As for the English, we shall see now what will become of them. The emperor is there." The principal advantage which Napoleon gained by this murderous conflict, was the confidence which it gave his troops, and the separation of the armies of Blucher and Wellington. This was rendered so complete that he thought it necessary to detach only a small force, under general Grouchy, to follow and watch the motions of the Prussians, while with the main body of his army he formed a junction with Ney, and attacked the duke of Wellington, But he had suffered the favourable opportunity to pass. The British, Hanoverian, and Belgic troops were now united. The artillery and cavalry had come up, and although they were not equal to him in numbers, the combat would certainly be doubtful. Had he attacked the duke of Wellington at first, instead of Blucher, or had he suffered the first corps to remain with Ney, the British would have been taken unconcentrated and unprepared, and would have been exposed to the most imminent danger.

The villages of Brie and Sombref remained with the Prussians at the close of the engagement, but at day-break on the following morning Blucher evacuated them, and retired without molestation to Gembloux, where the fourth corps, under general Bulow, had now arrived. Thence he continued his retreat to Wavre, where he took an advantageous position on the night of the 17th, and again opened a communication with the English army. When the first corps, in pursuance of the emperor's urgent request, arrived at Ligny, the battle had already turned in favour of the French. It was then the policy of Napoleon, even according to the opinion of his own marshals, to have pressed with those new troops on the weakened and wavering battalions of the enemy. A well conducted retreat would thus have been changed into a disorderly flight, and the whole army of Blucher would have been put hors de combat. But satisfied with the advantages which he had gained, and eager to repair his error in weakening Ney without informing him of the change in the disposition of the troops, he ordered the first corps to return to their former position, though they might now have

been highly serviceable to himself, and could not possibly be useful to the marshal. They again arrived at Frasné, at ten o'clock, when the combat of Quatre Bras was terminated. "Thus (says marshal Ney) 25,000 or 30,000 men were idly paraded during the whole of the battle from the left to the right, without firing a shot," This error was decisive of the fate of the campaign.

The events of the 16th had a material influence on the plans of the opposing generals. While the duke of Wellington was proposing to follow up his advantage at Quatre Bras, by attacking Ney at Frasné, he received, on the morning of the 17th, the news that Blucher had been defeated on the preceding day, and was in full retreat. This left the duke no option but to fall back on such a corresponding position as might main. tain his lateral communication with the Prussian right wing: since to have remained in advance would have enabled Buonaparte either to have placed his army between those of England and Prussia, or to have turned his whole force against the duke's army, which was inferior in number.

The movement of Buonaparte's army from St. Amand and Ligny to Frasné occupied a space of time which was not unemployed by the duke of Wellington. He had not yet been joined by the whole of his divisions, and he had determined to decline the combat till he could fight on his selected position, the field of Waterloo. With his usual promptitude, the duke ordered an immediate retreat, and before eleven all the troops were on the road to the forest of Soignes, the cavalry covering the rear. They had scarcely commenced their march when the masses of the enemy began to appear. The French cuirassiers and lancers formed the advanced guard, and pressed upon the rear of the Bri tish columns. The rain fell in torrents. The roads were almost impassable, and the open country could not be traversed even by the cavalry. The French were, for this reason, unable to harass the flanks of the retiring army, and confined all their efforts to the centre, which proceeded on the high road. Many skirmishes took place, with alternate success, until the rear of the British army entered Genappe. Lord Uxbridge, now

marquis of Anglesea, halted on a plain behind the town, and resolved to attack the enemy's squadrons as they issued from the place. The seventh hussars were ordered to begin the attack. They charged with courage and impetuosity, but with their small horses and light arms they were unable to make any impression on the heavy-armed troops by which they were opposed. They rallied and returned to the charge, but the massive columns of the enemy remained unbroken. The heavy household troops were then ordered to advance, to charge with rapidity, and to strike only at the limbs. The French were dismayed at this mode of attack, and unable to withstand the resistless torrent, precipitately fled,

Rumours were immediately circulated by the partizans of France in the neighbourhood of Brussels, that the British were totally defeated, and the French triumphantly advancing. Lord Uxbridge was therefore induced to circulate the subjoined address:

