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be expected, that the professions of the sovereigns of these countries in behalf of moderation and justice would extend so far in their execution as the giving up of Poland, and its restoration to the condition and privileges of an actually independent government. But Saxony was differently situated; and it may naturally be asked, Ou what possible ground could the case of Saxony come before sovereigns who had claimed honour to themselves for their moderation, and for their abhorrence of all the principles and conduct of Buonaparte? But Saxony was a conquered country. Did they then mean still to retain the barbarous and unjust idea, that the conquest of a country gave a right to the conquerors to dispose of it as they thought proper, or to reserve it for themselves? If they did, they had emancipated themselves but very partially and imperfectly from the principles of Buonaparte. France was a conquered country; but France they did not treat as such: all the territories which they had wrested from France were conquered countries; but these were either actually restored, or it was naturally expected from the professions of the allied sovereigns, that they would be restored to their national independence, and their old station and rank in Europe. What, then, had Saxony done to be made an exception? The ultimate success of Europe against Buonaparte, it was virtually acknowledged by the conquerors themselves, had been in a great measure owing to the feelings and resistance of the people; and the allied sovereigns had given the world reason to believe, that the happiness of the people in all they had done, and in all they meant to do, at Vienna, was their principal and cherished object. But the people of Saxony were perhaps the most enlightened, industrious, and happy of all Germany; and this condition, if not obtained for them, had been secured and extended to them by their sovereign and his government. Why, then, even propose to alter her government? why propose that that feeling of national independence should be destroyed by incorporating them with another state, which must at the same time weaken the sources of their happiness? The reason given was, that the king of Saxony had been the friend and ally

of Buonaparte; this was the reason for dethroning him; and as the allied sovereigns were desirous of placing the whole of Europe in such a state of equipoise with regard to power, as should diminish the probability of future wars, it was moreover supposed to be their object to annex Saxony to Prussia Here then are two questions to be considered: Whether the king of Saxony ought to be dethroned? and, if he ought, what should become of Saxony?

The king of Saxony, it was contended, deserved no mercy: he had adhered to Buonaparte to the last, and therefore ought to suffer the fate of Buonaparte: and this was the language of sovereigns, who all in their turns had adhered to Buonaparte; who had joined with him in many of his schemes of ambition and conquest. Did the emperor of Russia forget that, by the treaty of Tilsit, he agreed to participate in the spoliation of Prussia? Did the king of Prussia forget his conduct towards Hanover? Did the emperor of Austria not recollect that, by giving his daughter in marriage to Buonaparte, he had done more than any of the other sovereigns to strengthen his power? But it was said they had all left him: yes, when they deemed it safe; when they found his fortunes decline. The king of Saxony of Saxony thought better of the stability of his fortune than he ought, and therefore ad hered to him longer than he ought. But let us grant, what indeed after all must be conceded, that the king of Saxony was a more steady and warm friend of Buonaparte than any of the other sovereigns had ever been, even at the period of their most solemn professions; ought he, therefore, on that account to be dethroned? This to be dethroned? This consequence undoubtedly would have followed, if the conquerors had been resolved to act on the usual principles which guided conquerors: but the question now was, What should be the fate of the king of Saxony if the emperor Alexander (for to him the world looked up in a most particular manner, not only on account of his more open and frequent professions, but also on account of his greater influence,) acted consistently with what he had led Europe to expect from him? The path of moderation and justice the path which directly led to the accomplishment of the hopes of Eurore,

was clear and distinct. The king of Saxony had been highly culpable in adhering so long as he did to the cause of Buonaparte: for this he ought perhaps to be punished. But, on the other hand, Saxony had flourished under his dominion: this should have been taken into consideration; and it ought, first of all, to have been investigated by the allied sovereigns, whether, if they punished the king, they would not thus also diminish the happiness of the inhabitants of Saxony.

To the people of France, who, though not so criminal as Buonaparte himself, could not be looked upon as guiltless, in so far as they enabled him to carry on his crimes, the allied sovereigns had granted the choice of a sove. reign. Were the people of Saxony not to receive an equal degree of favour, because their sovereign had been an instrument in the hand of Buonaparte? No person who knew his character, who was acquainted with his mode of rule over Saxony, could for a moment suppose that he approved of Buonaparte's crimes: he was weak, but not wicked. On these considerations, therefore, it might have been hoped that the king of Saxony would not be punished by the deprivation of his dominions, by sovereigns who had each of them known and felt the influence of that man, for his connexion with whom it was thus proposed to punish him.

