pable of taking real and personal estate to her own separate and exclusive use, and that she has also an incidental power to dispose of it. (Citing 1 Fonbl. Eq. b. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (n); 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 18, pp. 151 to 266.)"

Wife's Paraphernalia. - See PARAPHERNALIA, Vol. 17, p. 312; Richardson v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 85 Ala. 559. The wearing apparel purchased by a married woman after her marriage, with the husband's money or upon his credit, belongs to him as against her creditors. Smith v. Abear, 87 Mich. 62.

Paraphernal Property.-See PARAPHERNAL, vol. 17, p. 312. In Louisiana a wife may buy property for cash with her paraphernal funds, and if the income from her paraphernal property is sufficient to meet the accruing payments, may buy on credit, and the property thus bought is paraphernal. Miller v. Handy, 33 La. Ann. 160. And where a husband has been a party to such purchase, and was informed of the terms of the contract at the time, he cannot afterwards avoid its effect in a contest with her heirs as to the ownership of the property. Succession of Bellande, 42 La. Ann. 241. A wife may rebut the presumption that property bought by her is community property by showing that it was purchased with her paraphernal funds, which were administered by her separately and apart from her husband. Stauffer v. Morgan, 39 La. Ann. 632. And this she may prove by parol evidence. Succession of Pinard, 30 La. Ann. 167.

A wife may employ her husband as her agent in the management of her paraphernal property, and the proceeds of such management belong to her and not to the community. Miller v. Handy, 33 La. Ann. 160; but it cannot be pledged as security for debts of the husband, or of the community. Putnam v. New York L. Ins. Co., 42 La. Ann. 739. A sale of a wife's paraphernal immovables will not be set aside, on the ground that a part of the purchase money went to pay debts of the husband. Morrow v. Goudchaux, 41 La. Ann. 711. And a married woman was allowed to bind legally her paraphernal property in order to liberate her hus

band from jail, and was not allowed to deny her obligation on the ground of marital influence and coercion, where she had bound the property by contracting with third persons in good faith. Jaffa v. Myers, 33 La. Ann. 406.

Pin Money.-See HUSBAND AND WIFE, vol. 9, p. 847. Pin money is a provision made by the husband, either in pursuance of a marriage contract or by a gift, for the purpose of supplying the wife with articles of dress, and with pocket money, in order to prevent the annoyance of a constant recourse to him with petty demands for personal expenditures. It may consist of gifts of money made from time to time, or of a specific periodical allowance, or of the savings and profits accruing from her domestic management. It must not be to the prejudice of the husband's creditors; and the wife acquires an unimpeachable right of property therein subject to two qualifications. First, it is bestowed for the specific purpose of decking her person for the credit of the common household, and a husband has a certain interest in it as well as the wife, and may demand, or constrain, the expenditure to be made accordingly; second, even though stipulated for by a marriage settlement, she cannot call upon her husband to pay any arrears if he has meanwhile provided for her current wants; nor in any event beyond the arrears of a single year. Nor, it seems, can her personal representative demand any arrears at all, for the money is designed to dress and adorn the wife during the year and not for the accumulation of the fund. I Minor's Inst. 321; citing 2 Bright's Husb. & W. 288, et seq.; 2 Story's Eq., §_1375, 1375a, citing Jodrell v. Jodrell, 9 Beav. 45; Slanning v. Style, 3 P. Wms. 337; Acton v. Acton, i Ves. 267; Peacock v. Monk, 2 Ves. 190; Fowler v. Fowler, 3 P. Wms. 355; Ball v. Coutts, I Ves. & B. 305; Howard v. Digby, 8 Bligh. N. R. 224, et seq.; and see Stanway v. Styles, 2 Eq. Abr. 246; Mangey v. Hungerford, 2 Eq. Abr. 156.

Pin money has been recognized in Maryland. Miller v. Williamson, 5 Md. 219; otherwise in North Carolina. McKinnon v. McDonald, 4 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 6; 72 Am. Dec. 574; Stewart's Husb. & W., § 188.

-

1. Stewart's Husband & Wife, § 217; Dow. v. Gould, etc., Silver Min. Co., 31 Cal. 631. See, for a collation of these statutes, Stimson's Am. Stat. Law, §6420, et seq.

