distance from home was on the eighth Sunday; that there was pain in her head four or five months. The injury happened October 10, 1909, and the case was tried July 5, 1910. At the time of the trial, she testified that she was still suffering from dizzy spells; that she lost a great deal of strength, and was not half as strong as she was before; that her sense of taste and smell were gone. The amount of the verdict has already been stated.

In the case of Buxton v. Ainsworth, 153 Mich. 315 (116 N. W. 1094), which was similar to the one before us, Mr. Justice MONTGOMERY, speaking for the court, said:

"It is claimed by the defendant that the jury would understand these instructions as permitting recovery for the loss of capacity to earn money. In view of the fact that the court had distinctly charged the jury that the plaintiff could not recover for loss of time or for diminished earning capacity on account of such injuries, we do not think the jury could have been misled by this instruc tion. If the verdict had given evidence by the amount of it that there was reasonable ground to believe that the jury had misapprehended the instruction, and that defendant had suffered by reason thereof, we should consider this question more serious. But the verdict in this case was $500, an amount which in itself indicates that the jury could not have misunderstood the instruction as warranting an award of damages for decreased capacity of earning money in the future."

See, also, Farrand v. Aldrich, 85 Mich. 593 (48 N. W. 628); Chapman v. Strong, 162 Mich. 623 (127 N. W. 741). When the extent of the injury and the amount of verdict is considered, we are satisfied the jury was not misled.

Complaint is made because the judge declined to give some of defendant's requests to charge. So far as these requests were proper statements of the law, the general charge fully covered them.

The remaining assignments of error discussed by counsel grow out of the examination of a witness and the comments made by the attorney examining him. The record shows an apparent lack of frankness in the witness

and a continual succession of objections by counsel to the questions which were put. It is evident the trial of the case was pursued with great zeal by counsel on both sides. A good deal of discretion must be lodged with the trial judge as to the extent and manner of the examination of witnesses. We are not satisfied the trial judge abused this discretion.

Judgment is affirmed.

STEERE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, BLAIR, STONE, and OSTRANDER, JJ., concurred. BIRD, J., did not sit.

WILKINS v. DETROIT UNITED RAILWAY.

1. EVIDENCE-EXPERT AND OPINION TESTIMONY-PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-NEW TRIAL.

In reviewing a verdict of $8,000 in favor of a practicing attorney who was injured by defendant street railway company, and claimed to have sustained permanent injuries, held, that the evidence of plaintiff's medical witnesses, although not in complete harmony, was for the jury and supported the verdict.

2. DAMAGES PERSONAL INJURIES-STREET RAILWAYS.

Verdict of $8,000 for permanent injuries to spine and muscles of shoulder, including hardening of muscles and neuritis, affecting earning capacity of practicing attorney who earned upwards of $6,000 a year, held, not excessive.

3. EVIDENCE-TRIAL-CROSS-EXAMINATION.

Nor was it error to refuse to permit defendant to cross-examine plaintiff as to the details of certain litigation in which he had been employed since his injuries.

4. SAME.

The court rightly ruled out an interrogatory of defendant's

counsel whether plaintiff wanted it to go out to the people of the county that his earning capacity had decreased by reason of the accident.

5. SAME PLEADING-DECLARATION-SPECIAL DAMAGES— EFFECT OF INJURY.

Where plaintiff's declaration alleged atrophy of the muscles of plaintiff's shoulder, it was competent to show that the effect thereof had been to cause curvature of his spine, though no allegations in the declaration presented such claim.

6. SAME-LEADING QUESTIONS-TRIAL.

It is within the discretion of the trial court to permit leading questions.

7. NEW TRIAL PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS- PRIVILEGED COM. MUNICATIONS.

Where affidavits presented by both parties on motion for a new trial raised questions of fact, and defendant's affidavits included one by plaintiff's physician, who stated matters which could not be received in evidence, because privileged, the court did not err in holding that the motion for a new trial should be denied.

