N the 5th of September, one day previous to the termination of the armistice, the American general learned that many church bells had been sent from the city to a

foundry called Casa Mata, to be cast into guns, and that immense quantities of powder, balls, and other military stores were arriving at the same

place. As soon as the truce terminated, General Scott determined on an immediate attack upon this place, hoping to deprive the enemy of their cannon and ammunition, both of which were at this time of the greatest importance to them. This determination was further strengthened by the consideration that recent events had deprived the enemy of more than three-fourths of the guns

necessary to defend the strong works at the eight principal gates of the city, which rendered a free communication with the cannon foundry highly essential to Santa Anna's operations. This communication could be cut off only by taking the formidable castle upon the heights of Chapultepec, situated between the city and Casa Mata, and overlooking both. For this dangerous operation the army was not altogether ready, and the earnest desire of General Scott was to avoid altogether, if possible, an attack upon this place, and approach the city by the distant southern approaches, should they be found less formidable. Preparatory to attempting this, he determined upon destroying the foundry and stores at Molino del Rey. The execution of this plan was intrusted to Brevet Major-General Worth.

On the morning of the 7th, Captain Mason, of the engineers, made a close and daring reconnoissance of the lines collateral to Chapulte pec, ascertaining the enemy's position to be as follows:-The left resting upon and occupying the strong stone buildings of Molino del Rey, near a grove at the foot of Chapultepec hill, and directly under the guns of its castle; the right resting upon Casa Mata, at the base of a ridge sloping gradually from the heights above the village of Tacubaya to the plain below. Midway between these buildings was the enemy's field-battery, supported on both sides by infantry.

PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK.

553

HIS reconnoissance was repeated, and verified by Captain Mason and Colonel Duncan, on the afternoon of the same day-the result indicating that the centre was the enemy' weak point, and that of his flanks, the left bordering on Molino del Rey, was the stronger. Generals Scott and Worth accompanied the engineers during the afternoon. The examination, however, was far from being satisfactory, since, although it afforded a fair observation of the configuration of the ground, and the extent of the enemy's forces, yet, on account of the defences being skilfully masked, only an imperfect idea was obtained of their actual strength.

On the same afternoon, a large body of the enemy was seen hovering about Molino del Rey, within a mile and a third of Tacubaya, where General Scott was stationed with his staff and Worth's division. They did not venture an attack, and the American commander would not derange his plans by offering battle.

General Worth's division was reinforced by two hundred and seventy dragoons and mounted riflemen, under Major Sumner, Cadwalader's infantry and voltigeur regiments, seven hundred and eightyfour strong, three pieces of field artillery, under Captain Drum, and two twenty-four pound battering guns, under Captain Huger. The whole command, thus reinforced, numbered three thousand two hundred men.

The orders of General Scott were that the division should attack and destroy the lines and defences between the Casa Mata and Molino del Rey, capture the enemy's artillery, destroy the machinery and material supposed to be in the foundry, but under no circumstances to make an attack upon Chapultepec. After carrying the works, the troops were to be withdrawn immediately to Tacubaya. The object of attack being connected with Chapultepec, it became necessary to isolate it from the defences of the castle. To effect this object, Colonel Garland's brigade, strengthened by two pieces of Captain Drum's battery, was posted on the right so as to intercept any reinforcements from Chapultepec, and be within sustaining distance of the assaulting party, and Huger's battering guns. The latter were placed on the ridge, five or six hundred yards from Molino del Rey, so as to play upon and detach it from Chapultepec. The assaulting party designed to act against the enemy's centre, consisting of five hundred picked men and officers, commanded by Brever Major Wright, was stationed on the ridge to the left of the battering guns. Colonel Clarke's brigade, under Colonel McIntosh, was

placed farther up the ridge, near Duncan's battery, so as either to protect the American left flank, to sustain the assaulting column, or to discomfit the enemy as circumstances would require. Cadwalader's brigade was held in reserve, in a position on the ridge between the battering guns and McIntosh's brigade, at easy supporting distance from both. Major Sumner, with his cavalry, was ordered to the extreme flank, to act as his own judgment might dictate; and the general disposition of the artillery was confided to Colonel Duncan. HESE preparations were designed

and executed in the most desirable manner, exhibiting in the subsequent result, the military abilities of the general who planned the whole attack, and of those who carried it into effect. The artillery was placed in the best possible position for preventing the arrival of any support from the castle, by breaking the continuous line of defences leading to that place, and distracting the garrison during the charge of Wright's party. This was posted so as to experience the least difficulty from

the nature of the ground, and the presence of the enemy's cavalry. The latter were watched by the intrepid Sumner, and at a wellchosen position, McIntosh's troops were placed in general superin tendence of the whole. But so strong were the Mexican defences, and throughout the whole line so skilfully masked, that but for a strong supporting reserve, Wright's charge-the soul of the entire assault-would probably have failed. Such support was afforded by Cadwalader's brigade, which during the action was called into active service, and contributed in no slight degree to victory.

At three o'clock, A. M., of the 8th, the division commenced its march by columns, each taking a different route. So accurately had every thing been arranged, that notwithstanding the darkness of the night, and the irregularity of the ground, the troops at daylight were found posted in the different positions with as much precision as though on parade. Very soon after the dawn of day, the report of Huger's guns, opening upon Molino del Rey, gave the signal for attack. So heavy were the discharges, that in a short time masses of masonry fell with tremendous noise, and the whole line of intrenchments began to shake. This, uniting with the roar of cannon, and