by the two conjointly were published by Studemund in 1884. In the years 1878 and 1883, says Studemund, 'acriter intenta oculorum acie nonnullorum locorum desperatorum lectionem nuperrime perficere potui, in aliis id certe discernere potui, utrum id quod aut a nobis aut ab aliis viris doctis divinando coniectum esset in codice extare potuerit necne. Atque utinam saepius coniecturae tot laboribus excogitatae codice confirmatae essent!' Among corrections which should have now been made in Mr. Poste's text are the following:-i. 74 'duxerit' should be dixerit': ib. 77 'item' should be itaque': ib. 182 amittit' should be 'amittet': ii. 47 'idque ita' should be id ita': ib. 82 'accepit' should be 'accipit': ib. 151 nihilo' should be non ideo': ib. 151 a 'quid ergo est' should be 'sit quid (ergo?)': in iv. 62 the MS. knows nothing of the last five actions said (in italics, be it acknowledged) to be bonae fidei: iv. 170 'sponsiones non faciat sponsionumve iudicia non accipiat' should give facit' and 'sponsionis': ib. 178 aliqua ' should be alia': ib. 181 religio iniungitur' should be 'religioni iungitur.' It may be said that these are small matters, and perhaps (except in i. 74) they make little difference in sense; but, nevertheless, no edition of Gaius can be considered up to date whose text does not embody the latest ascertained readings of the Veronese palimpsest.

In the second place, we cannot help thinking that the book would have been improved by the omission of those passages in the Commentary in which the editor diverges into the by-paths of abstract jurisprudence. Nothing, we suppose, is more certain, than that Gaius can be thoroughly understood by a reader who knows nothing of Austin or his ways of looking at law; indeed, an opinion may be hazarded that sometimes Austin is absolutely a stumbling-block and obstacle to an intelligent reading of a Roman legal writer. Still less useful are the references to Aristotle's Ethics and the Syllogism, which (we may be thankful) are not so numerous as the interpolated passages dealing with Right, Duty (always called Obligation), Sanction, Title, and so forth. We should be very much surprised to find that one English student of Gaius out of fifty has any knowledge of logic. Those who have may perhaps discover that it throws an unexpected light on, legal phenomena (p. 10), on conditions (p. 362), on the relation of Institutions to Rights' (p. 22), or on the time-honoured distinction between rights acquired through titles and rights acquired ex lege immediate (p. 183); those not so blest will probably understand their Gaius fairly well without it. A distinguished Oxford professor has said that the possession of the Syllogism (in conjunction with original sin) is what distinguishes man from Tà Coa, and therefore it must be a good thing: we merely submit that it (and Austin and Aristotle) is out of place in a commentary upon a writer who wants so much real exposition as does Gaius.

The commentary proper does not appear to have been subjected to much alteration, and it fully deserves, as a whole, the great esteem in which it has been held since its original publication. Many of the notes are quite excellent, and always have been so. Nevertheless, we feel bound to say that there are others among them which we hoped Mr. Poste would have reconsidered when a new edition of his work was called for, or which, whether old or new, we cannot regard as accurate or sufficient to the purpose. The ghost of Savigny's fantastic theory as to mutuum—nexum— execution-slain over and over again, not least effectively by Savigny's admirer Puchta,-stalks repeatedly across Mr. Poste's pages, where it gravely poses as a thing of solid flesh and blood, whose truth and reality are indisputable (e. g. pp. 330, 346, 388); in the second of these passages Gaius' own statement (iv. 21) that manus iniectio was the proper proceeding on all