Lands in Texas belonging to a married woman are termed in that State her separate property," and she has in equity all the power to dispose of them which could be given to her by the amplest deed of settlement. Slaughter v. Glenn, 98 U. S. 242.

2. Musson v. Trigg, 51 Miss. 183. The Alabama Code, 1886, §§ 2351, et seq., establishes an entirely new system of laws relating to the property of married women, and abrogates the distinction between the equitable and statutory separate estates, except in cases where the property is conveyed to an active trustee, and, therefore, with that exception, equitable separate estates are now statutory in Alabama. Rooney v. Michael, 84 Ala. 585.

3. Morrison v. Thistle, 67 Mo. 596; Holthaus v. Hornbostle, 60 Mo. 439; Porter v. Bank of Rutland, 19 Vt. 410; Chew v. Beall, 13 Md. 348; George v. Spencer, 2 Md. Ch. 353; Jackson v. McAliley, 1 Speers Eq. (S. Car.) 303; 40 Am. Dec. 620; Paul v. Leavitt, 53 Mo. 595; Wood v. Wood, 83 N. Y. 575, affirming 18 Hun (N. Y.) 350; and see Gillespie v. Burleson, 28 Ala. 551; Walton v. Broaddus, 6 Bush (Ky.) 328; Pond v. Skeen, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 126; Lee v. Prieaux, 3 Bro. C. C. 381; Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195.

No Trustee Necessary.-A conveyance may be to the wife direct, no trustee being necessary; equity never suffering a trust to fail for want of a trustee. It has even been held unnecessary to make the settlement in the form of a trust. The husband will be deemed to hold as trustee for his wife

and to be accountable to her for the rents and profits as any other trustee would be. Bennet v. Davis, 2 P. Wms. 316; Izod v. Lamb, 1 C. & J. 35; Slanning . Style, 3 P. Wms. 337; Lucas v. Lucas, 1 Atk. 270; Lee v. Prideaux, 3 Bro. C. C. 381; McLean v. Longlands, 5 Ves. 79; Parker v. Brooke, 9 Ves. 583; Rich v. Cockrell, 9 Ves. 369; Arundell v. Phipps, 10 Ves. 139; Davidson v. Atkinson, 5 T. R. 434; Minor's Inst. 319; Pepper v. Lee, 53 Ala. 33; Wilkinson v. Cheatham, 45 Ala. 331; Sledge v. Clopton, 6 Ala. 589; Sadler v. Bean, 9 Ark. 202; Green v. Brooks, 25 Ark. 318; Riley v. Riley, 25 Conn. 154; Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195; Long v. White, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 226; Richardson v. Stodder, 100 Mass. 528; Gover v. Owings, 16 Md. 91; Holthaus . Hornbostle, 60 Mo. 439; Smith v. Seiberling, 35 Fed. 677; Schafroth v. Ambs, 46 Mo. 114; McKennan v. Phillips, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 571; 37 Am. Dec. 438; Vance v. Nogle, 70 Pa. St. 176; Trenton Banking Co. v. Woodruff, 2 N. J. Eq. 117; Armstrong v. Ross, 20 N. J. Eq. 109; Shirley v. Shirley, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 363; Shepard v. Shepard, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 57; Wood v. Wood, 83 N. Y. 575; O'Brien, Petitioner, 11 R. I. 419; Boykin v. Ciples, 2 Hill Eq. (S. Car.) 200; 29 Am. Dec. 67; Hamilton v. Bishop, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 33; 29 Am. Dec. 101; Porter v. Bank of Rutland, 19 Vt. 410; Radford v. Carwile, 13 W. Va. 573; Jones v. Obenchain, 10 Gratt. (Va.) 259; Sayers v. Wall, 26 Gratt. (Va.) 354; Wallingsford v. Allen, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 583.

But in Michigan the necessity for a trustee, in a conveyance from husband to wife, was removed only by statute. Ransom v. Ransom, 30 Mich. 328.