"Brussels, June 22, 1815. "MY DEAR BROTHER OFFICERS,

It has been stated to me that a report injurious to the reputation of our regiment has gone abroad, and I, therefore, do not lose a moment in addressing you on the subject. The report must take its origin from the affair which took place with the advanced guard of the French cavalry near Genappe, on the 17th, when I ordered the seventh to cover the retreat. As I was with you, and saw the conduct of every individual, there is no one more capable of speaking to the fact than I am. As the lancers pressed us hard, I ordered you (upon a principle I ever did, and shall act upon) not to wait to be attacked, but to fall upon them. The attack was most gallantly led by the officers, but it failed. It failed because the lancers stood firm, and had their flanks completely secured, and were backed by a great mass of cavalry. The regiment was repulsed, but it did not run away. No it rallied immediately. I renewed the attack. It again failed, from the same cause. It retired in perfect order, although it had sustained so severe a loss; but you had thrown the lancers into confusion, who being in motion, I then made an attack

upon them with the life-guards, who certainly made a very handsome charge, and completely succeeded. This is the plain honest truth. However slightly I think of lancers, under ordinary circumstances, I do think, posted as they were, they had a most decided advantage over the hussars. The impetuosity, however, and the weight of the life-guards, carried all before them. Whilst I exculpate my own regiment, I am delighted in being able to bear testimony to the gallant conduct of the former.

Be not uneasy, my brother officers, you had ample opportunity, of which you gallantly availed yourselves, of revenging yourselves on the 18th for the failure of the 17th; and after all, what regiment, and which of us individually, is certain of success. Be assured that I am proud of being your colonel, and that you possess my utmost confidence. Your sincere friend,

Signed) " ANGLESEA, Lieut.-Gen."

Lord Wellington now continued his retreat to the entrance of the forest of Soignes, three miles in front of Waterloo. He had passed through this part of the country at a time when there was no appearance that hostilities would be so soon renewed, and had caused a plan of this and other military positions in the neighbourhood of Brussels to be executed by colonel Carmichael Smith, the chief engineer, observing to that officer, that were he ever to fight a battle for the defence of Brussels, Waterloo was the ground which he would choose. He now called for that sketch, made his arrangements for the night, and established his head-quarters at a petty inn in the small village of Waterloo, about a mile from the rear of the position. The army slept upon their arms, upon the ridge of a gentle declivity, chiefly covered with standing corn.

The French, whose forces were gradually coming up during the evening, occupied a ridge nearly opposite to the position of the English army. The villages in the rear of the rising ground were also filled with the soldiers of their numerous army. Buonaparte established his headquarters at Planchenoit, a small village in the rear of the position.

Thus arranged, both generals and their
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respective armies, waited the arrival of morning, and the events it was to bring. The night, as if the elements meant to match their fury with that which was preparing for the morning, was stormy in the extreme, accompanied by furious gusts of wind, heavy bursts of rain, continued and vivid flashes of lightning, and the loudest thunder our officers had ever heard. Both parties had to sustain this tempest, in the exposed situation of an open bivouack, without the means of protection or refreshment. But though these hardships were common to both armies, yet (as was the case previous to the battle of Agincourt) the moral feelings of the English army were depressed below their ordinary tone, and those of the French exalted to a degree of confidence and presumption, unusual even to the soldiers of that nation.

The British could not avoid reflecting that the dear bought success at Quatre Bras, while it had cost many valuable lives, had produced, in appearance at least, no corresponding result: a toilsome advance and bloody action had been followed by a retreat equally laborious to the soldier, and the defeat of the Prussians, which was now rumoured with circumstances of much exaggeration, had left Buonaparte at liberty to assail them separately, and with his whole force, except that small proportion which might be necessary to pursue their defeated and dispirited allies. If to this it be added, that their ranks were filled with many thousand foreigners, on whose faith they could not implicitly rely, it must be confessed that there was sufficient scope for melancholy reflections. To balance these, there remained their confidence in their

commander, their native undaunted courage, and a stern resolution to discharge their duty, and leave the result to Providence.

The French, on the other hand, had forgotten in their success at Ligny their failure at Quatre Bras, or if they remembered it, their miscarriage was ascribed to treachery. It was reported, in order to confirm this representation, that Boumont and other officers had been tried and shot, for having, by misconduct, occasioned the disaster. Admitting the partial success of Wellington," the English duke (said the French) commanded but the right wing of the Prussian army, and had in fact shared in Blucher's defeat, as he himself actually acknowledged, by imitating his retreat." All was exultation and triumph. No one supposed the English would halt, or make head, until they reached their vessels: no one doubted that the Belgian troops would join the emperor in a mass: it would have been disaffection to suppose that there laid any impediment in their next morning's march to Brussels; and all regretted the tempestuous night, as it afforded to the despairing English the means of retiring unmolested. Buonaparte encouraged these sanguine prepossessions of his troops, by affecting to share their sentiments. When the slow and gloomy morning of the 18th of June shewed him his enemies, still in posses sion of the heights which they had occupied the night before, and determined to maintain them, he could not suppress his satisfaction, but exclaimed, while he stretched his arm towards their position, as if to grasp his prey, "Je les tiens donc ces Anglois." ~ “ I have these Englishmen !"

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