judgment debts is by implication treated as undeserving of credit. We might indeed show by other examples (e. g. p. 409) that the fascination which this great writer exercises over Mr. Poste is too great to allow of any criticism even in matters where criticism is now admitted to have had the best of it, but want of space demands that we shall proceed to point out minor notes which stand in need of correction or re-statement. The evidence that the exceptio doli was introduced by a praetor named Cassius (p. 140) is of the flimsiest description, and Haenel has as good as proved that it was the work of Gallus Aquilius: Mr. Poste can hardly have read the additions and corrections (p. xxvii) to the late Professor Muirhead's Roman Law. A usufructuary would soon have found out to his cost (Dig. 7. 1. 10) that 'silva caedua' is not 'timber,' as it is rendered on p. 156; and most readers will rub their eyes on seeing Traditio coordinated with Mancipatio, &c. as a Title by Civil Law' (p. 158)—which indeed Mr. Poste himself seems to have thought better of in his index (p. 682). On p. 190 we have without comment the statement (based on a Tribonianism in Inst. ii. 1. 41) that Traditio was a recognised mode of conveyance at the date of the Twelve Tables, which, whether true or not, is irreconcilable with the Commentary on p. 162. The determination of res mancipi (p. 158) is nothing short of absurd, being based on the assumption that horses and oxen have more 'individual character' than sheep or swine: it further describes the latter animals as 'fungible things,' though how 'fungible' passes our comprehension. The note on power of sale in mortgage (p. 195) is misleading: Javolenus is speaking of pignus qua pignus, Ulpian of pignus after the extension to it of the rules and rights of hypotheca. The number of witnesses required for a will (as Justinian tells us in the passage to which Mr. Poste refers) was derived from the Edict, not from the Civil Law (p. 207). Why heres should always be rendered 'devisee' is an unsolved mystery. The note on ii. 147 lays down as true of all capitis deminutio a rule which applied to c. d minima only. On p. 240 Mr. Poste remarks, 'of Roman testators Justinian says rather crudely," most parents disinherit or pretermit their children without any cause" the statement would not appear so 'crude' if plerumque' were taken not with 'parentes,' but with 'sine causa,' to which it obviously belongs. On the same page there is a most misleading statement about the lex Falcidia and the querela inofficiosi. On p. 265 the date of the lex Voconia is supposed to have been' B. C. 169: thirty-four pages later it is unhesitatingly given as B. c. 168. We are unaware of the authority upon which it is stated (p. 264) that the Epistola Hadriani superseded the lex Furia de Sponsu: it is commonly believed that they related to different forms of suretyship. Finally, we may doubt whether Mr. Poste is correct in saying (p. 454) that relative negligence, like culpa lata, is now generally assimilated to intentional wrong': certainly the Roman lawyers themselves furnish no justification for so treating it. These criticisms are suggested by the commentary on the first three books of the text: only want of space debars us from indicating passages in the last part of the volume which would appear to be equally susceptible of improvement.

Commentaries on the Present Laws of England. By THOMAS BRETT. In two volumes. London: William Clowes & Sons, Ld. 1890. 8vo. evi, xxiii and 1233 pp.

It is in vain to expect catholicity of legal knowledge in any man of less calibre than Blackstone. No man can hope to be absolute in all the numbers

of English law. The most he can aspire to be is an authority in one or more provinces of our law. So that we open Mr. Brett's volumes without expecting too much. We must say at once that we find even less than we expected. It is impossible to deal with such a subject as Executors' in five short pages, or with Costs' in three, and it is not fair to claim that an adequate representation of Deceit' is given by a statement of Smith v. Chadwick, followed by a statement of, and some cuttings from the judgments in, Derry v. Peek. It would have been well to refer at least to the character of the action, and to its bearing on the prospectuses of companies, if not also to the reasoning adverse to the decision in Derry v. Peek. Of course we cannot expect to have all points summarised in some twelve hundred pages, but it would be far more to the purpose to give in general terms the nature and bearings of the action of deceit than to adopt the easy course of quoting from one or two of the leading cases of modern times under this head. We find it difficult to understand a statement of Mr. Brett's about churchwardens: he writes that they can only dispose of the church goods, and the consent of the parishioners and the leave of the ordinary is strictly required.' Apart from the grammar of this sentence, we are puzzled to know whether or not it means that churchwardens alone can dispose of the church property. Or does he mean that churchwardens can only dispose of church goods with the consent of the parishioners, the leave of the ordinary being also required? We are surprised to find that in dealing with the subject of nuisance, to which Mr. Brett devotes two pages, he does not give the often-quoted definition of a private nuisance from Walter v. Selfe, though he is very exact in distinguishing public and private nuisances as was done in Soltau v. De Held. This we expect to find in a book designed for students who desire to obtain within a reasonable compass a statement of the present laws of England.' If two pages are allotted to a statement of Vagliano's action against the Bank of England, surely it shows some want of proportion to give no more space to the important subject of master and servant. It would have been well to warn the student reader of the fact that Vagliano may lose his judgment in the House of Lords, and after all his case, though it raises a very interesting point upon the Bills of Exchange Act, can hardly be said to lay down any new principles of law. We have searched in vain through Mr. Brett's pages and index for any trace of that curious tenure which is known as customary freehold. Although there is substantial truth in Bishop Wilberforce's dictum about Convocation, that it can talk as much as it pleases, but can do nothing, we think that this assembly deserves something more of notice than Mr. Brett awards to it. He says in a footnote that it has ceased to exercise any legislative powers, without noticing that for a long series of years, from 1721 to 1858, it was altogether in abeyance. And if it is necessary to state that an archdeacon must be a man of twenty-five at least, surely it would have been well to give the minimum age for a bishop, which is thirty. If reference is made to Phillimore v. Machon (1 P. D. 488), it should also be made to Re A. B., Clerk (11 P. D. 56). We doubt the necessity, in a book for students, of giving such details as the five kinds of deans, and we doubt the wisdom of giving for such readers long lists of cases more or less bearing upon the subject-matter of the chapter. How can a learner be expected to look up the twenty-four cases on the Settled Land Act which Mr. Brett appends to his chapter on settlements, or the twenty-six cases 'which may be usefully consulted on the subject of charities'? Apropos of citing cases, we must take exception, not only to a decision being dubbed 'reluctant,' but also to the constant practice of referring to the Weekly Notes,' and even to the Times' Law Reports, and Brett's Leading Cases.' Surely all these