If, however, the fate of the king of Saxony was decided, and he should be deprived of his territories; what ought to be the fate of Saxony itself? Ought not the allied sovereigns to have addressed the inhabitants to the following purport:-" Your king no longer deserves to rule over you, or to be recognised by us, because of his adherence to Buonaparte: in order to deter other sovereigns, it is absolutely necessary to make an example of him; we must therefore deprive him of his throne; we know that to you (except in the case of his attachment to Buonaparte) he has been a good prince; that Saxony under him has flourished exceedingly, so as now to be superior to most other parts of Germany, in agriculture, manufac tures, literature and happiness: these blessings we wish to preserve to you: but as we are sensible that they cannot be preserved entire unless national independence be pre

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served, and the minds and hearts of the people go with the government, we cheerfully give you the choice of your new sovereign; we do not wish to strip Saxony of any part of her old and legitimate territory, nor to deprive her of her independence; and though' we feel ourselves under the necessity of not placing the continuance of your prince on the throne within your choice, we completely give up to you the selection of his successor." Such language would have been greeted by Europe as the harbinger of her peace and happiness: and to such language the people of Saxony, who had never approved of or sanctioned the attachment of their king to Buonaparte,-the army of Saxony, who by their defection from the tyrant, at the battle of Leipsic, had contributed so essentially to the fate of that decisive and glorious day,were justly entitled.

But it was said that Saxony must be annexed to Prussia; that the inferior consideration of the independence and wishes of its inhabitants must give way to the paramount consideration of the future peace of Europe. The object of the congress of Vienna, it was given out, was the placing of the various states on the continent of Europe on such a relative footing, that future wars might be avoided; or, if they took place, that no one power, as France had recently done, might preponderate so greatly as to overwhelm the rest of the continent. This was certainly a desirable object; and could it have been effected by means not at variance with justice, it would have been hailed with joyful acclamations by every friend of the tranquillity and happiness of mankind. But had the allied sovereigns forgotten already one of the most fatal and dreadful infringements which Buonaparte made on the venerable code of morality, which had always before his time been professed, though, alas! too often forgotten in conduct by the sovereigns of Europe, that evil might not be done that good might come? In no respect had the revolution of France, and especially the military despotism to which that event had given rise, done more mischief to mankind, than in the unsettling, and holding up to contempt,. those principles of morality which had alwaysbefore been at least professed: and yet the

allied sovereigns thought of sanctioning the new principles of France.

The important objection that occurs to this proposal (setting aside for the present all considerations of a moral nature) is, that Prussia might be strengthened in a much more proper and natural manner. By the treaty of Tilsit, between the emperor Alexander and Buonaparte, a large part of the dominions of Prussia were taken from her, and given to Alexander :-why not restore them? Has Alexander any better claim to them than Buonaparte had to most of his conquests? These territories were not conquered by Alexander, but by Buonaparte, and given by the latter to the former; to that sovereign, who had entered into the war with Buonaparte for the protection of Prussia. Unless Alexander wished the world to believe that the articles of the treaty of Tilsit, so far as they regarded the spoliation of Prussia, were not compulsory on him, he ought to have taken the first opportunity, after he was free from the shackles of the enemy, to have restored to Prussia the territories of which she was stripped. Soon after Prussia freed herself from Buonaparte, a treaty was entered into between Alexander and Frederick, by which the former bound himself to obtain for the latter an extent of territory nearly if not quite equal to what it had been prior to the treaty of Tilsit. It might have been supposed that it was the intention of Alexander, as soon as peace was restored to Europe, to fulfil this treaty by restoring those parts which he had recovered from Buonaparte. This, however, was not his intention: what he got, justly belonging to a sovereign in whose defence he had gone to war, from a man who had no right to give it away, he was unwilling to restore to that sovereign even when they were on the most intimate footing of public alliance and private friendship; but he would indemnify him by annexing dominions over which neither of them had any right but the right of conquest.

