Should the Russian trader put off direct intercourse with India for a while, and confine his operations to Afghanistan, five easy marches will take his caravan from Sarakhs to Herat, and if he goes beyond, the distance from Herat to Candahar is less than from Tiflis to Baku. From Sarakhs all the way to Candahar is only ten miles longer than from Baku to Batoum. Hence, apparently the time is not far distant when the Parsees will be back again at Baku, not to worship the Everlasting Fire, but for the purpose of buying lamp oil for the bazaars of India, and other commonplace objects. What will be the effects of such intercourse I have no space to discuss in this work, but some suggestions as to their character may be found in the Appendix. We cannot prevent this intercourse. The past and present policy of Mr. Gladstone's Government, of making a Chinese wall of Afghanistan to keep out the Russian trader and Russian tchinovnik, is so appallingly stupid that one cannot wonder at the statesmen of St. Petersburg holding our ministers in such high esteem. Even now that Russia is upsetting things right and left in Central Asia, they still continue to hope that a couple of towns held by a rabble will indefinitely separate the two empires. Yet nothing on earth and nothing in heaven can prevent the approximation of Russia and India. If we do not secure at once a strong frontier to defend India, Russia will organize a strong frontier to assail it. And when she gets that strong frontier, England will have to be on her good behaviour in the East. On this account, with the Cossack entrenching himself at Merv and Sarakhs, and Kerosine revolutionizing affairs in the Caspian, the time has arrived when we should leave off being, like the Guebers of old-mute devotees before the Altar of Everlasting Talk-and ourselves fashion A MOTTO FOR BOTH LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES. 339 and impress a sound patriotic policy upon our rulers. The Empire first, Party afterwards-this should be our motto; nor can I conceive a loftier aim than that all should combine to uphold that Empire against those forces which have made Old Persia a prey to New Russia, and given over to the sway of the Cossack the magnificent resources of the Region of the Eternal Fire. THE END. APPENDIX. 1.- SKOBELEFF'S PROJECT FOR INVADING INDIA. 5. THE RUSSIAN ANNEXATION OF MERV. SKOBELEFF'S PROJECT FOR INVADING AT various times small extracts have been given from the correspondence of the late General Skobeleff, containing his views of the practicability of a Russian invasion of India. The subjoined is the first complete document, however, that has yet been published on the subject. Its authenticity is beyond question. The italicised passages exist in the original : : Letter from General Skobeleff to a near relative, on the invasion of India, recently found among the papers of the late Prince Tcherkassky. "I thank you heartily for your unchanging remembrance of me. I am thankful, but not surprised; it was by your co-operation that I began life in the military arena, and I am indebted to you for the first impressions of independent military service. To a certain degree I boldly express my conviction that you will henceforth take an interest in me, and assist me to continue to serve exclusively for war, which (after the success I have achieved it has now become manifest) is for me in life not a means but an end; and, moreover, the only one which causes me to value-life. In this is really included the exclusiveness of my ambition, not always intelligible to everybody. You, who with discernment supported me more than twelve years ago, will probably now not refuse my petition, it being of a perfectly identical character; of course, conformably with fresh circumstances and position, as that with which Cornet Skobeleff, of the Horse Guards, stood before you. However, my petition is not altogether of an unconditional character. If I have decided to trouble you, it is because I am firmly persuaded that we have nothing to expect of a decidedly serious nature on the Fart of the inhabitants of Turkestan in the event of a war with Turkey, and that if we are going to fight exclusively with Turkey, or that the idea of the terrible, offensive, decisive, significance of Turkestan in the event of hostilities with England has not yet come to maturity in the highest spheres, it would be too severe a trial to remain here during the war. "The object of this letter is to partly remind you of myself and my recent responsible fighting, but chiefly to express to you with the fullest frankness what in my opinion ought to be and could be undertaken by Turkestan for the glory and greatness of Russia, in the event of a decisive rupture with England. The aim to which I point possesses a great, a world-wide significance. Every Russian, acknowledging the possibility of success, and placed by fate near the affair, cannot fail to display the very significant means which, I allow myself to say, our authorities have accidentally amassed in this country, and with which, with corresponding decision and timely |