to ascertain and determine to his satisfaction whether or not it is safe to cross. If he neglects to do that, then he is guilty of such negligence on the subject as will preclude his recovery. If, however, he does that, then he is not guilty of such negligence as will preclude him from recovery."

The sixth assignment alleges error in the following portion of the charge:

"After all, gentlemen, I think you know as well, possibly, as the court, having been here as long as you have, what is meant by these conflicting terms, the exact definition-negligence and contributory negligence."

The undisputed evidence showed that the plaintiff did stop, look, and listen when his horse's head was 5 feet from the track; that he looked up the track 75 feet, which was as far as he could look; and that he saw no car and heard no signal. Assuming that the court erred in holding that the rule did not require plaintiff to stop, this error could not have prejudiced defendant. The excerpts quoted are only a portion of the charge, and, considering the entire charge, we are not satisfied that there was such prejudicial error as to require a reversal of the case. The seventh assignment of error alleges

"That the court erred in not discharging the jury from further consideration of the case when it appeared that one of the jurors had made a private investigation of the premises where the accident had occurred, and had reported his findings during the consideration of the case by the jury."

After the jury had retired to consider their verdict, they returned into court and presented a written question to the court, whereupon the following occurred:

"The Court: No, Mr. Foreman; that is very improper. If any juror has done that, he has done that which he should not have done. I think, Mr. Donaldson, the record should show this. The question that is asked of me by the foreman is, 'Can a juror use knowledge that he has acquired during the noon recess, relative to surroundings, in his argument in the jury room?' The jurors, of

course, will bring to bear in the trial of an issue of fact their general knowledge; but it is improper for a juror, during the progress of a trial, to go out and make an individual, detailed study of the surroundings, in the absence of the other jurors or of the court or of the lawyers. If a juror has done that, he has done that which he should not have done, and, having done that, it would be improper for him to use that as a basis for argument. I am not sure, gentlemen, what the effect of the verdict will be in the light of this disclosure; nevertheless, you may retire and consider the case. That is a matter for subsequent determination."

This conduct of one of the jurors is also made a ground for the motion for a new trial, in denying which the court held that, since there was no conflicting testimony as to the surroundings, and all of the jurymen concurred in the verdict for plaintiff, the defendant could not have been prejudiced by the view of the premises by the individual juror. Defendant contends that, under the rule in this State, the court must presume prejudicial error, and this undoubtedly is the general rule. Churchill v. Alpena Circuit Judge, 56 Mich. 536 (23 N. W. 211); Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Campbell, 140 Mich. 384 (103 N. W.856). Where, however, the only misconduct complained of is, as in this case, that a juryman has viewed the location of an accident on a public street necessarily familiar to many citizens, where the testimony is all one way as to the location and its surroundings, where the court cautions the jury against using such information, and where we can see that it is extremely improbable that such occurrence could have prejudiced the defendant, we adopt the reasonable rule announced by the Supreme Court of Minnesota:

"Not every unauthorized view of the locus in quo will require the setting aside of the verdict. Considerations of practical justice forbid it. It would be an injustice to deprive an innocent party of his verdict simply because there was a casual inspection of the premises by some of the jurors, or because they were familiar with them. If verdicts were set aside for such reasons, there would be no

reasonable limits to litigation, especially in cities where the opportunities are great for jurors personally to view the locality of an accident under consideration." Rush v. Railway Co., 70 Minn. 8 (72 N. W. 734).

See, also, Lyons v. Dee, 88 Minn. 490 (93 N. W. 901). The judgment is affirmed.

MOORE, C. J., and STEERE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, STONE, and OSTRANDER, JJ., concurred. BIRD, J., did not sit.

GRINNELL v. CABLE-NELSON PIANO CO.

1. LIBEL AND SLANDER-PUBLICATION-JOINT DEFENDANTS. All persons who have been engaged in, or have been connected with, the publication of a libel, are responsible for the results.