But, in the second place, it was the proposed object of this annexation of Saxony to Prussia to strengthen the latter: were the allied sovereigns so ignorant of human nature, so totally unacquainted with history; had they so soon forgotten what had just

passed before their eyes, as to suppose that a kingdom could be strengthened by mere extension of territory? Did they think that, if the Saxons were averse from a union with Prussia, Prussia would actually be benefited by such a union? Their professed object was to render Prussia more capable of coping with France, with France, or with any other power that might attack her; and was this object likely to be accomplished by placing in the heart of extended Prussia two millions of subjects, anxious to regain their national character and independence, and ready to join the first enemy who should declare against Prussia? The protection of the latter country against France must be very imperfectly obtained by the annexation of Saxony, even supposing the Saxons to be anxious for the union. The population of the whole united kingdom would not amount to one-third of the population of France; and while the population of the latter country was compact and easily and quickly embodied in case of war, the population of Prussia would be extended over a great and divided surface, and would be consequently inefficient. Before France could invade Prussia she must conquer much intervening territory, and it was therefore adviseable that the latter adviseable that the latter power should remain one integral kingdom, as a barrier against the encroachments of France.

Notwithstanding these obvious considerations, the fate of Saxony was fully decided by two of the powers even before the congress commenced its sittings. Prince Repnin, the Russian governor of Dresden, sent on November 3d a notification to the Saxon authorities, acquainting them that by a letter from the minister of state, Baron de Stein, he had been informed of a convention concluded at Vienna, in virtue of which the emperor of Russia, in concert with Austria and England, was to invest the government of Saxony in the hands of the king of Prussia, "in order thus to operate the union of Saxony with Prussia, which will soon take place in a manner more solemn and formal." The prince proceeded to say that king Frederick William, in quality of future sovereign of the country, had declared his intention to unite it to Prussia, with the cordial concurrence of the emperor Alexander.-

Prince Repnin announced the same determination in the farewell speech which he delivered at Dresden on Nov. 8, when he formally resigned his employments to the Prussian government, and the Russian were succeeded by the Prussian troops. Although the courts of Austria and Great Britain agreed to the provisional occupation of that country by Prussia, they considered its final possession as still a subject of discussion in the congress, and as a question in some measure undecided. The unfortunate king of Saxony, immediately after he had learned this transfer of the occupation of his country, published a declaration expressing "his lively feelings of grief at the event," asserting his inviolable right to be reinstated in his royal authority, and positively affirming that he would never consent to the cession of the states inherited from his ancestors, or receive any indemnity or equivalent that might be offered to his acceptance. He afterwards confirmed his assurance by the subjoined

DECLARATION.

FREDERICK AUGUSTUS, by the grace of God, king of Saxony, duke of Warsaw,

&c.

We have just learned with lively feelings of grief that our kingdom of Saxony has been provisionally occupied by the troops of his Prussian majesty. Firmly resolved never to separate our fate from that of our people; filled with confidence in the justice and magnaninity of the allied sovereigns, and intending to join their alliance as soon as we had the means of doing so, we determined, after the battle of Leipsic, there to await the conquerors. But the sovereigns refused to hear

us.

We were compelled to depart from our states, and proceed to Berlin. His majesty the emperor of Russia nevertheless made known to us, that our removal from Saxony was dictated only by military interests, and his majesty at the same time invited us to repose in him entire confidence. We also received from their majesties the emperor of Austria, and the king of Prussia, affecting proofs of interest and sensibility. We were in consequence enabled to cherish the hope. that as soon as these military considerations ceased to operate, we should be reinstated in

our rights, and restored to our dear subjects. Far, however, from crediting the reports circulated with regard to the fate of our states since the epoch of the peace of Paris, we place entire confidence in the justice of the allied monarchs, though it be impossible to penetrate the motives of the proceedings which they have pursued towards us. The conservation and consolidation of legitimate dynasties was the grand object of the war which has been so happily terminated; the coalesced powers accordingly repeatedly proclaimed in the most solemn manner, that, far removed from every plan of conquest and aggrandisement, they had only in view the restoration of the rights and liberties of Europe. Saxony, in particular, received the most positive assurances, that her integrity would be maintained. That integrity essentially includes the conservation of the dynasty for which the nation has publicly manifested its constant attachment, and the unanimous wish to be re-united to its sovereign. The inviolability of our righs, and of those of our house, to the well and justly acquired inheritance of our ancestors, is acknowledged. Our speedy reinstatement ought to be the consequence thereof. We should be wanting to the most sacred duties towards our royal house, and towards our people, were we to remain silent under the new measures projected against our states at a moment when we are entitled to expect their restitution. The intention manifested by the court of Prussia, of provisionally occupying our Saxon states, compels us to forearm our well-founded rights against such a step, and solemnly to protest against the consequences which may be drawn from such a measure. It is before the congress of Vienna, and in the face of all Europe, that we discharge this duty, by signing these presents with our hand, and at the same time publicly reiterating the declaration, communicated some time ago to the allied courts, that we will never consent to the cession of the states inherited from our ancestors, and that we will never accept any indemnity or equivalent that may be offered to us.

