rule over them, under the title of regent. This circumstance certainly did no good to the cause of Norway, because a strong suspicion went abroad, that the king of Denmark was at the bottom of the resistance of this country to be transferred to Sweden. On this account, it would have been better if they had chosen as a regent a person entirely unconnected with Denmark, a native Norwegian.

About a month after the treaty between Sweden and Denmark, prince Christian put forth a proclamation to the Norwegians, in which he called upon them in strong and animated language to stand forth in defence of their national independence, and to repel every attempt to transfer them to Sweden. At the same time he issued a proclamation respecting the relation which was to exist between Norway and other powers; and the abolition of privateering. The hope that Great Britain would at least not oppose the endeavours of the Norwegians to secure their independence, is strongly expressed in the preamble to this proclamation; in which prince Christian, in his own name, and in the name of the nation of Norway at large, states, that he considers it a great blessing, and favour on the part of the king of Denmark, that, before he absolved them of their oaths, he established peace between them and Great Britain. The first declaration in the proclamation is, that Norway is at peace with all the world; the others relate principally to the preservation of neutrality and the encouragement of commerce.

As soon as the Norwegians had gone so far in their opposition to Sweden as to declare themselves independent, and to elect a sovereign, it became necessary for them to seek the means of defending their country from the invasion of the Swedish forces. They trusted much to the almost impenetrable nature of their frontier, to which they had been more than once indebted for their protection, and the destruction of the invading Swedish army: but as there was a part of their frontier which was accessible, it was necessary to raise as large an army as possible to defend it. Of troops, Norway had abundance; for all ranks and ages, as well as both sexes, seemed animated with a fixed deter

mination to repulse the Swedes, or perish in the attempt. Their regular army probably amounted to 30,000 men; but they were half starved, badly armed, and inexperienced. Famine indeed was what they most dreaded: and against this they knew they could not protect themselves, if the maritime powers, and especially Great Britain, took an active part against them. But they did hope that Britain would assist them; at least, they did not doubt but Britain would allow the importation of grain.

In order to enable prince Christian more effectually to wield the powers of Norway in the arduous contest, he was raised to the dignity of king. In the beginning of July, envoys were sent to him from Austria, Russia, England, and Prussia, who called upon him to agree to an armistice, till the assembling of a diet, into whose hands he might return that crown which he had received from the nation. The terms of the proposed armistice were three. From Christian was demanded an immediate agreement to resign the crown to the diet, and the evacuation of a frontier, together with the surrender of certain forts on it. On the part of the Swedes it was conceded by the envoys, that the blockade of certain ports should be raised during the truce.

With respect to the resignation of the crown, Christian replied, that he should make known to the nation the danger to which it was exposed, and represent to it the advantages which would be secured to it on its acceding to a constitutional union with Sweden: "But (he added) you know me sufficiently to be convinced that, faithful to my engagements, I will never separate my fate from that of Norway, in the event of a brave though useless resistance against the united forces of Europe being employed to an honourable reconciliation, for which I shall employ all my credit!"-He next deprecates the introduction of Swedish troops into the forts during the truce, as calculated to excite commotion; and speaks of himself as determined, even upon this point, to head that commotion when it has once sprung up. to avoid it, he proposes that the forts shall be put in the custody of armed citizens.Lastly, he demands that the blockade shall be raised universally; but upon that subject, H

and the truce generally, he writes a letter to the king of Sweden. In this letter he candidly acknowledges, that if he should relinquish the defence of Norway, it will be only through necessity! He will assemble the diet; he will make known to that body the conditions proposed; he will point out all the perils of a perseverance in the contest."If (says he) the nation accept the conditions, I shall instantly abdicate the throne; if they reject them, my fate shall not be separated from their's."

Soon afterwards he gave in a second note to the envoys; in which he calls on them, in the name of their respective powers, to guarantee the basis of the union of Norway with Sweden, as well as the conditions of the intermediate armistice he likewise requires "that the sittings of the diet shall be prolonged, so as to enable it to close its deliberations without interruption ;" and that the blockade shall be raised, so as to admit a free importation of corn into Norway..

