the contract and the bar bill, we think there is a fair inference that one offset the other. The decree of the court below is reversed, and one may be entered here in accordance with this opinion. The appellant will recover costs of both courts. STEERE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, BLAIR, STONE, and OSTRANDER, JJ., concurred. BIRD, J., did not sit. PEOPLE v. TART. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-LOCAL OPTION-PRINCIPAL AND AGENTFURNISHING LIQUOR-STATUTES. One who takes money of another living in a county that has adoped prohibition, and in good faith purchases with it, in a county where intoxicating liquor may be lawfully sold, a bottle of whisky, which he delivers to the other in the county of his residence, does not violate 2 Comp. Laws, § 5412 et seq. Error to Oceana; Sessions, J., presiding. Submitted January 18, 1912. (Docket No. 151.) Decided March 30, 1912. Fred Tart was convicted of violating the local-option law. Reversed and respondent discharged. Franz C. Kuhn, Attorney General, and F. E. Wetmore, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Rufus F. Skeels, for respondent. Is one who obtains liquor for and delivers it to another, using the latter's money, guilty of selling the same, see notes in 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 268; 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 334. BROOKE, J. The respondent was convicted of the violation of the local-option law. He has brought the case here by writ of error. The charge in the information is that respondent, at the township of Golden, in Oceana county, did then and there sell, give away, and furnish to one William Mathews a certain quantity of malt, brewed, spirituous, and intoxicating liquors, to wit, one quart of whisky, etc., contrary to the provisions of section 5412, 2 Comp. Laws. The judge charged the jury: "It is the claim of the people in this case that Mr. Tart and Mr. Mathews were employed upon the same farm in the township of Golden, in this county, at the time, and that Mr. Tart went to Muskegon on the 4th day of last July to spend the day; that prior to his going Mr. Mathews gave him $1 and requested him to purchase a dollar's worth of whisky for him in Muskegon and bring it back to him. It is the claim of the people that Mr. Tart took Mr. Mathews' money and purchased a quart of whisky in Muskegon county, and upon his return on the evening of the 4th day of July delivered that quart bottle of whisky to Mr. Mathews; and it is the claim of the people that that constitutes a violation of the local-option law, so called, which, it is conceded, was in force in this county at that time. As a matter of law, gentlemen, you are instructed that if Mr. Tart took Mr. Mathews' money and, acting for him, purchased a quart of whisky in the county of Muskegon and brought it to Mr. Mathews and deliv ered it to him in this county, such an act constituted a furnishing of intoxicating liquor within the law, and, if you find that to be the fact, it will be your duty to convict this respondent and find him guilty. One matter has been called to my attention, gentlemen. The place where the liquor was purchased by Mr. Tart is of no materiality. The crucial question is whether or not he delivered the liquor, under the circumstances, within this county to Mr. Mathews. It wouldn't make any difference whether he bought it in Muskegon county or somewhere else, so far as that part of it is concerned. You may retire, gentlemen." The foregoing excerpt from the charge perhaps sufficiently indicates the character of the act which the court held to be a violation of law. It should, however, be noted that respondent, who was about to go to Muskegon, was asked by Mathews as an accommodation to him to take $1 of his money and purchase a bottle of whisky for him in Muskegon, and bring it back to him in Oceana county. Respondent had no interest in any portion of the liquor purchased for Mathews with the money given him by Mathews for that purpose The question presented is a very simple one. Is an agent, who takes the money of one living in a "localoption" county, and with it purchases liquor in a county where it may be legally sold, which he delivers to his principal in the "local-option" county, guilty of any of fense under the so-called "local-option " law? It is clear that Mathews himself might have gone to Muskegon, bought his bottle of whisky, and carried it back into Oceana county. It is equally clear that a resident of a "local-option" county may order and pay for intoxicating liquors outside his own county and have them shipped to him by express or otherwise. People v. Converse, 157 Mich. 32 (121 N. W. 475). liquor in Oceana This case is to be Curry, 163 Mich. The act of respondent in this case cannot be distinguished upon principle from that of a common carrier. He neither gave, sold, nor furnished the county within the meaning of the act. distinguished from the case of People v. 181 (128 N. W. 213, 30 L. R. A. [N. S.] 892), where the intoxicating liquor was purchased in bulk from a contributed fund, each contributor drinking as much and as often as he chose from the common stock. Here Mathews had an individual and exclusive property in the bottle of whisky which his money had paid for and which was delivered to him. Had there been any question, under the testimony, of the good faith of respondent in performing the act of agency with no interest in the transaction except to accommodate Mathews, that question should have been submitted to the jury under our former decis ions. See People v. Hancock, 166 Mich. 654 (132 N. W. 443). A verdict of acquittal should have been directed as requested by respondent. The judgment is reversed, and respondent discharged. MOORE, C. J., and STEERE, MCALVAY, BLAIR, STONE, and OSTRANDER, JJ., concurred. BIRD, J., did not sit. ZAGELMEYER v. LAUGHRAY CONCRETE BRICK CO. 1. CONTRACTS-PATENTS-INVENTIONS-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ASSIGNMENTS. In a suit for the specific enforcement of a contract to assign to a corporation, which the parties were engaged in promoting, any improvements and inventions the parties might thereafter make in brickmaking machines or in concrete for making brick, a decree requiring the assignment to the company of a subsequently acquired patent of an invention discovered by the promissors in the contract, relating to the subjectmatter of their original patent, was within the rule permitting such contracts to be enforced when the subject-matter of the inventions is described and made definite.1 2. INSOLVENCY-PATENTS-Corporations—CREDITORS' RIGHTS. The president of the corporation, having no lien upon any of its assets, was not entitled to a preference over other creditors of the corporation out of the proceeds of the sale of such patent under the order of the court after the insolvency of the company. Appeal from Bay; Collins, J. Submitted April 6, 1911. (Docket No. 32.) Decided November 3, 1911. Rehearing denied June 1, 1912. Agreement to assign future inventions on sale of patent, see note in 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1094. Bill by Alexander Zagelmeyer against the Laughray Concrete Brick Machine Company, Robert Laughray, G. Frederick Laughray, and Edward Laughray, for specific performance of a contract to convey certain patents. From a decree for complainant, defendants appeal. Modified and affirmed. Lee E. Joslyn, for complainant. BIRD, J. The prayer of the bill of complaint in this cause prayed for the specific performance of a contract made by the complainant with the defendants Laughray. The relief prayed for was granted by the trial court, and the defendants Laughray have appealed. The defendant corporation, a domestic one, was organized in April, 1906, the principal object of which was the manufacturing and selling of brick and brick machinery. The complainant and defendants Laughray were the incorporators and stockholders. For upwards of two years prior to the incorporation of the company, the complainant and defendants worked together under a copartnership agreement, the complainant furnishing the money and the defendants the inventive genius in an effort to perfect an improved machine for making brick. Just prior to the incorporation of the company, but while it was in contemplation, the parties made a contract, the material portions of which are as follows: "Witnesseth, that whereas the parties hereto are about organizing a corporation under the laws of Michigan, under the name of Laughray Concrete Brick Machine Company, with a paid in capital stock of $25,000.00, of which each of the parties hereto subscribes for and owns 625 shares of the par value of $10.00 a share, and whereas as part of the capital stock there will be assigned to the corporation the Laughray patents, United States No. 747,443, dated Dec. 22, 1903, Canadian No. 92,237, dated Mch. 21, 1905, and pending application for patent in the United States patent office: Now, therefore, in consider |