It is provided by the Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), that the vestries shall appoint persons to remove all dirt, ashes, &c., within their parish; that if the owner of any premises shall require the scavenger to remove the refuse of any trade, such owner shall pay to the scavenger a reasonable sum for such removal; that the justices shall determine whether the matter is or is not the refuse of trade, and the decision of such justices shall be final. REG. v. BRIDGE. 1890. Practice- Statement of summary Refusal of court to state case-Ques tion of law- term used in refuse "- The Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49), s. 33, enacts that any person aggrieved who desires to question the jurisdictionorder of a court of summary jurisdiction, on the ground that it is erroneous in point of law, may apply to the court to state a case, and, if the court decline to state the case, may apply to the High Court of Justice for an order requiring the case to be stated. The vestry of St. M. refused to remove, unless paid for doing so, the ashes and other refuse produced by furnaces at an hotel within the parish, such furnaces being used for supplying the electric light and other purposes. The manager of the hotel applied to one of the metropolitan police 18 & 19 Vict. magistrates, who decided that the ashes were not trade refuse, c. 120, s. 125) and that the vestry must remove them without extra payment. -Summary On behalf of the vestry an application was made to the magistrate Act, 1879 to state a case for the opinion of the High Court, but he refused (42 & 43 Vict. to do so upon the grounds (1) that his decision was final and c. 49, s. 33). conclusive, and (2) that no point of law arose in the case. Held, that the decision of the magistrate was not final and conclusive, and that the question whether the ashes were trade refuse or not depended upon the construction and interpretation to be put upon the words of a statute, and was therefore a question of law upon which the magistrate must state a case. THIS HIS was an order nisi calling upon John Bridge, Esq., one of the magistrates of the police-courts of the metropolis sitting at the Bow-street Police-court and Frederick Gordon, to show cause why the said magistrate should not state and sign a case for the opinion of this court. It is provided by the Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), as follows: Sect. 125. It shall be lawful for every vestry and district board and they are hereby required to appoint and employ a sufficient number of persons, or to contract with any company or persons, for the sweeping and cleansing of the several streets, within their parish or district, and for collecting and removing all dirt, ashes, rubbish, &c., in or under houses and places within their parish or district. Sect. 128. In case any scavenger is required by the owner or occupier of any house or land to remove the refuse of any trade, manufacture, or business, or of any building materials, such owner or occupier shall pay to the scavenger a reasonable sum for such removal, such sum, in case of dispute, to be settled by two justices. Sect. 129. If any dispute or difference of opinion arise between the owner or occupier of any such house or land and the scavengers required to remove such refuse as to what shall be considered as refuse, it shall be lawful for any two justices, upon application made to them by either of the parties in difference, to determine whether Jurisdiction REG. V. BRIDGE. 1890. Practice special case summary the subject-matter of dispute is or is not refuse of trade, manufacture, or business, or of any building materials, and in every such case the decision of such justices shall be final and conclusive. At the Hôtel Métropole, which is situate within the parish of St. Martin's-in-the-Fields, are three furnaces, which are used for Appeal supplying steam power for heating the hotel, pumping water, Statement of cooking, and working the engines for supplying the electric light. The vestry of St. Martin's refused to remove the ashes by court of and clinkers from these furnaces, upon the ground that they were jurisdiction- trade refuse, unless the proprietors of the hotel paid them, under Refusal of the provisions of sect. 128 above set out, for so doing. The court to state proprietors of the hotel refused to make any payment to the tion of law vestry, and upon the 27th day of April, 1889, they took out a Meaning of summons at the Bow-street Police-court to have the question term used in decided whether the subject of dispute was or was not a refuse of statute- trade or business. case-Ques "Trade Act, 1855 "Refuse The magistrate decided that the refuse was not a trade refuse Metropolis within the meaning of the above section, and that the vestry was Management therefore liable to remove it without extra payment. An appli(18 & 19 Vict. cation was thereupon made to the magistrate to state a case for c. 120, 8, 125) the opinion of this court, but he declined to do so upon the -Summary grounds (1) that by sect. 129, above set out, his decision in the Jurisdiction matter was made final and conclusive, and (2) that no point of (42 & 43 Vict. law arose in the case. Act, 1879 c. 49, s. 33). The Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49), s. 33, enacts that, Any person aggrieved who desires to question a conviction, order, determination, or other proceeding of a court of summary jurisdiction, on the ground that it is erroneous in point of law, or is in excess of jurisdiction, may apply to the court to state a special case setting forth the facts of the case and the grounds on which the proceeding is questioned, and if the court decline to state the case, may apply to the High Court of Justice for an order requiring the case to be stated. Crump, Q.C. (with him J. E. Bankes and Courthope Munro) now showed cause.