4. HUSBAND AND WIFE, vol. 9, p.

848; Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Bro. C. C. 16; 1 White & Tudor's Lead. Cas. 481 (Text Book Series, vol. 2, p. 536); Hale v. Stone, 14 Ala. 803; Short v. Battle, 52 Ala. 456; Jenkins v. McConico, 26 Ala. 213; Vail v. Vail, 49 Conn. 52; Magill v. Mercantile Trust Co., 81 Ky. 129; Duke v. Duke, 81 Ky. 308; Gaines v. Poor, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 503; Walton v. Broaddus, 6 Bush (Ky.) 328; Brant v. Mickle, 28 Md. 436; Carroll v. Lee, 3 Gill. & J. (Md.) 505; 22 Am. Dec. 350; Williams v. Claiborne, 7 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 488; Hunt. Booth, Freem. Ch. (Miss.) 215; Edwards. Burns, 26 Mo. App. 44; Boatman's Sav. Bank v. Collins, 75 Mo. 280; Paul v. Leavitt, 53 Mo. 595; Hart v. Leete, 104 Mo. 315; Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor, 53 Mo. 444; Boal v. Morgner, 46 Mo. 48; Ashcraft v. Little, 4 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 236; Rudisell. Watson, 2 Dev. Eq. (N. Car.) 430; Hamilton v. Bishop, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 33; 29 Am. Dec. 101; Beaufort v. Collier, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 487; 44 Am. Dec. 321; Pond v. Skeen, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 126; Murdock v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 557; Buck v. Wroten, 24 Gratt. (Va.) 250; Logan v. Thrift, 20 Ohio St. 62; Quigley v. Graham, 18 Ohio St. 42.

The words designed to create a separate estate for a married woman need not appear in the granting clause or in the habendum clause of the deed. Morrison v. Thistle, 67 Mo. 596.

The release of her dower is a good consideration for a conveyance to her separate use. Skyes v. Chadwick, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 141. A conveyance by a husband during the marriage, in consideration of love and affection, in trust for the use of his wife during life, remainder to his children, does not give her the life estate, "in consideration or by reason of the marriage." Phillips v. Phillips, 9 Bush (Ky.) 183.

Phrases Held Sufficient in Themselves to Create a Separate Estate.-The following phrases by themselves have been held to have the effect, in a settlement on a married woman, of excluding the husband's rights: "For her sole and separate use. Parker v. Brooke, 9 Ves. 583; Williams v. Maull, 20 Ala. 721; Clarke v. Windham, 12 Ala. 798; Robinson v. O'Neal, 56 Ala. 541; Swain v. Duane, 48 Cal. 358. "For her own sole use and benefit." Heathman v. Hall, 3 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 236. "For her use and benefit." Goulder v. Cann, 1 De G. F. &

J. 146. "For her sole use." Guishaber v. Hairman, 2 Bush (Ky.) 320; Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195. "As her separate estate." Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195; Swain v. Duane, 48 Cal. 358. "For her full and sole use and benefit." Arthur v. Arthur, 11 Ir. Eq. 511. "Only as and for her own separate estate, free from the control of her husband." Wood v. Wood, 83 N. Y. 575: "For her sole use and benefit." Adamson v. Armitage, 19 Ves. 415; Purdue v. Montgomery Bldg., etc., Assoc., 79 Ala. 478; Hutchins v. Dixon, 11 Md. 29. "To her exclusive use, benefit, and behoof." Williams v. Avery, 38 Ala. 115. "To her sole use, benefit, and behoof." Fears v. Brooks, 11 Ga. 195; Guishaber v. Hairman, 2 Bush (Ky.) 320; Steel v. Steel, I Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 452. "For her exclusively." Gould v. Hill, 18 Ala. 84. "For her exclusive use and benefit." Hutchins v. Dixon, 11 Md. 29. "For her own use and at her own disposal." Pritchard v. Ames, Turn. & R. 222. "For her sole and absolute use." Short v. Battle, 52 Ala. 456. "To be hers and hers only." Ozley v. Ikelheimer, 26 Ala. 332. "For her own use and benefit independent of any other person." Williams v. Maull, 20 Ala. 721; Brown v. Johnson, 17 Ala. 232; Ashcraft v. Little, 4 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 236. "For her without any hindrance or molestation whatever." Newman v. James, 12 Ala. 29. "For her use independent of any husband." Wagstaff v. Smith, 9 Ves. 520. "Not subject to the control of her husband." Bain v. Lescher, 11 Sim. 297. "Not to be sold, bartered, or traded by the husband." Woodrum v. Kirkpatrick, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 218. "For her livelihood." Darby v. Darby, 3 Atk. 399. "For her sole and exclusive use." Townshend v. Matthews, 10 Md. 251. And see further I Min. Inst. 318; Young v. Young, 3 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 216; Turner v. Kelly, 70 Ala. 85; Miller v. Voss, 62 Ala. 122; Pepper v. Lee, 53 Ala. 33; Sprague v. Shields, 61 Ala. 428; Gest v. Williams, 4 Del. Ch. 55; MacCon

nell

v. Lindsay, 131 Pa. St. 476; Charles v. Coker, 2 S. Car. 123; Gray v. Robb, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 74.