2. SAME.

Though no direct testimony established the agency of defendants in circulating a libelous letter, evidence that one of the defendants procured the jurat of the writer of the letter, that he forwarded it to the other defendant by whom he was employed, that it was for such employer's interest in competition with plaintiff to publish the statements, and that the writer was afterwards taken into its employ after having certain conferences with its officers, in one of which it appeared that the use of such letter was discussed, that the writing of the same was done at the instance of the other defendant and one of its employés took it and made use of the letter, furnished evidence sufficient to require the submission of the question to the jury.

Error to Washtenaw; Kinne, J. Submitted January 23, 1912. (Docket No. 93.) Decided March 12, 1912.

Case by Ira Grinnell and Clayton A. Grinnell, copartners as Grinnell Bros., against the Cable-Nelson Piano Company and William H. Proctor for libel. A judgment for defendants on a verdict directed by the court is reviewed by plaintiffs on writ of error. Reversed.

William L. January (A. J. Sawyer, Jr., and Geer, Williams, Martin & Butler, of counsel), for appellants.

John P. Kirk and Arthur Brown (M. J. Cavanaugh, of counsel), for appellees.

STONE, J. This is an action on the case for publishing an alleged libel.

The plaintiffs are, and were in 1909, engaged in the business of dealing in musical instruments generally, and in the manufacture and sale of pianos, and are known to the trade as "Grinnell Bros.," and have their principal store at Detroit, and between 30 and 40 branch stores at different places in Michigan. The defendant the CableNelson Piano Company is, and in 1909 was, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of pianos, with its factory at South Haven, Mich., and its principal business office in Chicago. In 1909, and at the time of the trial, Fay S. Cable was its president. In 1909, the defendant Proctor was the agent or traveling salesman of the defendant corporation for the territory comprising Indiana, Ohio, and the lower peninsula of Michigan, residing at Ypsilanti. The defendant corporation had at least 30 or 40 dealers in pianos of its manufacture in this State. Part of Proctor's duties as traveling salesman was to visit dealers, and whenever he learned of anything on these visits which he thought would be of interest to the defendant corporation he would make a report of it. There was keen competition between the plaintiffs and the defendant corporation, and in April, 1909, this competition was "waxing warm," as Mr. Cable expressed it. At Ypsilanti, there was a music dealer by the name of The

odore C. Smoke, who had at one time been in the employ of the plaintiffs, but who had, some time prior to April, 1909, engaged in business on his own account, and was handling at that time the Starr & Baldwin line of pianos, the Henderson line, and the Cable-Nelson pianos, manufactured by the defendant corporation.

Mr. Smoke, under date of April 24, 1909, wrote and addressed to Mr. Proctor the following letter:

"Mr. H. D. PROCTOR,

"Dear Sir:

"City.

"YPSILANTI, 4/24/1909.

"You was speaking to me about the Stile E. Cable Nelson. I guess I had better not order that Stile that is the Stile that the Grinnell Bros. got when they bought out Wolcott at Hillsdale and they took it in the back room and sand-papered the hammers off so as to make it sound tinny. Also let now and then a string down, and took it down to the depot and shipped it to Kalamazoo. Now they are just mean enough to ship one right out here to Ypsilanti. I am not at all afraid of them but I know all their dirty tricks. They fixed a Capin that way in Kazoo once. We sold Mrs. Herb Gilson at Scotts, Mich., a sterling Stile 79 for $65 and this Capin piano. It was at the time Schwankovsky had such a great run on the Capin. And I know they have done the same to the Cable Nelson for I was instructed to help to do it. I am pressing them hard and they'll not be square so I wouldn't be surprised at anything.

"Yours respectfully,

"THEO. SMOKE."

Proctor was at this time acquainted with Smoke, and had made a "consignment" contract with him to handle the Cable-Nelson pianos before this letter was written. Relative to this letter, defendant Proctor testified as follows:

"I called there to solicit an order for some pianos, and Mr. Smoke told me this story from A to Z unsolicited, without any solicitation on my part whatever. I did not ask him for it. He told me this story. I was asking him to buy style E, and he gave this as a reason for not