Error to Wayne; Rohnert, J. Submitted January 10, 1912. (Docket No. 43.) Decided March 29, 1912.

Case by Charles T. Wilkins against the Detroit United Railway for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Corliss, Leete & Joslyn (A. B. Hall, of counsel), for appellant.

Dohany & Dohany, for appellee.

OSTRANDER, J. Plaintiff alleged, and his testimony tended to prove, that he was injured by the negligence of defendant's servants while he was alighting from a car. Some assignments of error relied upon are based upon exceptions to rulings admitting and rejecting testimony, but the argument of appellant is addressed principally to the point that a new trial, which the court below refused, should have been granted because the verdict was exces

sive and was against the weight of the evidence. What is claimed to be newly discovered evidence was presented upon the motion for a new trial and was and is urged as ground for a new trial. We have examined the record, and, as requested to do, have compared the testimony given by the medical men called in behalf of plaintiff and those called in behalf of defendant. It is said in argument that much of the medical testimony produced for plaintiff is loose, contradictory, indefinite, problematical, and unsatisfactory, while that offered for defendant is clear, scientific, and accurate. Plaintiff's version of the time and manner of his injury is not directly disputed. The extent of the injuries received and the immediate and continuing effect of them, and whether and, if at all, how much, the earning capacity of the plaintiff has been diminished thereby, are the principal matters in dispute. There are apparent discrepancies in the testimony for plaintiff, especially when that of the plaintiff himself and that of some of his medical witnesses is compared. There is perhaps a lack of entire agreement on the part of his medical witnesses as to the exact nature and extent of his injuries. The motion for a new trial was not decided by the trial judge but by his successor in office. Therefore we have not before us the opinion of the judge who had superior opportunity to determine the credibility of witnesses.

But we find no want of testimony supporting the theory of the plaintiff, and are not inclined to interpose the judgment of this court for that of the jury, whose particular duty it was to weigh and value the testimony of the medical, as well as that of other, witnesses. There is no such demonstrable, scientific infirmity in the views expressed by the physicians that this court may assume a knowledge with respect thereto superior to that possessed by the jury. The jury was warranted in finding that plaintiff was injured in the manner and with some of the consequences alleged in the declaration, and that he was entitled to recover substantial damages.

Nor do we think we should interfere upon the ground

damages was made. A verPlaintiff is a practicing law

that an excessive award for dict of $8,000 was returned. yer in the city of Detroit. When the cause was tried, he was a candidate for the office of circuit judge of Wayne county. The annual salary of that office is $7,000. He professed himself to be of opinion that if elected to the office he was physically and mentally able and competent to discharge the official duties. The alleged injury was received in February, 1909. The cause was tried in February, 1911. Plaintiff testified that in the year 1910 he earned more than $6,000, and that for certain work done in June, July, and August of the year 1909 he received $1,500, earned by 63 days of work of 7 hours a day

It may be noticed here that error is assigned, based upon the alleged refusal of the court to permit proper cross-examination of plaintiff upon the subject of his earning capacity and the amount of work he did after receiv ing his injury. The ruling excepted to was 'one refusing counsel the right to go further into the details of certain litigation conducted by plaintiff. Plaintiff had testified concerning a certain cause that it took considerable time in court, involved about $18,000 upon the papers, involved about $700 in the end. We cannot say that crossexamination was unduly restricted. Plaintiff testified:

"I can perform my duties as a lawyer now. I do perform duties as a lawyer at a greater strain, that is all."

But there is also testimony of pain endured, and probably to be endured, and of permanent physical injury affecting the nervous system; of neuritis, and of a gradual hardening of muscles. Upon the testimony submitted to the jury, the award of damages was not clearly excessive.

As has been stated, appellant contends that the testimony which was submitted to the jury is not the testimony which should have been submitted to them, and we notice the further assignments of error, based upon exceptions to rulings admitting or rejecting testimony.