust the country, even by these discussions, will not be unprepared to bear them; this will afford a permanent provision for the interest of that debt which we must contract, while the proposition of the hon. gentleman would give us only a tax for a single year-a tax which, if he is sincere in hoping that it will last in England only for the period of its present proposed enactment, he must also hope that we should be obliged, in Ireland, to repeal it; and I would ask him, where the public creditor was to look for his permanent security, or if he would be then ready to suggest other measures to supply the necessary deficiency of our revenue?

I think, Sir, that I have stated enough to justify me in resisting the hon. gentleman's motion, and in calling upon the House to resist it. I have shown, I hope to the satisfaction of the House, that the tax being proposed in England for one year, it could not be taken as a permanent provision for payment of that debt which we must create. I think I have a right to say, that this measure which he suggests, could not be fairly in operation until long after that period at which we hope to see its expiration in Great Britain. I have endeavoured to prove that so large a proportion of your duty in England must be affected by the deduction which in common fairness must be made, that even you would have to find fresh means, to no inconsiderable amount, to compensate that deficiency; and I am firmly convinced, that without reference to any local or political circumstances of the country, the creation of a system so widely complicated, and of such accumulated expense, would detract so much from the internal produce of the tax, that, if I had been satisfied to take this alone as the provision for the present year, in the expectation that it would be sufficient, I should have been deceiving both Parliament and myself. In what I have ventured to offer, I have taken a view only comparative of the motion of which the hon. gentleman has made, and of the means to which I shall myself recur.


is not from any fear of public obloquy, that I avoid what he calls the only statesman-like measure of finance. I am not ashamed to avow that I value popularity; I should be ashamed of myself if I did not; but it is that popularity which follows one's actions, and not which one's actions follow. If the necessities of the country should still unhappily continue, and we are to be placed either on a war expenditure, or obliged to continue in that state of military preparation of which the expenditure is as great as that of war, it may be my duty to propose to Parliament, a measure as strong as that which now I deprecate; from the performance of that duty I shall not shrink. I shall find in the public necessity my justification, if indeed any justification be necessary in the eyes of those who have never been backward when they could prove their attachment to the common cause; when they could participate in your dangers, or contribute to the glory of the empire. Sir, I shall say no more-what my feelings are on this subject is of little moment; but Ireland awaits with hope and with confidence the decision of the House of Commons.

Sir John Newport declared, that the right hon. gentleman had so ably vindicated the state and exertions of Ireland, that he had left him little to say. In 14 years since the Union, Ireland had brought into the Exchequer of the country considerably upwards of 60 millions, or more than four millions and a half annually, by taxes, exclusively of what she had been called on to produce by way of loan. He trusted the House would not vote an abstract proposition of this nature, as it would throw a firebrand of irreparable injury between both countries, which would be most fatal to Ireland.

Mr. Peel made a few observations in support of the arguments of his right hon. friend, (Mr. V. Fitzgerald). If a tax were proposed, the collection of which was not feasible, it was doing nothing whatever for the country. He thought the Property-tax of England might operate for Ireland as an Absentee tax.

Sir H. Montgomery said, he had in all the stages opposed the renewal of the Property-tax, as the means of entering into a new war, which he deprecated as ruinous to the finances and security of the country. He agreed with the Chancellor of the Irish Exchequer, that persons competent to assess and collect the tax in

Ireland were not to be found, and that, therefore, it was particularly unfit to be introduced into Ireland. The right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer for Ireland had estimated the annual amount of absentee income, which was spent in this country, and from which Ireland derived no benefit, at three millions annually, and the amount of the interest of debt payable to English creditors at four millions; the Income-tax on which, amounting to 700,000l. a year, ought in justice to be carried to the credit of Ireland, which would make good the present deficiency in the revenue, and provide for the loan of the year. In reply to the Secretary for Ireland he said, there was this difference in the tax proposed in the Irish parliament on absentees and the present tax, that the first was receivable in aid of the Irish revenue, and the present tax was payable into the Treasury of England.

Mr. Grattan observed, that he had heard with the greatest pleasure the able arguments of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer for Ireland, and that he entirely coincided in opinion with him on the subject.