-No proper application has been made to the magistrate to state a case. By rule 17 of the Summary Jurisdiction Rules, 1880, the application must be made in writing, whereas in this case it was made verbally directly after the magistrate had given his decision. [MATHEW, J.-The object of that rule was that the magistrate and parties interested should have proper notice of the application, and in this case it is admitted that it was made in open court when everyone was present. I think that the application was sufficient.] The decision of the magistrate is, by sect. 129 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855, made final and conclusive, and that provision is not overruled by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879. There was no question of law in dispute; the question whether this refuse was trade refuse was a question of fact for the magistrate. [FRY, L.J.-The question is, what construction is to be put upon the words "refuse of trade or business" in the Act; that seems to me to be a question of law.]. R. G. Glenn in support of the rule.-The magistrate has no option under the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, but must state a case on the application of a party aggrieved who desires to question his order on the ground that it is erroneous in point of law. The vestry here say that they are aggrieved by the construction the magistrate has put upon the words of a statute, which, I submit, is a point of law. I REG. v. BRIDGE. 1890. Practice summary case- -Question of lawMeaning of term used in statute"Trade refuse "Metropolis Management Act, 1855 -Summary Act, 1879 AppealStatement of FRY, L.J.-The facts in this case are shortly these. Frederick special case Gordon, the manager of the Hôtel Métropole, which is situate by court of within the parish of St. Martin's-in-the-Fields, laid an informa- jurisdictiontion before one of the magistrates at the Bow-street Police Court, Refusal of in which he complained that the vestry refused to remove the court to state dust, rubbish, and refuse from the said Hôtel Métropole contrary to the statute 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, s. 125. Upon the hearing of the summons which was issued upon that information the magistrate decided that the refuse in question was not the refuse of a trade or business as was contended on behalf of the vestry, and that the vestry must therefore remove it, and that the hotel manager was not liable to pay the vestry any extra amount for doing so. The magistrate was then asked on behalf of the vestry, (18 & 19 Vict. to state a case for the opinion of this court. This he declined to c. 120, s. 125) do, and upon these two grounds: "(1) that by sect. 129 of 18 and 19 Vict. c. 120, my decision in the matter is made final and conclusive; and (2) that no point of law arose in the case." think that the learned magistrate was wrong, and that a case should be stated. There is no doubt that if sect. 129 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), stood alone the decision of the magistrate would be final and conclusive. But by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49), which is a general enactment applicable to all proceedings in courts of summary jurisdiction, it is provided by sect. 33, that "any person aggrieved who desires to question a conviction, order, determination, or other proceeding of a court of summary jurisdiction, on the ground that it is erroneous in point of law, or is in excess of jurisdiction, may apply to the court to state a special case." Now, the obvious meaning of the Legislature was of a very wide description, namely, that whenever a point of law arose in a court of summary jurisdiction and one of the parties was dissatisfied with the way in which it was decided, such party should be at liberty to come to this court for the purpose of obtaining the opinion of this court upon such point of law. The provision in the Act of 1855 is modified by the Act of 1879. The magistrate has decided that no point of law arises, but there I cannot agree with him. The case includes the point as to what construction and interpretation is to be placed upon certain words in an Act of Parliament. It might be a question of fact if there were no dispute as to the meaning of the words in the statute, and as to the origin of the ashes. But the real controversy between the parties is what is the meaning of this expression in the statute? The first question is, were they "ashes?" REG. で。 BRIDGE. 