1. To reform a deed on the ground of mistake, it must be
shown conclusively that such mistake was mutual.
Where the bill does not allege, nor the accompanying
affidavits state, that the mistake was mutual, and the
answer denies it, the deed cannot be rectified. Ramsey
v. Smith,
See MORTGAGE, 2, 7; Partnership; Vendor and Vendee, 1.
Account.
See PRACTICE, 5.
Acknowledgment.
See DEED, 1.
Ademption.
See LEGACY, 6-8.
1. A testator gave the residue of his estate to his executors,
in trust to pay one-sixth thereof to the children of a
deceased daughter, and to pay the income of the remain-
ing five shares to his children during their natural lives,
and then their shares to go to their issue respectively;
and if any of his children should die leaving no lawful
issue, the share of such child should sink into the resi-
due; and, in order to make an equal division of his
estate, that any obligations he might hold against any of
his children, and all advances to any of them charged
against them in his accounts, should be deducted from
their respective shares, and income allowed them only
on the residue, and the lawful issue of any child should
take only such residue. At the time of testator's death,
four of his children were indebted to him on obligations
held by him, one son to an amount exceeding his share
of the estate; that son had a daughter (his only child)
living when the will was made, but she has since died.
The testator assigned as a gift to one of his daughters a
bond and mortgage given by her husband (she joining in
the latter) on his property, but whether this was charged
to her in testator's accounts does not appear.-Held,
(1) That if no such charge against her was made, it
cannot be deducted from her share.
(2) That the son who was indebted to the estate in
excess of his share, must pay such excess, and no more.
(3) Query, Whether the English rule that "dying with-
out leaving issue" means having had no lawful issue, and
hence that the death of such issue during the parent's
life-time, does not destroy such issue's prior vested inter-
est, has been adopted here. Sayre v. Sayre,
1. A real estate broker employed to find a purchaser for land,
is bound to disclose to his principal any facts known to
him, material to the transaction, and, if the broker takes
part in the negotiation, he is bound to exert his skill for
the benefit of his principal. Young v. Hughes,
2. Purchasers obtaining a contract for the sale of land through
a real estate broker who, with their knowledge and in
collusion with them, has concealed material facts from
his principal or exerted his skill in the negotiation
against his principal, cannot in equity enforce the con-
tract, and such a contract will be set aside. Id.,
3. The state treasurer of New Jersey, being informed that the
State Bank at New Brunswick, in which he had a deposit
of $33,900 of state funds, was in an embarrassed condi-
tion, drew on that fund, and deposited his draft for col-
lection in the Trenton Bank, in which he also kept a
state account. The amount of the draft was credited to
the treasurer, and it was forwarded for collection the
same day, received by the State Bank the next day,
charged to the treasurer and credited to the Trenton
Bank. At one o'clock on that day the State Bank closed
its doors on account of insolvency, and is now in the
hands of a receiver.-Held, that the Trenton Bank only
acted as a collecting agent for the accommodation of the
state, in the matter, and was not chargeable with the
loss of the amount of the draft; but, even if it were
otherwise liable, the failure of the treasurer to communi-
cate to the Trenton Bank his knowledge or information
of the failing condition of the State Bank, would, in
equity, discharge the former bank. Freeholders of Middle-
sex v. State Bank at New Brunswick,
See CORPORATION, 5.
See DIVORCE, 2; SOLICITOR, 1.
1. The discretion of the court in allowing answers to be
amended should always be exercised cautiously, and
leave should never be granted except when necessary to
the doing of justice. Mechanics National Bank v. Burnet
Mfg. Co.,
2. When the testimony is adapted to the general frame of the
bill, although it does not conform to it in every particu
lar, an amendment of such bill is not in all cases neces-
sary before decree. Thornton v. Ogden,
3. Query, Whether an amendment of a bill at the final hearing
can be allowed, when such amendment consists of facts
that falsify materially the facts originally stated. Id.,
Appeal.
1. It is entirely discretionary with the orphans court to re-
state an administrator's account or not, and from such
determination no appeal lies. Moore v. Raggi,
2. The statute (Rev. p. 771 2 86) provides that an appeal from
the decree of the orphans court, on a claim against an
insolvent estate, must be taken within twenty days from
the time of rendering the decree. Exceptions to a claim
were heard October 10th, 1879. About November 15th,
1879, the court rendered its decision, but announced no
time for signing the decree. The decree was signed
December 2d, 1879, which was not a regular court day,
and was marked as filed as of that date, by "G. L., late
surrogate." G. L. was not then the surrogate of the
county. On December 17th, 1879, the appellant's proc-
tor inquired for it of the actual surrogate, who did not
know of its existence, but searched for and found it on
that day, and marked it filed as of that date.-Held, that
an appeal taken on December 31st, 1879, was within the
time limited by the statute. Young v. Young,
3. General creditors of an estate are not "aggrieved," within
the meaning of the constitution, and hence have no
right to appeal from an order of the orphans court direct-
ing lards to be sold to pay debts of such estate. Parker
v. Reynolds,
4. An order made in the progress of the cause, finding a party
in contempt, and compelling him to give a bond securing
the return of certain moneys received by him, such bond
having been given, is not appealable. Knauss v. Jones,
5. One cannot appeal from a decree of the court of chancery
to this court, for the purpose of having the decree
affirmed. He must appear to be aggrieved, or he has no
standing here. Green v. Blackwell,
6. An appellant, who complains of one portion of a decree in
chancery, does not thereby acquire the right to ask for
the affirmance of other and independent parts of the
decree of which no one complains. Id.,
7. An executor or trustee, representing the interests of per-
sons who are otherwise unrepresented in the cause, is
entitled to appeal from a decree which injuriously affects
those interests. Id.,
See EXECUTORS, 1; JURISDICTION, 5.
See DEED, 4; INSURANCE, 1; MORTGAGE, 8, 9; SOLICITOR, 2.
1. By a decree of this court, Carrie E. Black recovered $2,900
(which was afterwards, on appeal, reduced to $1,000)
against her husband, Clayton Black. Her solicitor
claimed the promissory note for $1,000 on which the last
decree was based, by assignment from her, for profes-
sional services, and, also, claimed the decree by another
assignment. By an attachment levied on "cash in hands
of Clayton Black," one of her creditors also claimed the
money due on the decree.-Held,
(1) That money due on a decree of this court, is not
the subject of attachment.
(2) That the levy was not effectual.
(3) That the solicitor's claim could not be passed upon
without notice to his client and proof by him to sustain
his claim. Black v. Black,
2. Moneys in the hands of a sheriff, raised by him in pursuance
of a decree of this court, is not liable to seizure by
Cairo & Fulton R. R. v. Titus, 3 Stew. Eq. 502.
Reversed, Cairo & Fulton R. R. v. Titus................................
Central R. R. Co. of N. J. v. Penna. R. R. Co., 4 Stew. Eq. 475.
Reversed, National Docks R. R. Co. v. Central R. R. Co.... 755
Jones v. Knauss, 4 Stew. Eq. 609.
Affirmed, Knauss v. Jones.........
Kittredge v. Neumann, 11 C. E. Gr. 195.
Distinguished, Clark v. Butler..............
Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Society, 3 Stew. Eq. 145.
Affirmed, Society v. Lehigh Valley R. R........
Marsh v. Mitchell, 11 C. E. Gr. 497..........
Affirmed....................
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