After which the



Mr. Bankes replied. House divided:

Yeas Noes

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meant the control of the Executive Government, he cordially acceded. But it would not be contended for by the right hon. gentleman, that the public monies, emanating from the public, and consigned in the Bank of England as the bankers of the public, were also placed out of the control of the House itself. He would allude to a particular instance of the exercise of this control by the House; he meant, in the case of the money deposited in the hands of the Bank for the payment of the public dividends. In 1791, Mr. Pitt, having reason to think that there was a great accumulation in the hands of the Bank of England of unclaimed dividends, made a claim for a portion of them in the name of the public. This claim was resisted by the Bank, as a breach of faith with the public creditor. But Mr. Pitt had the firmness to persist; the Bank were obliged to give way, and 500,000l. was then taken from the funds in the hands of the Bank, and applied to the public service. In 1798 a similar arrangement took place, by which 500,000l. was again applied to the public service. After he had stated this, he could not see that there was any thing to preclude the Legislature from making any arrangement respecting the public money in the hands of the Bank, they might think fit, whether emanating from the Consolidated Fund, or any other source. He had been asked by the Governor of the Bank, what measure he intended to found on the Papers in question, if the House should grant them? It would be a sufficient answer if he were to say, that it would be premature, if not presumptuous in him, were be to state what he intended to do with those papers before examining them. But if the amount of balances in the hands of the Bank were now what they were in 1807, that is, between 1 and 12 millions, he had no hesitation in stating, that he should endeavour, either by a reduction of the balances or by some regulation, to make them productive of interest and advantage to the public. Whether he should propose any such regulation himself, or leave it to persons better qualified, or whether he should be precluded by the Bank Loan Act from making any such attempt, were questions with which he would not then occupy the House. But he had no hesitation in giving it as an opinion, not hastily adopted by him, that some regulation was practicable, nay easy, provided the Bank of England, taking an enlarged view


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Wednesday, April 26.

MOTION RESPECTING BALANCES IN THE HANDS OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND, &c.] Mr. Grenfell said, he understood that the production of the Papers, which he had moved for on a former evening, respecting the Balances of Public Money in the hands of the Bank of England, would no longer be opposed by the right hon. gentleman opposite. He did not feel it necessary at present to enter at any great length into the subject; but he hoped the House would indulge him a very few minutes while he submitted one or two observations to them. It had been stated the other night, by the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that by far the greatest proportion of the Public Balances in the hands of the Bank of England would be found, on examination, to be derived from the Consolidated Fund, and that they were, therefore, beyond the control of the Public. To this doctrine, if by the control of the public was

of its public duty should lend itself to the
object. Nay, the object was practicable
even on the supposition that the Bank of
England should be so far unmindful of the
duties which it owed to the public, as to
oppose the arrangement. He hoped, after
what he had now said, that no gentleman
would contend that there was any thing
impracticable in the application of this
regulation to the balances in the hands of
the Bank of England; and provided along
with this there should be a reduction of
their charge for the management of the
public debt, the effect would be to produce
a saving of between five and six hundred
thousand pounds per annum, which was
equal to the interest on a loan of ten
millions, still leaving an ample and liberal
allowance to the Bank of England. He
wished to allude to one other point, the
statement of the income of the Bank of
England, derivable either from the trans-
actions which they carried on for the
public, or as shown from the documents
on the table of the House. The first head
of the income of the Bank was that de-
rived from the circulation of their paper.
The amount of this circulation at one
period was not less than 31 millions; but
he was aware that the amount had been
reduced. He was not, however, giving
an exaggerated statement when he fixed
the average at twenty-seven millions. He
took the income from this source
1,390,000l. The next head of income was
the balances in the hands of the Bank.
The amount in 1807, was 11,500,000l.
Deducting 3 millions, lent to the public
without interest, there remained in their
hands 8,500,000l. The profit from this
was 425,000l. The third head was that
which they were paid for managing the
public debt. He had already stated this
at 267,000l. to which must be added an
allowance for a house, of which he did
not know the meaning, of 40001. making
in all 271,000l. The fourth head, con-
sisting of interest paid by the public to the
Bank, amounted to 330,000l. The amount
from all these sources was 2,376,000l.
He had confined himself to all those
sources of income, either derivable from
the public, or appearing in the papers
before the House, without any reference
to their private business. The hon. gen-year respectively."
tleman concluded with moving, that there
be laid before the House the following
Papers: 1. "An Account of the Balances
of Cash in the hands of the Bank of Eng-
land on the 1st and 15th days of each


