plaintiff in error, v. Peter Wiederer and Leonard Wiederer, arising on an importation of pieces of glass, square, oblong, or round, with ground or beveled edges described in the invoice as "glass unsilbert." Duty was assessed at the rate of 45 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 135 of the tariff act of March 3, 1883, as articles of glass, cut. The importers claim that the merchandise was dutiable either as parts of watches, under paragraph 494 of said act, which imposed a duty of 25 per cent ad valorem upon watches, watch cases, watch movements, parts of watches and watch materials not specially enumerated or provided for, or as parts of clocks under paragraph 414, which laid a duty of 30 per cent ad valorem upon "clocks and parts of clocks."

On the trial of the case, the claim that the merchandise was dutiable as parts of watches was abandoned by the importers, who insisted that it should have been assessed as parts of clocks.

The evidence in the case tended to show that this particular merchandise had been imported for use in the manufacture of clocks, but it was also shown that similar merchandise was sometimes used by manufacturers of hand mirrors, by carriage manufacturers, by photographers, by perfumers, by makers of lamps, and for other objects.

While the decision of the Supreme Court in this case is adverse to the Government, such result is partly due to the failure to take proper exceptions on the trial of the case in the court below.

The decision upon the merits of the case may be, however, considered as favorable to the Government, in so far as it lays down a very clear definition of the term "chief use." On this subject the court holds that the paragraph of the tariff law considered in this case (Magone v. Wiederer), namely, that relating to parts of clocks, is subject to the same rules of application as laid down in Magone v. Heller (150 U. S., 70), the court stating:

"It follows that whilst Magone v. Heller adhered to the settled rule of chief use, a guide was there announced by which to discover whether the facts established such chief use. Chief use in itself is a vague and uncertain term. Magone v. Heller, therefore, held that chief use was to be ascertained by that which was commonly, practically, and generally done, and was not to be overthrown by an occasional exception for practical or experimental purposes. Thus. we repeat, Magone v. Heller, whilst enforcing and applying the rule of chief use, furnished the instrument for determining and measuring its operation and giving certainty to its application."

This Heller case was decided under a clause relating to "substances expressly used for manure;" the court now holding that "express use" is the same as" chief use," and quoting with approval from Magone v. Heller the following language:

"If the only common use of a substance is to be made into manure, or to be itself spread upon the land as manure, the fact that occasionally or by way of experiment it is used for a different purpose will not take it out of the exception. But if it is commonly, practically, and profitably

used for a different purpose, it can not be considered as used expressly for manure, even if in the majority of instances it is so used."

Had these rulings been fully given to the jury by the trial judge as they are set out in the Supreme Court's opinion the verdict would probably have been for the Government. It may also be added that in this Wiederer case the jury was apparently allowed to consider the actual subsequent use of the particular articles imported. This evidence, though doubtless of great weight with them, was incompetent under the recent case of Sonn v. Magone, decided November 11 last by the Supreme Court.

Under the circumstances, you are hereby authorized to take the usual steps for satisfying the judgment in this case, but, for the reasons stated, the Wiederer case can not be regarded as supporting the contentions of the importers in other cases arising under the clause of the tariff of 1883 relating to parts of clocks.

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, December 2, 1895. In the matter of the protest, 96231 a-7903, of Messrs. Merck & Co., against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain merchandise, imported per Marthara, and entered February 26, 1895.

Opinion by WILKINSON, General Appraiser.

The merchandise is potassium metal. It was assessed for duty as a manufacture of metal at 35 per cent under paragraph 177, act of August 28, 1894, and is claimed to be dutiable at 10 per cent or at 20 per cent under section 3.

The article is the metal potassium in its crudest form, obtained or manufactured from tartar or potash. While it is a crude metal, it is a manufactured article, and, following our ruling in the "Ferrochrome" case (G. A. 3123), we sustain the claim that it is dutiable at 20 per cent under section 3.

(16720-G. A. 3308.)

Cotton anklets or cuffs, knit.

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, December 4, 1895. In the matter of the protest, 87619a-8479, of Schefer, Schramm & Vogel, against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain merchandise, imported per La Champagne, and entered February 27, 1895.

Opinion by TICHENOR, General Appraiser.

We find that the goods here in question are cylindrical knit cotton anklets or cuffs, with one raw and one seamed or finished border, which

are intended to be sewn or otherwise permanently attached to drawers or undershirts to make them fit closely about the ankle or wrist, and are known either as anklets or cuffs, being of the same general character as the goods which were the subject of Board's decision of December 15, 1893 (G. A. 2372).

In accordance with said decision, which was affirmed by the United States circuit court for the southern district of New York, in re United States v. Field & Wagener (see synopsis 15739) we sustain the claim of the protestants that these goods are dutiable at 35 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 264 of the act of August 28, 1894, and reverse the collector's decision in the assessment of duty thereon at 40 per cent ad valorem as "cotton wearing apparel" under paragraph 258 of said act.

(16721-G. A. 3309.)

Fish, the product of American fisheries.

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, December 9, 1895.

In the matter of the protest, 26644b-147, of T. M. Nicholson, against the decision of the collector of customs at Boston, Mass., as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain merchandise, imported per N. E. Symonds, and entered February 11, 1895.

Opinion by LUNT, General Appraiser.