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FREDERICK Augustur. Given at Frederickfeld, Nov. 4, 1814...

It was not merely from the circumstances which transpired respecting the proceedings of the congress of Vienna, that apprehensions were entertained, by the friends of liberty and independence, that the allied sovereigns would violate the professions they had made previous to the departure of Buonaparte to the Isle of Elba. A glaring example of rapacity and injustice was presented to the world in the invasion of Norway, and the annexation of that kingdom to the dominions of Sweden. After the battle of Leipsic, it was determined by the allies that the crown prince of Sweden, with the force under his command, should not advance against France, but should be employed in making an attempt on Hamburgh, and afterwards in compelling Denmark to abandon the cause of Buonaparte for that of the confederates. Bernadotte finding that he could make no impression upon Hamburgh, and being convinced that this city must follow the fate of Buonaparte and of France, directed, as we have seen, all his efforts against the Danes. The latter, in several engagements, fought well, but they were always compelled to vield to superior numbers, and at length a suspension of hostilities was arranged, for the purpose of framing the terms of peace. These, however, not being adjusted, operations again commenced, but the Danes being drawn across the river Eyder, were soon compelled to submit to the terms which they before had rejected. On the 14th of January a treaty of peace was signed between Sweden and Denmark, of which the following are the principal articles: By article 2d, the king of Sweden engaged to use his mediation with his allies, to bring about a peace between them and the king of Denmark. By article 3d, the king of Denmark engaged to take an active part against the emperor of the French, to declare war against that power, and in consequence to join an auxiliary Danish corps to the army of the north of Germany, under the orders of his royal highness the crown prince of Sweden. This was to be done in pursuance of a convention between Denmark and Great Britain, by which the number of men to be supplied by the former was fixed at 10,000, and the sum to be paid by the latter at 400,000Z.

The 4th article is the most important: by it his majesty the king of Denmark, for himself and his successors, renounces for ever and irrevocably all his rights and claims on the kingdom of Norway; which with its dependencies (Greenland, and the Ferroe Islands and Iceland excepted,) is to belong in full and sovereign property to the king of Sweden, and make one with his united kingdom. On the other hand, by the 5th article, the king of Sweden binds himself in the most solemn manner to cause the inhabitants of the kingdom of Norway and its dependencies to enjoy in future all the laws, privileges, rights and franchises, such as they have hitherto subsisted.

By the 7th article, the king of Sweden, for himself and his successors, renounced irrevocably and for ever, in behalf of the king of Denmark, all rights and claims to the dukedom of Swedish Pomerania, and the principality of the island of Rugen; to the inhabitants of which the king of Denmark solemnly engaged himself to secure all their laws, rights, franchises, and privileges.

By the 13th article it is stated, that "as the king of Sweden, so far as is practicable, and as depends upon him, wishes that the king of Denmark may receive compensation for the renunciation of the kingdom of Norway, of which his majesty has given satisfactory proof in the cession of Swedish Pomerania and the island of Rugen; so his majesty. will use all his endeavours with the allied powers, to secure in addition, at a general peace, a full equivalent to Denmark for the cession of Norway."

There was good reason to apprehend that this cession of Norway by the king of Denmark would not be palatable to the Norwegians: they had always resisted, with great spirit and success every attempt of Sweden to conquer them; and regarding their country (as indeed it was styled in the treaty of peace) as a separate kingdom from Denmark, they did not conceive that the king of Denmark had any right to transfer them to Sweden. Accordingly, soon after the treaty, it was rumoured that the Norwegians meant to resist the transference, and to declare themselves an independent state. Prince Christian of Denmark was fixed upon to

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