month, between the 1st of February 1807 and 1st of April 1815, inclusive, resulting from payments under the head of Customs, and of all other branches of the public revenue, stating the average balance in each year, made up from the said days. 2. An Account of the Balances of Cash in the hands of the Bank of England on the 1st and 15th days of each month, between the 1st of February 1807 and the 1st of April 1815, inclusive, resulting from the Postmaster-general's account with the Bank, stating the average balance in each year, made up from the said days. 3. An Account of the Balances of Cash in the hands of the Bank of England on the 1st and 15th days of each month, between the 1st of February 1807 and 1st of April 1815, inclusive, belonging to the different departments of the Government, including the Balances of the Accountant-general of the Court of Chancery, and stating the average balance in each year, made up from the said days. 4. An Account of the Exchequer-bills and Bank-notes deposited by the Governor and Company of the Bank of England as Cash in the chests of the four Tellers in his Majesty's receipt of Exchequer on the 7th of August 1807, and on every 28th day subsequent to that period, down to the 1st of April 1815. 5. An Account of the Balance of the Account of the American Commissioners, and of all other Public Balances not particularly specified in the four preceding Accounts with the Bank of England, on the 1st of January in each year, from the year 1808 to the year 1815, inclusive; distinguishing the amount under each head respectively. 6. An Account of the total amount of Unclaimed Dividends in the hands of the Bank at the periods immediately preceding the payment of the quarterly dividends since January 1807. 7. An Account of all other Allowances made by the Public to the Bank, or charged by the Bank against the public, not specified in an Account respecting the charge for the management of the public debt, ordered to be laid before the House on the 19th instant, for transacting any other public service in the years 1813 and 1814, describing the nature of the services and the amount charged thereon in each

The Chancellor of the Exchequer was disposed to coincide in the motion. The hon. gentleman's statement of the profit of the Bank was exaggerated; he had not allowed for a great variety of charges.

With respect to the analogy contended | He admitted that the expenses of the for in the case of unclaimed dividends, it establishment of the Bank were to be dedid not hold. The amount of such divi- ducted from the profits, but could not dends might be called dead cash, and agree with the Chancellor of the Exchecould by no arrangement become the pro- quer that it was necessary for the Bank to perty of the Bank. Government were the hold one shilling in reserve to answer desupposed general heirs in all such cases; mands; for those demands were always whatever had no claimaut, was considered paid in paper since the passing of the to belong to the public at large. Restriction Act.

The motions were agreed to.

Mr. Ponsonby said, the agreement which had now taken place between the two sides of the House, had been anticipated by him from their approach to one another in point of numbers on the late vote. He did not think that for a long time a motion had been brought forward so likely to produce solid benefit to the public. He hoped it would be understood that there was no disposition to infringe upon the agreement actually subsisting between Government and the Bank; but he hoped it would be understood also, that no new agreement would be entered into till the House had an opportunity of considering these papers.

Mr. Mellish said, he had voted against the production of the accounts, only because he thought it unjust and unfair that the Act passed so late as March last, by which the public faith was pledged, should be in any iota disturbed.

Mr. Peter Moore said, it was a most preposterous proposition, that the public should be obliged to pay the Bank interest for three millions lent to them out of their own money, and leave a balance of nine millions besides. Such a doctrine did not suit the present times, when all classes were borne down by the weight of taxes. The hon. gentleman then went into the consideration of the audit of the public accounts, for which 60,000l. was paid, without preventing an accumulation of the unaudited accounts.

Mr. Manning said a few words upon the security the Bank possessed in an Act of Parliament, which pledged the faith of the House.

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Thursday, April 27.

TREATY SIGNED AT VIENNA ON THE 25TH OF MARCH.] Marquis Wellesley rose and said :