In reply, the envoys grant the contingent guarantee required of their several sovereigns; but complain that all the conditions which they had proposed as the basis of the armistice had been altered. Yet still are they willing to convey his royal highness's propositions to the king of Sweden, with this intimation also, that they will second them by

army against Norway. The people of Britain, who from their constitution, their habits and feelings, are much disposed to sympathize with all attempts made by the people of any country to gain or retain their independence, and generally to express their sentiments fearlessly and openly, not only on their own affairs but also on the affairs of all other nations, could not be silent on the subject of Norway, and the case which they made out was a strong one.

It was contended that it was tyrannical, and in the very teeth of the professions of the allied sovereigns, to compel the Norwegians to submit to a power which they detested that Buonaparte could have done nothing worse; and that it was particularly unworthy of Great Britain, and disgraceful to her, to co-operate in this attempt to force a sovereign on the Norwegians, especially by blockading the ports, and thus starving them into submission. They asked what was the leading principle of the British constitution; on what account did we hold ourselves out as the envy and admiration of the world? Was it not because, according to our constitution, the consent of the people is necessary to the legitimacy of any government? Had not our ancestors bled to defend this principle? Had not we taken up arms against Buonaparte because he had enslaved Europe, dominion? and

afford his majesty an occasion of commencing by a signal benefit the exercise of his influence in Norway.

On the 17th of July, the envoys returned from their mission: and on the 26th of that month military operations commenced between the Norwegian and Swedish flotillas. The former were stationed near the Hualorn islands, protected by about 23 batteries raised there. The Norwegian commander on the advance of the Swedish fleet evacuated the islands, and retreated towards Frederickstadt. This circumstance put the Swedes in possession of positions of the highest importance for the opening of the campaign. Soon after this, the plenipotentiaries of the four powers set out again for Underwallda, to repair to Christiana to make a last effort for arrangement; and at the same time the prince royal of Sweden put himself at the head of his

we now give the lie, not only to our ances tors, but also to our own recent conduct, by joining in the league against the people of Norway?

In this case, there could be no doubt what was the wish of the Norwegians: they had expressed that wish unanimously from themselves: and what was the character of the people whom we joined in oppressing? Perhaps more like our own than any other nation in Europe: or rather like what our ancestors were, when they fought and bled in defence of those blessings which we now enjoyed. The Norwegians were simple, without guile, manly, determined and brave: and would we put a yoke on such a people? Had Britain and the allied sovereigns so soon forgot that they had been fighting for the liberties of Europe? Had they so soon forgotten the charges which they brought

against Buonaparte? Had Britain in particular forgotten the reasons which induced her to aid the Spaniards? Had not they, like the Norwegians, been transferred by their sovereign to a foreigner, whose yoke they detested? Had not we applauded them for their resistance? Had we not assisted them in throwing it off? Did we not take credit to ourselves for our conduct on this occasion? Had then our conduct been wrong? Ought we rather to have joined in subduing the people of Spain to the yoke of Buonaparte? Or did we make a distinction between the same actions, when committed by Buonaparte and when committed by any other person? Or was the charge against us true, that we assisted the Spaniards because it was our interest to assist them? The case of the Norwegians appeared so strong, and so worthy of sympathy, that even ministers in parliament seemed to lament the treaty by which the allies had bound themselves to secure Norway to Sweden. As this treaty, to which Britain was a party, existed, it was necessary to see it carried into execution. On the ground of this treaty, therefore, and on the further ground of the peace between Denmark and Sweden, by which the former agreed to give up Norway to the latter, the attempt to subdue the Norwegians was boldly justified.

So flagrant an infringement of the rights of nations inspired the opposition in both houses of parliament with unwonted vigor. In the house of Lords (May 10) the order upon which their Lordships were summoned being read, carl Grey stated, that a subject of greater importance, as to principle, had never been discussed. It included the maxims of good faith, of moral and political justice, the doctrines of public law, and the interpretation of treaties. These were all to be considered before we decided on the conduct of a people who had done us no injury, and who were known to us only by their patriotism, their industry, and their virtues. The treaty with Sweden had last year been sanctioned by parliament, notwithstanding the opposition of himself and friends: he was still of opinion, that British policy never sustained a greater shock, nor the British character a deeper stain, than had been inflicted