Phrases Held Insufficient in Themselves to Create a Separate Estate.— The following phrases by themselves have been held not to have the effect, in a settlement on a married woman, of excluding the husband's rights:

220.

"To A's wife." Moore v. Jones, 13 Ala. 296; Fitch v. Ayer, 2 Conn. 143. "In trust for her." Vail v. Vail, 49 Conn. 52. "For her proper use. Tyler v. Lake, 2 R. & M. 183. "To her and her children." Dunn v. Bank of Mobile, 2 Ala. 152. "For her own use." Brandt v. Mickle, 28 Md. 436; Turton v. Turton, 6 Md. 375. "For her use." Merrill v. Bullock, 105 Mass. 486; Clevenstein's Appeal, 15 Pa. St. 499. "And enjoy as she sees fit." Wood v. Polk, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.) "For her use and benefit." Turton v. Turton, 6 Md. 375; Brandt v. Mickle, 28 Md. 436. "For the joint use of herself and husband." Gould v. Hill, 18 Ala. 86. "For her own use, benefit, and behoof." Guishaber v. Hairman, 2 Bush (Ky.) 320. "In her own right." Merrill v. Bullock, 105 Mass. 486. And see also Pollard v. Merrill, 15 Ala. 169; Gillespie v. Burleson, 28 Ala. 551; Lewis v. Elrod, 38 Ala. 17; Harris v. Harbeson, 9 Bush (Ky.) 397; Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195; Whitten v. Whitten, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 193; Tennent v. Stoney, I Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 22; 44 Am. Dec. 213; 1 Min. Inst. 317.

1. 1 Minor's Inst. 318; Whitten v. Whitten, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 191; Peters v. Clements, 46 Tex. 114; Garland v. Pamplin, 32 Gratt. (Va.) 314; Teague v. Downes, 69 N. Car. 280; Deming v. Williams, 26 Conn. 226; 68 Am. Dec. 386; Underhill v. Morgan, 33 Conn. 105; Riley v. Riley, 25 Conn. 153; Williams v. King, 43 Conn. 569; Darcy v. Ryan, 44 Conn. 518; McMillan v. Peacock, 57 Ala. 127; Smith v. Seiberling, 35 Fed. Rep. 677; Harris v. Harris, 71 Ala. 536.

In Whitten v. Whitten, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 191, the court, by Fletcher, J., said: "The doctrine that a gift to the wife is a gift to the husband cannot apply where the husband himself makes a gift or grant to the wife, which surely

cannot be taken as a gift or grant to himself. . . And where the husband himself makes a gift or grant to the wife, the intention to relinquish his own rights in favor of the wife, and thus to give her a separate property or interest, is necessarily and most clearly and unequivocally manifested and declared."

And see Harris v. Harbeson, 9 Bush (Ky.) 397, where a husband showed, by clear and explicit acts, an intention to give his wife the rents and profits of her land, by having her rents kept separate from his own, and, when sold, paying the proceeds to her, and, when loaning her moneys, by taking notes payable to her. The acts showed not only an intention to give them to his wife, but constituted an executed gift, which a court of equity would uphold and enforce as against him after her death. Gill v. Woods, 81 Ill. 64; 25 Am. Rep. 264.

A promissory note of a third person, given by the husband to the wife during coverture, becomes a part of her equitable, and not her statutory, estate, and any conveyance of property by him to her directly during coverture, except in compensation or substitution for other property which belongs to her statutory estate, creates in her an equitable estate. Hamaker v. Hamaker, 88 Ala. 431.

Where a married woman claims her earnings as her equitable separate estate, by way of gift from her husband, it will not be sustained, unless it is made clear that the husband intended to divest himself of all interest in such earnings, and to set them apart to the wife. Bolman v. Overall, 86 Ala. 168.