The crew

We find the facts in this case to be substantially as follows: On or about the 20th of November, 1894, the schooner N. E. Symonds, of 125 tons burden, registered, cleared from the port of Castine, bound for Newfoundland, having on board, as shown by her manifest, certain stores for the vessel and also a supply of merchandise, 574 tons of salt for curing fish and 50 empty fish barrels. The master also had with him $900 in gold. The vessel was supplied with a seine boat, 2 dories, 2 seines 200 fathoms in length, and 15 or 16 herring nets. consisted of the master, mate, and 5 seamen. The vessel first proceeded to Fortunes Bay, Newfoundland, and entered at the custom-house at St. Jacques, where the master paid light-house dues and duties upon that portion of his cargo specified in the manifest as merchandise, including the salt. The vessel then sailed from Fortunes Bay to the narrow waters west of Sound Island, at the inner extremity of Placentia Bay, in or near Black River, and later to the waters west of Woody and of Barren Island, a few miles distant from Black River.

American vessels, under existing local laws and the treaties with Great Britain, have not the right to take fish in the waters aforesaid, and in order to procure a cargo the master, furnishing seines and boats, engaged from twenty to thirty of the local fishermen and inhabitants to take herring at a certain price per barrel, the herring being delivered on the deck of the vessel. Fifty barrels were salted and packed and the remainder were salted and stowed in bulk. In the taking of these

fish the ends of the seines were drawn to the shore and the fish so impounded were dipped into boats and thence delivered over the side of the vessel, the crew performing such portion of the labor as was required of them. The local fishermen were no part of the crew of the vessel, and they were paid for the fish in money and merchandise, and the seines and seine boat were left with some of them, the value of the whole being equivalent to about $1 per barrel for the fish, which price was the price paid to the local fishermen in the harbors of Newfoundland at that time for fresh herring so delivered.

When the lading was completed, the vessel, on the 17th day of January, 1895, cleared from the custom-house at Black River for Bucksport, Me., 1,500 barrels of salted herring being specified in the clearance as her cargo.

The vessel touched at Gloucester and entered at Boston on or abont February 11, 1895. The collector assessed duty upon said herring at one-half of 1 cent per pound under the provisions of paragraph 210 of the act of August 28, 1894, and the protestant, T. M. Nicholson, claims free entry as fish taken by an American fishing vessel for which no entry is required, or that they are exempt from duty under paragraph 568 of said act as fish "the product of American fisheries."

We find that said fish are herring salted and that the same are not the product of American fisheries.

The protest is overruled and the decision of the collector affirmed.

(16722-G. A. 3310.)

Protest effective as to goods not advanced in value, regardless of nonpayment of increased duties on other goods in the same entry.

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, December 13, 1895.

In the matter of the protest, 69510 a-7273, of Adolph Strauss & Co., against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain merchandise, imported per Havel, and entered April 26, 1894.

Opinion by SHARRETTS, General Appraiser.

The goods covered by this protest are described in the invoice as hairpins, and we find those indicated by pattern numbers 220 to 229, inclusive, to be pins metallic. We therefore hold that the goods of the designated numbers come within the provision for such goods in paragraph 206 of the act of October 1, 1890, and to that extent the claim in the protest is sustained.

The collector states to the Board in his letter of transmittal that the increased duty found to be due on the liquidation of the entry was not paid by the importers until more than ten days after the liquidation of the entry, but an examination of the papers discloses the fact that this increased duty did not apply to the goods on which we afford relief to

the importers, they having been liquidated at the same rate of duty as that at which they were entered. On the facts as presented to us we hold that the importers have complied with the provision in section 14 of the act of June 10, 1890, in which they are required to pay the full amount of duties ascertained to be due on their merchandise if it is entered for consumption.

[Withheld for review.]

(16723-G. A. 3311.)

Protests-Inclusion of Sundays in time limited for filing.

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, December 13, 1895.

In the matter of the protest, 86858 a-6728, of August Pollman, against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain merchandise, imported per Amalfi, and entered September 9, 1895.

Opinion by SOMERVILLE, General Appraiser.

The entry in this case was liquidated by the collector at the port of New York on Tuesday, March 28, 1895.

The protest was filed on Monday, April 8, 1895. The collector declined to consider or entertain it, on the ground that the paper was not filed within the time specified in section 14 of the Customs Administrative Act, which limitation is required to be "within ten days after * * * such ascertainment and liquidation of duties."

The question raised for decision by the Board is whether Sunday is to be excluded or included in estimating the statutory period of ten days, where the last day on which a protest is ordinarily required to be filed falls on Sunday.

The counsel for the importers has filed with the Board an able and persuasive argument, in which he contends that it is a rule of statutory construction, as well as of the common law, that where the last of a number of days allowed for the doing of an act falls on Sunday, the act may be done on the next day.

There are many authorities that sustain this view which we would be inclined to follow as announcing a doctrine both just and reasonable, if we were not embarrassed by controlling authorities to the contrary (Endlich on Inter. Statutes, sec. 393, note 216, where the adjudged cases are cited.)

But the precise question in controversy has been determined by the circuit court for the southern district of New York in the case of Shefer v. Magone (47 Fed. Rep., 872), where Judge Lacombe, in construing section 2931 of the Revised Statutes, United States, held the contrary view, and decided in precisely a parallel case that the whole question is one of statutory regulation by Congress, and that its legislation is necessarily exclusive, and does not permit the tenth day to be excluded when it