by that treaty. No authority could, however, induce him to persuade this country to depart from her engagements; and if it could be shown that this treaty compelled us to assist Sweden in the subjugation of Norway, their lordships would do well to reject his motion. But the first question was, whether that treaty required from us such measures as were now pursued towards Norway: secondly, whether those measures could be justified by the doctrines of public law: thirdly, whether Sweden had so acted as to be entitled to call upon us for the execution of these measures: and, fourthly, whether sound policy would justify us in complying with such demands. In considering the construction of the treaty itself, it would be found to contain no such obligation as the blockade of the ports of Norway. At the suggestion of Russia we had agreed to employ force to compel Denmark to relinquish Norway. The obligation contracted on our part had been fulfilled. We had not guaranteed to Sweden the peaceable possession of Norway. That such was the fair construction of the treaty, he appealed to his majesty's ministers-a construction which was admitted in their subsequent treaty with Denmark. Denmark. What then did this treaty bind us to perform? Certainly, to use every possible exertion, that Denmark should agree to the transfer of Norway to Sweden-and now, when Denmark had ceded all her claims to that country, we were resorting to further and more obnoxious measures of compelling the submission of Norway. Would the noble and learned lord at the head of the law permit the recovery upon a contract “ ab initio" illegal? Would they not say, You have entered into an illegal contract, which is ab initio void, and you must bear the loss? In the case of nations the principle was the same-the difference of power made no dif ference of justice. What were the disposable rights of the king of Denmark? Were they founded on the consent of the people, on which all thrones rested? or, did they allow him to transfer the people of Norway like cattle? He was speaking in the nineteenth century, and in the British parliament-and surely there wanted no arguments to prove, that a sovereignty could not be transferred

without the consent of the people, nor that a sovereign had no title to obedience when he ceased to give protection. This was the principle of the revolution in this countryupon this principle his majesty reigned. The rights of the king of Denmark were those of a sovereign only, and not of a proprietor. From what Grotius had written on this subject, it might be deduced, that sovereignty could not be transferred without the express or implied consent of the people. Puffendorff was of the same opinion. "If a prince," according to that writer, "was compelled to yield his sovereignty, he could not place a portion of his subjects under any obligation not to resist the surrender-he could not hinder their erecting themselves into a commonwealth, or any other disposal of themselves." The whole of Vattel's writings went to prove, that sovereignties could never with justice be transferred, unless the people consented to the transfer. These authorities were conclusive. He wished their lordships to imagine what would be the consequences of an attempt of the king of England to transfer the sovereignty of Ireland or Scotland. When Richard the second had transferred even the sovereignty of Gascony, the Gascons resisted, and their resistance was successful. When John gave up the sovereignty of England to the pope, the barons asserted the principle, that the king had no such right. What was the consequence of the transfer of the crown of Scotland by Balio to our Edward I.? Had history sanctioned the pretence that the resistance of the Scotch was rebellion? Had history, as well as Edward, condemned the great and patriotic Wallace as a traitor? No-the transaction had fixed a deep and indelible stain upon the character of the British monarch!

"Scots who have with Wallace bled-
Scots whom Bruce has often led-
Welcome to your gorey bed!

Or to victory!"

In these and similar lines had the glorious struggle against the transfer of sovereignty been consecrated. That part of our history was never read by any who were sensible of the value of liberty and independence, without regret. Who did not desire to be a sharer

in the noble efforts of a Wallace and a Bruce? Who did not follow the actions of those heroes with breathless anxiety, and the most ardent wishes for their success?

"Thy spirit, Independence, let me share?
Lord of the lion-heart, and eagle-eye;
Thy steps I'll follow with my bosom bare,
Nor heed the storm that howls along the sky."