2. Morrison v. Thistle. 67 Mo. 596; Porter v. Bank of Rutland, 19 Vt. 410; Klenke v. Koeltze, 75 Mo. 239.

Where a fund is given to trustees to pay to a married woman "the rents, dividends, and income thereof annu

ally," the increase, as it becomes payable, is not to be regarded as estate newly acquired, and therefore the marital rights of the husband, as to such income, are not affected by an act which provides that all property thereafter acquired by any married woman shall be held by her to her sole and separate use. Vail . Vail, 49 Conn. 52; citing Sterns v. Weather, 30 Ala. 712; but see Nelson v. Hollins, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 553:

In a settlement of property by a husband on his wife, free from all his liabilities, an exception of such incumbrances as the two together shall request the trustee to make, is not repugnant to the grant, but is merely a qualification thereof. Etna Ins. Co. v. Brodinax, 48 Fed. Rep. 892.

Decisions Allowing a Separate Estate. Where land was devised to a trustee to be used for the maintenance of a devisor's son, and any family that he might thereafter have, on the subsequent marriage of the son his wife was held to be entitled to a maintenance out of the profits of the lands, as her equitable separate estate. Jones v. Reese, 65 Ala. 134. And where the earnings of the wife, gifts from her friends, or her separate estate, is invested in land, it will be held to be her separate estate, even though the husband takes the title in his own name. Martin v. Colburn, 88 Mo. 229; Cox v. Cox, 91 Mo. 71; Haden v. Ivey, 51 Ala. 381; Whitehead v. Whitehead, 64 N. Car. 538; Grantham v. Grantham, 34 S. Car. 504. Where her property is sold and a security taken for the purchase money in the husband's name, it is still the wife's, and she may file a bill in chancery by her next friend to enforce the lien, if the security is not paid. Sampley v. Watson, 43 Ala. 377; and if he has entered land in his own name with money of his wife's separate estate, because of a regulation of the land office, he is bound, although in embarrassed circumstances, to convey the land to a trustee for her benefit. Payne v. Twyman, 68 Mo. 339.

A recital in a deed that it is the separate property of the wife, removes any presumption that it is community property, and vests the title according to the terms of the deed. McCutchen v. Purinton (Tex. 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 710.

A verbal antenuptial contract by a woman that she shall own and control, as separate estate, the property she

then has, will be valid, and though her husband contributes his services as carpenter and builder in erecting a house upon land purchased by her, it cannot be subjected to his debts. Turner v. Short (Ky. 1888), 7 S. W. Rep. 391.

If, in a sealed instrument, the husband acknowledges the receipt of money as his wife's share of her parent's estate and binds himself to return it to her when she so desires, it shows a sufficient intent to create a separate estate in the wife, and the marital rights of the husband do not attach. Wadsworthville Poor School v. Bryson, 34 S. Car. 401. Where she is dissatisfied with his investment of her money in land, and he promises to pay her the value of the property, her executors may claim the value of the same against his estate on his failure to do

So.

In re Lazarus' Estate (Pa. 1892), 23 Atl. Rep. 372.

Where a married woman mingles with the profits of a boarding house run by her, a monthly allowance from her husband, and it is not apparent whether the furniture of the house is purchased with her money or that furnished by the husband, it will be deemed to be her separate property. Diefendorff v. Hopkins (Cal. 1891), 28 Pac. Rep. 265. A court of equity ca settle on her, her share in the personalty of her father's estate, in the hands of an administrator, and the creditors of her insolvent husband cannot have the same applied to the payment of their claims. Bethel v. Smith, 83 Ky. 84.

Where the plaintiff's husband drove a number of cows at night from her premises and the next day they were found in defendant's possession, he claiming to have purchased them from her husband and refusing to return them, and the evidence showed that the plaintiff had purchased the cows with her own funds; that feed bought for them on credit was charged to her; that she had supported the family, and that the owner of the premises she occupied had given her permission to live there, it was sufficient to sustain the finding of a referee, in an action of trover for the cows, that they were hers. Pangburn v. Crowner (Supreme Ct.), 17 Ñ. Y. Supp. 301.

If a husband allows his wife, during his lifetime, to hold a note and use the proceeds as her own property, it must be considered to have been her separate