1890. PracticeAppealStatement of special case by court of summary jurisdiction Refusal of and the answer to that depends upon the meaning of that word. Then, supposing that they are "ashes," do they come within the exception, or are the vestry bound to remove them without extra payment. I think that it is clear that there is a point of law involved in this case, and that the magistrate must therefore state a case for the opinion of this court. MATHEW, J.-I am of the same opinion. The question arising in this case is one as to the construction to be placed upon certain words in an Act of Parliament. It is necessary to find out what was the meaning of the Legislature, and that is a point of law upon which the magistrate must state a case. There may be court to state excellent reasons for deciding the case either one way or the case-Question of law- other way, but we must see whether the magistrate has decided Meaning of the point of law correctly, and in order that we may do so he term used in must state a case. statute"Trade refuse"Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, s. 125) -Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 48, s. 33). Order absolute. Solicitors for the applicant, Fladgate and Fladgate. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Thursday, Jan. 30, 1890. (Before FRY, L.J. and MATHEW, J.) WHITEHURST (app.) v. FINCHER (resp.) (a) Gaming-Illegal betting-Room "open, kept, or used" for betting-Person making bets in bar-room of public-houseThe Betting Houses Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119), ss. 1, 3. A person on three successive days went to the bar-room of a publichouse for the purpose of betting, and did there bet upon certain horse races with persons resorting thereto, but he had no interest in the keeping, management, or tenancy of the room, or of any part of the public-house. Held, that as the room had not been opened, kept, or used for the purpose of betting, he had not committed an offence under the 3rd section of the Betting Houses Act, 1853, which imposes a penalty upon any person who being the owner or occupier of any house, office, room, or other place, or a person using the same, (a) Reported by W. W. ORR, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. shall open, keep, or use the same for the purpose of betting with WHITEHURST persons resorting thereto. Snow v. Hill (52 L. T. Rep. N. S. 859; 14 Q. B. Div. 588) followed. v. FINCHER. 1890. Gaming CASE stated by the stipendiary magistrate for the Wolver- Person using hampton and South Staffordshire district. Customer premisesBetting Houses Act. 1853-16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, ss. 1, 3. place opened, At a petty sessions held at West Bromwich, the defendant kept, or used was charged on three several informations with having, on the for betting27th, 28th, and 29th days of June, 1889, unlawfully used a making bets certain room, namely, the bar-room of the Dartmouth Hotel, in licensed West Bromwich, for the purpose of betting upon certain horse races with persons resorting thereto, contrary to sect. 3 of the Betting Houses Act (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119). It was proved that the defendant, on each of the days mentioned, went to the barroom of the hotel for the purposes of betting, and did there bet with persons resorting thereto upon certain horse races. defendant did not occupy any specific part of the room or bar, which was a public room, neither had the defendant any interest whatever in the keeping, management, or tenancy of the said room, or any part of the hotel. The For the defendant, it was contended before the magistrate that he could not be convicted under sect. 3 of the Act, as he only resorted to the room or bar as one of the public, although he did make bets with other people when there; and in support of this contention he relied on Snow v. Hill (ubi sup.). For the complainant, it was contended that a "room" being designated by sect. 3 of the Act, the defendant "used" the same for the purpose of betting, and was therefore guilty of an offence under the section: (Slatter v. Bailey, 37 J. P. 262.) The magistrate held that, although the defendant did in fact make use of the room or bar for the purpose of betting, and did in fact make bets there, still, as he had no interest in the room or any designated place therein, it was not such a user as was contemplated by the statute, and he dismissed the summons, but stated this case as to whether his determination was correct in point of law. F. J. Lowe (Shakespeare with him) for the appellant. It is submitted that the learned magistrate was wrong, and that he ought to have convicted the defendant. The question was, whether the defendant was a person using the place for the purpose of betting, and the magistrate found that he was not. It was not the intention of the Legislature that, to ensure a conviction, there should have been a previous user of the place for betting. The 1st section of the Act renders liable to prosecution as nuisances, houses opened, kept, or used for the purposes of betting; sect. 3 goes further, and says that people using such houses shall be liable to a penalty. [MATHEW, J.-That is for using rooms so opened, that is, opened for the purpose of betting.] The section is aimed at three classes of persons, |