last-named decisions are chronicled elsewhere. We have noticed several instances of carelessness in correcting proofs. One of the most flagrant is in the résumé which Mr. Brett gives of the Mortmain Act, 1888, where by a copyist's error in leaving out more than two lines of sect. 6 (2) absolute nonsense is made of a sentence. It is hardly correct to say, with Mr. Brett, that Lord St. Leonards' will gave rise to litigation. It was the absence of his will which gave rise to litigation. We have dwelt long enough on the faults of this book. We would say, in conclusion, that Mr. Brett's statements of law are, generally speaking, clear and good. And we think his plan of citing in the main modern cases, which are not only more accessible, but also more readable and more intelligible than older decisions, is distinctly to be commended.

The Law of Trade Marks, &c. By LEWIS BOYD SEBASTIAN. Third Edition. London: Stevens & Sons. 1890. 8vo. lxxii and 724 PP.

MR. SEBASTIAN's standard work on trade marks now appears in a third edition, with an increased bulk of more than 150 pages. The increased bulk is due, to the extent of about sixty pages, to the mass of decided cases, English and American, which have accumulated during the last six years; and, for the rest, consists of the addition of much inevitable matter to the appendices. To this latter part of the volume are now transferred the 'International arrangements,' which were inserted, probably by reason of their late appearance, in the preliminary matter of the second edition. The most important addition consists of the Merchandize Marks Act, 1887 (which repealed the inefficient and hardly intelligible Act of 1862), with the consequential Customs Regulations and General Orders. These form, having regard to section 103 of the Patents &c. Act of 1883 and the existing international arrangements, an important and interesting code for industrial protection. The countries who have acceded to these international arrangements now include Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Norway, Switzerland and the United States of America. The continued abstention of Germany is a fact to be noted. It is a policy that may suit a certain class of manufacturers, but whether it makes for the permanent reputation or benefit of German industries, is at least questionable.

We have also received t

A Treatise on the law of Estoppel and its application in practice. By MELVILLE M. BIGELOW. Fifth edition. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co. 1890. La. 8vo. lix and 791 pp.-There is a new chapter in this edition on estoppel by negligent conduct without express representation. The fact that it is the fifth edition, and published only three years after the fourth, is more eloquent than any critical commendation of ours could be.

A Treatise on Private International Law, with principal reference to its practice in England. Third edition. By JOHN WESTLAKE, Q.C. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Lim. 8vo. xxvi and 382 pp.-The Preface to the third edition of this well-known work states that the English authorities are brought down to date, but the scope and plan of the work are not altered.'

The Law of Arbitration, &c. By W. OUTRAM CREWE. London: W. Clowes & Sons, Lim. 1890. 8vo. xxxviii and 119 pp.

The Law Relating to Public Statutory Undertakings, comprising Railway Companies, Water, Gas and Canal Companies, Harbours, Docks and Piers, &c. By J. B. STREET. London: Stevens & Sons, Lim. 8vo. xvi and 228 pp.

The Law relating to Apprentices.

By EVANS AUSTIN. London: Reeves & Turner. 1890. 8vo. xvi and 216 pp.

An Historical Sketch of the Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery (being the Yorke Prize Essay of the University of Cambridge for 1889). By D. M. KERLY. Cambridge University Press. 1890. 8vo. vi and

303 pp.

History of the Court of Chancery and of the rise and development of the doctrines of Equity. By A. H. MARSH, Q.C. Toronto: Carswell & Co. 1890. 8vo. viii and 140 pp.

The Stamp Duties on Sea Insurances. By E. K. ALLEN. London: C. & E. Layton. 1890. 8vo. 139 pp.

Graeco-Roman Institutions, from anti-evolutionist points of view. By EMIL REICH. Oxford: Parker & Co. 1890. 8vo. 100 pp.

American and English Railroad Cases. Vol. XLI, Northport, Long Island, N. Y.: Edward Thompson Co. 1890. La. 8vo. viii and 737 PP.

The Confirmation of Executors in Scotland, according to the Practice in the Commissariot of Edinburgh. By J. G. CURRIE. Second Edition. Edinburgh: W. Green & Sons. 1890. 8vo. xii and 372 pp.