pre

The Scottish barons had replied to the pope, that no king should be imposed upon Scotland without their consent. Such was then the language of the Scottish barons, and such was now the language of the Norwegian freeholders! Thus he had proved, that we were not bound by the construction of the treaty to assist in the subjugation of Norway; and since it was clear that the king of Denmark could not transfer the sovereignty, it was equally clear that, let whatever treaty exist, no one could justly compel the Norwegians to submission. His lordship then adverted to the documents, and complained of their defective character. Sweden did not appear to have furnished her contingent of troops, nor could the noble lords tend absolutely to say, that the crown prince had done his duty. What was the testimony of Mr. Thornton and sir Charles Stewart on this subject? What would be that of the gallant marshal Blucher, could he be brought to give his opinion of the services of the crown prince of Sweden? During the eventful period that followed the battle of Leipsic, who ever heard of the crown prince? Was not the strongest discontent excited by his inactivity? And when he did move, where did he move? Not upon the enemy, but upon Norway. Even when he had compelled Denmark to consent to the cession of Norway, where was the crown prince during the anxious months of January, February, and March? Why, on the 28th of March he was at Liege! There a demi-official article had appeared in the Liege Gazette, declaring his disappointment at not being called upon to send a plenipotentiary to Chatillon, complaining that the Hanseatic legion had been withdrawn from his command, and that his remonstrances had not met with due attention, and, in conclusion, expressing his determination not to take an active part till this was explained. On the 16th of April, six

teen days after the battle on the heights of Montmartre, the Swedes are put in motion, and the prince repairs to Paris. And yet he stipulates for the assistance of Britain for the unwarrantable reduction of Norway! He requires the criminality of this country to obtain a reward for his inactivity! His lordship then declared that policy was also against the cession of Norway to Sweden. Sweden would naturally look to France to balance her against Russia, while Russia was of all others the most natural, noble, and useful alliance for England. There was, undoubtedly, the happiest hope of a long and lasting peace with France, but he must be a sanguine politician who did not look to a possible future difference of prospect. But was there no alternative for Norway but a dependence on either Sweden or Denmark? Was there not independence? Might she not be more beneficial to this country under the impulse of liberty. His lordship then combated the idea of the resistance of Norway being instigated by a Danish faction. Even if there were a Danish faction, why not attack Denmark rather than blockade Norway? After a series of lucid and powerful arguments, his lordship concluded by moving an address to the prince regent, entreating that the blockade of Norway by a British force should be raised.

The earl of Harrowby, in reply, contended that Russia had a right to engage for the union of Norway with Sweden, and that his Britannic majesty had a similar right to accede to such an engagement. He thought that kingdoms, as well as provinces, might be transferred by treaty with all the rights of their former sovereigns. According to certain doctrines, a sovereign might cede a province which he could not keep, and then that province might start into a state. A country might be cut up into twenty pieces, and each start up with a head and tail as an independent body. The presumptive heir to the crown had gone to Norway, and endeavoured to set up a state, after the king had ceded it. The Danish civil officers had been ordered, to return. There was reason to think that the liberal terms of Sweden had been studiously concealed from the Norwegians. As to the condition of the Norwe

gians by the transfer, was there no difference in a transfer from a free to a despotic, and from a despotic to a free constitution.? It was a satisfaction, that instead of imposing hardships on Norway the contrary was the fact. The king of Sweden offered Norway freedom. He lamented that, amidst the glorious circumstances of the time, there should be even the single voice of earl Grey to disturb the general joy by the expression of complaints. After much desultory conversation between lords sation between lords Liverpool, Grenville, and Holland, the motion was lost by a large majority.

In the House of Commons the arguments of Mr. Whitbread were urged with the same want of success as those of lord Grey. He asserted that the crown prince of Sweden had not fulfilled the stipulations of the treaty, by which we had agreed to assist him in the subjugation and annexation of Norway. This was his firm opinion; and it was, he believed, the opinion of the highest military authorities, that Sweden had not given that assistance to the common cause which she was bound by the express conditions of this unprincipled contract to give. He should like to have had the opinions of sir Charles Stewart, and of marshal Blucher, as to the effec tive co-operation of Sweden at the battle of Leipsic, and after that battle, after the allies had entered France, or when they were under the walls of Paris. With respect to the charge of treachery against Denmark, in defeating the cession of Norway, which she herself had formerly made, it was sufficiently answered by the ratification of the original treaty with that country, so late as the 19th of April, when it was plain that the allies were perfectly satisfied with the conduct and good faith of the king of Denmark. Every one knew what blockade meant in the present instance. It was not intended to prevent the sending of arms or ammunition to Norway, but to cut off her supplies of food, to inflict upon her that which had been described by Mr. Burke as the greatest of all possible calamities, as a calamity so dreadful that every humane mind. shuddered and turned away from its contemplation. Would not the house pause, then, before they proceeded to this last act of aggravated injustice