My Lords; I rise for the purpose of moving that the Order of the Day for our taking into consideration to-morrow the conduct observed by Congress towards Saxony be discharged. It is some time since I distinctly stated to your lordships, that in my opinion the best course to be pursued with respect to this subject, was for his Majesty's ministers to give to Parliament a full and detailed explanation of

the whole of the transactions which have taken place at Vienna, instead of waiting until partial intelligence should be extracted from them by any such motion as that which it was my intention to make to. morrow. Finding, however, that his Majesty's ministers did not think proper to adopt this suggestion, and conceiving that the particular treatment of Saxony de. manded early and serious attention, I gave that notice of a motion which I am now desirous for the present to withdraw. I am desirous to withdraw it, my lords, in the first place, because, from the tendency of a paper which has been laid on your lordships' table, I am inclined to hope that at no very distant period his Majesty's ministers will be induced to afford Parliament spontaneous information on the subject. In that expectation, I am led to postpone my motion for a few days, in order to ascertain whether that will or will not be the case. But, my lords, I am rendered still more desirous to withdraw my motion for the present, by the very serious reflections which have occurred to me, and which must have occurred to every one of your lordships, on the perusal of the document which has recently been laid before Parliament-I mean the Treaty signed at Vienna on the 25th of March;-a document, on the fundamental principle of which, I will abstain from making many

observations, but which is so obscure in itself, and yet is of such enormous magnitude in point of importance, that the consideration of it has wholly occupied my mind ever since its production, with a view to endeavour to discover its meaning, and the precise nature of the objects which it has in contemplation. I do hope, my lords, that his Majesty's ministers will explain to us the principle on which this instrument proceeds. For my own part, I think it a point which presses so imperatively for immediate and active consideration, that I should not conceive that I was acting with due respect to your lordships, or with due regard to the interests of the country, were I to attempt to divert the attention of Parliament to any other topic until this has been disposed of.

My Lords, when we voted the Address to his royal highness the Prince Regent, on the 7th of April, I concurred in that vote, because I understood, from the terms of the Address itself, from the explanations of the noble lords opposite, and from the general turn of the debate on that occasion, that the only question for our decision was, whether or not Great Britain was placed in such a situation, the return to France of the present Ruler of that country, as to render it necessary or advisable for us to arm ourselves by sea and land, and to be thus prepared to act in concert with our Allies for the security of the tranquillity of Europe. The question of war or peace was expressly reserved by the noble earl opposite. My lords, I have too much regard for the noble earl, and too much respect for your lordships, to indulge in language that might be deemed too strong upon this subject; but without violating truth and sincerity, it is impossible to abstain from declaring that good faith was not observed towards your lordships in the transactions of that evening. What other feeling can we entertain, when we understand that, two days prior to the vote of the 7th of April, his Majesty's ministers were in possession of the Treaty of Vienna, and had actually solved on a war, the arrangements of which were even completed? I know, my lords, that the noble earl told us on a recent evening, that circumstances had occurred in France between the signature of the Treaty at Vienna and the motion for the Address in this House, which might have occasioned a change of sentiment on the part of the Allies. But, with regard to ourselves, were we not aware of all that

had passed in France-were we not aware of all that had passed at Naples-and yet had not his Majesty's ministers acceded to the Treaty of Vienna? If ever, therefore, my lords, there was a case in which his Majesty's ministers violated their good faith towards Parliament, by calling upon Parliament to vote under circumstances which they omitted explicitly to state, it was this case. I have thrown out this observation, because the neglect on the part of his Majesty's ministers to communicate information on that occasion, is one of the reasons which induce me at present not to intrude upon your lordships my motion respecting Saxony. But this is not all. As I have before stated, I am mainly influenced in this determination by the contemplation of the Treaty, the substance of which is before your lordships.

My lords, I repeat, that this Treaty is so obscure as to be almost unintelligible. When that which I considered, and which I shall ever consider as a great public calamity, the return to France of the present Ruler of that country took place, there were two modes in which the occurrence might have been treated by his Majesty's Government and their Allies. They might have treated it as a revolt against the legitimate government of France, involving in it consequences menacing in the highest degree the tranquillity and independence of Europe. On the policy of such a course of proceeding I will not touch; but at least it would have been intelligible. The other mode in which the subject might have been treated, would have been by divesting themselves of all passion, by avoiding the appearance of being scared or terrified, and by calmly and deliberately looking at the state of the world in order to place this question before themselves for determination. Whether, with a full comprehension of the evils which were threatened by the return of Napoleon Buonaparté to power, it was nevertheless not practicable to put Eurpope in such a situation as to render impotent any agre-gressive attempt by France on her tranquillity. My lords, I refrain from arguing the policy of either of these modes of proceeding. Neither has been adopted. The middle course has been pursued. This country and the Allies have preferred what, I presume, they think the line of management. They have carefully avoided all the advantages which might have been derived from either of the proceedings which I have described, and they have

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